Bioconservatism, bioliberalism, and the wisdom of reflecting on repugnance

Ethics and responsibility in biohybrid robotics research

The industrial revolution of the 19th century marked the onset of an era of machines and robots that transformed societies. Since the beginning of the 21st century, a new generation of robots envisions similar societal transformation. These robots are biohybrid: part living and part engineered. They may self-assemble and emerge from complex interactions between living cells. While this new era of living robots presents unprecedented opportunities for positive societal impact, it also poses a host of ethical challenges. A systematic, nuanced examination of these ethical issues is of paramount importance to guide the evolution of this nascent field. Multidisciplinary fields face the challenge that inertia around collective action to address ethical boundaries may result in unexpected consequences for researchers and societies alike. In this Perspective, we i) clarify the ethical challenges associated with biohybrid robotics, ii) discuss the need for and elements of a potential governance framework tailored to this technology; and iii) propose tangible steps toward ethical compliance and policy formation in the field of biohybrid robotics.

The Socio-Political Roles of Neuroethics and the Case of Klotho

An increasing amount of very diverse scholarship self-identifies as belonging to the field of neuroethics, illuminating a need to provide some reference points for what that field actually entails. We argue that neuroethics is a single field with distinct perspectives, roles, and subspecialties. We propose that-in addition to the three traditional perspectives delineated by Eric Racine-a fourth, socio-political perspective, must be recognized in neuroethics. The socio-political perspective in neuroethics focuses on the interplay between the behavioral as well as the brain sciences and the socio-political system; this interplay includes social regulation in addition to all other realistic elements of social and political neurodiscourses. Thus, defining what-if any-roles the socio-political perspective in neuroethics might have is a pressing issue. Doing so could provide guidance for defining the criteria for prospective ethical evaluations in neuroethics. A promising approach to doing this could be by describing the roles of neuroethics in terms of the more concrete examples of the roles of political philosophy in general, as in the tradition of John Rawls. We take klotho, the supposed "longevity protein," as a modern neuroethics case to exemplify the obstacles faced in securing neuroethics' legitimacy and how the Rawlsian framework we propose may be applied to handle cases such as this. Ultimately, the socio-political perspective in neuroethics should not be swayed by the media hype and ought to offer useful ethical guidance and articulation of genuine ethical concerns to policy makers and the public alike.

The role of philosophy and ethics at the edges of medicine

BACKGROUND

The edge metaphor is ubiquitous in describing the present situation in the world, and nowhere is this as clearly visible as in medicine. "The edge of medicine" has become the title of books, scholarly articles, media headlines, and lecture series and seems to be imbued with hype, hope, and aversion. In order better to understand what is at stake at "the edge of medicine" this article addresses three questions: What does "the edge of medicine" mean in contemporary debates on modern medicine? What are the challenges "on the edge of medicine" (in these various meanings of "on the edge")? How can philosophy and ethics contribute with addressing these challenges?

METHODS

Literature searches in PubMed and Google Scholar are used to identify uses of the phrase "the edge of medicine" while conventional content analysis is used to analyze meanings of and challenges with "the edge of medicine." These results are then investigated with respect to how philosophy and ethics can address the identified challenges.

RESULTS

The literature reveals that "the edge of medicine" has many meanings, such as: Border; Margin (of life); Frontier; Forefront; Fringes; Plunge (abyss); Brink (verge); Conflict; and Balancing. In general, the various meanings address four basic challenges: setting limits, keeping control, make meaning, and handling conflicts or aporias. The analysis of each of the meanings of "the edge of medicine" identifies a wide range of important and urgent tasks for the humanities in general, and for philosophy and ethics in particular: 1) clarifying concepts; 2) clarifying assumptions and premises of arguments, methods, advice, and decisions; 3) elaborate new concepts and new theories; 4) conceptualize and handle uncertainty, moral regret, and residue; 5) reveal "the emperor's new clothes;" 6) identify trends and reflect on their implications; 7) demarcation; and 8) reflecting on goodness in medicine.

CONCLUSION

The phrase "the edge of medicine" expresses a wide range of challenges for modern health care. Together with other disciplines philosophy and ethics can and should make crucial contributions at "the edge of medicine," which is where the future of human beings and societies is created and formed.

Who Will Be the Members of Society 5.0? Towards an Anthropology of Technologically Posthumanized Future Societies

The Government of Japan’s “Society 5.0” initiative aims to create a cyber-physical society in which (among other things) citizens’ daily lives will be enhanced through increasingly close collaboration with artificially intelligent systems. However, an apparent paradox lies at the heart of efforts to create a more “human-centered” society in which human beings will live alongside a proliferating array of increasingly autonomous social robots and embodied AI. This study seeks to investigate the presumed human-centeredness of Society 5.0 by comparing its makeup with that of earlier societies. By distinguishing “technological” and “non-technological” processes of posthumanization and applying a phenomenological anthropological model, this study demonstrates: (1) how the diverse types of human and non-human members expected to participate in Society 5.0 differ qualitatively from one another; (2) how the dynamics that will shape the membership of Society 5.0 can be conceptualized; and (3) how the anticipated membership of Society 5.0 differs from that of Societies 1.0 through 4.0. This study describes six categories of prospective human and non-human members of Society 5.0 and shows that all six have analogues in earlier societies, which suggests that social scientific analysis of past societies may shed unexpected light on the nature of Society 5.0.

Limits to human enhancement: nature, disease, therapy or betterment?

BACKGROUND

New technologies facilitate the enhancement of a wide range of human dispositions, capacities, or abilities. While it is argued that we need to set limits to human enhancement, it is unclear where we should find resources to set such limits.

DISCUSSION

Traditional routes for setting limits, such as referring to nature, the therapy-enhancement distinction, and the health-disease distinction, turn out to have some shortcomings. However, upon closer scrutiny the concept of enhancement is based on vague conceptions of what is to be enhanced. Explaining why it is better to become older, stronger, and more intelligent presupposes a clear conception of goodness, which is seldom provided. In particular, the qualitative better is frequently confused with the quantitative more. We may therefore not need "external" measures for setting its limits - they are available in the concept of enhancement itself. While there may be shortcomings in traditional sources of limit setting to human enhancement, such as nature, therapy, and disease, such approaches may not be necessary. The specification-of-betterment problem inherent in the conception of human enhancement itself provides means to restrict its unwarranted proliferation. We only need to demand clear, sustainable, obtainable goals for enhancement that are based on evidence, and not on lofty speculations, hypes, analogies, or weak associations. Human enhancements that specify what will become better, and provide adequate evidence, are good and should be pursued. Others should not be accepted.

The is and ought of the Ethics of Neuroenhancement: Mind the Gap

Ethical perspectives on the use of stimulants to enhance human cognitive performance (neuroenhancement) are polarized between conservative and liberal theories offering opposing advice on whether individuals have a right to use neuroenhancers and what the social outcomes of neuroenhancement might be. Meanwhile, empirical evidence shows modest prevalence and guarded public attitudes toward the neuroenhancement use of stimulants. In this Perspective, we argue that the dissonance between the prescriptions of ethical theories (what ought to be) and empirical evidence (what is) has impaired our understanding of neuroenhancement practices. This dissonance is a result of three common errors in research on the ethics of neuroenhancement: (1) expecting that public perspectives will conform to a prescriptive ethical framework; (2) ignoring the socio-economic infrastructures that influence individuals' decisions on whether or not to use neuroenhancement; and (3) overlooking conflicts between fundamental ethical values namely, safety of neuroenhancement and autonomy. We argue that in order to understand neuroenhancement practices it is essential to recognize which values affect individual decisions to use or refuse to use neuroenhancement. Future research on the ethics of neuroenhancement should assess the morally significant values for stakeholders. This will fill the gap between what ought to be done and what is done with an improved understanding of what can be done within a particular context. Clarifying conflicts between competing moral values is critical in conducting research on the efficacy of substances putatively used for neuroenhancement and also on neuroenhancement practices within academic, professional and social environments.

Emotional reactions to human reproductive cloning

BACKGROUND

Extant surveys of people's attitudes towards human reproductive cloning focus on moral judgements alone, not emotional reactions or sentiments. This is especially important given that some (especially Leon Kass) have argued against such cloning on the ground that it engenders widespread negative emotions, like disgust, that provide a moral guide.

OBJECTIVE

To provide some data on emotional reactions to human cloning, with a focus on repugnance, given its prominence in the literature.

METHODS

This brief mixed-method study measures the self-reported attitudes and emotions (positive or negative) towards cloning from a sample of participants in the USA.

RESULTS

Most participants condemned cloning as immoral and said it should be illegal. The most commonly reported positive sentiment was by far interest/curiosity. Negative emotions were much more varied, but anxiety was the most common. Only about a third of participants selected disgust or repugnance as something they felt, and an even smaller portion had this emotion come to mind prior to seeing a list of options.

CONCLUSIONS

Participants felt primarily interested and anxious about human reproductive cloning. They did not primarily feel disgust or repugnance. This provides initial empirical evidence that such a reaction is not appropriately widespread.

Disgust in bioethics

“Dissecting Bioethics,” edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Häyry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics.

The section is dedicated to the idea that words defined by bioethicists and others should not be allowed to imprison people’s actual concerns, emotions, and thoughts. Papers that expose the many meanings of a concept, describe the different readings of a moral doctrine, or provide an alternative angle to seemingly self-evident issues are therefore particularly appreciated.

The themes covered in the section so far include dignity, naturalness, public interest, community, disability, autonomy, parity of reasoning, symbolic appeals, and toleration.

All submitted papers are peer reviewed. To submit a paper or to discuss a suitable topic, contact Tuija Takala attuija.takala@helsinki.fi.