Heterogeneity of Market Structures in the Iranian Model of Kidney Transplantation

Public Opinions on Removing Disincentives and Introducing Incentives for Organ Donation: Proposing a European Research Agenda

The shortage of organs for transplantations is increasing in Europe as well as globally. Many initiatives to the organ shortage, such as opt-out systems for deceased donation and expanding living donation, have been insufficient to meet the rising demand for organs. In recurrent discussions on how to reduce organ shortage, financial incentives and removal of disincentives, have been proposed to stimulate living organ donation and increase the pool of available donor organs. It is important to understand not only the ethical acceptability of (dis)incentives for organ donation, but also its societal acceptance. In this review, we propose a research agenda to help guide future empirical studies on public preferences in Europe towards the removal of disincentives and introduction of incentives for organ donation. We first present a systematic literature review on public opinions concerning (financial) (dis)incentives for organ donation in European countries. Next, we describe the results of a randomized survey experiment conducted in the United States. This experiment is crucial because it suggests that societal support for incentivizing organ donation depends on the specific features and institutional design of the proposed incentive scheme. We conclude by proposing this experiment's framework as a blueprint for European research on this topic.

Kidneys for Sale: Empirical Evidence From Iran

The kidney market in Iran is the only legal market of this sort globally. Yet, it has not been empirically studied based on real data. For the first time, we obtained data on donors and recipients from the Kidney Foundation in Mashhad, April 2011 up to March 2018, and assessed which individualistic characteristics contribute to a kidney’s price. Our findings indicate that each year of education for both donors and recipients increases the kidney price. Moreover, old patients are willing to make a higher payment to young vendors. We have also provided some policy implications to improve the efficiency of kidney allocations.