Chimpanzee uses manipulative gaze cues to conceal and reveal information to foraging competitor

Tactical deception has been widely reported in primates on a functional basis, but details of behavioral mechanisms are usually unspecified. We tested a pair of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in the informed forager paradigm, in which the subordinate saw the location of hidden food and the dominant did not. We employed cross-correlations to examine temporal contingencies between chimpanzees' behavior: specifically how the direction of the subordinate's gaze and movement functioned to manipulate the dominant's searching behavior through two tactics, withholding, and misleading information. In Experiment 1, not only did the informed subordinate tend to stop walking toward a single high value food, but she also refrained from gazing toward it, thus, withholding potentially revealing cues from her searching competitor. In a second experiment, in which a moderate value food was hidden in addition to the high value food, whenever the subordinate alternated her gaze between the dominant and the moderate value food, she often paused walking for 5 s; this frequently recruited the dominant to the inferior food, functioning as a "decoy." The subordinate flexibly concealed and revealed gaze toward a goal, which suggests that not only can chimpanzees use visual cues to make predictions about behavior, but also that chimpanzees may understand that other individuals can exploit their gaze direction. These results substantiate descriptive reports of how chimpanzees use gaze to manipulate others, and to our knowledge are the first quantitative data to identify behavioral mechanisms of tactical deception.

RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS

Cross correlations show a subordinate chimpanzee tactically deceived a dominant by not gazing toward a valuable food (withholding), and recruiting to a "decoy" food (misleading). Chimpanzees understand that others can exploit their gaze direction.

Getting back to the rough ground: deception and 'social living'

At the heart of the social intelligence hypothesis is the central role of 'social living'. But living is messy and psychologists generally seek to avoid this mess in the interests of getting clean data and cleaner logical explanations. The study of deception as intelligent action is a good example of the dangers of such avoidance. We still do not have a full picture of the development of deceptive actions in human infants and toddlers or an explanation of why it emerges. This paper applies Byrne & Whiten's functional taxonomy of tactical deception to the social behaviour of human infants and toddlers using data from three previous studies. The data include a variety of acts, such as teasing, pretending, distracting and concealing, which are not typically considered in relation to human deception. This functional analysis shows the onset of non-verbal deceptive acts to be surprisingly early. Infants and toddlers seem to be able to communicate false information (about themselves, about shared meanings and about events) as early as true information. It is argued that the development of deception must be a fundamentally social and communicative process and that if we are to understand why deception emerges at all, the scientist needs to get 'back to the rough ground' as Wittgenstein called it and explore the messy social lives in which it develops.