An Allais paradox without mental time travel

Does Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Damage Really Increase Impulsiveness? Delay and Probability Discounting in Patients with Focal Lesions

If the tendency to discount rewards reflects individuals' general level of impulsiveness, then the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards should be negatively correlated: The less a person is able to wait for delayed rewards, the more they should take chances on receiving probabilistic rewards. It has been suggested that damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) increases individuals' impulsiveness, but both intertemporal choice and risky choice have only recently been assayed in the same patients with vMPFC damage. Here, we assess both delay and probability discounting in individuals with vMPFC damage (n = 8) or with medial temporal lobe (MTL) damage (n = 10), and in age- and education-matched controls (n = 30). On average, MTL-lesioned individuals discounted delayed rewards at normal rates but discounted probabilistic rewards more shallowly than controls. In contrast, vMPFC-lesioned individuals discounted delayed rewards more steeply but probabilistic rewards more shallowly than controls. These results suggest that vMPFC lesions affect the weighting of reward amount relative to delay and certainty in opposite ways. Moreover, whereas MTL-lesioned individuals and controls showed typical, nonsignificant correlations between the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards, vMPFC-lesioned individuals showed a significant negative correlation, as would be expected if vMPFC damage increases impulsiveness more in some patients than in others. Although these results are consistent with the hypothesis that vMPFC plays a role in impulsiveness, it is unclear how they could be explained by a single mechanism governing valuation of both delayed and probabilistic rewards.

Neuropathology of a remarkable case of memory impairment informs human memory

Kent Cochrane (K.C.) has been investigated by researchers for nearly three decades after intracranial trauma from a motorcycle accident at age 30 resulted in a striking profile of amnesia. K.C. suffered severe anterograde amnesia in both verbal and non-verbal domains which was accompanied by selective retrograde amnesia for personal events experienced prior to the time of his injury (episodic memory), with relative preservation of memory for personal and world facts (semantic memory), and of implicit memory. This pattern of spared and impaired memory extended to spatial memory for large-scale environments and beyond memory to future imagining and decision-making. Post-mortem brain findings at age 62 included moderate diffuse atrophy, left orbitofrontal contusion, left posterior cerebral artery infarct, and left anterior frontal watershed infarct. Notably, there was severe neuronal loss and gliosis of the hippocampi bilaterally. The left hippocampus was severely affected anteriorly and posteriorly, but CA2, CA4, and the dentate gyrus (DG) were focally spared. There was associated degeneration of the left fornix. The right hippocampus showed near complete destruction anteriorly, with relative preservation posteriorly, mainly of CA4 and DG. Bilateral parahippocampal gyri and left anterior thalamus also showed neuron loss and gliosis. There was no evidence of co-existing neurodegenerative phenomena on beta-amyloid, phosphorylated tau, or TDP-43 immunostaining. The extent of damage to medial temporal lobe structures is in keeping with K.C.'s profound anterograde and retrograde amnesia, with the exception of the unexpected finding of preserved CA2/CA4 and DG. K.C.'s case demonstrates that relatively clean functional dissociations are still possible following widespread brain damage, with structurally compromised brain regions unlikely to be critical to cognitive functions found to be intact. In this way, the findings presented here add to K.C.'s significant contributions to our understanding of clinical-anatomical relationships in memory.

Why has evolution not selected for perfect self-control?

Self-control refers to the ability to deliberately reject tempting options and instead select ones that produce greater long-term benefits. Although some apparent failures of self-control are, on closer inspection, reward maximizing, at least some self-control failures are clearly disadvantageous and non-strategic. The existence of poor self-control presents an important evolutionary puzzle because there is no obvious reason why good self-control should be more costly than poor self-control. After all, a rock is infinitely patient. I propose that self-control failures result from cases in which well-learned (and thus routinized) decision-making strategies yield suboptimal choices. These mappings persist in the decision-makers' repertoire because they result from learning processes that are adaptive in the broader context, either on the timescale of learning or of evolution. Self-control, then, is a form of cognitive control and the subjective feeling of effort likely reflects the true costs of cognitive control. Poor self-control, in this view, is ultimately a result of bounded optimality. This article is part of the theme issue 'Risk taking and impulsive behaviour: fundamental discoveries, theoretical perspectives and clinical implications.

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, 'autonoetic' character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms, and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken towards an event simulation. On this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in 'future-oriented mental time travel' neither do justice to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons for why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.

Prospection and the Present Moment: The Role of Episodic Foresight in Intertemporal Choices between Immediate and Delayed Rewards

Humans are capable of imagining future rewards and the contexts in which they may be obtained. Functionally, intertemporal choices between smaller but immediate and larger but delayed rewards may be made without such episodic foresight. However, we propose that explicit simulations of this sort enable more flexible and adaptive intertemporal decision-making. Emotions triggered through the simulation of future situations can motivate people to forego immediate pleasures in the pursuit of long-term rewards. However, we stress that the most adaptive option need not always be a larger later reward. When the future is anticipated to be uncertain, for instance, it may make sense for preferences to shift toward more immediate rewards, instead. Imagining potential future scenarios and assessment of their likelihood and affective consequences allows humans to determine when it is more adaptive to delay gratification in pursuit of a larger later reward, and when the better strategy is to indulge in a present temptation. We discuss clinical studies that highlight when and how the effect of episodic foresight on intertemporal decision-making can be altered, and consider the relevance of this perspective to understanding the nature of self-control.

Remembering Preservation in Hippocampal Amnesia

The lesion-deficit model dominates neuropsychology. This is unsurprising given powerful demonstrations that focal brain lesions can affect specific aspects of cognition. Nowhere is this more evident than in patients with bilateral hippocampal damage. In the past 60 years, the amnesia and other impairments exhibited by these patients have helped to delineate the functions of the hippocampus and shape the field of memory. We do not question the value of this approach. However, less prominent are the cognitive processes that remain intact following hippocampal lesions. Here, we collate the piecemeal reports of preservation of function following focal bilateral hippocampal damage, highlighting a wealth of information often veiled by the field's focus on deficits. We consider how a systematic understanding of what is preserved as well as what is lost could add an important layer of precision to models of memory and the hippocampus.