Personal Payments from Pharmaceutical Companies to Authors of Oncology Clinical Practice Guidelines

Medical oncologists' dance with international guidelines and national reimbursement: insights from a survey in Türkiye

BACKGROUND

This study explores Turkish medical oncologists' perceptions of integrating international treatment guidelines with national reimbursement policies, considering local legal, economic, and healthcare constraints.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

A cross-sectional online survey was conducted from March 24-31, 2024, targeting all 1,096 active oncologists registered with the Turkish Medical Oncology Association, as these specialists are exclusively authorized to prescribe anticancer drugs under national regulations. The survey included 25 questions on demographics, perceptions of guidelines, and integration preferences. Statistical analyses, including chi-square tests and logistic regression, identified factors influencing guideline preferences.

RESULTS

Among 337 respondents (31%), 94% found international guidelines essential, but 62% noted a lack of clear real-world algorithms. Significant predictors for preferring national guidelines included working in public institutions (OR: 3.90, p < 0.001), concerns about pharmaceutical industry influence (OR: 4.38, p = 0.017), legal challenges (OR: 5.89, p < 0.001), and variability among clinical research centers (OR: 2.95, p = 0.019). Despite these challenges, 57% favored national guidelines for their compatibility with local healthcare policies.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings highlight the need for hybrid models that merge the evidence-based rigor of international frameworks with local healthcare priorities. Such models can enhance equitable and effective cancer care in Türkiye by addressing both global standards and national realities.

Trends in enforcement of National Comprehensive Cancer Network financial conflict of interest policy

BACKGROUND

The National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) financial conflict of interest (FCOI) policy sets dollar maximums for panelists, but violations may occur.

METHODS

We studied NCCN Guidelines panelists for the 20 most prevalent cancers, 2013-2022. We included panelists with at least 1 full calendar year of service ("current panelists") and those who began service during the study period ("new panelists"); NCCN FCOI policy limits ($20 000 from any single company or $50 000 across all companies) apply to both groups. Industry payments were obtained from Open Payments and mapped manually via National Provider Identifier. We calculated industry payments received, excluding the same payment categories as does NCCN (research, meals, travel and lodging). We estimated whether panelists received payments exceeding NCCN limits ("violation"). As a proxy for whether panelists were subsequently disqualified as stipulated, we measured continued service for at least 1 full calendar year ("retention") subsequent to an estimated violation. We analyzed retention before and after 2016, due to increased scrutiny on NCCN FCOI in 2016.

RESULTS

The annual proportion of current panelists with estimated violations ranged between 0.5% (2020) and 5.8% (2016). Among panelists who did vs did not have violations, retention was 83.6% vs 88.5% during 2014-2015 (odds ratio [OR] = 0.55, 95% CI = 0.26 to 1.31) and 46.6% vs 89.4% during 2017-2020 (OR = 0.10, 95% CI = 0.06 to 0.17). Among new panelists, 2.7% (5/185) had prior-year violations during 2014-2015, as did 5.5% (18/330) during 2017-2021.

CONCLUSIONS

Each year, a small portion of panelists receive industry payments exceeding NCCN limits. Since 2016, the likelihood that such panelists will continue to serve has decreased substantially.

Are Patients With Cancer Best Managed in a Clinical Trial?

This Viewpoint analyzes how the NCCN’s boxed statement that all cancer is best managed in a clinical trial cannot be applied to all patients and calls for its removal from its clinical practice guidelines.

Pharmaceutical Industry Payments to Medical Oncologists in the Netherlands: Trends and Patterns Provided by an Open-Access Transparency Data Set

PURPOSE

Health care expenditure related to oncologic treatments is skyrocketing although many treatments offer marginal, if any, clinical benefit. Financial conflicts of interest (fCOI) resulting from pharmaceutical industry (pharma) payments to physicians is increasingly recognized as a predictive factor for regulatory board approval and guideline incorporation of low-value treatments. We sought to study the extent to which pharma payments to medical oncologists occur in the Netherlands, the amount of money involved, and whether these occur more frequently and are higher for key opinion leaders (KOLs).

METHODS

In our cross-sectional retrospective database study, we used several Dutch open-access databases and extracted data registered between 2019 and 2021.

RESULTS

A cumulative amount of €899,863 was paid to 48.8% of the 408 registered medical oncologists. Over time, there was a marked decline in both the proportion of medical oncologists receiving payments (from 40.4% in 2019 to 19.1% in 2021) and the mean annual value of payments (from €2,962 in 2019 to €2,188 in 2021) with the latter mainly resulting from a decline in hospitality-related transactions. KOLs were more likely to receive industry payments and received a higher median payment value.

DISCUSSION

Our findings should contribute to the increasing awareness in the Netherlands of the potential effects of fCOI.

Conflict of Interest Disclosure in Oncology: Preliminary Insights From the Global ONCOTRUST-1 Cross-Sectional Study

PURPOSE

Conflicts of interest (COIs) between oncologists and industry might considerably influence how the presentation of the research results is delivered, ultimately affecting clinical decisions and policy-making. Although there are many regulations on reporting COI in high-income countries (HICs), little is known about their reporting in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Oncology Transparency Under Scrutiny and Tracking (ONCOTRUST-1) is a pilot global survey to explore the knowledge and perceptions of oncologists regarding COI.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

We designed an online 27-question-based survey in the English language to explore the perceptions and knowledge of oncologists regarding COI, with an emphasis on LMICs. Descriptive statistics and the Consensus-Based Checklist for Reporting of Survey Studies guidelines were used to report the findings.

RESULTS

ONCOTRUST-1 surveyed 200 oncologists, 70.9% of them practicing in LMICs. Median age of the respondents was 36 (range, 26-84) years; 47.5% of them were women. Of the respondents, 40.5% reported weekly visits by pharmaceutical representatives to their institutions. Regarding oncologists' perceptions of COI that require disclosure, direct financial benefits, such as honoraria, ranked highest (58.5%), followed by gifts from pharmaceutical representatives (50%) and travel grants for attending conferences (44.5%). By contrast, personal or institutional research funding, sample drugs, consulting or advisory board, expert testimony, and food and beverage funded by pharmaceutical industry were less frequently considered as COI. Moreover, only 24% of surveyed oncologists could correctly categorize all situations representing a COI.

CONCLUSION

These findings underscore the importance of clear guidelines, education, and transparency in reporting COI in oncology. This hypothesis-generating pilot survey provided the rationale for ONCOTRUST-2 study, which will compare perceptions of COI among oncologists in LMICs and HICs.

Pharmaceutical industry payments and delivery of non-recommended and low value cancer drugs: population based cohort study

OBJECTIVE

To estimate the association between oncologists' receipt of payments from the pharmaceutical industry and delivery of non-recommended or low value interventions among their patients.

DESIGN

Cohort study.

SETTING

Fee-for-service Medicare claims.

PARTICIPANTS

Medicare beneficiaries with a diagnosis of incident cancer (new occurrence of a cancer diagnosis code in proximity to claims for cancer treatment, and no such diagnosis codes during a ≥1 year washout period) during 2014-19, who met additional requirements identifying them as at risk for one of four non-recommended or low value interventions: denosumab for castration sensitive prostate cancer, granulocyte colony stimulating factors (GCSF) for patients at low risk for neutropenic fever, nab-paclitaxel for cancers with no evidence of superiority over paclitaxel, and a branded drug in settings where a generic or biosimilar version was available.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

Receipt of the non-recommended or low value drug for which the patient was at risk. The primary association of interest was the assigned oncologist's receipt of any general payments from the manufacturer of the corresponding non-recommended or low value drug (measured in Open Payments) within 365 days before the patient's index cancer date. The two modeling approaches used were general linear model controlling for patients' characteristics and calendar year, and general linear model with physician level indicator variables.

RESULTS

Oncologists were in receipt of industry payments for 2962 of 9799 patients (30.2%) at risk for non-recommended denosumab (median $63), 76 747 of 271 485 patients (28.3%) at risk for GCSF (median $60); 18 491 of 86 394 patients (21.4%) at risk for nab-paclitaxel (median $89), and 4170 of 13 386 patients (31.2%) at risk for branded drugs (median $156). The unadjusted proportion of patients who received non-recommended denosumab was 31.4% for those whose oncologist had not received payment and 49.5% for those whose oncologist had (prevalence difference 18.0%); the corresponding values for GCSF were 26.6% v 32.1% (5.5%), for nab-paclitaxel were 7.3% v 15.1% (7.8%), and for branded drugs were 88.3% v 83.5% (-4.8%). Controlling for patients' characteristics and calendar year, payments from industry were associated with increased use of denosumab (17.5% (95% confidence interval 15.3% to 19.7%)), GCSF (5.8% (5.4% to 6.1%)), and nab-paclitaxel (7.6% (7.1% to 8.1%)), but lower use of branded drugs (-4.6% (-5.8% to -3.3%)). In physician level indicator models, payments from industry were associated with increased use of denosumab (7.4% (2.5% to 12.2%)) and nab-paclitaxel (1.7% (0.9% to 2.5%)), but not with GCSF (0.4% (-0.3% to 1.1%)) or branded drugs (1.2% (-6.0 to 8.5%)).

CONCLUSIONS

Within some clinical scenarios, industry payments to physicians are associated with non-recommended and low value drugs. These findings raise quality of care concerns about the financial relationships between physicians and industry.

Physician Payments from Pharmaceutical Companies Related to Cancer Drugs

BACKGROUND

Drug manufacturers claim that the purpose of financial payments to physicians is to facilitate education about new drugs. This claim suggests 2 testable hypotheses: payments should not be associated with drug revenue and payments for each drug should decline over time as physicians become educated.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

We used open payments data on industry payments. We included payments for cancer drugs without generic/biosimilar competitors and used federal data sources to measure Medicare spending (a proxy for overall drug revenue) and a number of prescribers. We used generalized estimating equations (GEE) to model the drug-level association between industry payments and Medicare spending. Separately, we used GEE to estimate the change in payments with respect to the duration of time since initial FDA approval.

RESULTS

The sample included 89 drugs and 361 drug-year observations. The total value of industry payments for oncology drugs increased, from $53 333 854 in 2014 to $90 343 731 in 2018. There was no association between log-transformed mean, per-physician industry payments, and per-physician Medicare spending (estimate -0.001, 95%CI, -0.005 to 0.004). Payments for individual drugs decreased over time; estimated payments in the subsequent year for a drug with mean, per-physician payments of $1000 in the index year was: $681* for drugs 0-4 years since approval, $825 for 5-9 years, and $679* for ≥10 years (*P < .05).

CONCLUSIONS

Although industry-sponsored education may also serve marketing purposes, the absence of association between industry payments and Medicare spending and the decline in payments subsequent to approval are consistent with claims that industry payments function to facilitate physician education.

Industry Relationships With Medical Oncologists: Who Are the High-Payment Physicians?

PURPOSE:

Many oncologists have relationships with industry. Previous work has shown that these payments are usually modest; however, there exist a subset of medical oncologists who receive more than $100,000 US dollars (USD) annually. Here, we describe the characteristics of these physicians.

METHODS:

This retrospective cohort study used the Open Payments data set to identify all US-based medical oncologists/hematologists who received $100,000+ USD in general payments linked to cancer medications in 2018. Open Payments and a web-based search were used to identify physician characteristics, demographics, research profile, and leadership positions.

RESULTS:

One hundred thirty-nine medical oncologists received > $100,000 USD in general payments. The median payment was $154,613 USD, and the total payment was $24.2 million USD. These high-payment physicians represent 1% of all US medical oncologists (N = 10,620) yet account for 37% of all industry payments in 2018. Sixty percent (84 of 139) and 21% (29 of 139) of these high-payment physicians hold hospital and specialty association leadership roles, respectively. One quarter (24%, 33 of 139) serve on journal editorial boards, and 10% (14 of 139) have authored clinical practice guidelines; 72% (100 of 139) hold faculty appointments.

CONCLUSION:

A small number of medical oncologists receive very high payments from the pharmaceutical industry. These physicians hold major leadership roles within oncology. Further work is needed to understand the extent to which these conflicts of interest may shape clinical practice and policy.