Cognitive control of feature bindings: evidence from children with autistic spectrum disorder

Instructed speed and accuracy affect binding

In the past few decades, binding and retrieval mechanisms have gained increased interest in research on human action control. Recent studies show that these mechanisms also play a role in the control of multiple independent actions. Here, two or more successively executed responses seem to be bound to each other so that repeating one of them can retrieve the other, affecting performance in this second response and resulting in so-called response-response binding effects. Binding effects are typically found in the response time data and, somewhat less reliably, also in the error rates. Whether binding effects show in the response times, the error rates, or both, is likely influenced by the current speed-accuracy settings of the participants, with binding effects more likely showing in error rates under a speed setting, while more likely showing in RTs under an accuracy setting. Alternatively, different speed-accuracy settings might also entail changes in executive control, affecting the size of observed binding effects. In this study, we tested these assumptions by comparing binding effects under different speed-accuracy settings that were induced via instructions focusing on speed, accuracy, or both (ambivalent). Binding effects were observed in response times independent of instructions, while in error rates, they only showed under speed or ambivalent instructions. These findings indicate that binding effects can be affected by instructions regarding speed and accuracy.

Partial repetition costs index a mixture of binding and signaling

People respond more slowly in two-choice tasks when either a previous stimulus feature or the previous response repeats in partial repetition trials than when (a) both repeat in complete repetition trials or (b) both alternate in complete alternation trials. The binding account posits that such partial repetition costs index a memory-retrieval conflict, which occurs because partial repetition trials trigger the retrieval of a previous stimulus feature or response that conflicts with a current stimulus feature or response. However, such costs may additionally reflect a simple decision-making heuristic that uses the repetition or alternation of a previous stimulus feature as a "signal" to bias response selection toward a repetition or an alternation of the previous response. To determine whether signaling contributes to partial repetition costs, we employed a four-choice task. Here, a stimulus feature repetition still signals a response repetition, but a stimulus feature alternation does not signal which of the three remaining responses to make. Consistent with an influence of signaling, we sometimes observed complete repetition advantages without complete alternation advantages. Exploratory analyses further revealed that partial repetition costs measured more broadly were smaller in the four-choice task than in a matched two-choice task. These findings suggest that partial repetition costs index a mixture of binding and signaling.

Creating Environmental Health Leaders When Educators Are Learning Too

The climate crisis is upon us, already exacting a health cost, with likely acceleration over our lifetimes. Our existing medical curricula do not adequately prepare medical students to deal with climate health nor to be leaders in the public health sphere. Current faculty have themselves not often been exposed to climate health training nor often to leadership training. This affords a unique opportunity for creative implementation of strategies to educate both faculty and students on how leadership skill building can complement the science and policy of climate health.

Leadership in Education, Medical Education and Health

We observe the impact of quality of leadership in our daily lives [...].

The Control of Event-File Management

According to the Theory of Event Coding, both perceived and self-produced events are coded by binding codes of the features of these events into event files. Here I argue that distinguishing between the actual binding process and the retrieval of event files is empirically difficult but theoretically important. As a first step towards disentangling these processes, I provide a brief overview of what the available evidence tells us with respect to the control of the binding process and the control of the retrieval process. I argue that there is not much evidence for selectivity of the binding process: Various kinds of stimuli and actions seem to be spontaneously integrated under various conditions, and there is increasing evidence that emotions, task instructions, and task context are coded into event files as well. On the other hand, there is increasing evidence for a high degree of selectivity of the retrieval process, suggesting that most if not all observations of effective impact on event files reflect an impact on retrieval, but not binding proper. I conclude by pointing out open questions and issues.

Bottom-up influences on voluntary task switching in different reward contexts?

In humans, voluntary task switching is susceptible to bottom-up influences like a switch of the target stimulus identity (Mayr & Bell, 2006). A recent study with ants (Czaczkes, Koch, Fröber, & Dreisbach, 2018) has shown that even irrelevant cue changes increase switching behavior, but only if they are presented within a high-reward context. To investigate whether a reward context would also increase switching behavior in response to meaningless cue changes in humans, we conducted two voluntary task switching experiments. On each trial, participants chose between two tasks preceded by one of two different color cues. Reward prospect was manipulated between blocks (Experiment 1: no vs. high reward; Experiment 2: low vs. high reward). In both experiments, the cue change did not modulate the voluntary switch rate. However, the voluntary switch rate was significantly lower in high-reward blocks as compared to no-reward or low-reward blocks. This suggests that bottom-up influences on deliberate task switching in humans are limited to task-relevant information. Moreover, the finding of a decreased voluntary switch rate within a high-reward context further supports the claim that unchanged high reward prospect promotes cognitive stability.

Autism Symptoms, Executive Functioning and Academic Progress in Higher Education Students

Many students with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) attending higher education drop out prematurely. The predictive value of self-reported daily executive functioning (EF) and (cognitive) performance-based EF (mental flexibility and working memory) for academic progress was evaluated in 54 young adults with ASD (M_age = 22.5, SD = 2.4, 72% male). Regression analyses showed that autism symptom severity explained 12% of variance in academic progress, which was raised to 36% by adding self-reported daily EF, and to 25% by adding performance-based EF. It is suggested that EF is a candidate marker for academic progress in higher education students with ASD and a candidate target for early intervention.

Rumination impairs the control of stimulus-induced retrieval of irrelevant information, but not attention, control, or response selection in general

The aim of the study was to throw more light on the relationship between rumination and cognitive-control processes. Seventy-eight adults were assessed with respect to rumination tendencies by means of the LEIDS-r before performing a Stroop task, an event-file task assessing the automatic retrieval of irrelevant information, an attentional set-shifting task, and the Attentional Network Task, which provided scores for alerting, orienting, and executive control functioning. The size of the Stroop effect and irrelevant retrieval in the event-five task were positively correlated with the tendency to ruminate, while all other scores did not correlate with any rumination scale. Controlling for depressive tendencies eliminated the Stroop-related finding (an observation that may account for previous failures to replicate), but not the event-file finding. Taken altogether, our results suggest that rumination does not affect attention, executive control, or response selection in general, but rather selectively impairs the control of stimulus-induced retrieval of irrelevant information.

Brief Sensory Training Narrows the Temporal Binding Window and Enhances Long-Term Multimodal Speech Perception

Our ability to integrate multiple sensory-based representations of our surrounding supplies us with a more holistic view of our world. There are many complex algorithms our nervous system uses to construct a coherent perception. An indicator to solve this 'binding problem' are the temporal characteristics with the specificity that environmental information has different propagation speeds (e.g., sound and electromagnetic waves) and sensory processing time and thus the temporal relationship of a stimulus pair derived from the same event must be flexibly adjusted by our brain. This tolerance can be conceptualized in the form of the cross-modal temporal binding window (TBW). Several studies showed the plasticity of the TBW and its importance concerning audio-visual illusions, synesthesia, as well as psychiatric disturbances. Using three audio-visual paradigms, we investigated the importance of length (short vs. long) as well as modality (uni- vs. multimodal) of a perceptual training aiming at reducing the TBW in a healthy population. We also investigated the influence of the TBW on speech intelligibility, where participants had to integrate auditory and visual speech information from a videotaped speaker. We showed that simple sensory trainings can change the TBW and are capable of optimizing speech perception at a very naturalistic level. While the training-length had no different effect on the malleability of the TBW, the multisensory trainings induced a significantly stronger narrowing of the TBW than their unisensory counterparts. Furthermore, a narrowing of the TBW was associated with a better performance in speech perception, meaning that participants showed a greater capacity for integrating informations from different sensory modalities in situations with one modality impaired. All effects persisted at least seven days. Our findings show the significance of multisensory temporal processing regarding ecologically valid measures and have important clinical implications for interventions that may be used to alleviate debilitating conditions (e.g., autism, schizophrenia), in which multisensory temporal function is shown to be impaired.

Theory of Event Coding (TEC) V2.0: Representing and controlling perception and action

This article provides an update of the Theory of Event Coding (TEC), which claims that perception and action are identical processes operating on the same codes - event files consisting of integrated networks of sensorimotor feature codes. The original version of the theory emphasized its representational underpinnings, but recent theoretical developments provide the basis for a more integrated view consisting of both the codes that are shared between perception and action in the control processes operating on these codes. Four developments are discussed in more detail: The degree to which the integration and retrieval of event files depends on current goals, how metacontrol states impact the handling of event files, how feature binding relates to event learning, and how the integration of non-social events relates to the integration of social events. Case examples using various versions of the Simon task are used to explain how the new version of TEC explains interactions between perception and action in non-social and social situations.

The effect of gamma-enhancing binaural beats on the control of feature bindings

Binaural beats represent the auditory experience of an oscillating sound that occurs when two sounds with neighboring frequencies are presented to one’s left and right ear separately. Binaural beats have been shown to impact information processing via their putative role in increasing neural synchronization. Recent studies of feature-repetition effects demonstrated interactions between perceptual features and action-related features: repeating only some, but not all features of a perception–action episode hinders performance. These partial-repetition (or binding) costs point to the existence of temporary episodic bindings (event files) that are automatically retrieved by repeating at least one of their features. Given that neural synchronization in the gamma band has been associated with visual feature bindings, we investigated whether the impact of binaural beats extends to the top-down control of feature bindings. Healthy adults listened to gamma-frequency (40 Hz) binaural beats or to a constant tone of 340 Hz (control condition) for ten minutes before and during a feature-repetition task. While the size of visuomotor binding costs (indicating the binding of visual and action features) was unaffected by the binaural beats, the size of visual feature binding costs (which refer to the binding between the two visual features) was considerably smaller during gamma-frequency binaural beats exposure than during the control condition. Our results suggest that binaural beats enhance selectivity in updating episodic memory traces and further strengthen the hypothesis that neural activity in the gamma band is critically associated with the control of feature binding.

Disrupted development and imbalanced function in the global neuronal workspace: a positive-feedback mechanism for the emergence of ASD in early infancy

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is increasingly being conceptualized as a spectrum disorder of connectome development. We review evidence suggesting that ASD is characterized by a positive feedback loop that amplifies small functional variations in early-developing sensory-processing pathways into structural and functional imbalances in the global neuronal workspace. Using vision as an example, we discuss how early functional variants in visual processing may be feedback-amplified to produce variant object categories and disrupted top-down expectations, atypically large expectation-to-perception mismatches, problems re-identifying individual people and objects, socially inappropriate, generally aversive emotional responses and disrupted sensory-motor coordination. Viewing ASD in terms of feedback amplification of small functional variants allows a number of recent models of ASD to be integrated with neuroanatomical, neurofunctional and genetic data.

What's in a "face file"? Feature binding with facial identity, emotion, and gaze direction

A series of four experiments investigated the binding of facial (i.e., facial identity, emotion, and gaze direction) and non-facial (i.e., spatial location and response location) attributes. Evidence for the creation and retrieval of temporary memory face structures across perception and action has been adduced. These episodic structures-dubbed herein "face files"-consisted of both visuo-visuo and visuo-motor bindings. Feature binding was indicated by partial-repetition costs. That is repeating a combination of facial features or altering them altogether, led to faster responses than repeating or alternating only one of the features. Taken together, the results indicate that: (a) "face files" affect both action and perception mechanisms, (b) binding can take place with facial dimensions and is not restricted to low-level features (Hommel, Visual Cognition 5:183-216, 1998), and (c) the binding of facial and non-facial attributes is facilitated if the dimensions share common spatial or motor codes. The theoretical contributions of these results to "person construal" theories (Freeman, & Ambady, Psychological Science, 20(10), 1183-1188, 2011), as well as to face recognition models (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, Biological Psychiatry, 51(1), 59-67, 2000) are discussed.

On the Temporal Precision of Thought: Individual Differences in the Multisensory Temporal Binding Window Predict Performance on Verbal and Nonverbal Problem Solving Tasks

Although psychology is greatly preoccupied by the tight link between the way that individuals perceive the world and their intelligent, creative behavior, there is little experimental work on the relationship between individual differences in perception and cognitive ability in healthy populations. Here, individual differences in problem solving ability were examined in relation to multisensory perception as measured by tolerance for temporal asynchrony between auditory and visual inputs, i.e., the multisensory temporal binding window. The results demonstrated that enhanced performance in both verbal and nonverbal problem solving tasks (the Remote Associates Test and Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices Task) is predicted by a narrower audio-visual temporal binding window, which reflects greater sensitivity to subtle discrepancies in sensory inputs. This suggests that the precision of individuals’ temporal window of multisensory integration might mirror their capacities for complex reasoning and thus the precision of their thoughts.

Understanding visual consciousness in autism spectrum disorders

The paper focuses on the question of what the (visual) perceptual differences are between individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and typically developing (TD) individuals. We argue against the view that autistic subjects have a deficiency in the most basic form of perceptual consciousness—namely, phenomenal consciousness. Instead, we maintain, the perceptual atypicality of individuals with autism is of a more conceptual and cognitive sort—their perceptual experiences share crucial aspects with TD individuals. Our starting point is Ben Shalom’s (2005, 2009) three-level processing framework for explaining atypicality in several domains of processing among autistics, which we compare with two other tripartite models of perception—Jackendoff’s (1987) and Prinz’s (2000, 2005a, 2007) Intermediate Level Hypothesis and Lamme’s (2004, 2006, 2010) neural account of consciousness. According to these models, whereas the second level of processing is concerned with viewer-centered visual representations of basic visual properties and incorporates some early forms of integration, the third level is more cognitive and conceptual. We argue that the data suggest that the atypicality in autism is restricted mainly to the third level. More specifically, second-level integration, which is the mark of phenomenal consciousness, is typical, yet third-level integration of perceptual objects and concepts is atypical. Thus, the basic experiences of individuals with autism are likely to be similar to typical subjects’ experiences; the main difference lies in the sort of cognitive access the subjects have to their experiences. We conclude by discussing implications of the suggested analysis of experience in autism for conceptions of phenomenal consciousness.

A specific impairment in cognitive control in individuals with high-functioning autism

Although it is largely demonstrated that Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) are characterized by executive dysfunctions, little is known about the fine-grained levels of this impairment. Here, we investigated the hierarchical architecture of control modules in autism using an experimental paradigm based upon a multistage model of executive functions. This model postulates that executive functions are hierarchically organized as a cascade of three different control processes, which are implemented according to information conveyed by sensory signals (sensory control), the immediate perceptual context (contextual control), and the temporal episode in which stimuli occur (episodic control). Sixteen high-functioning adults with autism or Asperger Syndrome (HFA/AS) and sixteen matched comparison participants took part in two distinct visuo-motor association experiments designed to separately vary the demands of sensory and episodic controls (first experiment) and contextual and episodic controls (second experiment). Participants with HFA/AS demonstrated no significant differences in performances with comparison participants when they had to control sensory or contextual information. However, they showed decreased accuracy when having to control information related to episodic signals. Remarkably, performances in episodic control were associated to the autism spectrum quotient in both groups, suggesting that this episodic control impairment might be at the core of ASDs. Those results plead for a specific, rather than generalised, deficit in executive functions in autism. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the impaired cognitive processes that are unique to autism and warrants confirmation using other models of executive functions.

A review of intentional and cognitive control in autism

Different clinical studies have provided empirical evidence for impairments in cognitive control in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). The challenge arises, however, when trying to specify the neurocognitive mechanisms behind the reported observations of deviant patterns of goal-directed behavior in ASD. Studies trying to test specific assumptions by applying designs that are based on a more controlled experimental conditions often fail in providing strong evidence for an impairment in specific cognitive functions. In this review, we summarize and critically reflect on behavioral findings and their theoretical explanations regarding cognitive control processing in autism, also from a developmental perspective. The specific focus of this review is the recent evidence of deficits in intentional control – a specific subset of cognitive control processes that biases the choice of our behavioral goals – coming from different research fields. We relate this evidence to the cognitive rigidity observed in ASD and argue that individuals with ASD experience problems at the intentional level rather than at the level of implementation of intentions. Both these processes are related to cognitive control mechanisms but in different ways. Finally, we discuss new directions in studying cognitive control in ASD and how these relate to adaptive cognition.