Discrepancies between normative and descriptive models of decision making and the understanding/acceptance principle

Not Getting Vaccinated? It Is a Matter of Problem-Solving Abilities and Socio-Cognitive Polarization

The anti-COVID-19 vaccination campaign in the United States provided a significant contribution to the control of the virus spread. Despite the recommendations by public health institutions, vaccine skepticism and hesitancy contributed to low vaccine uptake, thus possibly disrupting the management of preventable diseases associated with the COVID-19 infection. The process that led individuals to accept COVID-19 vaccines required the ability to gather, synthesize, and weigh-up information within a novel, dynamically changing, complex, and ambiguous context. To deal with such complexity, we hypothesized that both the ability of reflection and flexible adaptation played a fundamental role. Based on previous research on cognitive predictors of vaccine refusal, we decided to investigate the combined role of two constructs, namely, problem-solving skills and socio-cognitive polarization (SCP), on vaccine acceptance and uptake. Two-hundred-seventy-seven US participants completed an online survey aimed to measure problem-solving ability, through a rebus puzzles task, and SCP, through a composite measure of absolutist thinking, political conservatism, and xenophobia. Mediation analyses indicated that SCP mediated the association between problem-solving ability and vaccine acceptance, so lower problem-solving abilities associated with higher polarization predicted vaccine rejection. Thus, our findings suggested that low problem-solving skills may represent a risk factor for COVID-19 vaccine refusal, with cognitive and social rigidity playing a crucial role in undermining the anti-COVID-19 vaccine uptake.

Cognitive Biases in Orthopaedic Surgery

INTRODUCTION

Cognitive biases are known to affect all aspects of human decision-making and reasoning. Examples include misjudgment of probability, preferential attention to evidence that confirms one's beliefs, and preference for certainty. It is not known whether cognitive biases influence orthopaedic surgeon decision-making. This study measured the influence of a few cognitive biases on orthopaedic decision-making in hypothetical vignettes. The questions we addressed were as follows: Do orthopaedic surgeons display the cognitive biases of base rate neglect and confirmation bias in hypothetical vignettes? Can anchoring and framing biases be demonstrated?

METHODS

One hundred ninety-six orthopaedic surgeons completed a survey consisting of three vignettes evaluating base rate neglect, five evaluating confirmation bias, and two separate vignettes each randomly exposing half of the group to different anchors and frames.

RESULTS

For the three vignettes evaluating base rate neglect, 43% (84 of 196) chose answers consistent with base rate neglect in vignette 1, 88% (173 of 196) in vignette 2, and 35% (69 of 196) in vignette 3. Regarding confirmation bias, 51% (100 of 196) chose an answer consistent with confirmation bias for vignette 1, 11% (22 of 196) for vignette 2, 22% (43 of 196) for vignette 3, 22% (44 of 196) for vignette 4, and 29% (56 of 196) for vignette 5. There was a measurable anchoring heuristic (56% versus 34%; a difference of 22%) and framing effect (77% versus 61%; a difference of 16%).

CONCLUSION

The influence of cognitive biases can be documented in patient vignettes presented to orthopaedic surgeons. Strategies can anticipate cognitive bias and develop practice debiasing strategies to limit potential error.

Comparing fast thinking and slow thinking: The relative benefits of interventions, individual differences, and inferential rules

Research on judgment and decision making has suggested that the System 2 process of slow thinking can help people to improve their decision making by reducing well-established statistical decision biases (including base rate neglect, probability matching, and the conjunction fallacy). In a large pre-registered study with 1,706 participants and 23,292 unique observations, we compare the effects of individual differences and behavioral interventions to test the relative benefits of slow thinking on performance in canonical judgment and decision-making problems, compared to a control condition, a fast thinking condition, an incentive condition, and a condition that combines fast and slow thinking. We also draw on the rule-based reasoning literature to examine the benefits of having access to a simple form of the rule needed to solve a specific focal problem. Overall, we find equivocal evidence of a small benefit from slow thinking, evidence for a small benefit to accuracy incentives, and clear evidence of a larger cost from fast thinking. The difference in performance between fast-thinking and slow-thinking interventions is comparable to a one-scale point difference on the 4-point Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). Inferential rules contribute unique explanatory power and interact with individual differences to support the idea that System 2 benefits from a combination of slower processes and knowledge appropriate to the problem.

The smart intuitor: Cognitive capacity predicts intuitive rather than deliberate thinking

Cognitive capacity is commonly assumed to predict performance in classic reasoning tasks because people higher in cognitive capacity are believed to be better at deliberately correcting biasing erroneous intuitions. However, recent findings suggest that there can also be a positive correlation between cognitive capacity and correct intuitive thinking. Here we present results from 2 studies that directly contrasted whether cognitive capacity is more predictive of having correct intuitions or successful deliberate correction of an incorrect intuition. We used a two-response paradigm in which people were required to give a fast intuitive response under time pressure and cognitive load and afterwards were given the time to deliberate. We used a direction-of change analysis to check whether correct responses were generated intuitively or whether they resulted from deliberate correction (i.e., an initial incorrect-to-correct final response change). Results showed that although cognitive capacity was associated with the correction tendency (overall r = 0.22) it primarily predicted correct intuitive responding (overall r = 0.44). These findings force us to rethink the nature of sound reasoning and the role of cognitive capacity in reasoning. Rather than being good at deliberately correcting erroneous intuitions, smart reasoners simply seem to have more accurate intuitions.

When more is less in financial decision-making: financial literacy magnifies framing effects

In recent years, the financial world has become more complex and intricate. In this context, numeracy and, particularly, financial literacy, are seen as paramount in providing consumers with the knowledge and confidence required to take part in financial markets. Despite some indicative empirical findings, it is still to be ascertained how the two competences differentially contribute to the quality of decision-making in financial contexts. Furthermore, it is still unknown to what degree financial literacy and numeracy, taken as relevant mind-ware for financial decision-making, are effective in guarding against well-documented biases such as loss aversion and framing effects. This study aims to clarify these issues by employing an experimental task, conceived as an approximation to real-world decision-making involving the sale of shares. Our results suggest that numeracy and financial literacy affect decision-making differently in a pattern that, in part, runs counter to conventional economic theory. The data indicate that numeracy promotes a pattern of choices closer to economic rationality, while financial literacy can prove counterproductive and may amplify cognitive biases, namely framing effects and loss aversion. The outcomes are interpreted in light of dual-process theories, and the political implications discussed.

How to Get Rid of the Belief Bias: Boosting Analytical Thinking via Pragmatics

The previous research attempts to reduce the influence of the belief bias on deductive thinking have often been unsuccessful and, when they succeeded, they failed to replicate. In this paper, we propose a new way to see an old problem. Instead of considering the analytical abilities of the respondent, we focus on the communicative characteristics of the experimental task. By changing the pragmatics into play through a subtle manipulation of the instruction of the syllogism problem, we obtained a strong improvement in the accuracy of the performance in both untrained and trained in logic respondents. We suggest that current models of deductive thinking should be broadened to consider also communicative understanding as part of the processing of the problem.

When (and When Not) to Make Exceptions: Links among Age, Precedent Setting Decisions, and Argument Evaluation

Negative precedents are set when, in the absence of mitigating conditions, social rules are not enforced by relevant authorities. This study examined the effects of normative (i.e., to enforce rules) and nonnormative arguments (i.e., to "make exceptions") on decisions that could establish negative precedents and whether those effects differed for children and adolescents. As expected, on baseline problems, age correlated positively with decision-making performance. After receiving normative arguments, normative decisions increased and adolescents-but not preadolescents-transferred their understanding to novel problems. Nonnormative arguments led to decrements in normative decisions across ages. However, only for preadolescents did performance decrements following nonnormative arguments transfer to novel problems. Discussion focuses on the abilities to engage in "metacognitive intercession," variability in children's and adolescents' decisions, and developments in the understanding of the consequences of violating the social rules.

Applying Item Response Theory to Develop a Shortened Version of the Need for Cognition Scale

The 18-item Need for Cognition Scale (NFC-18) is the most commonly used tool to measure the need for cognition. The aim of this study was to explore the possibility of developing an abbreviated version of the scale, applying the item response theory (IRTirt). Item response theory analyses suggested the exclusion of eight items that did not perform well in measuring the latent trait. The resulting 10-item scale (NFC-10), which included highly discriminative items, covered the same range of the measured trait as the original scale and showed high measurement precision along various levels of the trait. Additionally, since IRT analyses can only confirm the accuracy of the short scale in measuring the underlying construct, we sought to replicate the nomological net of the NFC-18 using the shortened version of the scale. The results showed that the NFC-10 reflects an adequate operationalization of the construct, in line with the longer version. In particular, as expected, the NFC-10 showed moderate relations with various measures of cognitive skills and self-report measures of cognitive styles, confidence, and anxiety. These findings confirm that we have obtained a much shorter version of the NFC that maintains excellent reliability and validity

Statistical numeracy as a moderator of (pseudo)contingency effects on decision behavior

Pseudocontingencies denote contingency estimates inferred from base rates rather than from cell frequencies. We examined the role of statistical numeracy for effects of such fallible but adaptive inferences on choice behavior. In Experiment 1, we provided information on single observations as well as on base rates and tracked participants' eye movements. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the availability of information on cell frequencies and base rates between conditions. Our results demonstrate that a focus on base rates rather than cell frequencies benefits pseudocontingency effects. Learners who are more proficient in (conditional) probability calculation prefer to rely on cell frequencies in order to judge contingencies, though, as was evident from their gaze behavior. If cell frequencies are available in summarized format, they may infer the true contingency between options and outcomes. Otherwise, however, even highly numerate learners are susceptible to pseudocontingency effects.

The Rationality of Risky Decisions

Over the years research in risky decision making has diagnosed variable degrees of irrationality in people's judgements and choices. In the 1960s an optimistic view dominated of a widely rational decision maker. The work of Tversky and Kahneman at the beginning of the 1970s led to a pessimistic view of basically flawed decision processes that frequently end up in `cognitive illusions'. In the 1980s a movement gained strength that pointed to the adaptiveness of seemingly irrational decisions. Recent work demonstrates that seemingly irrational choices may be due to different task construal between experimenters and participants. The respective evaluative change in what the rationality issue is generally taken to show is overdue, however. The negative message of fundamentally flawed human decision making has to be replaced by a more positive picture that acknowledges that some reactions to task and context are advantages rather than disadvantages of human decision making. Recent work on systems of thinking shows that different task construals can be meaningfully related to different systems of thinking, thus enabling a more unbiased treatment of the rationality issue.

Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate

Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.

Disadvantageous Deck Selection in the Iowa Gambling Task: The Effect of Cognitive Load

Research has shown that cognitive load affects overall Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) performance, but it is unknown whether such load impacts the selection of the individual decks that correspond to gains or losses. Here, participants performed the IGT either in a full attention condition or while engaged in a number monitoring task to divide attention. Results showed that the full attention group was more aware of the magnitude of gains or losses for each draw (i.e., payoff awareness) than was the divided attention group. However, the divided attention group was more sensitive to the frequency of the losses (i.e., frequency awareness), as evidenced by their increased preference for Deck B, which is the large but infrequent loss deck. An analysis across blocks showed that the number monitoring group was consistently more aware of loss frequency, whereas the full attention group shifted between awareness of loss frequency and awareness of payoff amount. Furthermore, the full attention group was better able to weigh loss frequency and payoff amount when making deck selections. These findings support the notion that diminished cognitive resources may result in greater selection of Deck B, otherwise known as the prominent Deck B phenomenon.

Good thinking or gut feeling? Cognitive reflection and intuition in traders, bankers and financial non-experts

The current study investigated differences in decision-making style and risk-taking between financial traders, non-trading bank employees, and people not working in finance. Traders scored significantly higher than participants in the other two groups on the cognitive reflection test (CRT) which measures the tendency to inhibit automatic but frequently false responses in reasoning tasks. Scores for traders compared to people outside the banking sector were also higher on a self-rated scale for reflective thinking in decision-making, but there were no differences in self-rated intuitive thinking between groups. Financial risk-taking correlated with cognitive reflection scores and was significantly lower in the non-expert group compared to the other groups working in financial services. Traders in the current study showed no elevated preference to use ‘intuition’ in their decision-making compared to other groups. Overall, these results indicate that compared to non-expert participants financial traders have a higher self-rated tendency for reflective thinking and a greater propensity to inhibit the use of mental shortcuts (heuristics) in decision-making.

Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories

Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic, and social outcomes, requiring reliable methods of reducing such belief. Thinking dispositions have been highlighted as one possible factor associated with belief in conspiracy theories, but actual relationships have only been infrequently studied. In Study 1, we examined associations between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of measures of thinking dispositions in a British sample (N=990). Results indicated that a stronger belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with lower analytic thinking and open-mindedness and greater intuitive thinking. In Studies 2-4, we examined the causational role played by analytic thinking in relation to conspiracist ideation. In Study 2 (N=112), we showed that a verbal fluency task that elicited analytic thinking reduced belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 3 (N=189), we found that an alternative method of eliciting analytic thinking, which related to cognitive disfluency, was effective at reducing conspiracist ideation in a student sample. In Study 4, we replicated the results of Study 3 among a general population sample (N=140) in relation to generic conspiracist ideation and belief in conspiracy theories about the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. Our results highlight the potential utility of supporting attempts to promote analytic thinking as a means of countering the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories.

O processo decisório descrito pelo indivíduo e representado nos sistemas de apoio à decisão

Este estudo teve como objetivo verificar se um Sistema de Apoio à Decisão (SAD) reproduz o processo de decisão humana. Para isso, tomaram-se, como base, os elementos fundamentais do método Processo Analítico Hierárquico (AHP), de Saaty (1991), que permitiu constituir cinco categorias de análise. Assim, por meio de um experimento em laboratório, foi realizada a tarefa de escolha de notebook sob duas maneiras: com e sem auxílio de um SAD, no qual foi utilizado o protocolo verbal think aloud, tendo somente a mente do indivíduo como guia da decisão. A apresentação dos resultados exibiu diferença significativa para quatro das cinco categorias de análise. Por meio dos testes de hipóteses, a única categoria que não teve diferença significativa em ambas as tarefas foi a ordem de escolha dos critérios. Com relação às demais categorias, não foi encontrada comprovação estatística para afirmar que o processo se assemelha ao processo de decisão com o auxílio de um SAD, embora o resultado final da decisão tenha sido o mesmo. Por tal razão, a hipótese deste estudo não pode ser confirmada, não sendo possível afirmar que um SAD reproduz o processo de decisão humana. Com relação ao comportamento do decisor, sobre as opções de busca de informações, pode-se dizer que o processo se assemelha em ambas as tarefas, uma vez que o decisor buscou as informações por critério.

The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is designed to measure the tendency to override a prepotent response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response. In this study, we showed that the CRT is a more potent predictor of performance on a wide sample of tasks from the heuristics-and-biases literature than measures of cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and executive functioning. Although the CRT has a substantial correlation with cognitive ability, a series of regression analyses indicated that the CRT was a unique predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks. It accounted for substantial additional variance after the other measures of individual differences had been statistically controlled. We conjecture that this is because neither intelligence tests nor measures of executive functioning assess the tendency toward miserly processing in the way that the CRT does. We argue that the CRT is a particularly potent measure of the tendency toward miserly processing because it is a performance measure rather than a self-report measure.

Decision-making heuristics and biases across the life span

We outline a contextual and motivational model of judgment and decision-making (JDM) biases across the life span. Our model focuses on abilities and skills that correspond to deliberative, experiential, and affective decision-making processes. We review research that addresses links between JDM biases and these processes as represented by individual differences in specific abilities and skills (e.g., fluid and crystallized intelligence, executive functioning, emotion regulation, personality traits). We focus on two JDM biases-the sunk-cost fallacy (SCF) and the framing effect. We trace the developmental trajectory of each bias from preschool through middle childhood, adolescence, early adulthood, and later adulthood. We conclude that life-span developmental trajectories differ depending on the bias investigated. Existing research suggests relative stability in the framing effect across the life span and decreases in the SCF with age, including in later life. We highlight directions for future research on JDM biases across the life span, emphasizing the need for process-oriented research and research that increases our understanding of JDM biases in people's everyday lives.

Correlations of cognitive reflection with judgments and choices

We investigated the role of individual differences in cognitive reflection in decision making. We measured the performance of 157 participants in the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005) and a number of decision-making tasks. We examined the relation of cognitive reflection with performance in tasks that assess correspondence (as distinct from coherence), such as predicting the ratings of chess players. We found significant correlations between cognitive reflection and all the estimation measures in correspondence tasks. Our results suggest that cognitive reflection is a thinking disposition that includes more characteristics than originally proposed by Frederick (2005). We proposed that cognitive reflection is related to the concept of actively open-minded thinking (Baron, 1985, 2008). We concluded that cognitive reflection is a thinking disposition that interacts with knowledge, domain-specific heuristics and characteristics of the environment and that it may play an essential role in the adaptation of the decision maker to different environments and situations.

Memory reflected in our decisions: Higher working memory capacity predicts greater bias in risky choice

The current study looks at the role working memory plays in risky-choice framing. Eighty-six participants took the Automatic OSPAN, a measurement of working memory; this was followed by a risky-choice framing task. Participants with high working memory capacities demonstrated well pronounced framing effects, while those with low working memory capacities did not. This pattern suggests that, in a typical risky-choice decision task, elaborative encoding of task information by those with high working memory capacity may lead them to a more biased decision compared to those with low working memory.

A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality

Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional corrections of intuitive judgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view of intuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilled and successful.

Is probability matching smart? Associations between probabilistic choices and cognitive ability

In three experiments involving over 1,500 university students (n = 1,557) and two different probabilistic choice tasks, we found that the utility-maximizing strategy of choosing the most probable alternative was not the majority response. In a story problem version of a probabilistic choice task in which participants chose from among five different strategies,the maximizing response and the probability-matching response were each selected by a similar number of students (roughly 35% of the sample selected each). In a more continuous, or trial-by-trial, task, the utility-maximizing response was chosen by only one half as many students asthe probability-matching response. More important, in both versions of the task, the participants preferring the utility-maximizing response were significantly higher in cognitive ability than were the participants showing a probability-matching tendency. Critiques of the traditional interpretation of probability matching as nonoptimal may well help explain why some humans are drawn to the nonmaximizing behavior of probability matching, but the traditional heuristics and biases interpretation can most easily accommodate the finding that participants high in computational ability are more likely to carry out the rule-based cognitive procedures that lead to maximizing behavior.

Heuristic and analytic processing: age trends and associations with cognitive ability and cognitive styles

Developmental and individual differences in the tendency to favor analytic responses over heuristic responses were examined in children of two different ages (10- and 11-year-olds versus 13-year-olds), and of widely varying cognitive ability. Three tasks were examined that all required analytic processing to override heuristic processing: inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning under conditions of belief bias, and probabilistic reasoning. Significant increases in analytic responding with development were observed on the first two tasks. Cognitive ability was associated with analytic responding on all three tasks. Cognitive style measures such as actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition explained variance in analytic responding on the tasks after variance shared with cognitive ability had been controlled. The implications for dual-process theories of cognition and cognitive development are discussed.

Rationality

This chapter reviews selected findings in research on reasoning, judgment, and choice and considers the systematic ways in which people violate basic requirements of the corresponding normative analyses. Recent objections to the empirical findings are then considered; these objections question the findings' relevance to assumptions about rationality. These objections address the adequacy of the tasks used in the aforementioned research and the appropriateness of the critical interpretation of participants' responses, as well as the justifiability of some of the theoretical assumptions made by experimenters. The objections are each found not to seriously impinge on the general conclusion that people often violate tenets of rationality in inadvisable ways. In the process, relevant psychological constructs, ranging from cognitive ability and need for cognition, to dual process theories and the role of incentives, are discussed. It is proposed that the rationality critique is compelling and rightfully gaining influence in the social sciences in general.