The effects of repeating false and misleading information on belief

More familiar, more credible? Distinguishing two types of familiarity on the truth effect using the drift-diffusion model

Familiar information is more likely to be accepted as true. This illusory truth effect has a tremendous negative impact on misinformation intervention. Previous studies focused on the familiarity from repeated exposure in the laboratory, ignoring preexisting familiarity with real-world misinformation. Over three studies (total N = 337), we investigated the cognitive mechanisms behind the truth biases from these two familiarity sources, and whether fact-checking can curb such biased truth perceptions. Studies 1 and 2 found robust truth effects induced by two sources of familiarity but with different cognitive processes. According to the cognitive process model, repetition-induced familiarity reduced decision prudence. Preexisting familiarity instead enhanced truth-congruent evidence accumulation. Study 3 showed that pre-exposing statements with warning flags eliminated the bias to truth induced by repetition but not that from preexisting familiarity. These repeated statements with warning labels also reduced decision caution. These findings furthered the understanding of how different sources of familiarity affect truth perceptions and undermine the intervention through different cognitive processes.

Mental health misinformation on social media: Review and future directions

Social media use for health information is extremely common in the United States. Unfortunately, this use may expose users to misinformation. The prevalence and harms of misinformation are well documented in many health domains (e.g., infectious diseases). However, research on mental health misinformation is limited. Our review suggests that mental health misinformation is common, although its prevalence varies across disorders and treatment types. Individual differences in susceptibility to misinformation have been documented for health misinformation generally but less so for mental health specifically. We discuss conceptual issues in defining mental health misinformation versus other classifications such as overgeneralizations from personal experience. Although there is clear evidence for false and actively misleading content, future research should also explore the role of negative healthcare experiences and health disparities on mental health misinformation on social media.

The mnemonic effect of central and peripheral misinformation on social media

The increasing use of social media has amplified the spread of false information. Yet little is known about the mnemonic consequences associated with exposure to different types of false information online. In two studies, we examined in a simulated online context how exposure to false information either central or peripheral in events affected memory. European American and Asian/Asian American college students (Study 1 N = 200; Study 2 N = 225) were presented with GIFs of daily life events and read tweets about the events that included four types of information: central true information, central false information, peripheral true information, and peripheral false information. They then took a True/False recognition test that included tweeted and untweeted true and false information and indicated how confident they were in their responses. Regardless of cultural background, participants in both studies demonstrated the misinformation effect, whereby they falsely recognised more and resisted less tweeted than untweeted false information. Furthermore, they showed higher susceptibility to peripheral than central false information exposed via tweets. Asian participants were less influenced by misinformation than European Americans in Study 2. These findings have important implications to combat misinformation in online environments.

An ongoing secondary task can reduce the illusory truth effect

Introduction

People are more likely to believe repeated information-this is known as the Illusory Truth Effect (ITE). Recent research on the ITE has shown that semantic processing of statements plays a key role. In our day to day experience, we are often multi-tasking which can impact our ongoing processing of information around us. In three experiments, we investigate how asking participants to engage in an ongoing secondary task in the ITE paradigm influences the magnitude of the effect of repetition on belief.

Methods

Using an adapted ITE paradigm, we embedded a secondary task into each trial of the encoding and/or test phase (e.g., having participants count the number of vowels in a target word of each trivia claim) and calculated the overall accuracy on the task.

Results

We found that the overall ITE was larger when participants had no ongoing secondary task during the experiment. Further, we predicted and found that higher accuracy on the secondary task was associated with a larger ITE.

Discussion

These findings provide initial evidence that engaging in an ongoing secondary task may reduce the impact of repetition. Our findings suggest that exploring the impact of secondary tasks on the ITE is a fruitful area for further research.

Repetition could increase the perceived truth of conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories can be encountered repeatedly, which raises the issue of the effect of their repeated exposure on beliefs. Earlier studies found that repetition increases truth judgments of factual statements, whether they are uncertain, highly implausible, or fake news, for instance. Would this "truth effect" be observed with conspiracy statements? If so, is the effect size smaller than the typical truth effect, and is it associated with individual differences such as cognitive style and conspiracy mentality? In the present preregistered study, we addressed these three issues. We asked participants to provide binary truth judgments to conspiracy and factual statements already displayed in an exposure phase (an interest judgment task) or that were new (displayed only in the truth judgment task). We measured participants' cognitive style with the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), and conspiracy mentality with the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ). Importantly, we found that repetition increased truth judgments of conspiracy theories, unmoderated by cognitive style and conspiracy mentality. Additionally, we found that the truth effect was smaller with conspiracy theories than with uncertain factual statements, and suggest explanations for this difference. The results suggest that repetition may be a simple way to increase belief in conspiracy theories. Whether repetition increases conspiracy beliefs in natural settings and how it contributes to conspiracism compared to other factors are important questions for future research.

The Illusion of Pure Reason in Science: A Cautionary Note

Introspection tells people that their behavior is both consciously reasoned and functional (i.e., rational), at least based on the evidence available to them. In contrast, research has found that much human behavior reported to be consciously determined, is strongly influenced by heuristics and the mechanistic principles of associative learning that usually function unconsciously and are sometimes sub-optimal. Scientists are trained to base their conclusions on a rational analysis of evidence, which enhances the scientific validity of their conclusions. But scientific training appears to do little to constrain the role of unconscious heuristics. The present point is that scientists are humans and, as such, they are subject to the influence of heuristics in their scientific conclusions just as laypeople are in their everyday behavior. As an example, the availability heuristic and how it seemingly feeds the repetition-induced truth effect are described. One consequence of this is that failures to replicate frequently cited papers do little to devalue the irreplicable reports. Although unconscious heuristics influence the scientific thinking of researchers, scientists are typically unaware of the role of these heuristics due to their operating below the horizon of introspection. This appears to explain the persistence, in light of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, of the views by many researchers that 'a prediction error is necessary for learning' and that 'reactivated memories have to be reconsolidated to be retained for future access.'