Cognitive ethology

Catch me if you can: free-living mice show a highly flexible dodging behaviour suggestive of intentional tactical deception

Intentional tactical deception, the employment of a tactic to intentionally deceive another animal, is a complex behaviour based on higher-order cognition, that has rarely been documented outside of primates and corvids. New laboratory-to-field assays, however, provide the opportunity to investigate such behaviour among free-living mice. In the present study, we placed laboratory-style test chambers with a single entrance near a forest outside Warsaw, where we observed the social interactions of two territorial murids, black-striped and yellow-necked mice, under food competition for seven months. Notably, among the social interactions, we video-recorded 21 instances of deceptive pursuer evasion. In the most obvious cases, an individual inside the chamber, to avoid an incoming mouse, hid by the chamber opening (the only means to enter or exit), paused until the pursuer entered and passed by, and then exploited the distraction of the back-turned pursuer by fleeing through the opening in a direction opposite to the one the pursuer came from. This deceptive dodging is the first evidence of a behaviour suggestive of intentional tactical deception among mice. As such, this deceptive behaviour may be of interest not only for rodent psychology but also, more generally, for the fields of non-human intentionality and theory of mind.

Could theropod dinosaurs have evolved to a human level of intelligence?

Noting that some theropod dinosaurs had large brains, large grasping hands, and likely binocular vision, paleontologist Dale Russell suggested that a branch of these dinosaurs might have evolved to a human intelligence level, had dinosaurs not become extinct. I offer reasons why the likely pallial organization in dinosaurs would have made this improbable, based on four assumptions. First, it is assumed that achieving human intelligence requires evolving an equivalent of the about 200 functionally specialized cortical areas characteristic of humans. Second, it is assumed that dinosaurs had an avian nuclear type of pallial organization, in contrast to the mammalian cortical organization. Third, it is assumed that the interactions between the different neuron types making up an information processing unit within pallium are critical to its role in analyzing information. Finally, it is assumed that increasing axonal length between the neuron sets carrying out this operation impairs its efficacy. Based on these assumptions, I present two main reasons why dinosaur pallium might have been unable to add the equivalent of 200 efficiently functioning cortical areas. First, a nuclear pattern of pallial organization would require increasing distances between the neuron groups corresponding to the separate layers of any given mammalian cortical area, as more sets of nuclei equivalent to a cortical area are interposed between the existing sets, increasing axon length and thereby impairing processing efficiency. Second, because of its nuclear organization, dinosaur pallium could not reduce axon length by folding to bring adjacent areas closer together, as occurs in cerebral cortex.

Embodying cognitive ethology

Cognitive psychology considers the environment as providing information, not affecting fundamental information processes. Thus, cognitive psychology's traditional paradigms study responses to precisely timed stimuli in controlled environments. However, new research demonstrates the environment does influence cognitive processes and offers cognitive psychology new methods. The authors examine one such proposal: cognitive ethology. Cognitive ethology improves cognitive psychology's ecological validity through first drawing inspiration from robust phenomena in the real world, then moving into the lab to test those phenomena. To support such methods, cognitive ethologists appeal to embodied cognition, or 4E cognition, for its rich relationships between agents and environments. However, the authors note while cognitive ethology focuses on new methods (epistemology) inspired by embodied cognition, it preserves most traditional assumptions about cognitive processes (ontology). But embodied cognition-particularly its radical variants-also provides strong ontological challenges to cognitive psychology, which work against cognitive ethology. The authors argue cognitive ethology should align with the ontology of less radical embodied cognition, which produces epistemological implications, offering alternative methodologies. For example, cognitive ethology can explore differences between real-world and lab studies to fully understand how cognition depends on environments.

Cognitive ecology: ecological factors, life-styles, and cognition

Cognitive ecology integrates cognition, ecology, and neurobiology in one topic and has recently broadened into an exciting diversity of themes covering the entire range of cognition and ecological conditions. The review identifies three major environmental factors interacting with cognition: environmental variation (predictable and unpredictable), environmental complexity and predation. Generally, variable environments favor cognitive abilities such as exploration, learning, innovation, memory and also result in larger brains as compared to stable environments. Likewise, cognition is enhanced in complex versus simple environments, whereas the relationship between predation and cognitive abilities can be positive or negative. However, organisms have often evolved entire life-styles (e.g., residency versus migration, food-caching versus noncaching, generalism versus specialism) to deal with these environmental factors. Considering cognition within this framework provides a much more diverse picture of how cognitive abilities evolved in conjunction with other adaptations to environmental challenges. This integrated approach identifies gaps of knowledge and allows the formulation of hypotheses for future testing. Several recently emerged approaches study cognitive abilities at a new and in part highly integrated level. For example, the effect that environment has on the development of cognitive abilities during ontogeny will improve our understanding about cause and effect and gene-environment interactions. Together with two recently emerged highly integrative approaches that link personality and pace-of-life syndromes with cognitive ecology these new directions will improve insight how cognition is interlinked with other major organizational processes. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author has declared no conflicts of interest for this article.