Rapid cognitive flexibility of rhesus macaques performing psychophysical task-switching

Mapping causal links between prefrontal cortical regions and intra-individual behavioral variability

Intra-individual behavioral variability is significantly heightened by aging or neuropsychological disorders, however it is unknown which brain regions are causally linked to such variabilities. We examine response time (RT) variability in 21 macaque monkeys performing a rule-guided decision-making task. In monkeys with selective-bilateral lesions in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) or in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, cognitive flexibility is impaired, but the RT variability is significantly diminished. Bilateral lesions within the frontopolar cortex or within the mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, has no significant effect on cognitive flexibility or RT variability. In monkeys with lesions in the posterior cingulate cortex, the RT variability significantly increases without any deficit in cognitive flexibility. The effect of lesions in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is unique in that it leads to deficits in cognitive flexibility and a significant increase in RT variability. Our findings indicate remarkable dissociations in contribution of frontal cortical regions to behavioral variability. They suggest that the altered variability in OFC-lesioned monkeys is related to deficits in assessing and accumulating evidence to inform a rule-guided decision, whereas in ACC-lesioned monkeys it results from a non-adaptive decrease in decision threshold and consequently immature impulsive responses.

A modified version of the dimensional change card sort task tests cognitive flexibility in children (Homo sapiens) and cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)

A modified Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task was used to test cognitive flexibility in adult cotton-top tamarins and children aged 19 months to 60 months. Subjects had to infer a rule from the experience of selecting between two cards to earn a reward, and the pairs of stimuli defined the rule (e.g., pick blue ones, not red ones, or pick trucks, not boats). Two different tests measured subjects' ability to shift to a reversal of the rule (intradimensional shift) and to shift to a new rule defined by a dimension previously irrelevant (interdimensional shift). Both adult tamarins and children aged 49-60 months were able to learn the initial rule and switch to a reversal and to a rule based on a different dimension. In contrast, the two younger groups of children, aged 19-36 months and aged 37-48 months, could switch when a reversal was imposed but took significantly longer to learn a new rule on a former irrelevant dimension. Experiment 2 presented a wider set of novel stimuli which shared some features with the original set to further explore the basis of rule learning. The result was that tamarins and 52- to 60-month-old children both chose novel stimuli that fit the rule and had no a priori associative strength, suggesting a rule application not solely based on associative strength. Importantly, novel items introduced some risk for choice, and children showed themselves to be risk-averse, whereas tamarins were risk-prone within a novel context. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Executive Functions in Birds

Executive functions comprise of top-down cognitive processes that exert control over information processing, from acquiring information to issuing a behavioral response. These cognitive processes of inhibition, working memory, and cognitive flexibility underpin complex cognitive skills, such as episodic memory and planning, which have been repeatedly investigated in several bird species in recent decades. Until recently, avian executive functions were studied in relatively few bird species but have gained traction in comparative cognitive research following MacLean and colleagues’ large-scale study from 2014. Therefore, in this review paper, the relevant previous findings are collected and organized to facilitate further investigations of these core cognitive processes in birds. This review can assist in integrating findings from avian and mammalian cognitive research and further the current understanding of executive functions’ significance and evolution.

Focusing and shifting attention in pigeon category learning

Adaptively and flexibly modifying one's behavior depending on the current demands of the situation is a hallmark of executive function. Here, we examined whether pigeons could flexibly shift their attention from one set of features that were relevant in one categorization task to another set of features that were relevant in a second categorization task. Critically, members of both sets of features were available on every training trial, thereby requiring that attention be adaptively deployed on a trial-by-trial basis based on contextual information. The pigeons not only learned to correctly categorize the stimuli but, as training progressed, they concentrated their pecks to the training stimuli (a proxy measure for attention) on those features that were relevant in a specific context. The pigeons selectively tracked the features that were relevant in Context 1-but were irrelevant in Context 2-and they selectively tracked the features that were relevant in Context 2-but were irrelevant in Context 1. This adept feature tracking requires disengaging attention from a previously relevant feature and shifting attention to a previously ignored feature on a trial-by-trial basis. Pigeons' adaptive and flexible performance provides strong empirical support for the involvement of focusing and shifting attention under exceptionally challenging training conditions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Problem solving flexibility across early development

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We tested cognitive flexibility in 2-, 3, and 4-year-old children.

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Children were presented with a novel task previously used with nonhuman primates.

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All children spontaneously solved the task; most (83.61%) used an efficient method.

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Children responded flexibly when task demands changed.

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4-year-olds were significantly more efficient than 2-year-olds.

Cognitive flexibility allows individuals to adapt to novel situations. However, this ability appears to develop slowly over the first few years of life, mediated by task complexity and opacity. We used a physically simple novel task, previously tested with nonhuman primates, to explore the development of flexible problem solving in 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children from a developmental and comparative perspective. The task goal was to remove barriers (straws) from a clear tube to release a ball. The location of the ball, and therefore the number of straws necessary to retrieve it, varied across two test phases (four of five straws and two of five straws, respectively). In Test Phase 1, all children retrieved the ball in Trial 1 and 83.61% used the most efficient method (removing only straws below the ball). Across Phase 1 trials, 4-year-olds were significantly more efficient than 2-year-olds, and solve latency decreased for all age groups. Test Phase 2 altered the location of the ball, allowing us to explore whether children could flexibly adopt a more efficient solution when their original (now inefficient) solution remained available. In Phase 2, significantly more 4-year-olds than 2-year-olds were efficient; the older children showed greater competency with the task and were more flexible to changing task demands than the younger children. Interestingly, no age group was as flexible in Phase 2 as previously tested nonhuman primates, potentially related to their relatively reduced task exploration in Phase 1. Therefore, this causally clear task revealed changes in cognitive flexibility across both early childhood and species.

Neural Correlates of Strategy Switching in the Macaque Orbital Prefrontal Cortex

We can adapt flexibly to environment changes and search for the most appropriate rule to a context. The orbital prefrontal cortex (PFo) has been associated with decision making, rule generation and maintenance, and more generally has been considered important for behavioral flexibility. To better understand the neural mechanisms underlying the flexible behavior, we studied the ability to generate a switching signal in monkey PFo when a strategy is changed. In the strategy task, we used a visual cue to instruct two male rhesus monkeys either to repeat their most recent choice (i.e., stay strategy) or to change it (i.e., shift strategy). To identify the strategy switching-related signal, we compared nonswitch and switch trials, which cued the same or a different strategy from the previous trial, respectively. We found that the switching-related signal emerged during the cue presentation and it was combined with the strategy signal in a subpopulation of cells. Moreover, the error analysis showed that the activity of the switch-related cells reflected whether the monkeys erroneously switched or not the strategy, rather than what was required for that trial. The function of the switching signal could be to prompt the use of different strategies when older strategies are no longer appropriate, conferring the ability to adapt flexibly to environmental changes. In our task, the switching signal might contribute to the implementation of the strategy cued, overcoming potential interference effects from the strategy previously cued. Our results support the idea that ascribes to PFo an important role for behavioral flexibility.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT We can flexibly adapt our behavior to a changing environment. One of the prefrontal areas traditionally associated with the ability to adapt to new contingencies is the orbital prefrontal cortex (PFo). We analyzed the switching related activity using a strategy task in which two rhesus monkeys were instructed by a visual cue either to repeat or change their most recent choice, respectively using a stay or a shift strategy. We found that PFo neurons were modulated by the strategy switching signal, pointing to the importance of PFo in behavioral flexibility by generating control over the switching of strategies.

Capuchin and rhesus monkeys but not humans show cognitive flexibility in an optional-switch task

Learned rules help us accurately solve many problems, but by blindly following a strategy, we sometimes fail to find more efficient alternatives. Previous research found that humans are more susceptible to this "cognitive set" bias than other primates in a nonverbal computer task. We modified the task to test one hypothesis for this difference, that working memory influences the advantage of taking a shortcut. During training, 60 humans, 7 rhesus macaques, and 22 capuchin monkeys learned to select three icons in sequence. They then completed 96 baseline trials, in which only this learned rule could be used, and 96 probe trials, in which they could also immediately select the final icon. Rhesus and capuchin monkeys took this shortcut significantly more often than humans. Humans used the shortcut more in this new, easier task than in previous work, but started using it significantly later than the monkeys. Some participants of each species also used an intermediate strategy; they began the learned rule but switched to the shortcut after selecting the first item in the sequence. We suggest that these species differences arise from differences in rule encoding and in the relative efficiency of exploiting a familiar strategy versus exploring alternatives.

Neuronal Correlates of Serial Decision-Making in the Supplementary Eye Field

Human behavior is influenced by serial decision-making: past decisions affect choices that set the context for selecting future options. A primate brain region that may be involved in linking decisions across time is the supplementary eye field (SEF), which, in addition to its well known visual responses and saccade-related activity, also signals the rules that govern flexible decisions and the outcomes of those decisions. Our hypotheses were that SEF neurons encode events during serial decision-making and link the sequential decisions with sustained activity. We recorded from neurons in the SEF of two rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta, one male, one female) that performed a serial decision-making task. The monkeys used saccades to select a rule that had to be applied later in the same trial to discriminate between visual stimuli. We found, first, that SEF neurons encoded the spatial parameters of saccades during rule selection but not during visual discrimination, suggesting a malleability to their movement-related tuning. Second, SEF activity linked the sequential decisions of rule selection and visual discrimination, but not continuously. Instead, rule-encoding activity appeared in a "just-in-time" manner before the visual discrimination. Third, SEF neurons encoded trial outcomes both prospectively, before decisions within a trial, and retrospectively, across multiple trials. The results thus identify neuronal correlates of rule selection and application in the SEF, including transient signals that link these sequential decisions. Its activity patterns suggest that the SEF participates in serial decision-making in a contextually dependent manner as part of a broader network.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Much research has gone into studying the neurobiological basis of single, isolated decisions. An important next step is to understand how the brain links multiple decisions to generate a coherent stream of thought and behavior. We studied neural activity related to serial decision-making in an area of frontal cortex known as the supplementary eye field (SEF). Neural recordings were conducted in monkeys that performed a serial decision-making task in which they selected and applied rules. We found that SEF neurons convey signals for serial decision-making, including transient encoding of one decision at the time it is needed for the next one and longer-term representations of trial outcomes, suggesting that the region plays a role in continuity of cognition and behavior.

Task switching in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) during computerized categorization tasks

The present experiments extended to monkeys a previously used abstract categorization procedure (Castro & Wasserman, 2016) where pigeons had categorized arrays of clipart icons based upon two task rules: the number of clipart objects in the array or the variability of objects in the array. Experiment 1 replicated Castro and Wasserman by using capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys and reported that monkeys' performances were similar to pigeons' in terms of acquisition, pattern of errors, and the absence of switch costs. Furthermore, monkeys' insensitivity to the added irrelevant information suggested that an associative (rather than rule-based) categorization mechanism was dominant. Experiment 2 was conducted to include categorization cue reversals to determine (a) whether the monkeys would quickly adapt to the reversals and inhibit interference from a prereversal task rule (consistent with a rule-based mechanism) and (b) whether the latency to make a response prior to a correct or incorrect outcome was informative about the presence of a cognitive mechanism. The cue reassignment produced profound and long-lasting performance deficits, and a long reacquisition phase suggested the involvement of associative learning processes; however, monkeys also displayed longer latencies to choose prior to correct responses on challenging trials, suggesting the involvement of nonassociative processes. Together these performances suggest a mix of associative and cognitive-control processes governing monkey categorization judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record

Simians in the Shape School: A comparative study of executive attention

Executive functions (EF) have been studied extensively in children and adults. However, EF tasks for young children can be difficult to administer and interpret. Espy (1997, Developmental Neuropsychology, 13, 495-499) designed the Shape School task to measure inhibition and switching in preschool-aged children. Shape School presents cartoon-like characters that children must flexibly name by their color, their shape, or both, depending on cues that indicate the appropriate rule. Shape School has been found to be age sensitive as well as predictive of performance on other EF tasks. We presented a computerized analogue of Shape School to seven rhesus macaques. Monkeys were trained to categorize characters by color or shape, or to inhibit this response, depending on whether the characters had eyes open, eyes closed, or wore hats. Monkeys performed above chance on the inhibition and switching components of the task. Long runs of a single classification rule and long runs of noninhibition trials had no significant impact on performance when the rule changed or inhibition was required. This nonverbal adaptation of Shape School can measure EF in nonhuman animals and could be used in conjunction with other EF tasks to provide a clearer picture of both human and nonhuman executive functions.

Neural correlates for task switching in the macaque superior colliculus

Successful task switching requires a network of brain areas to select, maintain, implement, and execute the appropriate task. Although frontoparietal brain areas are thought to play a critical role in task switching by selecting and encoding task rules and exerting top-down control, how brain areas closer to the execution of tasks participate in task switching is unclear. The superior colliculus (SC) integrates information from various brain areas to generate saccades and is likely influenced by task switching. Here, we investigated switch costs in nonhuman primates and their neural correlates in the activity of SC saccade-related neurons in monkeys performing cued, randomly interleaved pro- and anti-saccade trials. We predicted that behavioral switch costs would be associated with differential modulations of SC activity in trials on which the task was switched vs. repeated, with activity on the current trial resembling that associated with the task set of the previous trial when a switch occurred. We observed both error rate and reaction time switch costs and changes in the discharge rate and timing of activity in SC neurons between switch and repeat trials. These changes were present later in the task only after fixation on the cue stimuli but before saccade onset. These results further establish switch costs in macaque monkeys and suggest that SC activity is modulated by task-switching processes in a manner inconsistent with the concept of task set inertia.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Task-switching behavior and superior colliculus (SC) activity were investigated in nonhuman primates performing randomly interleaved pro- and anti-saccade tasks. Here, we report error rate and reaction time switch costs in macaque monkeys and associated differences in stimulus-related activity of saccade-related neurons in the SC. These results provide a neural correlate for task switching and suggest that the SC is modulated by task-switching processes and may reflect the completion of task set reconfiguration.

Perceptual category learning of photographic and painterly stimuli in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and humans

Humans are highly adept at categorizing visual stimuli, but studies of human categorization are typically validated by verbal reports. This makes it difficult to perform comparative studies of categorization using non-human animals. Interpretation of comparative studies is further complicated by the possibility that animal performance may merely reflect reinforcement learning, whereby discrete features act as discriminative cues for categorization. To assess and compare how humans and monkeys classified visual stimuli, we trained 7 rhesus macaques and 41 human volunteers to respond, in a specific order, to four simultaneously presented stimuli at a time, each belonging to a different perceptual category. These exemplars were drawn at random from large banks of images, such that the stimuli presented changed on every trial. Subjects nevertheless identified and ordered these changing stimuli correctly. Three monkeys learned to order naturalistic photographs; four others, close-up sections of paintings with distinctive styles. Humans learned to order both types of stimuli. All subjects classified stimuli at levels substantially greater than that predicted by chance or by feature-driven learning alone, even when stimuli changed on every trial. However, humans more closely resembled monkeys when classifying the more abstract painting stimuli than the photographic stimuli. This points to a common classification strategy in both species, one that humans can rely on in the absence of linguistic labels for categories.

Transitive inference in humans (Homo sapiens) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) after massed training of the last two list items

Transitive inference (TI) is a classic learning paradigm for which the relative contributions of experienced rewards and representation-driven inference have been vigorously debated, particularly with regard to the notion that animals are capable of logic and reasoning. Rhesus macaque subjects and human participants performed a TI task in which, prior to learning a seven-item list ABCDEFG, a block of trials presented exclusively the pair FG. Contrary to the expectation of associative models, the high prior rate of reward for F did not disrupt learning of the entire list. Monkeys (who each completed many sessions) learned to anticipate that novel stimuli should be preferred over F. We interpret this as evidence of a task representation of TI that generalizes beyond learning about specific stimuli. Humans (who were task-naïve) showed a transitory bias to F when it was paired with novel stimuli, but very rapidly unlearned that bias. Performance with respect to the remaining stimuli was consistent with past reports of TI in both species. These results are difficult to reconcile with any account that seeks to assign the strength of association between individual stimuli and rewards. Instead, they support both sophisticated cognitive processes in both species, albeit with some species differences.

The Monitoring and Control of Task Sequences in Human and Non-Human Primates

Our ability to plan and execute a series of tasks leading to a desired goal requires remarkable coordination between sensory, motor, and decision-related systems. Prefrontal cortex (PFC) is thought to play a central role in this coordination, especially when actions must be assembled extemporaneously and cannot be programmed as a rote series of movements. A central component of this flexible behavior is the moment-by-moment allocation of working memory and attention. The ubiquity of sequence planning in our everyday lives belies the neural complexity that supports this capacity, and little is known about how frontal cortical regions orchestrate the monitoring and control of sequential behaviors. For example, it remains unclear if and how sensory cortical areas, which provide essential driving inputs for behavior, are modulated by the frontal cortex during these tasks. Here, we review what is known about moment-to-moment monitoring as it relates to visually guided, rule-driven behaviors that change over time. We highlight recent human work that shows how the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC) participates in monitoring during task sequences. Neurophysiological data from monkeys suggests that monitoring may be accomplished by neurons that respond to items within the sequence and may in turn influence the tuning properties of neurons in posterior sensory areas. Understanding the interplay between proceduralized or habitual acts and supervised control of sequences is key to our understanding of sequential task execution. A crucial bridge will be the use of experimental protocols that allow for the examination of the functional homology between monkeys and humans. We illustrate how task sequences may be parceled into components and examined experimentally, thereby opening future avenues of investigation into the neural basis of sequential monitoring and control.