Event segmentation and the temporal compression of experience in episodic memory

Recall as a Window into Hippocampally Defined Events

We experience the present as a continuous stream of information, but often experience the past in parcels of unique events or episodes. Decades of research have helped to articulate how we perform this event segmentation in the moment, as well as how events and their boundaries influence what we later remember. More recently, neuroscientific research has suggested that the hippocampus plays a role at critical moments during event formation alongside its established role in enabling subsequent recall. Here, we review and explore the relationship between event processing and recall with the perspective that it can be uniquely characterized by the contributions of the hippocampus and its interactions with the rest of the brain. Specifically, we highlight a growing number of empirical studies suggesting that the hippocampus is important for processing events that have just ended, bridging the gap between the prior and current event, and influencing the contents and trajectories of recalled information. We also catalogue and summarize the multifaceted sets of findings concerning how recall is influenced by event structure. Lastly, we discuss several exciting directions for future research and how our understanding of events might be enriched by characterizing them in terms of the operations of different regions of the brain.

Towards an ecologically valid naturalistic cognitive neuroscience of memory and event cognition

The landscape of human memory and event cognition research has witnessed a transformative journey toward the use of naturalistic contexts and tasks. In this review, we track this progression from abrupt, artificial stimuli used in extensively controlled laboratory experiments to more naturalistic tasks and stimuli that present a more faithful representation of the real world. We argue that in order to improve ecological validity, naturalistic study designs must consider the complexity of the cognitive phenomenon being studied. Then, we review the current state of "naturalistic" event segmentation studies and critically assess frequently employed movie stimuli. We evaluate recently developed tools like lifelogging and other extended reality technologies to help address the challenges we identified with existing naturalistic approaches. We conclude by offering some guidelines that can be used to design ecologically valid cognitive neuroscience studies of memory and event cognition.

Ease-of-retrieval mediates the relations of negative emotional states and passage of time judgments

Little research has investigated the relations of emotional states and passage of time judgments over a long period and explored the mechanisms underlying the relations. In this research, we conducted three studies (N = 2010 in total) in the three time points throughout a year including the end of 2020, the beginning and middle of 2021. In each study, we measured participants' negative emotional states that arise in daily life (including loneliness, anxiety, and depression), feelings of how easy/hard to recall the things having done in the last year, and yearly passage of time judgments. The results from the three studies consistently showed that individuals' feelings of ease-of-retrieval mediated the relations of negative emotional states and yearly passage of time judgments. The stronger the negative emotional states, the harder people feel to recall the things from the last year, and the faster people perceive time passing last year. This research provides novel insights for understanding the relations of negative emotional states and passage of time judgments, and importantly, individuals' feelings of ease-of-retrieval plays a significant role on explaining the relations.

Working memory capacity for continuous events: The root of temporal compression in episodic memory?

Remembering the unfolding of past episodes usually takes less time than their actual duration. In this study, we evaluated whether such temporal compression emerges when continuous events are too long to be fully held in working memory. To do so, we asked 90 young adults to watch and mentally replay video clips showing people performing a continuous action (e.g., turning a car jack) that lasted 3, 6, 9, 12, or 15 s. For each clip, participants had to carefully watch the event and then to mentally replay it as accurately and precisely as possible. Results showed that mental replay durations increased with event duration but in a non-linear manner: they were close to the actual event duration for short videos (3-9 s), but significantly smaller for longer videos (12 and 15 s). These results suggest that working memory is temporally limited in its capacity to represent continuous events, which could in part explain why the unfolding of events is temporally compressed in episodic memory.

More than a moment: What does it mean to call something an 'event'?

Experiences are stored in the mind as discrete mental units, or 'events,' which influence-and are influenced by-attention, learning, and memory. In this way, the notion of an 'event' is foundational to cognitive science. However, despite tremendous progress in understanding the behavioral and neural signatures of events, there is no agreed-upon definition of an event. Here, we discuss different theoretical frameworks of event perception and memory, noting what they can and cannot account for in the literature. We then highlight key aspects of events that we believe should be accounted for in theories of event processing--in particular, we argue that the structure and substance of events should be better reflected in our theories and paradigms. Finally, we discuss empirical gaps in the event cognition literature and what the future of event cognition research may look like.

Experience and memory of time and emotions two years after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic

In this French longitudinal study, we assessed judgment of the passage of time in current life and the predictors of this judgment 2 years after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, i.e., at a time when there was no lockdown and no protective measures. We then compared these measures with the same participants' passage-of-time judgments assessed during each of the past three French lockdowns. We also assessed their memory representations of the passage of time in the past, i.e., for the various lockdowns. The results showed the persistence of the feeling of time slowing down outside of lockdown. However, this was no longer linked to external factors (lack of activity, disruption of everyday routines) as found in the previous studies conducted during the lockdowns, but to an individual internal factor, namely a high level of depression in the general population. Moreover, the results revealed that the experience of the passage of time for the past lockdowns was compressed in memory, being judged to be faster than it actually was. This time compression tended to be greater in depressed people. It was also associated with a positive bias for all the other examined factors (e.g., sleep quality, life routine, boredom, happiness). We assumed that this time compression would be related to processes involved in the recall of unfolding events, with certain moments being omitted or forgotten during recall, as well as to the process of reconstruction in autobiographical memory. Our study therefore shows the long-lasting effect of lockdowns on mental health of the general population, which was expressed by the persistent feeling of a slowing down of time. It is therefore necessary to take care of this psychologically fragile population and to avoid further lockdowns in response to a new health crisis, that they cannot cope with.

Evidence That Event Boundaries Are Access Points for Memory Retrieval

When recalling memories, we often scan information-rich continuous episodes, for example, to find our keys. How does our brain access and search through those memories? We suggest that high-level structure, marked by event boundaries, guides us through this process: In our computational model, memory scanning is sped up by skipping ahead to the next event boundary upon reaching a decision threshold. In adult Mechanical Turk workers from the United States, we used a movie (normed for event boundaries; Study 1, N = 203) to prompt memory scanning of movie segments for answers (Study 2, N = 298) and mental simulation (Study 3, N = 100) of these segments. Confirming model predictions, we found that memory-scanning times varied as a function of the number of event boundaries within a segment and the distance of the search target to the previous boundary (the key diagnostic parameter). Mental simulation times were also described by a skipping process with a higher skipping threshold than memory scanning. These findings identify event boundaries as access points to memory.

Measuring event segmentation: An investigation into the stability of event boundary agreement across groups

People spontaneously divide everyday experience into smaller units (event segmentation). To measure event segmentation, studies typically ask participants to explicitly mark the boundaries between events as they watch a movie (segmentation task). Their data may then be used to infer how others are likely to segment the same movie. However, significant variability in performance across individuals could undermine the ability to generalize across groups, especially as more research moves online. To address this concern, we used several widely employed and novel measures to quantify segmentation agreement across different sized groups (n = 2-32) using data collected on different platforms and movie types (in-lab & commercial film vs. online & everyday activities). All measures captured nonrandom and video-specific boundaries, but with notable between-sample variability. Samples of 6-18 participants were required to reliably detect video-driven segmentation behavior within a single sample. As sample size increased, agreement values improved and eventually stabilized at comparable sample sizes for in-lab & commercial film data and online & everyday activities data. Stabilization occurred at smaller sample sizes when measures reflected (1) agreement between two groups versus agreement between an individual and group, and (2) boundary identification between small (fine-grained) rather than large (coarse-grained) events. These analyses inform the tailoring of sample sizes based on the comparison of interest, materials, and data collection platform. In addition to demonstrating the reliability of online and in-lab segmentation performance at moderate sample sizes, this study supports the use of segmentation data to infer when events are likely to be segmented.

A Computational Complexity Perspective on Segmentation as a Cognitive Subcomputation

Computational feasibility is a widespread concern that guides the framing and modeling of natural and artificial intelligence. The specification of cognitive system capacities is often shaped by unexamined intuitive assumptions about the search space and complexity of a subcomputation. However, a mistaken intuition might make such initial conceptualizations misleading for what empirical questions appear relevant later on. We undertake here computational-level modeling and complexity analyses of segmentation - a widely hypothesized subcomputation that plays a requisite role in explanations of capacities across domains, such as speech recognition, music cognition, active sensing, event memory, action parsing, and statistical learning - as a case study to show how crucial it is to formally assess these assumptions. We mathematically prove two sets of results regarding computational hardness and search space size that may run counter to intuition, and position their implications with respect to existing views on the subcapacity.

Representational dynamics of memories for real-life events

The continuous flow of experience that characterizes real-life events is not recorded as such in episodic memory but is condensed as a succession of event segments separated by temporal discontinuities. To unravel the neural basis of this representational structure, we recorded real-life events using wearable camera technology and used fMRI to investigate brain activity during their temporal unfolding in memory. We found that, compared to the representation of static scenes in memory, dynamically unfolding memory representations were associated with greater activation of the posterior medial episodic network. Strikingly, by analyzing the autocorrelation of brain activity patterns at successive time points throughout the retrieval period, we found that this network showed higher temporal dynamics when recalling events that included a higher density of event segments. These results reveal the key role of the posterior medial network in representing the dynamic unfolding of the event segments that constitute real-world memories.

Neural signatures associated with temporal compression in the verbal retelling of past events

When we retell our past experiences, we aim to reproduce some version of the original events; this reproduced version is often temporally compressed relative to the original. However, it is currently unclear how this compression manifests in brain activity. One possibility is that a compressed retrieved memory manifests as a neural pattern which is more dissimilar to the original, relative to a more detailed or vivid memory. However, we argue that measuring raw dissimilarity alone is insufficient, as it confuses a variety of interesting and uninteresting changes. To address this problem, we examine brain pattern changes that are consistent across people. We show that temporal compression in individuals’ retelling of past events predicts systematic encoding-to-recall transformations in several higher associative regions. These findings elucidate how neural representations are not simply reactivated, but can also be transformed due to temporal compression during a universal form of human memory expression: verbal retelling.

Brain patterns measured while participants first watched a movie in the fMRI scanner, then recalled the movie’s key narrative features, demonstrate that temporal compression in individuals’ retelling of past events predicts encoding-to-recall transformations.

Switching task sets creates event boundaries in memory

People segregate continuously unfolding experiences into discrete events in memory. This process, known as event segmentation, results in better memory for the temporal order of experiences within an event and expands subjective temporal distance for items encoded across event boundaries. Previous research has suggested that the creation of event boundaries is driven by (typically unpredicted) changes in external stimulation, though many prior studies have confounded a change in bottom-up input with a concurrent change in task goal. This raises the question of whether event segmentation can be triggered by the endogenous cognitive control processes involved in switching task sets, independent of changes in bottom-up stimulation. We investigated this question by embedding task set changes during encoding of a series of trial-unique images, and comparing subsequent temporal order and distance memory for item pairs encoded across a change in task set with item pairs encoded within the same task set. Across five experiments, we demonstrate that both cued and voluntary task set changes are sufficient to create event boundaries, while ruling out potential confounding effects of shifts in stimulus set, response set, task cues, and task difficulty. Thus, internal control processes are a key determinant of segmenting episodic memories, and task set updating can trigger event segmentation independent of any externally induced, perceptual or task-based prediction error.

Slices of the past: how events are temporally compressed in episodic memory

Remembering everyday events typically takes less time than the actual duration of the retrieved episodes, a phenomenon that has been referred to as the temporal compression of events in episodic memory. Here, we review recent studies that have shed light on how this compression mechanism operates. The evidence suggests that the continuous flow of experience is not represented as such in episodic memory. Instead, the unfolding of events is recalled as a succession of moments or slices of past experience that includes temporal discontinuities-portions of past experience are omitted when remembering. Consequently, the rate of event compression is not constant but depends on the density of recalled segments of past experience.

The temporal compression of events during episodic future thinking

While the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie episodic future thinking are increasingly well understood, little is known about how the temporal unfolding of events is represented in future simulations. In this study, we leveraged wearable camera technology to examine whether real-world events are structured and compressed in the same way when imagining the future as when remembering the past. We found that future events were simulated at proportionally higher speed than past events and that the density of experience units representing the unfolding of events was lower for future than for past episodes. Despite these differences, the nature of events influenced compression rates in the same way for past and future events. Furthermore, the perceived duration of both types of events depended on the density of represented experience units. These results provide novel insight into the mechanisms that structure the unfolding of events during future simulations.

Sequence Memory in the Hippocampal-Entorhinal Region

Episodic memories are constructed from sequences of events. When recalling such a memory, we not only recall individual events, but we also retrieve information about how the sequence of events unfolded. Here, we focus on the role of the hippocampal-entorhinal region in processing and remembering sequences of events, which are thought to be stored in relational networks. We summarize evidence that temporal relations are a central organizational principle for memories in the hippocampus. Importantly, we incorporate novel insights from recent studies about the role of the adjacent entorhinal cortex in sequence memory. In rodents, the lateral entorhinal subregion carries temporal information during ongoing behavior. The human homologue is recruited during memory recall where its representations reflect the temporal relationships between events encountered in a sequence. We further introduce the idea that the hippocampal-entorhinal region might enable temporal scaling of sequence representations. Flexible changes of sequence progression speed could underlie the traversal of episodic memories and mental simulations at different paces. In conclusion, we describe how the entorhinal cortex and hippocampus contribute to remembering event sequences-a core component of episodic memory.

Zooming In and Out on One's Life: Autobiographical Representations at Multiple Time Scales

The ability to decouple from the present environment and explore other times is a central feature of the human mind. Research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience has shown that the personal past and future is represented at multiple timescales and levels of resolution, from broad lifetime periods that span years to short-time slices of experience that span seconds. Here, I review this evidence and propose a theoretical framework for understanding mental time travel as the capacity to flexibly navigate hierarchical layers of autobiographical representations. On this view, past and future thoughts rely on two main systems-event simulation and autobiographical knowledge-that allow us to represent experiential contents that are decoupled from sensory input and to place these on a personal timeline scaffolded from conceptual knowledge of the content and structure of our life. The neural basis of this cognitive architecture is discussed, emphasizing the possible role of the medial pFC in integrating layers of autobiographical representations in the service of mental time travel.

Event Perception and Memory

Events make up much of our lived experience, and the perceptual mechanisms that represent events in experience have pervasive effects on action control, language use, and remembering. Event representations in both perception and memory have rich internal structure and connections one to another, and both are heavily informed by knowledge accumulated from previous experiences. Event perception and memory have been identified with specific computational and neural mechanisms, which show protracted development in childhood and are affected by language use, expertise, and brain disorders and injuries. Current theoretical approaches focus on the mechanisms by which events are segmented from ongoing experience, and emphasize the common coding of events for perception, action, and memory. Abetted by developments in eye-tracking, neuroimaging, and computer science, research on event perception and memory is moving from small-scale laboratory analogs to the complexity of events in the wild.