Brain Pioneers and Moral Entanglement: An Argument for Post-trial Responsibilities in Neural-Device Trials

We argue that in implanted neurotechnology research, participants and researchers experience what Henry Richardson has called "moral entanglement." Participants partially entrust researchers with access to their brains and thus to information that would otherwise be private, leading to created intimacies and special obligations of beneficence for researchers and research funding agencies. One of these obligations, we argue, is about continued access to beneficial technology once a trial ends. We make the case for moral entanglement in this context through exploration of participants' vulnerability, uncompensated risks and burdens, depth of relationship with the research team, and dependence on researchers in implanted neurotechnology trials.

Personalized 3D printed scaffolds: The ethical aspects

Personalized 3D printed scaffolds are a new generation of implants for tissue engineering and regenerative medicine purposes. Scaffolds support cell growth, providing an artificial extracellular matrix for tissue repair and regeneration and can biodegrade once cells have assumed their physiological and structural roles. The ethical challenges and opportunities of these implants should be mapped in parallel with the life cycle of the scaffold to assist their development and implementation in a responsible, safe, and ethically sound manner. This article provides an overview of these relevant ethical aspects. We identified nine themes which were linked to three stages of the life cycle of the scaffold: the development process, clinical testing, and the implementation process. The described ethical issues are related to good research and clinical practices, such as privacy issues concerning digitalization, first-in-human trials, responsibility and commercialization. At the same time, this article also creates awareness for underexplored ethical issues, such as irreversibility, embodiment and the ontological status of these scaffolds. Moreover, it exemplifies how to include gender in the ethical assessment of new technologies. These issues are important for responsible development and implementation of personalized 3D printed scaffolds and in need of more attention within the additive manufacturing and tissue engineering field. Moreover, the insights of this review reveal unresolved qualitative empirical and normative questions that could further deepen the understanding and co-creation of the ethical implications of this new generation of implants.

Beyond the RCT: When are Randomized Trials Unnecessary for New Therapeutic Devices, and What Should We Do Instead?

OBJECTIVE

The aim of this study was to develop an evidence-based framework for evaluation of therapeutic devices, based on ethical principles and clinical evidence considerations.

SUMMARY BACKGROUND DATA

Nearly all medical products which do not work solely through chemical action are regulated as medical devices. Their huge range of purposes, mechanisms of action and risks pose challenges for regulation. High-profile implantable device failures have fuelled concerns about the level of clinical evidence needed for market approval. Calls for more rigorous evaluation lack clarity about what kind of evaluation is appropriate, and are commonly interpreted as meaning more randomized controlled trials (RCTs). These are valuable where devices are genuinely new and claim to offer measurable therapeutic benefits. Where this is not the case, RCTs may be inappropriate and wasteful.

METHODS

Starting with a set of ethical principles and basic precepts of clinical epidemiology, we developed a sequential decision-making algorithm for identifying when an RCT should be performed to evaluate new therapeutic devices, and when other methods, such as observational study designs and registry-based approaches, are acceptable.

RESULTS

The algorithm clearly defines a group of devices where an RCT is deemed necessary, and the associated framework indicates that an IDEAL 2b study should be the default clinical evaluation method where it is not.

CONCLUSIONS

The algorithm and recommendations are based on the principles of the IDEAL-D framework for medical device evaluation and appear eminently practicable. Their use would create a safer system for monitoring innovation, and facilitate more rapid detection of potential hazards to patients and the public.

The ethics of explantation

BACKGROUND

With the increased use of implanted medical devices follows a large number of explantations. Implants are removed for a wide range of reasons, including manufacturing defects, recovery making the device unnecessary, battery depletion, availability of new and better models, and patients asking for a removal. Explantation gives rise to a wide range of ethical issues, but the discussion of these problems is scattered over many clinical disciplines.

METHODS

Information from multiple clinical disciplines was synthesized and analysed in order to provide a comprehensive approach to the ethical issues involved in the explantation of medical implants.

RESULTS

Discussions and recommendations are offered on pre-implantation information about a possible future explantation, risk-benefit assessments of explantation, elective explantations demanded by the patient, explantation of implants inserted for a clinical trial, patient registers, quality assurance, routines for investigating explanted implants, and demands on manufacturers to prioritize increased service time in battery-driven implants and to market fewer but more thoroughly tested models of implants.

CONCLUSION

Special emphasis is given to the issue of control or ownership over implants, which underlies many of the ethical problems concerning explantation. It is proposed that just like transplants, implants that fulfil functions normally carried out by biological organs should be counted as supplemented body parts. This means that the patient has a strong and inalienable right to the implant, but upon explantation it loses that status.

A Heart without Life: Artificial Organs and the Lived Body

The use of artificial organs is likely to increase in the future, given technological advances, increases in chronic diseases, and limited donor organs. This article examines how artificial organs could affect people's experience and conceptualization of bodies and our understanding of the relation of body to self. I focus on artificial heart devices and argue that these have two conflicting potential influences. First, they may influence people to regard the body as machinelike and separable from the self. Second, they may effect changes to subjective experience that can be understood as changes to the self, confirming the self's embodiment. My primary purpose is to increase our understanding of what might change if it becomes more usual to have a body that is partly nonorganic. But I also argue that the analysis points to potential ethical concerns related to strengthening biomedical conceptions of the body and to the devaluing of bodies and body parts.

Treating or Killing? The Divergent Moral Implications of Cardiac Device Deactivation

In this article, I argue that there is a moral difference between deactivating an implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) and turning off a cardiac pacemaker (CP). It is, at least in most cases, morally permissible to deactivate an ICD. It is not, at least in most cases, morally permissible to turn off a pacemaker in a fully or significantly pacemaker-dependent patient. After describing the relevant medical technologies—pacemakers and ICDs—I continue with contrasting perspectives on the issue of deactivation from practitioners involved with these devices: physicians, nurses, and allied professionals. Next, I offer a few possible analyses of the situation, relying on recent work in medical ethics. Considerations of intention, responsibility, and replacement support my distinguishing between ICDs and CPs. I conclude by recommending a change in policy of one of the leading cardiac societies.

On Replacement Body Parts

Technological advances are making devices that functionally replace body parts-artificial organs and limbs-more widely used, and more capable of providing patients with lives that are close to "normal." Some of the ethical issues this is likely to raise relate to how such prostheses are conceptualized. Prostheses are ambiguous between being inanimate objects and sharing in the status of human bodies-which already have an ambiguous status, as both objects and subjects. At the same time, the possibility of replacing body parts with artificial objects puts pressure on the normative status typically accorded to human bodies, seemingly confirming that body parts are replaceable objects. The paper argues that bodies' normative status relies on the relation of a body to a person and shows that persons could have similar relations to prostheses. This suggests that in approaching ethical issues surrounding prostheses, it is appropriate to regard them as more like body parts than like objects.