Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens) know when they are ignorant about the location of food

Social cognition and metacognition in great apes: a theory

Twenty-five years ago, at the founding of this journal, there existed only a few conflicting findings about great apes' social-cognitive skills (theory of mind). In the 2 ½ decades since, we have discovered that great apes understand the goals, intentions, perceptions, and knowledge of others, and they use this knowledge to their advantage in competitive interactions. Twenty-five years ago there existed basically no studies on great apes' metacognitive skills. In the 2 ½ decades since, we have discovered that great apes monitor their uncertainty and base their decisions on that, or else decide to gather more information to make better decisions. The current paper reviews the past 25 years of research on great ape social cognition and metacognition and proposes a theory about how the two are evolutionarily related.

Knowledge in Sight: Toddlers Plan Efficient Epistemic Actions by Anticipating Learning Gains

Anticipating the learning consequences of actions is crucial to plan efficient information seeking. Such a capacity is needed for learners to determine which actions are most likely to result in learning. Here, we tested the early ontogeny of the human capacity to anticipate the amount of learning gained from seeing. In study 1, we tested infants' capacity to anticipate the availability of sight. Fourteen-month-old infants (N = 72) were invited to search for a toy hidden inside a container. The participants were faster to attempt at opening a shutter when this action allowed them to see inside the container. Moreover, this effect was specifically observed when seeing inside the container was potentially useful to the participants' goals. Thus, infants anticipated the availability of sight, and they calibrated their information-seeking behaviors accordingly. In studies 2 and 3, we tested toddlers' capacity to anticipate whether data would be cognitively useful for their goals. Two-and-a-half-year-olds (N = 72) had to locate a target character hidden among distractors. The participants flipped the characters more often, and were comparatively faster to initiate this action when it yielded access to visual data allowing them to locate the target. Thus, toddlers planned their information-seeking behaviors by anticipating the cognitive utility of sight. In contrast, toddlers did not calibrate their behaviors to the cognitive usefulness of auditory data. These results suggest that cognitive models of learning guide toddlers' search for information. The early developmental onset of the capacity to anticipate future learning gains is crucial for active learning.

Young children spontaneously devise an optimal external solution to a cognitive problem

Metacognition plays an essential role in adults' cognitive offloading decisions. Despite possessing basic metacognitive capacities, however, preschool-aged children often fail to offload effectively. Here, we introduced 3- to 5-year-olds to a novel search task in which they were unlikely to perform optimally across trials without setting external reminders about the location of a target. Children watched as an experimenter first hid a target in one of three identical opaque containers. The containers were then shuffled out of view before children had to guess where the target was hidden. In the test phase, children could perform perfectly by simply placing a marker in a transparent jar attached to the target container prior to shuffling, and then later selecting the marked container. Children of all ages used this external strategy above chance levels if they had seen it demonstrated to them, but only the 4- and 5-year-olds independently devised the strategy to improve their future performance. These results suggest that, when necessary for optimal performance, even 4- and 5-year-olds can use metacognitive knowledge about their own future uncertainty to deploy effective external solutions.

Children boost their cognitive performance with a novel offloading technique

Ninety-seven children aged 4-11 (49 males, 48 females, mostly White) were given the opportunity to improve their problem-solving performance by devising and implementing a novel cognitive offloading strategy. Across two phases, they searched for hidden rewards using maps that were either aligned or misaligned with the search space. In the second phase, maps were presented on rotatable turntables, thus allowing children to manually align all maps and alleviate mental rotation demand. From age six onwards, children showed strong evidence of both mentally rotating misaligned maps in phase 1 and manually aligning them in phase 2. Older children used this form of cognitive offloading more frequently, which substantially improved performance and eliminated the individual differences observed in phase 1.

Development of strategic social information seeking: Implications for cumulative culture

Human learners are rarely the passive recipients of valuable social information. Rather, learners usually have to actively seek out information from a variety of potential others to determine who is in a position to provide useful information. Yet, the majority of developmental social learning paradigms do not address participants’ ability to seek out information for themselves. To investigate age-related changes in children’s ability to seek out appropriate social information, 3- to 8-year-olds (N = 218) were presented with a task requiring them to identify which of four possible demonstrators could provide critical information for unlocking a box. Appropriate information seeking improved significantly with age. The particularly high performance of 7- and 8-year-olds was consistent with the expectation that older children’s increased metacognitive understanding would allow them to identify appropriate information sources. Appropriate social information seeking may have been overlooked as a significant cognitive challenge involved in fully benefiting from others’ knowledge, potentially influencing understanding of the phylogenetic distribution of cumulative culture.

Metacognition and mindreading in young children: A cross-cultural study

Prior studies document cross cultural variation in the developmental onset of mindreading. In particular, Japanese children are reported to pass a standard false belief task later than children from Western countries. By contrast, we know little about cross-cultural variation in young children's metacognitive abilities. Moreover, one prominent theoretical discussion in developmental psychology focuses on the relation between metacognition and mindreading. Here we investigated the relation between mindreading and metacognition (both implicit and explicit) by testing 4-year-old Japanese and German children. We found no difference in metacognition between the two cultural groups. By contrast, Japanese children showed lower performance than German children replicating cultural differences in mindreading. Finally, metacognition and mindreading were not related in either group. We discuss the findings in light of the existing theoretical accounts of the relation between metacognition and mindreading.

Children Devise and Selectively Use Tools to Offload Cognition

From maps sketched in sand to supercomputing software, humans ubiquitously enhance cognitive performance by creating and using artifacts that bear mental load [1-5]. This extension of information processing into the environment has taken center stage in debates about the nature of cognition in humans and other animals [6-9]. How does the human mind acquire such strategies? In two experiments, we investigated the developmental origins of cognitive offloading in 150 children aged between 4 and 11 years. We created a memory task in which children were required to recall the location of hidden targets. In one experiment, participants were provided with a pre-specified cognitive offloading opportunity: an option to mark the target locations with tokens during the hiding period. Even 4-year-old children quickly adopted this external strategy and, in line with a metacognitive account, children across ages offloaded more often when the task was more difficult. In a second experiment, we provided children with the means to devise their own cognitive offloading strategy. Very few younger children spontaneously devised a solution, but by ages 10 and 11, nearly all did so. In a follow-up test phase, a simple prompt greatly increased the rate at which the younger children devised an offloading strategy. These findings suggest that sensitivity to the difficulties of thinking arises early in development and improves throughout the early school years, with children learning to modify the world around them to compensate for their cognitive limits.

Developmental origins of cognitive offloading

Many animals manipulate their environments in ways that appear to augment cognitive processing. Adult humans show remarkable flexibility in this domain, typically relying on internal cognitive processing when adequate but turning to external support in situations of high internal demand. We use calendars, calculators, navigational aids and other external means to compensate for our natural cognitive shortcomings and achieve otherwise unattainable feats of intelligence. As yet, however, the developmental origins of this fundamental capacity for cognitive offloading remain largely unknown. In two studies, children aged 4-11 years (n = 258) were given an opportunity to manually rotate a turntable to eliminate the internal demands of mental rotation--to solve the problem in the world rather than in their heads. In study 1, even the youngest children showed a linear relationship between mental rotation demand and likelihood of using the external strategy, paralleling the classic relationship between angle of mental rotation and reaction time. In study 2, children were introduced to a version of the task where manually rotating inverted stimuli was sometimes beneficial to performance and other times redundant. With increasing age, children were significantly more likely to manually rotate the turntable only when it would benefit them. These results show how humans gradually calibrate their cognitive offloading strategies throughout childhood and thereby uncover the developmental origins of this central facet of intelligence.

Origin and evolution of human cognition

We investigate which of the higher cognitive abilities or types of intelligence characteristic of humans are found, even in preliminary form, in non-human animals, predominantly primates, or whether qualitatively different ("unique") human abilities exist. This concerns (1) tool use and fabrication, (2) problem solving, (3) gaze following, (4) mirror self-recognition, (5) imitation, (6) metacognition, (7) theory of mind, (8) consciousness, (9) prosociality, and (10) language. We found that none of these abilities can be regarded as unique to humans without precursors in non-human primates. The observed differences in cognitive functions, underlying brain mechanisms and resulting behaviors correlate best with differences in the information processing capacity as an equivalent of general intelligence based on the number of cortical neurons, packing density and axonal conduction velocity plus long-range cortical fascicles. The biggest quantitative change appears to concern the origin of syntactical language, but this was preceded by an increased mental ability to manipulate sequential events within working memory.

Development of Children's Use of External Reminders for Hard-to-Remember Intentions

This study explored under what conditions young children would set reminders to aid their memory for delayed intentions. A computerized task requiring participants to carry out delayed intentions under varying levels of cognitive load was presented to 63 children (aged between 6.9 and 13.0 years old). Children of all ages demonstrated metacognitive predictions of their performance that were congruent with task difficulty. Only older children, however, set more reminders when they expected their future memory performance to be poorer. These results suggest that most primary school-aged children possess metacognitive knowledge about their prospective memory limits, but that only older children may be able to exercise the metacognitive control required to translate this knowledge into strategic reminder setting.

When do you know what you know? The emergence of memory monitoring

Recent research on comparative metacognition shows that animals, like humans, can differentiate between what they know and what they do not know. However, not much is known about the metacognitive behaviors of human children during their early years. To explore the emergence of memory-monitoring skills, two experiments were conducted using nonverbal tasks adapted from the work of Kornell, Son, and Terrace (2007) and Hampton (2001). Experiment 1 endeavored to determine when children began to show the ability to monitor their memories retrospectively. Experiment 2 aimed to reveal when young children knew what they knew by assessing their prospective monitoring. The results suggested that 4- to 5-year-olds had the ability to judge retrospectively their accuracy in a serial position task, whereas 3- to 4-year-olds did not. In contrast, 4.5- to 5-year-olds could discern items present in and absent from their memory before recognition, whereas 4- to 4.5-year-olds could not. In conclusion, 4-year-olds began to make accurate confidence judgments retrospectively, and children who are approximately 4.5years old began to demonstrate prospective memory-monitoring skills.

Young children communicate their ignorance and ask questions

Children acquire information, especially about the culture in which they are being raised, by listening to other people. Recent evidence has shown that young children are selective learners who preferentially accept information, especially from informants who are likely to be representative of the surrounding culture. However, the extent to which children understand this process of information transmission and actively exploit it to fill gaps in their knowledge has not been systematically investigated. We review evidence that toddlers exhibit various expressive behaviors when faced with knowledge gaps. They look toward an available adult, convey ignorance via nonverbal gestures (flips/shrugs), and increasingly produce verbal acknowledgments of ignorance ("I don't know"). They also produce comments and questions about what their interlocutors might know and adopt an interrogative stance toward them. Thus, in the second and third years, children actively seek information from interlocutors via nonverbal gestures or verbal questions and display a heightened tendency to encode and retain such sought-after information.

Young Children's Sensitivity to Their Own Ignorance in Informing Others

Prior research suggests that young children selectively inform others depending on others’ knowledge states. Yet, little is known whether children selectively inform others depending on their own knowledge states. To explore this issue, we manipulated 3- to 4-year-old children’s knowledge about the content of a box and assessed the impact on their decisions to inform another person. Moreover, we assessed the presence of uncertainty gestures while they inform another person in light of the suggestions that children's gestures reflect early developing, perhaps transient, epistemic sensitivity. Finally, we compared children’s performance in the informing context to their explicit verbal judgment of their knowledge states to further confirm the existence of a performance gap between the two tasks. In their decisions to inform, children tend to accurately assess their ignorance, whereas they tend to overestimate their own knowledge states when asked to explicitly report them. Moreover, children display different levels of uncertainty gestures depending on the varying degrees of their informational access. These findings suggest that children’s implicit awareness of their own ignorance may be facilitated in a social, communicative context.

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) modulate their use of an uncertainty response depending on risk

Metacognition refers to thinking about thinking, and there has been a great deal of interest in how this ability manifests across primates. Based on much of the work to date, a tentative division has been drawn with New World monkeys on 1 side and Old World monkeys and apes on the other. Specifically, Old World monkeys, apes, and humans often show patterns reflecting metacognition, but New World monkeys typically do not, or show less convincing behavioral patterns. However, recent data suggest that this difference may relate to other aspects of some experimental tasks. For example, 1 possibility is that risk tolerance affects how capuchin monkeys, a New World primate species, tend to perform. Specifically, it has recently been argued that on tasks in which there are 2 or 3 options, the "risk" of guessing is tolerable for capuchins because there is a high probability of being correct even if they "know they do not know" or feel something akin to uncertainty. The current study investigated this possibility by manipulating the degree of risk (2-choices vs. 6-choices) and found that capuchin monkeys used the uncertainty response more on 6-choice trials than on 2-choice trials. We also found that rate of reward does not appear to underlie these patterns of performance, and propose that the degree of risk is modulating capuchin monkeys' use of the uncertainty response. Thus, the apparent differences between New and Old World monkeys in metacognition may reflect differences in risk tolerance rather than access to metacognitive states.

Assessment of metacognitive monitoring and control in baboons (Papio papio)

Metacognition refers to the ability of an organism to evaluate its states of knowledge (metacognitive monitoring) and engage in appropriate information-seeking behaviors when a lack of knowledge is detected (metacognitive control). This study assessed metacognitive monitoring and control in three Guinea baboons (Papio papio). Monkeys were required to report on a touchscreen the location of two target stimuli that had previously appeared briefly on a grid. They could either respond directly or use a "Repeat" key providing an opportunity to repeat the target stimuli. In Experiment 1, the baboons used the Repeat key more frequently in difficult trials and transferred this use of the key to novel conditions. Two baboons showed higher accuracy when they declined using the key compared to Baseline trials in which the key was not available, suggesting accurate metacognitive monitoring judgments. The same two baboons were consistently faster at reporting the targets' locations after a repetition of the stimulus. In Experiment 2, the baboons had to choose between two Repeat keys, one for each target. Two baboons showed a preference for repeating the presentation of the less visible target, suggesting that they identified what information they lack. Overall, results support the hypothesis of metacognitive monitoring in baboons, and also provide limited evidence for metacognitive control. We propose that tests requiring subjects to choose between several metacognitive responses in computerized tasks provide a suitable new approach for studying targeted information-seeking behaviors in animals.