Elasticities of market shares and social health insurance choice in Germany: a dynamic panel data approach

Does the chronically ill population in the Netherlands switch their health insurer as often as the general population? Empirical evidence from a nationwide survey study

Background

Consumer mobility is an important aspect of a health insurance system based on managed competition. Both the general population and insured with a chronic illness should enjoy an equal opportunity to switch their insurer every year. We studied possible differences in the rates of switching between these two groups in the Netherlands.

Methods

A structured questionnaire was sent to 1500 members of Nivel’s Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel (response rate: 47%) and to 1911 chronically ill members of the National Panel of the Chronically ill and Disabled (response rate: 84%) in February 2016. Associations between switching and background characteristics were estimated using logistic regression analyses with interaction effects.

Results

In general, we did not find significant differences in switching rates between the general population and chronically ill population. However, a combination of the population and background characteristics demonstrated that young insured with a chronic illness switched significantly less often than young insured from the general population (1% versus 17%).

Conclusions

Our results demonstrated that the group of young people with a chronic illness is less inclined to switch insurer. This observation suggests that this group might either face difficulties or barriers which prevents them from switching, or that they experience a high level of satisfaction with their current insurer. Further research should therefore focus on unravelling the mechanisms which explain the differences in switching rates.

Learning from failure in healthcare: Dynamic panel evidence of a physician shock effect

Procedural failures of physicians or teams in interventional healthcare may positively or negatively predict subsequent patient outcomes. We identify this effect by applying (non)linear dynamic panel methods to data from the Belgian transcatheter aorta valve implantation registry containing information on the first 860 transcatheter aorta valve implantation procedures in Belgium. We find that a previous death of a patient positively and significantly predicts subsequent survival of the succeeding patient. We find that these learning from failure effects are not long-lived and that learning from failure is transmitted across adverse events.

Introducing risk adjustment and free health plan choice in employer-based health insurance: Evidence from Germany

To equalize differences in health plan premiums due to differences in risk pools, the German legislature introduced a simple Risk Adjustment Scheme (RAS) based on age, gender and disability status in 1994. In addition, effective 1996, consumers gained the freedom to choose among hundreds of existing health plans, across employers and state-borders. This paper (a) estimates RAS pass-through rates on premiums, financial reserves, and expenditures and assesses the overall RAS impact on market price dispersion. Moreover, it (b) characterizes health plan switchers and investigates their annual and cumulative switching rates over time. Our main findings are based on representative enrollee panel data linked to administrative RAS and health plan data. We show that sickness funds with bad risk pools and high pre-RAS premiums lowered their total premiums by 42 cents per additional euro allocated by the RAS. Consequently, post-RAS, health plan prices converged but not fully. Because switchers are more likely to be white collar, young and healthy, the new consumer choice resulted in more risk segregation and the amount of money redistributed by the RAS increased over time.

Switching gains and health plan price elasticities: 20 years of managed competition reforms in The Netherlands

In this paper we estimate health plan price elasticities and financial switching gains for consumers over a 20-year period in which managed competition was introduced in the Dutch health insurance market. The period is characterized by a major health insurance reform in 2006 to provide health insurers with more incentives and tools to compete, and to provide consumers with a more differentiated choice of products. Prior to the reform, in the period 1995-2005, we find a low number of switchers, between 2 and 4% a year, modest average total switching gains of 2 million euros per year and short-term health plan price elasticities ranging from -0.1 to -0.4. The major reform in 2006 resulted in an all-time high switching rate of 18%, total switching gains of 130 million euros, and a high short-term price elasticity of -5.7. During 2007-2015 switching rates returned to lower levels, between 4 and 8% per year, with total switching gains in the order of 40 million euros per year on average. Total switching gains could have been 10 times higher if all consumers had switched to one of the cheapest plans. We find short-term price elasticities ranging between -0.9 and -2.2. Our estimations suggest substantial consumer inertia throughout the entire period, as we find degrees of choice persistence ranging from about 0.8 to 0.9.

Differences in price elasticities of demand for health insurance: a systematic review

Many health insurance systems apply managed competition principles to control costs and quality of health care. Besides other factors, managed competition relies on a sufficient price-elastic demand. This paper presents a systematic review of empirical studies on price elasticity of demand for health insurance. The objective was to identify the differing international ranges of price elasticity and to find socio-economic as well as setting-oriented factors that influence price elasticity. Relevant literature for the topic was identified through a two-step identification process including a systematic search in appropriate databases and further searches within the references of the results. A total of 45 studies from countries such as the USA, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland were found. Clear differences in price elasticity by countries were identified. While empirical studies showed a range between -0.2 and -1.0 for optional primary health insurance in the US, higher price elasticities between -0.6 and -4.2 for Germany and around -2 for Switzerland were calculated for mandatory primary health insurance. Dutch studies found price elasticities below -0.5. In consideration of all relevant studies, age and poorer health status were identified to decrease price elasticity. Other socio-economic factors had an unclear impact or too limited evidence. Premium level, range of premiums, homogeneity of benefits/coverage and degree of forced decision were found to have a major influence on price elasticity in their settings. Further influence was found from supplementary insurance and premium-dependent employer contribution.

Switching rates in health insurance markets decrease with age: empirical evidence and policy implications from the Netherlands

All consumer groups with specific preferences must feel free to easily switch insurer in order to discipline insurers to be responsive to consumers’ heterogeneous preferences. This paper provides insight into the switching behaviour of low-risks (i.e. young or healthy consumers) and high-risks (i.e. elderly or unhealthy consumers) in the Netherlands in the period 2009–2012. We analysed: (1) administrative data with objective health status information (i.e. medically diagnosed diseases and pharmaceutical use) and information on health care expenses of nearly the entire Dutch population (n=15.3 million individuals) and (2) three-year sample data (n=1152 individuals). Our findings indicate that switching rates strongly decrease with age. For example, in 2009, consumers aged 25–44 switched 10 times more than consumers aged 75 or older. Another finding is that switching rates decrease as the predicted health care expenses increase. Although healthy consumers switch twice as much as unhealthy consumers, this difference becomes much smaller after adjusting for age. We conclude that our findings can be explained by higher perceived switching costs by elderly consumers than by young consumers. Consequently, insurers have low incentives to act as quality-conscious purchasers of care for the elderly consumers. Therefore, strategies should be developed to increase the choice of insurer of elderly consumers.

Wettbewerb als Steuerungsform im Gesundheitswesen

Der Wettbewerb im Gesundheitswesen ist kein Selbstzweck, sondern dient der Verbesserung der Versorgung der Versicherten. Im Rahmen der GKV sollte er in einem Preiswettbewerb zwischen Krankenkassen und einem Preis- und Qualitätswettbewerb der Leistungsanbieter um Verträge mit den Kassen bestehen. Der Staat muss aber die Rahmenbedingungen dafür schaffen. Momentan sind diese nicht erfüllt, da die Zuweisungen aus dem Gesundheitsfonds zu hoch und die Freiräume zur Vertragsgestaltung zu gering sind.

Public and private health insurance in Germany: the ignored risk selection problem

We investigate risk selection between public and private health insurance in Germany. With risk-rated premiums in the private system and community-rated premiums in the public system, advantageous selection in favor of private insurers is expected. Using 2000 to 2007 data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), we find such selection. While private insurers are unable to select the healthy upon enrollment, they profit from an increase in the probability to switch from private to public health insurance of those individuals who have experienced a negative health shock. To avoid distorted competition between the two branches of health care financing, risk-adjusted transfers from private to public insurers should be instituted.

Ownership and financial sustainability of German acute care hospitals

This paper considers the role of ownership form for the financial sustainability of German acute care hospitals over time. We measure financial sustainability by a hospital-specific yearly probability of default (PD) trying to mirror the ability of hospitals to survive in the market in the long run. The results show that private ownership is associated with significantly lower PDs than public ownership. Moreover, path dependence in the PD is substantial but far from 100%, indicating a large number of improvements and deteriorations in financial sustainability over time. Yet, the general public hospitals have the highest path dependence. Overall, this indicates that public hospitals, which are in a poor financial standing, remain in that state or even deteriorate over time, which may be conflicting with financial sustainability.

Regulated competition in health care: switching and barriers to switching in the Dutch health insurance system

BACKGROUND

In 2006, a number of changes in the Dutch health insurance system came into effect. In this new system mobility of insured is important. The idea is that insured switch insurers because they are not satisfied with quality of care and the premium of their insurance. As a result, insurers will in theory strive for a better balance between price and quality. The Dutch changes have caught the attention, internationally, of both policy makers and researchers. In our study we examined switching behaviour over three years (2007-2009). We tested if there are differences in the numbers of switchers between groups defined by socio-demographic and health characteristics and between the general population and people with chronic illness or disability. We also looked at reasons for (not-)switching and at perceived barriers to switching.

METHODS

Switching behaviour and reasons for (not-)switching were measured over three years (2007-2009) by sending postal questionnaires to members of the Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel and of the National Panel of people with Chronic illness or Disability. Data were available for each year and for each panel for at least 1896 respondents - a response of between 71% and 88%.

RESULTS

The percentages of switchers are low; 6% in 2007, 4% in 2008 and 3% in 2009. Younger and higher educated people switch more often than older and lower educated people and women switch more often than men. There is no difference in the percentage of switchers between the general population and people with chronic illness or disability. People with a bad self-perceived health, and chronically ill and disabled, perceive more barriers to switching than others.

CONCLUSION

The percentages of switchers are comparable to the old system. Switching is not based on quality of care and thus it can be questioned whether it will lead to a better balance between price and quality. Although there is no difference in the frequency of switching among the chronically ill and disabled and people with a bad self-perceived health compared to others, they do perceive more barriers to switching. This suggests there are inequalities in the new system.

Preferences for health insurance and health status: does it matter whether you are Dutch or German?

This contribution seeks to measure preferences for health insurance of individuals with and without chronic conditions in two countries, Germany and the Netherlands. The objective is to test the presumption that preferences between these two subpopulations differ and to see whether having a chronic condition has a different influence on preferences depending on the country. The evidence comes from two Discrete Choice Experiments performed in 2005 (Germany) and 2006 (the Netherlands, right after a major health reform). Results point to an even more marked resistance against restrictions of physician choice among individuals with chronic conditions in both countries. Thus, the alleged beneficiaries of Disease Management Programs would have to be highly compensated for accepting the restrictions that go with them.

The intention to switch health insurer and actual switching behaviour: are there differences between groups of people?

BACKGROUND

Several western countries have introduced managed competition in their health care system. In the Netherlands, a new health insurance law was introduced in January 2006 making it easier to switch health insurer each year.

OBJECTIVE

The objective was to measure people's intention to switch health insurer and actual switching behaviour. We also examined whether some groups were less inclined to switch health insurer and/or had more difficulty to exert their intention to switch.

DESIGN

In October 2006, members of three Dutch panels indicated whether they intended to switch health insurer during that year's open enrollment period. In the beginning of 2007, the same people were asked whether they indeed switched health insurer.

RESULTS

Only 1% intended to switch health insurer. Women, older people, lower educated people, people who were insured for a longer period and people who reported a bad or moderate health were less inclined to switch health insurer. The amount of switching was higher among individuals who intended to switch (31%) than among individuals who did not know whether they would switch (7%) and individuals with no intention to switch (2%). Among those who intended to switch health insurer, women and people who reported a good health switched health insurer more often. The years of enrollment were also associated with actual switching behaviour.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

We might have to temper the optimistic expectations on enhanced choice. Future research should determine why people do not switch health insurer when they intend to and which barriers they experience.

The influence of supplementary health insurance on switching behaviour: evidence from Swiss data

This paper focuses on the switching behaviour of enrolees in the Swiss basic health insurance system. Even though the new Federal Law on Social Health Insurance (LAMal) was implemented in 1996 to promote competition among health insurers in basic insurance, there is limited evidence of premium convergence within cantons. This indicates that competition has not been effective so far, and reveals some inertia among consumers who seem reluctant to switch to less expensive funds. We investigate one possible barrier to switching behaviour, namely the influence of supplementary insurance. We use survey data on health plan choice (a sample of 1943 individuals whose switching behaviours were observed between 1997 and 2000) as well as administrative data relative to all insurance companies that operated in the 26 Swiss cantons between 1996 and 2005. The decision to switch and the decision to subscribe to a supplementary contract are jointly estimated.Our findings show that holding a supplementary insurance contract substantially decreases the propensity to switch. However, there is no negative impact of supplementary insurance on switching when the individual assesses his/her health as 'very good'. Our results give empirical support to one possible mechanism through which supplementary insurance might influence switching decisions: given that subscribing to basic and supplementary contracts with two different insurers may induce some administrative costs for the subscriber, holding supplementary insurance acts as a barrier to switch if customers who consider themselves 'bad risks' also believe that insurers reject applications for supplementary insurance on these grounds. In comparison with previous research, our main contribution is to offer a possible explanation for consumer inertia. Our analysis illustrates how consumer choice for one's basic health plan interacts with the decision to subscribe to supplementary insurance.

The Dutch health insurance reform: switching between insurers, a comparison between the general population and the chronically ill and disabled

BACKGROUND

On 1 January 2006 a number of far-reaching changes in the Dutch health insurance system came into effect. In the new system of managed competition consumer mobility plays an important role. Consumers are free to change their insurer and insurance plan every year. The idea is that consumers who are not satisfied with the premium or quality of care provided will opt for a different insurer. This would force insurers to strive for good prices and quality of care. Internationally, the Dutch changes are under the attention of both policy makers and researchers. Questions answered in this article relate to switching behaviour, reasons for switching, and differences between population categories.

METHODS

Postal questionnaires were sent to 1516 members of the Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel and to 3757 members of the National Panel of the Chronically ill and Disabled (NPCD) in April 2006. The questionnaire was returned by 1198 members of the Consumer Panel (response 79%) and by 3211 members of the NPCD (response 86%). Among other things, questions were asked about choices for a health insurer and insurance plan and the reasons for this choice.

RESULTS

Young and healthy people switch insurer more often than elderly or people in bad health. The chronically ill and disabled do not switch less often than the general population when both populations are comparable on age, sex and education. For the general population, premium is more important than content, while the chronically ill and disabled value content of the insurance package as well. However, quality of care is not important for either group as a reason for switching.

CONCLUSION

There is increased mobility in the new system for both the general population and the chronically ill and disabled. This however is not based on quality of care. If reasons for switching are unrelated to the quality of care, it is hard to believe that switching influences the quality of care. As yet there are no signs of barriers to switch insurer for the chronically ill and disabled. This however could change in the future and it is therefore important to monitor changes.