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Calmette T, Meunier H. Is self-awareness necessary to have a theory of mind? Biol Rev Camb Philos Soc 2024. [PMID: 38676546 DOI: 10.1111/brv.13090] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/14/2023] [Revised: 04/11/2024] [Accepted: 04/16/2024] [Indexed: 04/29/2024]
Abstract
Forty years ago, Gallup proposed that theory of mind presupposes self-awareness. Following Humphrey, his hypothesis was that individuals can infer the mental states of others thanks to the ability to monitor their own mental states in similar circumstances. Since then, advances in several disciplines, such as comparative and developmental psychology, have provided empirical evidence to test Gallup's hypothesis. Herein, we review and discuss this evidence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tony Calmette
- Centre de Primatologie de l'Université de Strasbourg, Niederhausbergen, 67207, France
- Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Adaptatives, UMR 7364, CNRS, Université de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, 67000, France
| | - Hélène Meunier
- Centre de Primatologie de l'Université de Strasbourg, Niederhausbergen, 67207, France
- Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Adaptatives, UMR 7364, CNRS, Université de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, 67000, France
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Subias L, Katsu N, Yamada K. Metacognition in wild Japanese macaques: cost and stakes influencing information-seeking behavior. Anim Cogn 2024; 27:22. [PMID: 38441831 PMCID: PMC10914859 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-024-01851-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/07/2023] [Revised: 10/20/2023] [Accepted: 10/25/2023] [Indexed: 03/07/2024]
Abstract
Metacognition allows us to evaluate memories and knowledge, thus enabling us to distinguish between what we know and what we do not. Studies have shown that species other than humans may possess similar abilities. However, the number of species tested was limited. Testing ten free-ranging Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) on a task in which they had to find food hidden inside one of the four opaque tubes, we investigated whether these subjects would seek information when needed. The monkeys could look inside the tubes before selecting one. We varied three parameters: the baiting process, the cost that monkeys had to pay to look inside the tubes, and the reward at stake. We assessed whether and how these parameters would affect the monkeys' tendency to look inside the tube before selecting one. When they were not shown which tube contained the reward, nine monkeys looked significantly more frequently in at least one condition. Half of them tended to reduce their looks when the cost was high, but only when they already knew the location of the reward. When a high-quality reward was at stake, four monkeys tended to look more inside the tubes, even though they already knew the reward's location. Our results are consistent with those of rhesus macaques, suggesting that metacognitive-like abilities may be shared by Cercopithecidae, and that, at least some monkeys may be aware of their lack of knowledge.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lorraine Subias
- Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, 1-2 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka, Japan.
| | - Noriko Katsu
- Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, 1-2 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka, Japan
| | - Kazunori Yamada
- Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, 1-2 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka, Japan
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Allritz M, McEwen ES, Call J. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) show subtle signs of uncertainty when choices are more difficult. Cognition 2021; 214:104766. [PMID: 34051422 PMCID: PMC8346948 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104766] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/01/2020] [Revised: 05/04/2021] [Accepted: 05/05/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
Humans can tell when they find a task difficult. Subtle uncertainty behaviors like changes in motor speed and muscle tension precede and affect these experiences. Theories of animal metacognition likewise stress the importance of endogenous signals of uncertainty as cues that motivate metacognitive behaviors. However, while researchers have investigated second-order behaviors like information seeking and declining difficult trials in nonhuman animals, they have devoted little attention to the behaviors that express the cognitive conflict that gives rise to such behaviors in the first place. Here we explored whether three chimpanzees would, like humans, show hand wavering more when faced with more difficult choices in a touch screen transitive inference task. While accuracy was very high across all conditions, all chimpanzees wavered more frequently in trials that were objectively more difficult, demonstrating a signature behavior which accompanies experiences of difficulty in humans. This lends plausibility to the idea that feelings of uncertainty, like other emotions, can be studied in nonhuman animals. We propose to routinely assess uncertainty behaviors to inform models of procedural metacognition in nonhuman animals.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Allritz
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP, UK; Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, Leipzig D-04103, Germany.
| | - Emma Suvi McEwen
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP, UK; Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, Leipzig D-04103, Germany
| | - Josep Call
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP, UK; Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, Leipzig D-04103, Germany
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Smith TR, Parrish AE, Creamer C, Rossettie M, Beran MJ. Capuchin monkeys (sometimes) go when they know: Confidence movements in Sapajus apella. Cognition 2020; 199:104237. [PMID: 32112968 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104237] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/20/2019] [Revised: 02/09/2020] [Accepted: 02/11/2020] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
To test for evidence of metacognition in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella), we analyzed confidence movements using a paradigm adapted from research with chimpanzees. Capuchin monkeys provide an interesting model species for the comparative assessment of metacognition as they show limited evidence of such cognitive-monitoring processes in a variety of metacognition paradigms. Here, monkeys were presented with a computerized delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) memory test in one location but were rewarded for correct responses in a separate location. Movements could be made from one location to the other at any time, but movements between a response and reward feedback may reflect confidence in the accuracy of the response. Critically, DMTS tests included occasional "no sample" trials where monkeys' performance was at chance when the trial started without a sample and a 1-s interval to the response options. We predicted that monkeys would (1) perform less accurately (and less confidently) at longer retention intervals, (2) move to the dispenser early more often on trials completed correctly than incorrectly, and (3) show a relation between faster response latency and early movements. Analyses of response times and "go" or "no go" confidence movements before feedback to the reward location suggested that the monkeys were capable of monitoring confidence in their responses. However, their confidence movements were less precise and less flexible than chimpanzees. Overall, this paradigm can reveal potential metacognitive abilities in nonhuman animals that otherwise demonstrate these abilities inconsistently.
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Perdue BM, Evans TA, Beran MJ. Chimpanzees show some evidence of selectively acquiring information by using tools, making inferences, and evaluating possible outcomes. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0193229. [PMID: 29641519 PMCID: PMC5894953 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0193229] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2017] [Accepted: 02/07/2018] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Metacognition refers to thinking about one's thinking or knowing what one knows. Research suggests that this ability is not unique to humans and may be shared with nonhuman animals. In particular, great apes have shown behaviors on a variety of tasks that are suggestive of metacognitive ability. Here we combine a metacognitive task, the information-seeking task, with tool use and variable forms of initial information provided to chimpanzees to explore how informational states impact behavioral responses in these apes. Three chimpanzees were presented with an apparatus that contained five locations where food could be hidden. If they pointed to the correct location, they received the reward, but otherwise they did not. We first replicated several existing findings using this method, and then tested novel hypotheses. The chimpanzees were given different types of information across the experiments. Sometimes, they were shown the location of the food reward. Other times, they were shown only one empty location, which was not useful information. The chimpanzees also could use a tool to search any of those locations before making a selection. Chimpanzees typically used the tool to search out the location of the reward when they could not already know where it was, but they did not use the tool when they already had been given that information. One chimpanzee made inferences about the location of hidden food, even when that food was never shown in that location. The final experiment involved hiding foods of differing preference values, and then presenting the chimpanzees with different initial knowledge states (i.e., where the best food was located, where the less-preferred food was located, or where no food was located). All chimpanzees used the tool when they needed to use it to find the best possible item on that trial, but responded by choosing a location immediately when they did not need the tool. This finding highlights that their behavior was not the result of a simple rule following such as pointing to where any food had been seen.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bonnie M. Perdue
- Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
- * E-mail:
| | - Theodore A. Evans
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
| | - Michael J. Beran
- Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, Georgia, United States of America
- Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
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When do you know what you know? The emergence of memory monitoring. J Exp Child Psychol 2017; 166:34-48. [PMID: 28863314 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2017.06.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/10/2017] [Revised: 06/26/2017] [Accepted: 06/26/2017] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
Abstract
Recent research on comparative metacognition shows that animals, like humans, can differentiate between what they know and what they do not know. However, not much is known about the metacognitive behaviors of human children during their early years. To explore the emergence of memory-monitoring skills, two experiments were conducted using nonverbal tasks adapted from the work of Kornell, Son, and Terrace (2007) and Hampton (2001). Experiment 1 endeavored to determine when children began to show the ability to monitor their memories retrospectively. Experiment 2 aimed to reveal when young children knew what they knew by assessing their prospective monitoring. The results suggested that 4- to 5-year-olds had the ability to judge retrospectively their accuracy in a serial position task, whereas 3- to 4-year-olds did not. In contrast, 4.5- to 5-year-olds could discern items present in and absent from their memory before recognition, whereas 4- to 4.5-year-olds could not. In conclusion, 4-year-olds began to make accurate confidence judgments retrospectively, and children who are approximately 4.5years old began to demonstrate prospective memory-monitoring skills.
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Checking behavior in rhesus monkeys is related to anxiety and frontal activity. Sci Rep 2017; 7:45267. [PMID: 28349919 PMCID: PMC5368664 DOI: 10.1038/srep45267] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2016] [Accepted: 02/23/2017] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
When facing doubt, humans can go back over a performed action in order to optimize subsequent performance. The present study aimed to establish and characterize physiological doubt and checking behavior in non-human primates (NHP). We trained two rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in a newly designed “Check-or-Go” task that allows the animal to repeatedly check and change the availability of a reward before making the final decision towards obtaining that reward. By manipulating the ambiguity of a visual cue in which the reward status is embedded, we successfully modulated animal certainty and created doubt that led the animals to check. This voluntary checking behavior was further characterized by making EEG recordings and measuring correlated changes in salivary cortisol. Our data show that monkeys have the metacognitive ability to express voluntary checking behavior similar to that observed in humans, which depends on uncertainty monitoring, relates to anxiety and involves brain frontal areas.
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Belin L, Henry L, Destays M, Hausberger M, Grandgeorge M. Simple Shapes Elicit Different Emotional Responses in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder and Neurotypical Children and Adults. Front Psychol 2017; 8:91. [PMID: 28194129 PMCID: PMC5276997 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00091] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/04/2016] [Accepted: 01/13/2017] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
According to the literature, simple shapes induce emotional responses. Current evaluations suggest that humans consider angular shapes as "bad" and curvilinear forms as "good," but no behavioral data are available to support this hypothesis. Atypical development, such as autism spectrum disorder (ASD), could modify humans' perception of visual stimuli and thereby their emotional effect. This study assessed the effects of simple stimuli (i.e., jagged edges shape, disk, star, spiral, eye-like shape, and head character) on the emotional responses of different groups of humans. First, we assessed the effects of a looming movement on neurotypical adults' emotional responses. Second, we assessed the effects of atypical development on emotional responses by comparing the reactions of neurotypical children and of children with ASD. We used different methodological approaches: self-evaluation through questionnaires and direct observation of participants' behavior. We found that (1) neurotypical adults tended to perceive looming stimuli negatively as they associated more negative feelings with them although few behavioral responses could be evidenced and (2) the emotional responses of neurotypical children and of children with ASD differed significantly. Neurotypical children perceived the spiral stimulus positively, i.e., a curvilinear shape, whereas children with ASD perceived the jagged edges stimulus positively, i.e., an angular shape. Although neurotypical children and children with ASD presented some behavioral responses in common, children with ASD smiled and vocalized more than did neurotypical children during stimuli presentations. We discuss our results in relation to the literature on humans' perception of simple shapes and we stress the importance of studying behavioral components for visual cognition research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Laurine Belin
- Laboratoire d’Éthologie Animale et Humaine EthoS–UMR-CNRS 6552, Université de Rennes 1Rennes, France
| | - Laurence Henry
- Laboratoire d’Éthologie Animale et Humaine EthoS–UMR-CNRS 6552, Université de Rennes 1Rennes, France
| | - Mélanie Destays
- Laboratoire d’Éthologie Animale et Humaine EthoS–UMR-CNRS 6552, Université de Rennes 1Rennes, France
| | - Martine Hausberger
- CNRS, Laboratoire d’Éthologie Animale et Humaine EthoS–UMR-CNRS 6552, Université de Rennes 1Rennes, France
| | - Marine Grandgeorge
- Laboratoire d’Éthologie Animale et Humaine EthoS–UMR-CNRS 6552, Station Biologique de Paimpont, Université de Rennes 1Paimpont, France
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Brown EK, Templer VL, Hampton RR. An assessment of domain-general metacognitive responding in rhesus monkeys. Behav Processes 2016; 135:132-144. [PMID: 27939856 DOI: 10.1016/j.beproc.2016.12.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2016] [Revised: 10/25/2016] [Accepted: 12/07/2016] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition is the ability to monitor and control one's cognition. Monitoring may involve either public cues or introspection of private cognitive states. We tested rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in a series of generalization tests to determine which type of cues control metacognition. In Experiment 1, monkeys learned a perceptual discrimination in which a "decline-test" response allowed them to avoid tests and receive a guaranteed small reward. Monkeys declined more difficult than easy tests. In Experiments 2-4, we evaluated whether monkeys generalized this metacognitive responding to new perceptual tests. Monkeys showed a trend toward generalization in Experiments 2 & 3, and reliable generalization in Experiment 4. In Experiments 5 & 6, we presented the decline-test response in a delayed matching-to-sample task. Memory tests differed from perceptual tests in that the appearance of the test display could not control metacognitive responding. In Experiment 6, monkeys made prospective metamemory judgments before seeing the tests. Generalization across perceptual tests with different visual properties and mixed generalization from perceptual to memory tests provide provisional evidence that domain-general, private cues controlled metacognition in some monkeys. We observed individual differences in generalization, suggesting that monkeys differ in use of public and private metacognitive cues.
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Affiliation(s)
- Emily Kathryn Brown
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, 201 Downman Dr., Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
| | | | - Robert R Hampton
- Department of Psychology and Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, 201 Downman Dr., Atlanta, GA 30322, USA
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