The Wreckage of Our Flesh: Dementia, Autonomy and Personhood. In: Denier Y, Gastmans C, Vandevelde A, editors. Justice, Luck & Responsibility in Health Care. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands; 2013. pp. 189-203. [DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-5335-8_11]

Revisiting respect for persons: conceptual analysis and implications for clinical practice

In everyday conversations, professional codes, policy debates, and academic literature, the concept of respect is referred to frequently. Bioethical arguments in recent decades equate the idea of respect for persons with individuals who are capable of autonomous decision-making, with the focus being explicitly on 'autonomy,' 'capacity,' or 'capability.' In much of bioethics literature, respect for persons is replaced by respect for autonomy. Though the unconditional respect for persons and their autonomy (irrespective of actual decision-making capacity) is established in Kantian bioethics, current argument and debates often revolve around a thin concept of autonomy, focusing on capacity and capability: persons are owed respect because they are 'rational beings' or with a focus on 'agency' and 'decision-making abilities.' However, these aspects alone are insufficient while engaging the concept of respect for persons, particularly in healthcare settings. This paper sets out to explore if the concept of respect for persons-as opposed to a thin concept of autonomy-could help us engage better in healthcare practices. We shall probe the practical value of the experiential aspect of respect-understood as the recognition of persons as respect-worthy through certain dispositions and deliberative acts-by reflecting on instances in clinical practice that tend to be dismissed as negligible or even unavoidable in a stressful environment such as a busy hospital. We shall argue that these instances are far from trivial but carry moral significance and express an unacceptable-disrespectful-attitude that can compromise the moral habitus in hospital settings. In our conclusion, we call for practicing recognition respect in the health professional-patient encounter by focussing on manners, attitudes, and behaviors. Furthermore, we call for continuous medical ethics education programs to address the moral significance of disrespectful behaviors and their manifestations in particular socio-cultural contexts.

Intimacy and Sexuality in Institutionalized Dementia Care: Clinical-Ethical Considerations

Intimacy and sexuality expressed by nursing home residents with dementia remains an ethically sensitive issue for care facilities, nursing staff and family members. Dealing with residents' sexual longings and behaviour is extremely difficult, putting a burden on the caregivers as well as on the residents themselves and their relatives. The parties in question often do not know how to react when residents express themselves sexually. The overall aim of this article is to provide a number of clinical-ethical considerations addressing the following question: 'How can expressions of intimacy and sexuality by residents with dementia be dealt with in an ethically responsible way?' The considerations formulated are based on two cornerstones: (1) the current literature on older peoples' experiences regarding intimacy and sexuality after the onset of dementia, and (2) an anthropological-ethical framework addressing four fundamental pillars of human existence namely the decentred self, human embodiment, being-in-the-world and being-with-others. The resulting considerations are oriented toward the individual sphere, the partnership sphere, and the institutional sphere. The continuous interaction between these spheres leads to orientations that both empower the residents in question and respect the complex network of relationships that surrounds them.

Autonomy, Trust, and Respect

This article seeks to explore and analyze the relationship between autonomy and trust, and to show how these findings could be relevant to medical ethics. First, I will argue that the way in which so-called "relational autonomy theories" tie the notions of autonomy and trust together is not entirely satisfying Then, I will introduce the so-called Encapsulated Interest Account as developed by Russell Hardin. This will bring out the importance of the reasons for trust. What good reasons do we have for trusting someone? I will criticize Hardin's business model as insufficiently robust, especially in the context of health care, and then turn to another source of trust, namely, love. It may seem that trust-through-love is much better suited for the vulnerability that is often involved in health care, but I will also show that it has its own deficiencies. Good health care should therefore pay attention to both models of trust, and I will offer some tentative remarks on how to do this.