Consciousness during dreams

EEG Microstate Dynamics Associated with Dream-Like Experiences During the Transition to Sleep

Consciousness always requires some representational content; that is, one can only be conscious about something. However, the presence of conscious experience (awareness) alone does not determine whether its content is in line with the external and physical world. Dreams, apart from certain forms of hallucinations, typically consist of non-veridical percepts, which are not recognized as false, but rather considered real. This type of experiences have been described as a state of dissociation between phenomenal and reflective awareness. Interestingly, during the transition to sleep, reflective awareness seems to break down before phenomenal awareness as conscious experience does not immediately fade with reduced wakefulness but is rather characterized by the occurrence of uncontrolled thinking and perceptual images, together with a reduced ability to recognize the internal origin of the experience. Relative deactivation of the frontoparietal and preserved activity in parieto-occipital networks has been suggested to account for dream-like experiences during the transition to sleep. We tested this hypothesis by investigating subjective reports of conscious experience and large-scale brain networks using EEG microstates in 45 healthy young subjects during the transition to sleep. We observed an inverse relationship between cognitive effects and physiological activation; dream-like experiences were associated with an increased presence of a microstate with sources in the superior and middle frontal gyrus and precuneus. Additionally, the presence of a microstate associated with higher-order visual areas was decreased. The observed inverse relationship might therefore indicate a disengagement of cognitive control systems that is mediated by specific, inhibitory EEG microstates.

Nothingness Is All There Is: An Exploration of Objectless Awareness During Sleep

Recent years have seen a heightened focus on the study of minimal forms of awareness during sleep to advance the study of consciousness and understand what makes a state conscious. This focus draws on an increased interest in anecdotical descriptions made by classic Indian philosophical traditions about unusual forms of awareness during sleep. For instance, in the so-called state of witnessing-sleep or luminosity sleep, one is said to reach a state that goes beyond ordinary dreaming and abide in a state of just awareness, a state in which one is not aware of anything else other than one’s own awareness. Moreover, for these traditions, this state is taken to be the essence or background of consciousness. Reports on such a state opens the door to exciting new lines of research in the study of consciousness, such as inquiry into the so-called objectless awareness during sleep—states of awareness that lack an ordinary object of awareness. In this two-staged research project, we attempted to find the phenomenological blueprints of such forms of awareness during sleep in 18 participants by conducting phenomenological interviews, informed by a novel tool in qualitative research, the micro-phenomenological interview (MPI) method. Following a phenomenological analysis, we isolated a similar phase across 12 reported experiences labeled as “nothingness phase” since it described what participants took to be an experience of “nothingness.” This common phase was characterized by minimal sense of self—a bodiless self, yet experienced as being “somewhere”—, the presence of non-modal sensations, relatively pleasant emotions, an absence of visual experience, wide and unfocused attention, and an awareness of the state as it unfolded.

The vision of dreams: from ontogeny to dream engineering in blindness

The mechanisms involved in the origin of dreams remain one of the great unknowns in science. In the 21st century, studies in the field have focused on 3 main topics: functional networks that underlie dreaming, neural correlates of dream contents, and signal propagation. We review neuroscientific studies about dreaming processes, focusing on their cortical correlations. The involvement of frontoparietal regions in the dream-retrieval process allows us to discuss it in light of the Global Workspace theory of consciousness. However, dreaming in distinct sleep stages maintains relevant differences, suggesting that multiple generators are implicated. Then, given the strong influence of light perception on sleep regulation and the mostly visual content of dreams, we investigate the effect of blindness on the organization of dreams. Blind individuals represent a worthwhile population to clarify the role of perceptual systems in dream generation, and to make inferences about their top-down and/or bottom-up origin. Indeed, congenitally blind people maintain the ability to produce visual dreams, suggesting that bottom-up mechanisms could be associated with innate body schemes or multisensory integration processes. Finally, we propose the new dream-engineering technique as a tool to clarify the mechanisms of multisensory integration during sleep and related mental activity, presenting possible implications for rehabilitation in sensory-impaired individuals. The Theory of Proto-consciousness suggests that the interaction of brain states underlying waking and dreaming ensures the optimal functioning of both. Therefore, understanding the origin of dreams and capabilities of our brain during a dreamlike state, we could introduce it as a rehabilitative tool.

CITATION

Vitali H, Campus C, De Giorgis V, Signorini S, Gori M. The vision of dreams: from ontogeny to dream engineering in blindness. J Clin Sleep Med. 2022;18(8):2051-2062.

Do animals dream?

The understanding of biological functions of sleep has improved recently, including an understanding of the deep evolutionary roots of sleep among animals. However, dreaming as an element of sleep may be particularly difficult to address in non-human animals because in humans dreaming involves a non-wakeful form of awareness typically identified through verbal report. Here, we argue that parallels that exist between the phenomenology, physiology, and sleep behaviors during human dreaming provide an avenue to investigate dreaming in non-human animals. We review three alternative measurements of human dreaming - neural correlates of dreaming, 'replay' of newly-acquired memories, and dream-enacting behaviors - and consider how these may be applied to non-human animal models. We suggest that while animals close in brain structure to humans (such as mammals and birds) may be optimal models for the first two of these measurements, cephalopods, especially octopuses, may be particularly good candidates for the third.

Self, Me and I in the repertoire of spontaneously occurring altered states of Selfhood: eight neurophenomenological case study reports

This study investigates eight case reports of spontaneously emerging, brief episodes of vivid altered states of Selfhood (ASoSs) that occurred during mental exercise in six long-term meditators by using a neurophenomenological electroencephalography (EEG) approach. In agreement with the neurophenomenological methodology, first-person reports were used to identify such spontaneous ASoSs and to guide the neural analysis, which involved the estimation of three operational modules of the brain self-referential network (measured by EEG operational synchrony). The result of such analysis demonstrated that the documented ASoSs had unique neurophenomenological profiles, where several aspects or components of Selfhood (measured neurophysiologically and phenomenologically) are affected and expressed differently, but still in agreement with the neurophysiological three-dimensional construct model of the complex experiential Selfhood proposed in our earlier work (Fingelkurts et al. in Conscious Cogn 86:103031. 10.1016/j.concog.2020.103031, 2020).

Modulating dream experience: Noninvasive brain stimulation over the sensorimotor cortex reduces dream movement

Recently, cortical correlates of specific dream contents have been reported, such as the activation of the sensorimotor cortex during dreamed hand clenching. Yet, despite a close resemblance of such activation patterns to those seen during the corresponding wakeful behaviour, the causal mechanisms underlying specific dream contents remain largely elusive. Here, we aimed to investigate the causal role of the sensorimotor cortex in generating movement and bodily sensations during REM sleep dreaming. Following bihemispheric transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) or sham stimulation, guided by functional mapping of the primary motor cortex, naive participants were awakened from REM sleep and responded to a questionnaire on bodily sensations in dreams. Electromyographic (EMG) and electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings were used to quantify physiological changes during the preceding REM period. We found that tDCS, compared to sham stimulation, significantly decreased reports of dream movement, especially of repetitive actions. Other types of bodily experiences, such as tactile or vestibular sensations, were not affected by tDCS, confirming the specificity of stimulation effects to movement sensations. In addition, tDCS reduced EEG interhemispheric coherence in parietal areas and affected the phasic EMG correlation between both arms. These findings show that a complex temporal reorganization of the motor network co-occurred with the reduction of dream movement, revealing a link between central and peripheral motor processes and movement sensations of the dream self. tDCS over the sensorimotor cortex interferes with dream movement during REM sleep, which is consistent with a causal contribution to dream experience and has broader implications for understanding the neural basis of self-experience in dreams.

Reactions to Dream Content: Continuity and Non-continuity

Although dream content may at times be quite outlandish or illogical, the dreamer’s emotional reactions to these events are not outlandish or illogical. Our study shows that the dreamer’s emotional reaction to people and events are similar to what they would have been in wake life. There is continuity between the emotional reactions of the dream and wake-self, even though situations may arise that are not likely or possible in wake life. For example, a dream may include people and places that span different times that are weaved together as if they were occurring at the moment. Further, the behavior of the dream-self is often different than that of the wake-self. When this happens, there is a non-continuity between the behavior of the dream and wake-self. Thus, there is both continuity and non-continuity between the dream and wake-self: Continuity in emotional reactions and non-continuity in the kinds of situations and behaviors that occur while dreaming. In the Kahn and Hobson, 2005a study, 58.7% of participants reported that their thinking within the context of the dream was similar to what it would have been had they been awake. About 55.1% of participants also reported that their thinking about the context of the dream was different than it would have been had they been awake. This difference affords the dream-self with novel experiences but that still elicit emotional reactions that are similar to how its wake-self would react. In essentially, every case when a comment was given to the question on thinking in the Kahn and Hobson, 2005a study, participants reported about how they emotionally reacted within the context of the dream and how they emotionally reacted about the content of the dream in comparison to how they would have reacted if awake.

Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness

In recent years, the scientific study of meditation and psychedelic drugs has seen remarkable developments. The increased focus on meditation in cognitive neuroscience has led to a cross-cultural classification of standard meditation styles validated by functional and structural neuroanatomical data. Meanwhile, the renaissance of psychedelic research has shed light on the neurophysiology of altered states of consciousness induced by classical psychedelics, such as psilocybin and LSD, whose effects are mainly mediated by agonism of serotonin receptors. Few attempts have been made at bridging these two domains of inquiry, despite intriguing evidence of overlap between the phenomenology and neurophysiology of meditation practice and psychedelic states. In particular, many contemplative traditions explicitly aim at dissolving the sense of self by eliciting altered states of consciousness through meditation, while classical psychedelics are known to produce significant disruptions of self-consciousness, a phenomenon known as drug-induced ego dissolution. In this article, we discuss available evidence regarding convergences and differences between phenomenological and neurophysiological data on meditation practice and psychedelic drug-induced states, with a particular emphasis on alterations of self-experience. While both meditation and psychedelics may disrupt self-consciousness and underlying neural processes, we emphasize that neither meditation nor psychedelic states can be conceived as simple, uniform categories. Moreover, we suggest that there are important phenomenological differences even between conscious states described as experiences of self-loss. As a result, we propose that self-consciousness may be best construed as a multidimensional construct, and that "self-loss," far from being an unequivocal phenomenon, can take several forms. Indeed, various aspects of self-consciousness, including narrative aspects linked to autobiographical memory, self-related thoughts and mental time travel, and embodied aspects rooted in multisensory processes, may be differently affected by psychedelics and meditation practices. Finally, we consider long-term outcomes of experiences of self-loss induced by meditation and psychedelics on individual traits and prosocial behavior. We call for caution regarding the problematic conflation of temporary states of self-loss with "selflessness" as a behavioral or social trait, although there is preliminary evidence that correlations between short-term experiences of self-loss and long-term trait alterations may exist.

Dreams and Psychedelics: Neurophenomenological Comparison and Therapeutic Implications

BACKGROUND

A resurgence of neurobiological and clinical research is currently underway into the therapeutic potential of serotonergic or 'classical' psychedelics, such as the prototypical psychedelic drug lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), psilocybin (4-phosphoryloxy-N,Ndimethyltryptamine), and ayahuasca - a betacarboline- and dimethyltryptamine (DMT)-containing Amazonian beverage. The aim of this review is to introduce readers to the similarities and dissimilarities between psychedelic states and night dreams, and to draw conclusions related to therapeutic applications of psychedelics in psychiatry.

METHODS

Research literature related to psychedelics and dreaming is reviewed, and these two states of consciousness are systematically compared. Relevant conclusions with regard to psychedelicassisted therapy will be provided.

RESULTS

Common features between psychedelic states and night dreams include perception, mental imagery, emotion activation, fear memory extinction, and sense of self and body. Differences between these two states are related to differential perceptual input from the environment, clarity of consciousness and meta-cognitive abilities. Therefore, psychedelic states are closest to lucid dreaming which is characterized by a mixed state of dreaming and waking consciousness.

CONCLUSION

The broad overlap between dreaming and psychedelic states supports the notion that psychedelics acutely induce dreamlike subjective experiences which may have long-term beneficial effects on psychosocial functioning and well-being. Future clinical studies should examine how therapeutic outcome is related to the acute dreamlike effects of psychedelics.

Consciousness across Sleep and Wake: Discontinuity and Continuity of Memory Experiences As a Reflection of Consolidation Processes

The continuity hypothesis (1) posits that there is continuity, of some form, between waking and dreaming mentation. A recent body of work has provided convincing evidence for different aspects of continuity, for instance that some salient experiences from waking life seem to feature in dreams over others, with a particular role for emotional arousal as accompanying these experiences, both during waking and while asleep. However, discontinuities have been somewhat dismissed as being either a product of activation-synthesis, an error within the consciousness binding process during sleep, a methodological anomaly, or simply as yet unexplained. This paper presents an overview of discontinuity within dreaming and waking cognition, arguing that disruptions of consciousness are as common a feature of waking cognition as of dreaming cognition, and that processes of sleep-dependent memory consolidation of autobiographical experiences can in part account for some of the discontinuities of sleeping cognition in a functional way. By drawing upon evidence of the incorporation, fragmentation, and reorganization of memories within dreams, this paper proposes a model of discontinuity whereby the fragmentation of autobiographical and episodic memories during sleep, as part of the consolidation process, render salient aspects of those memories subsequently available for retrieval in isolation from their contextual features. As such discontinuity of consciousness in sleep is functional and normal.

A template model of embodiment while dreaming: Proposal of a mini-me

Dreams are usually centered around a dream self capable of tasks generally impossible in waking, e.g. flying or walking through walls. Moreover, the bodily dream self appears relatively stable and insensitive to changes of the embodied wake self, raising the question of whether and to what extent the dream self is embodied. To further explore its determinants, we tested whether the dream self would be affected by either pre-sleep focused attention to a body part or by its experimental alteration during the day. Choosing a repeated-measures design, we analyzed how often key words reflecting the experimental manipulations appeared in the dream reports. Results suggest that the dream self is not affected by these manipulations, strengthening the hypothesis that, in the majority of dreams, the dream self is only weakly embodied, utilizing a standard template of embodiment akin to a prototype of self operating independently from the physical waking self.

Psychosis and the Control of Lucid Dreaming

Dreaming and psychosis share important features, such as intrinsic sense perceptions independent of external stimulation, and a general lack of criticism that is associated with reduced frontal cerebral activity. Awareness of dreaming while a dream is happening defines lucid dreaming (LD), a state in which the prefrontal cortex is more active than during regular dreaming. For this reason, LD has been proposed to be potentially therapeutic for psychotic patients. According to this view, psychotic patients would be expected to report LD less frequently, and with lower control ability, than healthy subjects. Furthermore, psychotic patients able to experience LD should present milder psychiatric symptoms, in comparison with psychotic patients unable to experience LD. To test these hypotheses, we investigated LD features (occurrence, control abilities, frequency, and affective valence) and psychiatric symptoms (measure by PANSS, BPRS, and automated speech analysis) in 45 subjects with psychotic symptoms [25 with Schizophrenia (S) and 20 with Bipolar Disorder (B) diagnosis] versus 28 non-psychotic control (C) subjects. Psychotic lucid dreamers reported control of their dreams more frequently (67% of S and 73% of B) than non-psychotic lucid dreamers (only 23% of C; S > C with p = 0.0283, B > C with p = 0.0150). Importantly, there was no clinical advantage for lucid dreamers among psychotic patients, even for the diagnostic question specifically related to lack of judgment and insight. Despite some limitations (e.g., transversal design, large variation of medications), these preliminary results support the notion that LD is associated with psychosis, but falsify the hypotheses that we set out to test. A possible explanation is that psychosis enhances the experience of internal reality in detriment of external reality, and therefore lucid dreamers with psychotic symptoms would be more able to control their internal reality than non-psychotic lucid dreamers. Training dream lucidity is likely to produce safe psychological strengthening in a non-psychotic population, but in a psychotic population LD practice may further empower deliria and hallucinations, giving internal reality the appearance of external reality.

Dream to Predict? REM Dreaming as Prospective Coding

The dream as prediction seems inherently improbable. The bizarre occurrences in dreams never characterize everyday life. Dreams do not come true! But assuming that bizarreness negates expectations may rest on a misunderstanding of how the predictive brain works. In evolutionary terms, the ability to rapidly predict what sensory input implies-through expectations derived from discerning patterns in associated past experiences-would have enhanced fitness and survival. For example, food and water are essential for survival, associating past experiences (to identify location patterns) predicts where they can be found. Similarly, prediction may enable predator identification from what would have been only a fleeting and ambiguous stimulus-without prior expectations. To confront the many challenges associated with natural settings, visual perception is vital for humans (and most mammals) and often responses must be rapid. Predictive coding during wake may, therefore, be based on unconscious imagery so that visual perception is maintained and appropriate motor actions triggered quickly. Speed may also dictate the form of the imagery. Bizarreness, during REM dreaming, may result from a prospective code fusing phenomena with the same meaning-within a particular context. For example, if the context is possible predation, from the perspective of the prey two different predators can both mean the same (i.e., immediate danger) and require the same response (e.g., flight). Prospective coding may also prune redundancy from memories, to focus the image on the contextually-relevant elements only, thus, rendering the non-relevant phenomena indeterminate-another aspect of bizarreness. In sum, this paper offers an evolutionary take on REM dreaming as a form of prospective coding which identifies a probabilistic pattern in past events. This pattern is portrayed in an unconscious, associative, sensorimotor image which may support cognition in wake through being mobilized as a predictive code. A particular dream illustrates.

REM sleep and memory reorganization: Potential relevance for psychiatry and psychotherapy

Sleep can foster the reorganization of memory, i.e. the emergence of new memory content that has not directly been encoded. Current neurophysiological and behavioral evidence can be integrated into a model positing that REM sleep particularly promotes the disintegration of existing schemas and their recombination in the form of associative thinking, creativity and the shaping of emotional memory. Particularly, REM sleep related dreaming might represent a mentation correlate for the reconfiguration of memory. In a final section, the potential relevance for psychiatry and psychotherapy is discussed.

Such stuff as dreams are made on? Elaborative encoding, the ancient art of memory, and the hippocampus

This article argues that rapid eye movement (REM) dreaming is elaborative encoding for episodic memories. Elaborative encoding in REM can, at least partially, be understood through ancient art of memory (AAOM) principles: visualization, bizarre association, organization, narration, embodiment, and location. These principles render recent memories more distinctive through novel and meaningful association with emotionally salient, remote memories. The AAOM optimizes memory performance, suggesting that its principles may predict aspects of how episodic memory is configured in the brain. Integration and segregation are fundamental organizing principles in the cerebral cortex. Episodic memory networks interconnect profusely within the cortex, creating omnidirectional “landmark” junctions. Memories may be integrated at junctions but segregated along connecting network paths that meet at junctions. Episodic junctions may be instantiated during non–rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep after hippocampal associational function during REM dreams. Hippocampal association involves relating, binding, and integrating episodic memories into a mnemonic compositional whole. This often bizarre, composite image has not been present to the senses; it is not “real” because it hyperassociates several memories. During REM sleep, on the phenomenological level, this composite image is experienced as a dream scene. A dream scene may be instantiated as omnidirectional neocortical junction and retained by the hippocampus as an index. On episodic memory retrieval, an external stimulus (or an internal representation) is matched by the hippocampus against its indices. One or more indices then reference the relevant neocortical junctions from which episodic memories can be retrieved. Episodic junctions reach a processing (rather than conscious) level during normal wake to enable retrieval. If this hypothesis is correct, the stuff of dreams is the stuff of memory.

Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research

This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to bring it into existence. This contribution argues that research on bodiless dreams, asomatic out-of-body experiences, and full-body illusions has the potential to make decisive future contributions. Further items on the proposed list of novel research targets include differentiating the concept of a “first-person perspective” on the subcognitive level; investigating relevant phenomenological and neurofunctional commonalities between mind-wandering and dreaming; comparing the functional depth of embodiment across dream and wake states; and demonstrating that the conceptual consequences of cognitive corruption and systematic rationality deficits in the dream state are much more serious for philosophical epistemology (and, perhaps, the methodology of dream research itself) than commonly assumed. The paper closes by specifying a list of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection between dream research and philosophy of mind.

Dreaming, waking conscious experience, and the resting brain: report of subjective experience as a tool in the cognitive neurosciences

Even when we are ostensibly doing “nothing”—as during states of rest, sleep, and reverie—the brain continues to process information. In resting wakefulness, the mind generates thoughts, plans for the future, and imagines fictitious scenarios. In sleep, when the demands of sensory input are reduced, our experience turns to the thoughts and images we call “dreaming.” Far from being a meaningless distraction, the content of these subjective experiences provides an important and unique source of information about the activities of the resting mind and brain. In both wakefulness and sleep, spontaneous experience combines recent and remote memory fragments into novel scenarios. These conscious experiences may reflect the consolidation of recent memory into long-term storage, an adaptive process that functions to extract general knowledge about the world and adaptively respond to future events. Recent examples from psychology and neuroscience demonstrate that the use of subjective report can provide clues to the function(s) of rest and sleep.

The bilocated mind: new perspectives on self-localization and self-identification

Does the human mind allow for self-locating at more than one place at a time? Evidence from neurology, cognitive neuroscience, and experimental psychology suggests that mental bilocation is a complex, but genuine experience, occurring more frequently than commonly thought. In this article, we distinguish between different components of bilocated self-representation: self-localization in two different places at the same time, self-identification with another body, reduplication of first-person perspective. We argue that different forms of mental bilocation may result from the combination of these components. To illustrate this, we discuss evidence of mental bilocation in pathological conditions such as heautoscopy, during immersion in virtual environments, and in everyday life, during social interaction. Finally, we consider the conditions for mental bilocation and speculate on the possible role of mental bilocation in the context of social interaction, suggesting that self-localization at two places at the same time may prove advantageous for the construction of a shared space.

Brain and Psyche in Early Christian Asceticism

This study is an 11-part investigation of the psychology and neuropsychology of early Christian asceticism as represented by Evagrius Ponticus (AD 345–399), the tradition's first ascetical theologian and possibly its most influential. Evagrius's biography is reviewed in the first section. The living circumstances and perceptual consequences of desert asceticism are considered in the second. Penitence, dispassion, and the mysticism of “pure prayer” are discussed in the third. Austerities are addressed in the fourth section, particularly fasting, prostrations, and prolonged standing. Ascetical perspectives on sleep, dreams, and the hypnogogic state are analyzed in the fifth. The depressive syndrome of acedia is discussed in the sixth. Evagrius's reports of auditory, olfactory, and visual hallucinations are analyzed in the seventh. Multiple complementary interpretations of demonic phenomena are developed in the eighth section. Evagrius's psychotherapy for anger is reviewed in the ninth. Interpersonal relations among ascetics are considered in the tenth section. The study concludes with a summary.

Cognitive and emotional processes during dreaming: a neuroimaging view

Dream is a state of consciousness characterized by internally-generated sensory, cognitive and emotional experiences occurring during sleep. Dream reports tend to be particularly abundant, with complex, emotional, and perceptually vivid experiences after awakenings from rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. This is why our current knowledge of the cerebral correlates of dreaming, mainly derives from studies of REM sleep. Neuroimaging results show that REM sleep is characterized by a specific pattern of regional brain activity. We demonstrate that this heterogeneous distribution of brain activity during sleep explains many typical features in dreams. Reciprocally, specific dream characteristics suggest the activation of selective brain regions during sleep. Such an integration of neuroimaging data of human sleep, mental imagery, and the content of dreams is critical for current models of dreaming; it also provides neurobiological support for an implication of sleep and dreaming in some important functions such as emotional regulation.

Dreaming and waking: similarities and differences revisited

Dreaming is often characterized as lacking high-order cognitive (HOC) skills. In two studies, we test the alternative hypothesis that the dreaming mind is highly similar to the waking mind. Multiple experience samples were obtained from late-night REM sleep and waking, following a systematic protocol described in Kahan (2001). Results indicated that reported dreaming and waking experiences are surprisingly similar in their cognitive and sensory qualities. Concurrently, ratings of dreaming and waking experiences were markedly different on questions of general reality orientation and logical organization (e.g., the bizarreness or typicality of the events, actions, and locations). Consistent with other recent studies (e.g., Bulkeley & Kahan, 2008; Kozmová & Wolman, 2006), experiences sampled from dreaming and waking were more similar with respect to their process features than with respect to their structural features.

Lucid dreaming and ventromedial versus dorsolateral prefrontal task performance

Activity in the prefrontal cortex may distinguish the meta-awareness experienced during lucid dreams from its absence in normal dreams. To examine a possible relationship between dream lucidity and prefrontal task performance, we carried out a prospective study in 28 high school students. Participants performed the Wisconsin Card Sort and Iowa Gambling tasks, then for 1 week kept dream journals and reported sleep quality and lucidity-related dream characteristics. Participants who exhibited a greater degree of lucidity performed significantly better on the task that engages the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (the Iowa Gambling Task), but degree of lucidity achieved did not distinguish performance on the task that engages the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (the Wisconsin Card Sort Task), nor did it distinguish self-reported sleep quality or baseline characteristics. The association between performance on the Iowa Gambling Task and lucidity suggests a connection between lucid dreaming and ventromedial prefrontal function.

Dreams and the temporality of consciousness

Understanding dreams has long been considered fundamental to the development of a theory of consciousness. Evidence from neurobiology and neuroimaging research has paved the way for new theories of dreaming that are empirically supported. In this article we argue that dreaming is a unique state of consciousness that incorporates 3 temporal dimensions: experience of the present, processing of the past, and preparation for the future. The temporal complexity of dreams is made possible in part by the unique neurobiological environment of sleep, in which stimuli are internally generated and many of the restrictions associated with waking thought are absent. Because dream consciousness is not determined by sensory stimuli, a flexible integration of past experiences and the forging of novel connections are possible. We argue that disparate dream theories may not be mutually exclusive but rather relate to different temporal domains of the dream state.

Bizarreness of size and shape in dream images

Bizarreness in dreams is defined as an unusual combination of features in the phenomenal unified consciousness, that is, an incoherent simulation of the waking world. The present study investigated the specific mechanisms underlying dream image production and the phenomenal unity of consciousness by focusing on size and shape bizarreness. Data were derived from a Dream Data Bank of experimental dream studies. Analyses revealed that feature distortion was quite infrequent. Results are discussed in terms of cognitive processes proposed in a dream production model. Theoretical cognitive constructs, such as Kosslyn's imagery model, memory systems functioning, and binding, were used to speculate about these two specific types of bizarreness.

Memory reactivation and consolidation during sleep

Do our memories remain static during sleep, or do they change? We argue here that memory change is not only a natural result of sleep cognition, but further, that such change constitutes a fundamental characteristic of declarative memories. In general, declarative memories change due to retrieval events at various times after initial learning and due to the formation and elaboration of associations with other memories, including memories formed after the initial learning episode. We propose that declarative memories change both during waking and during sleep, and that such change contributes to enhancing binding of the distinct representational components of some memories, and thus to a gradual process of cross-cortical consolidation. As a result of this special form of consolidation, declarative memories can become more cohesive and also more thoroughly integrated with other stored information. Further benefits of this memory reprocessing can include developing complex networks of interrelated memories, aligning memories with long-term strategies and goals, and generating insights based on novel combinations of memory fragments. A variety of research findings are consistent with the hypothesis that cross-cortical consolidation can progress during sleep, although further support is needed, and we suggest some potentially fruitful research directions. Determining how processing during sleep can facilitate memory storage will be an exciting focus of research in the coming years.

Reduced Alpha power associated with the recall of mentation from Stage 2 and Stage REM sleep

Relationships between Alpha (8-12 Hz) activity and cognitive processes during wakefulness raise the possibility of similar relationships between Alpha and cognitive activity during sleep. We hypothesized that Alpha power decreases during both Stage 2 and REM sleep would index the presence of sleep mentation in these stages. Absolute power for six classical EEG bands and three Alpha subbands was calculated for Stage 2 and REM sleep awakenings both with and without mentation recall. In both stages, recall was associated with lower Alpha power, especially with middle Alpha power (9.5-11.5 Hz). Unexpectedly, a similar effect for Delta power (0.5-4.0 Hz) was also observed. The Alpha effect may reflect cognitive elaboration active in the minutes preceding awakening; however, attention and memory processes cannot be excluded. The Delta effect is consistent with prior observations of regular linkages between Alpha and Delta power during sleep.

Re-representing consciousness: dissociations between experience and meta-consciousness

A distinction is drawn between non-conscious (unexperienced), conscious (experienced), and meta-conscious (re-represented) mental processes. There is evidence for two types of dissociations between consciousness and meta-consciousness, the latter being defined as the intermittent explicit re-representation of the contents of consciousness. Temporal dissociations occur when an individual, who previously lacked meta-consciousness about the contents of consciousness, directs meta-consciousness towards those contents; for example, catching one's mind wandering during reading. Once meta-consciousness is triggered, translation dissociations can occur if the re-representation process misrepresents the original experience, such as when one verbally reflects on non-verbal experiences or takes stock of subtle or ambiguous experiences.