Contrast between what is expected and what occurs increases pigeon’s suboptimal choice

Inhibition and paradoxical choice

The present study evaluated the role of inhibition in paradoxical choice in pigeons. In a paradoxical choice procedure, pigeons receive a choice between two alternatives. Choosing the "suboptimal" alternative is followed 20% of the time by one cue (the S+) that is always reinforced, and 80% of the time by another cue (S-) that is never reinforced. Thus, this alternative leads to an overall reinforcement rate of 20%. Choosing the "optimal" alternative, however, is followed by one of two cues (S3 or S4), each reinforced 50% of the time. Thus, this alternative leads to an overall reinforcement rate of 50%. González and Blaisdell (2021) reported that development of paradoxical choice was positively correlated to the development of inhibition to the S- (signal that no food will be delivered on that trial) post-choice stimulus. The current experiment tested the hypothesis that inhibition to a post-choice stimulus is causally related to suboptimal preference. Following acquisition of suboptimal preference, pigeons received two manipulations: in one condition one of the cues in the optimal alternative (S4) was extinguished and, in another condition, the S- cue was partially reinforced. When tested on the choice task afterward, both manipulations resulted in a decrement in suboptimal preference. This result is paradoxical given that both manipulations made the suboptimal alternative the richer option. We discuss the implications of our results, arguing that inhibition of a post-choice cue increases attraction to or value of that choice.

Forced-exposure trials increase suboptimal choice

The influence of single option or forced-exposure (FE) trials was studied in the suboptimal choice task. Pigeons chose between an optimal alternative that led to food half of the time and a suboptimal alternative that led to food 20% of the time. Choice of the suboptimal alternative was compared across groups of subjects that received different numbers of FE trials during training. In Experiment 1, subjects received 100% FE trials, 67% FE trials, or only choice trials. Pigeons in the two groups that had FE trials developed extreme preference for the signaled suboptimal alternative over the unsignaled optimal alternative, while pigeons that had no FE trials showed pronounced individual differences. Experiment 2 compared 10% and 90% FE trials. When neither alternative signaled trial outcomes, both groups of subjects strongly preferred the optimal alternative. When the suboptimal alternative provided differential signals, the subjects in the 90% FE group developed strong preference for the suboptimal alternative and subjects in the 10% FE group maintained preference for the optimal alternative. The results of both experiments demonstrate that FE trials can have substantial effects on the development of preference in the suboptimal choice task.

Revisited: Pigeons Have Much Cognitive Behavior in Common With Humans

The hypothesis proposed by Macphail (1987) is that differences in intelligent behavior thought to distinguish different species were likely attributed to differences in the context of the tasks being used. Once one corrects for differences in sensory input, motor output, and incentive, it is likely that all vertebrate animals have comparable intellectual abilities. In the present article I suggest a number of tests of this hypothesis with pigeons. In each case, the evidence suggests that either there is evidence for the cognitive behavior, or the pigeons suffer from biases similar to those of humans. Thus, Macphail’s hypothesis offers a challenge to researchers to find the appropriate conditions to bring out in the animal the cognitive ability being tested.

Neural circuitry of information seeking

Humans and animals navigate uncertain environments by seeking information about the future. Remarkably, we often seek information even when it has no instrumental value for aiding our decisions - as if the information is a source of value in its own right. In recent years, there has been a flourishing of research into these non-instrumental information preferences and their implementation in the brain. Individuals value information about uncertain future rewards, and do so for multiple reasons, including valuing resolution of uncertainty and overweighting desirable information. The brain motivates this information seeking by tapping into some of the same circuitry as primary rewards like food and water. However, it also employs cortex and basal ganglia circuitry that predicts and values information as distinct from primary reward. Uncovering how these circuits cooperate will be fundamental to understanding information seeking and motivated behavior as a whole, in our increasingly complex and information-rich world.

Challenges and Opportunities in Animal Models of Gambling-like Behavior

In the past several years, there has been an explosion of interest in animal models of risk-based decision-making, a fundamental process associated with gambling disorder. While early work focused on establishing various tasks for assaying decision-making, current studies are determining the (subtle and not-so-subtle) influence of cues in driving risky decisions to better understand problem gambling. In addition, these decision-making paradigms are now being used to investigate comorbid conditions such as substance dependence or brain injury and replicating observations from human patients. These animal models have now developed to a point where therapeutic interventions may be assessed for not just gambling disorder, but also a number of other conditions which engender risky decision-making.