Economic evaluation of pay-for-performance in health care: a systematic review

Impact of reimbursement systems on patient care - a systematic review of systematic reviews

BACKGROUND

There is not yet sufficient scientific evidence to answer the question of the extent to which different reimbursement systems influence patient care and treatment quality. Due to the asymmetry of information between physicians, health insurers and patients, market-based mechanisms are necessary to ensure the best possible patient care. The aim of this study is to investigate how reimbursement systems influence multiple areas of patient care in form of structure, process and outcome indicators.

METHODS

For this purpose, a systematic literature review of systematic reviews is conducted in the databases PubMed, Web of Science and the Cochrane Library. The reimbursement systems of salary, bundled payment, fee-for-service and value-based reimbursement are examined. Patient care is divided according to the three dimensions of structure, process, and outcome and evaluated in eight subcategories.

RESULTS

A total of 34 reviews of 971 underlying primary studies are included in this article. International studies identified the greatest effects in categories resource utilization and quality/health outcomes. Pay-for-performance and bundled payments were the most commonly studied models. Among the systems examined, fee-for-service and value-based reimbursement systems have the most positive impact on patient care.

CONCLUSION

Patient care can be influenced by the choice of reimbursement system. The factors for successful implementation need to be further explored in future research.

Association of a Heart Failure Management Incentive in Primary Care With Clinical Outcomes: A Retrospective Cohort Study

BACKGROUND

We aim to examine the association between primary care physicians' billing of Q050A, a pay-for-performance heart failure (HF) management incentive fee code, and the composite outcome of mortality, hospitalization, and emergency department visits.

METHODS AND RESULTS

This population-based cohort study linked administrative health databases in Ontario, Canada, for patients with HF aged >66 years between January 1, 2008, and March 31, 2020. Cases were patients with HF who had a Q050A fee code billed. Cases and controls were matched 1:1 on age, sex, patient status on being rostered to a primary care physician, cardiologist, or internist visit in the 6 months before study enrollment, Johns Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Group resource use bands, days between HF diagnosis and study enrollment (±2 years), and the logit of the propensity score. A Cox proportional hazards model assessed the association of Q050A with the outcome. A total of 59 664 cases had a Q050A billed, whereas 244 883 patients did not. Before matching, patients who had a Q050A billed were more likely to be men (52% versus 49%), were rostered to a primary care physician (100% versus 96%), had a higher Charlson Comorbidity Index, and had higher health care costs. The mean follow-up was 481 days for cases and 530 days for controls. The composite outcome (hazard ratio, 1.11 [95% CI, 1.09-1.12]) was significantly higher for cases than controls.

CONCLUSIONS

The Q050A incentive improved financial compensation for primary care physicians managing patients with HF but was not associated with improvements in the outcome. Research on promoting evidence-based HF management is warranted.

Alternative Reimbursement Models for Health Providers in High-Performance Sport: Stakeholder Experiences and Perceptions

BACKGROUND

Value-based healthcare provider reimbursement models have been proposed as an alternative to traditional fee-for-service arrangements that can align financial reimbursement more closely to the outcomes of value to patients and society. This study aimed to investigate stakeholder perceptions and experiences of different reimbursement systems for healthcare providers in high-performance sport, with a focus on fee-for-service versus salaried provider models.

METHODS

Three in-depth semi-structured focus group discussions and one individual interview were conducted with key stakeholders across the Australian high-performance sport system. Participants included healthcare providers, health managers, sports managers and executive personnel. An interview guide was developed using the Exploration, Preparation, Implementation, Sustainment framework, with key themes deductively mapped to the innovation, inner context and outer context domains. A total of 16 stakeholders participated in a focus group discussion or interview.

RESULTS

Participants identified several key advantages of salaried provider models over fee-for-service arrangements, including: the potential for more proactive and preventive models of care; enhanced inter-disciplinary collaboration; and the ability for providers to have a deeper understanding of context and how their role aligns with a broader set of priorities for an athlete and the organisation. Noted challenges of salaried provider models included the potential for providers to revert to reactive care delivery when not afforded adequate capacity to provide services, and difficulties for providers in demonstrating and quantifying the value of their work.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings suggest that high-performance sporting organisations seeking to improve primary prevention and multidisciplinary care should consider salaried provider arrangements. Further research to confirm these findings using prospective, experimental study designs remains a priority.

Does the implementation of pay-for-performance indicators improve the quality of healthcare? First results in France

Background

Pay-for-performance (P4P) models are intended to promote quality of care in both hospitals and primary care settings. They are considered as a means of changing medical practices, particularly in primary care.

Objectives

The first objective of this study was to assess how performance indicators changed over time, measured through “Remuneration on Public Health Objectives” (ROSP) scores, between 2017 and 2020 in a large French region (Grand Est region), and to compare this evolution in the rural vs. urban areas of the region. The second objective was to focus on the area with the least improvement in ROSP scores and to investigate whether the scores and the available sociodemographic characteristics of the area were associated.

Methods

First, we measured the evolution over time of P4P indicators (i.e., ROSP scores) obtained from the regional health insurance system, for GP practices in the Grand Est region between 2017 and 2020. We then compared the scores between the Aube Department and the rest of the region (urban areas). To address the second objective, we focused on the area found to have the least improvement in indicators to investigate whether there was a relationship between ROSP score and sociodemographic characteristics.

Results

More than 40,000 scores were collected. We observed an overall improvement in scores over the study period. The urban area (Grand Est region minus the Aube) scored better than the rural area (Aube) for chronic disease management [median 0.91 (0.84–0.95) vs. 0.90(0.79–0.94), p < 0.001] and prevention [median 0.36 (0.22–0.45) vs. 0.33 (0.17–0.43), p < 0.001], but not for efficiency, where the rural area (Aube) performed better [median 0.67(0.56–0.74) vs. 0.69 (0.57–0.75 in the rest of the Grand Est region, p = 0.004]. In the rural area, we found no significant association between ROSP scores and sociodemographic characteristics, except for extreme rurality in some sub-areas.

Conclusions

At the regional level, the overall improvement in scores observed between 2017 and 2020 suggests that the implementation of ROSP indicators have improved the quality of care, particularly in urban areas. These results also suggest that efforts should be focused on rural areas, which already had the lowest scores at the start of the P4P program.

Incentives Promoting Contracted Family Doctor Service Policy to Improve Continuity and Coordination in Diabetes Patient Management Care in China

Background

As the first step toward building a gatekeeping system in China, the governments have introduced a contracted family doctor service (CFDS) policy in primary healthcare (PHC) facilities. This study was to examine the association between apply of incentive to improve the implementation of CFDS and the performance on diabetes management care.

Methods

We conducted a cross-sectional study in 72 PHC facilities in 6 cities that piloted the CFDS. Multivariate regression models were applied, based on a sample of 827 PHC providers and 420 diabetic patients.

Results

PHC providers who reported the performance being linked with increased income were 168.1 and 78.0% more likely to have good continuity and coordination of diabetes patient management care, respectively. Additional one-point percentage of PHC providers whose performance on CFDS was assessed was associated with 7.192 times higher probability of patients with control of blood glucose.

Discussion

Inclusion of incentives rewarding better performance on CFDS were associated with better delivery process and outcome performance on diabetes management care.

Conclusion

Design and implementation of the incentive should be accompanied with the policy of CFDS, in order to increase the proportion of performance-related income of PHC providers, thereby improving the quality of diabetes management care.

Hospital funding reforms in Canada: a narrative review of Ontario and Quebec strategies

Background

In the early 2000s, Ontario and Quebec, two provinces of Canada, began to introduce hospital payment reforms to improve quality and access to care. This paper (1) critically reviews patient-based funding (PBF) implementation approaches used by Quebec and Ontario over 15 years, and (2) identifies factors that support or limit PBF implementation to inform future decisions regarding the use of PBF models in both provinces.

Methods

We adopted a narrative review approach to document and critically analyse Quebec and Ontario experiences with the implementation of patient-based funding. We searched for documents in the scientific and grey literature and contacted key stakeholders to identify relevant policy documents.

Results

Both provinces targeted similar hospital services—aligned with nationwide policy goals—fulfilling in part patient-based funding programmes’ objectives. We identified four factors that played a role in ensuring the successful—or not—implementation of these strategies: (1) adoption supports, (2) alignment with programme objectives, (3) funding incentives and (4) stakeholder engagement.

Conclusions

This review provides lessons in the complexity of implementing hospital payment reforms. Implementation is enabled by adoption supports and funding incentives that align with policy objectives and by engaging stakeholders in the design of incentives.

Antibiotic prophylaxis as a quality of care indicator: does it help in the fight against surgical site infections following fragility hip fractures?

INTRODUCTION

Fragility hip fractures are associated with increased morbidity, mortality, and costs. To improve patient care, quality indicator programs were introduced. Yet, the efficacy of these programs and specific quality indicators are questioned. We aimed to determine whether defining prophylactic pre-surgical antibiotic treatment as a quality indicator affected hip fracture outcomes.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

A retrospective study comparing consecutive patients, 65 years and older, who were operated for fragility hip fractures between 01/01/2011 and 30/06/2016, before and after the prophylactic pre-surgical antibiotic treatment quality indicator, which was introduced in 01/2014. Primary outcomes were 1-year surgical site infections (SSI). Secondary outcomes were meeting the quality index and mortality rates, either within a hospital or during the first post-operative year.

RESULTS

904 patients, ages 82.5 ± 7.2 years were operated for fragility hip fractures. 403 patients presented before the antibiotic prophylaxis quality indicator, and 501 following its administration. Patients demographics were comparable. In the pre-quality indicator period, documentation of prophylactic antibiotic treatment was lacking. Only 19.6% had a record for antibiotic administration in their surgical records and for merely 10.4% the type of antibiotic was stated. However, in the post-quality indicator period, 97.0% of patients had a registered prophylactic antibiotic regimen in the hour preceding the surgical incision (p  < 0.001). Post-operative SSI rates were equivalent, and as were in-hospital infections, mortality and recurrent hospitalizations CONCLUSIONS: The introduction of the pre-operative antibiotic treatment quality indicator increased the documentation of antibiotic administration yet failed to influence the incidence of post-operative orthopaedic and medical infections in fragility hip fracture patients.

Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Local Primary Care Incentive Scheme: A Difference-in-Differences Study

National financial incentive schemes for improving the quality of primary care have come under criticism in the United Kingdom, leading to calls for localized alternatives. This study investigated whether a local general practice incentive-based quality improvement scheme launched in 2011 in a city in the North West of England was associated with a reduction in all-cause emergency hospital admissions. Difference-in-differences analysis was used to compare the change in emergency admission rates in the intervention city, to the change in a matched comparison population. Emergency admissions rates fell by 19 per 1,000 people in the years following the intervention (95% confidence interval [17, 21]) in the intervention city, relative to the comparison population. This effect was greater among more disadvantaged populations, narrowing socioeconomic inequalities in emergency admissions. The findings suggest that similar approaches could be an effective component of strategies to reduce unplanned hospital admissions elsewhere.

Hospital performance and payment: impact of integrating pay-for-performance on healthcare effectiveness in Lebanon

Background: In 2014 the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health integrated pay-for-performance into setting hospital reimbursement tiers, to provide hospitalization service coverage for the majority of the Lebanese population. This policy was intended to improve effectiveness by decreasing unnecessary hospitalizations, and improve fairness by including risk-adjustment in setting hospital performance scores. Methods: We applied a systematic approach to assess the impact of the new policy on hospital performance. The main impact measure was a national casemix index, calculated across 2011-2016 using medical discharge and surgical procedure codes. A single-group interrupted time series analysis model with Newey ordinary least squares regression was estimated, including adjustment for seasonality, and stratified by case type. Code-level analysis was used to attribute and explain changes in casemix index due to specific diagnoses and procedures. Results: Our final model included 1,353,025 cases across 146 hospitals with a post-intervention lag-time of two months and seasonality adjustment. Among medical cases the intervention resulted in a positive casemix index trend of 0.11% per month (coefficient 0.002, CI 0.001-0.003), and a level increase of 2.25% (coefficient 0.022, CI 0.005-0.039). Trend changes were attributed to decreased cases of diarrhea and gastroenteritis, abdominal and pelvic pain, essential hypertension and fever of unknown origin. A shift from medium to short-stay cases for specific diagnoses was also detected. Level changes were attributed to improved coding practices, particularly for breast cancer, leukemia and chemotherapy. No impact on surgical casemix index was found. Conclusions: The 2014 policy resulted in increased healthcare effectiveness, by increasing the casemix index of hospitals contracted by the Ministry. This increase was mainly attributed to decreased unnecessary hospitalizations and was accompanied by improved medical discharge coding practices. Integration of pay-for-performance within a healthcare system may contribute to improving effectiveness. Effective hospital regulation can be achieved through systematic collection and analysis of routine data.

Performance Pay in Hospitals: An Experiment on Bonus-Malus Incentives

Recent policy reforms in Germany require the introduction of a performance pay component with bonus–malus incentives in the inpatient care sector. We conduct a controlled online experiment with real hospital physicians from public hospitals and medical students in Germany, in which we investigate the effects of introducing a performance pay component with bonus–malus incentives to a simplified version of the German Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) system using a sequential design with stylized routine cases. In both parts, participants choose between the patient optimal and profit maximizing treatment option for the same eight stylized routine cases. We find that the introduction of bonus–malus incentives only statistically significantly increases hospital physicians’ proportion of patient optimal choices for cases with high monetary baseline DRG incentives to choose the profit maximizing option. Medical students behave qualitatively similar. However, they are statistically significantly less patient oriented than real hospital physicians, and statistically significantly increase their patient optimal decisions with the introduction of bonus–malus incentives in all stylized routine cases. Overall, our results indicate that whether the introduction of a performance pay component with bonus–malus incentives to the (German) DRG system has a positive effect on the quality of care or not particularly depends on the monetary incentives implemented in the DRG system as well as the type of participants and their initial level of patient orientation.

The evidence gap on gendered impacts of performance-based financing among family physicians for chronic disease care: a systematic review reanalysis in contexts of single-payer universal coverage

BACKGROUND

Although pay-for-performance (P4P) among primary care physicians for enhanced chronic disease management is increasingly common, the evidence base is fragmented in terms of socially equitable impacts in achieving the quadruple aim for healthcare improvement: better population health, reduced healthcare costs, and enhanced patient and provider experiences. This study aimed to assess the literature from a systematic review on how P4P for diabetes services impacts on gender equity in patient outcomes and the physician workforce.

METHODS

A gender-based analysis was performed of studies retrieved through a systematic search of 10 abstract and citation databases plus grey literature sources for P4P impact assessments in multiple languages over the period January 2000 to April 2018, following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. The study was restricted to single-payer national health systems to minimize the risk of physicians sorting out of health organizations with a strong performance pay component. Two reviewers scored and synthesized the integration of sex and gender in assessing patient- and provider-oriented outcomes as well as the quality of the evidence.

FINDINGS

Of the 2218 identified records, 39 studies covering eight P4P interventions in seven countries were included for analysis. Most (79%) of the studies reported having considered sex/gender in the design, but only 28% presented sex-disaggregated patient data in the results of the P4P assessment models, and none (0%) assessed the interaction of patients' sex with the policy intervention. Few (15%) of the studies controlled for the provider's sex, and none (0%) discussed impacts of P4P on the work life of providers from a gender perspective (e.g., pay equity).

CONCLUSIONS

There is a dearth of evidence on gender-based outcomes of publicly funded incentivizing physician payment schemes for chronic disease care. As the popularity of P4P to achieve health system goals continues to grow, so does the risk of unintended consequences. There is a critical need for research integrating gender concerns to help inform performance-based health workforce financing policy options in the era of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Hospital performance and payment: impact of integrating pay-for-performance on healthcare effectiveness in Lebanon

Background: In 2014 the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health integrated pay-for-performance into setting hospital reimbursement tiers, to provide hospitalization service coverage for the majority of the Lebanese population. This policy was intended to improve effectiveness by decreasing unnecessary hospitalizations, and improve fairness by including risk-adjustment in setting hospital performance scores. Methods: We applied a systematic approach to assess the impact of the new policy on hospital performance. The main impact measure was a national casemix index, calculated across 2011-2016 using medical discharge and surgical procedure codes. A single-group interrupted time series analysis model with Newey ordinary least squares regression was estimated, including adjustment for seasonality, and stratified by case type. Code-level analysis was used to attribute and explain changes in casemix index due to specific diagnoses and procedures. Results: Our final model included 1,353,025 cases across 146 hospitals with a post-intervention lag-time of two months and seasonality adjustment. Among medical cases the intervention resulted in a positive casemix index trend of 0.11% per month (coefficient 0.002, CI 0.001-0.003), and a level increase of 2.25% (coefficient 0.022, CI 0.005-0.039). Trend changes were attributed to decreased cases of diarrhea and gastroenteritis, abdominal and pelvic pain, essential hypertension and fever of unknown origin. A shift from medium to short-stay cases for specific diagnoses was also detected. Level changes were attributed to improved coding practices, particularly for breast cancer, leukemia and chemotherapy. No impact on surgical casemix index was found. Conclusions: The 2014 policy resulted in increased healthcare effectiveness, by increasing the casemix index of hospitals contracted by the Ministry. This increase was mainly attributed to decreased unnecessary hospitalizations and was accompanied by improved medical discharge coding practices. Integration of pay-for-performance within a healthcare system may contribute to improving effectiveness. Effective hospital regulation can be achieved through systematic collection and analysis of routine data.

Healthcare Digitalization and Pay-For-Performance Incentives in Smart Hospital Project Financing

This study aims to explore the impact of healthcare digitalization on smart hospital project financing (PF) fostered by pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives. Digital platforms are a technology-enabled business model that facilitates exchanges between interacting agents. They represent a bridging link among disconnected nodes, improving the scalable value of networks. Application to healthcare public-private partnerships (PPPs) is significant due to the consistency of digital platforms with health issues and the complexity of the stakeholder's interaction. In infrastructural PPPs, public and private players cooperate, usually following PF patterns. This relationship is complemented by digitized supply chains and is increasingly patient-centric. This paper reviews the literature, analyzes some supply chain bottlenecks, addresses solutions concerning the networking effects of platforms to improve PPP interactions, and investigates the cost-benefit analysis of digital health with an empirical case. Whereas diagnostic or infrastructural technology is an expensive investment with long-term payback, leapfrogging digital applications reduce contingent costs. "Digital" savings can be shared by key stakeholders with P4P schemes, incentivizing value co-creation patterns. Efficient sharing may apply network theory to a comprehensive PPP ecosystem where stakeholding nodes are digitally connected. This innovative approach improves stakeholder relationships, which are re-engineered around digital platforms that enhance patient-centered satisfaction and sustainability. Digital technologies are useful even for infectious disease surveillance, like that of the coronavirus pandemic, for supporting massive healthcare intervention, decongesting hospitals, and providing timely big data.

Cautionary study on the effects of pay for performance on quality of care: a pilot randomised controlled trial using standardised patients

BACKGROUND

Due to the difficulty of studying incentives in practice, there is limited empirical evidence of the full-impact pay-for-performance (P4P) incentive systems.

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate the impact of P4P in a controlled, simulated environment.

DESIGN

We employed a simulation-based randomised controlled trial with three standardised patients to assess advanced practice providers' performance. Each patient reflected one of the following: (A) indicated for P4P screenings, (B) too young for P4P screenings, or (C) indicated for P4P screenings, but screenings are unrelated to the reason for the visit. Indication was determined by the 2016 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services quality measures.

INTERVENTION

The P4P group was paid $150 and received a bonus of $10 for meeting each of five outcome measures (breast cancer, colorectal cancer, pneumococcal, tobacco use and depression screenings) for each of the three cases (max $300). The control group received $200.

SETTING

Learning resource centre.

PARTICIPANTS

35 advanced practice primary care providers (physician assistants and nurse practitioners) and 105 standardised patient encounters.

MEASUREMENTS

Adherence to incentivised outcome measures, interpersonal communication skills, standards of care, and misuse.

RESULTS

patient was more likely to be prescribed screenings not indicated, but highlighted by P4P: breast cancer screening (47% P4P vs 0% control, p<0.01) and colorectal cancer screening (24% P4P vs 0% control, p=0.03). The P4P group over-reported completion of incentivised measures resulting in overpayment (average of $9.02 per patient).

LIMITATIONS

A small sample size and limited variability in patient panel limit the generalisability of findings.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings caution the adoption of P4P by highlighting the unintended consequences of the incentive system.

Effects of pay-for-performance for primary care physicians on diabetes outcomes in single-payer health systems: a systematic review

BACKGROUND

Although pay-for-performance (P4P) for diabetes care is increasingly common, evidence of its effectiveness in improving population health and health system sustainability is deficient. This information gap is attributable in part to the heterogeneity of healthcare financing, covered medical conditions, care settings, and provider remuneration arrangements within and across countries. We systematically reviewed the literature concentrating on whether P4P for physicians in primary and community care leads to better diabetes outcomes in single-payer national health insurance systems.

METHODS

Studies were identified by searching ten databases (01/2000-04/2018) and scanning the reference lists of review articles and other global health literature. We included primary studies evaluating the effects of introducing P4P for diabetes care among primary care physicians in countries of universal health coverage. Outcomes of interest included patient morbidity, avoidable hospitalization, premature death, and healthcare costs.

RESULTS

We identified 2218 reports; after exclusions, 10 articles covering 8 P4P interventions in 7 countries were eligible for analysis. Five studies, capturing records from 717,166 patients with diabetes, were graded as high-quality evaluations of P4P on health outcomes. Based on three quality studies, P4P can result in reduced risk of mortality over the longer term-when linked to performance metrics. However, studies from other jurisdictions, where P4P was not linked to specific patient-oriented objectives, yielded little or mixed evidence of positive health impacts.

CONCLUSION

Evidence of the effectiveness of P4P depends on whether physicians' incentive payments are explicitly tied to performance metrics. However, the most appropriate indicators for performance monitoring remain in question. More research with rigorous evaluation in different settings is needed.

Designing and using incentives to support recruitment and retention in clinical trials: a scoping review and a checklist for design

Background

Recruitment and retention of participants are both critical for the success of trials, yet both remain significant problems. The use of incentives to target participants and trial staff has been proposed as one solution. The effects of incentives are complex and depend upon how they are designed, but these complexities are often overlooked. In this paper, we used a scoping review to ‘map’ the literature, with two aims: to develop a checklist on the design and use of incentives to support recruitment and retention in trials; and to identify key research topics for the future.

Methods

The scoping review drew on the existing economic theory of incentives and a structured review of the literature on the use of incentives in three healthcare settings: trials, pay for performance, and health behaviour change. We identified the design issues that need to be considered when introducing an incentive scheme to improve recruitment and retention in trials. We then reviewed both the theoretical and empirical evidence relating to each of these design issues. We synthesised the findings into a checklist to guide the design of interventions using incentives.

Results

The issues to consider when designing an incentive system were summarised into an eight-question checklist. The checklist covers: the current incentives and barriers operating in the system; who the incentive should be directed towards; what the incentive should be linked to; the form of incentive; the incentive size; the structure of the incentive system; the timing and frequency of incentive payouts; and the potential unintended consequences. We concluded the section on each design aspect by highlighting the gaps in the current evidence base.

Conclusions

Our findings highlight how complex the design of incentive systems can be, and how crucial each design choice is to overall effectiveness. The most appropriate design choice will differ according to context, and we have aimed to provide context-specific advice. Whilst all design issues warrant further research, evidence is most needed on incentives directed at recruiters, optimal incentive size, and testing of different incentive structures, particularly exploring repeat arrangements with recruiters.

Relationship between general practice capitation funding and the quality of primary care in England: a cross-sectional, 3-year study

OBJECTIVE

To explore the relationship between general practice capitation funding and quality ratings based on general practice inspections.

DESIGN

Cross-sectional study pooling 3 years of primary care administrative data.

SETTING

UK primary care.

PARTICIPANTS

7310 practices (95% of all practices) in England which underwent Care Quality Commission (CQC) inspections between November 2014 and December 2017.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

CQC ratings. Ordered logistic regression methods were used to predict the relationship between practice capitation funding and CQC ratings in each of five domains of quality: caring, effective, responsive, safe and well led, together with an overall practice rating.

RESULTS

Higher capitation funding per patient was significantly associated with higher CQC ratings across all five quality domains: caring (OR 1.14, 95% CI 1.04 to 1.23), effective (OR 1.08, 95% CI 1.00 to 1.16), responsive (OR 1.09, 95% CI 1.02 to 1.17), safe (OR 1.11, 95% CI 1.05 to 1.18), well led (OR 1.13, 95% CI 1.06 to 1.20) and overall rating (OR 1.13, 95% CI 1.06 to 1.19).

CONCLUSION

Higher capitation funding was consistently associated with higher ratings across all CQC domains and in the overall practice rating. This study suggests that measured dimensions of the quality of care are related to the underlying capitation funding allocated to each general practice, implying that additional capitation funding may be associated with higher levels of primary care quality.

Factors associated with misreporting in performance-based financing in Burkina Faso: Implications for risk-based verification

Performance-based financing (PBF) has been piloted in many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) as a strategy to improve access to and quality of health services. As a key component of PBF, quantity verification is carried out to ensure that reported data matches the actual number of services provided. However, cost concerns have led to a call for risk-based verification. Existing evidence suggests misreporting is associated with factors such as complexity of indicators, high service volume, and accepted error margin. In contrast, evidence on the association of key facility characteristics with misreporting in PBF is scarce. We contributed to filling this gap in knowledge by combining administrative data from a large-scale pilot PBF program in Burkina Faso with data from a health facility assessment in the context of an impact evaluation of the intervention. Our results showed the coexistence of both overreporting and underreporting and that misreporting varied by service indicator and health district. We also found that the number of clinical staff at the facility, the population size in the facility catchment area, and the distance between the facility and the district administration were associated with the probability of misreporting. We recommend further research of these factors in the move towards risk-based verification. In addition, given that our analysis identified relevant associations, but could not explain them, we recommend further qualitative inquiry into verification processes.

Person-Centered Care as Facilitated by Kansas' PEAK 2.0 Medicaid Pay-for-Performance Program and Nursing Home Resident Clinical Outcomes

Purpose of the Study

Person-centered care (PCC) is intended to improve nursing home residents’ quality of life, but the closer bonds it engenders between residents and staff may also facilitate improvements to residents’ clinical health. Findings on whether adoption ameliorates resident clinical outcomes are conflicting, with some evidence of harm as well as benefit. To provide clearer evidence, the present study made use of Kansas’ PEAK 2.0 Medicaid pay-for-performance (P4P) program, which incents the adoption of PCC. The program is distinctive in training facilities’ staff on adopting PCC through a series of well-defined stages and providing regular feedback about their progress.

Design and Methods

A retrospective cohort study was performed with 349 Kansas facilities spread across several well-defined PCC adoption stages, ranging from nonadoption to comprehensive adoption. The outcomes were thirteen 2014–2016 Nursing Home Compare long-stay resident clinical measures and a composite measure incorporating only nonimputed data for those 13 outcomes. Observed facility demographic differences were controlled for with propensity score adjustment. Treatment effect analyses were run with each outcome, with the predictor variable of program stage.

Results

Seven of the 13 clinical measures plus the composite measure indicated better health for residents in homes at higher program stages, relative to those in nonparticipating homes, including a 49% lower prevalence of major depressive symptoms in strongly adopting facilities.

Implications

The findings suggest that greater PCC adoption through PEAK participation is associated with better quality of care. Policymakers in other states may want to consider implementing a program modeled on PEAK 2.0.

Modelling the cost-effectiveness of pay-for-performance in primary care in the UK

BACKGROUND

Introduced in 2004, the United Kingdom's (UK) Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is the world's largest primary-care pay-for-performance programme. Given some evidence of the benefits and the substantial costs associated with the QOF, it remains unclear whether the programme is cost-effective. Therefore, we assessed the cost-effectiveness of continuing versus stopping the QOF.

METHODS

We developed a lifetime simulation model to estimate quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and costs for a UK population cohort aged 40-74 years (n = 27,070,862) exposed to the QOF and for a counterfactual scenario without exposure. Based on a previous retrospective cross-country analysis using data from 1994 to 2010, we assumed the benefits of the QOF to be a change in age-adjusted mortality of -3.68 per 100,000 population (95% confidence interval -8.16 to 0.80). We used cost-effectiveness thresholds of £30,000/QALY, £20,000/QALY and £13,000/QALY to determine the optimal strategy in base-case and sensitivity analyses.

RESULTS

In the base-case analysis, continuing the QOF increased population-level QALYs and health-care costs yielding an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of £49,362/QALY. The ICER remained >£30,000/QALY in scenarios with and without non-fatal outcomes or increased drug costs, and under differing assumptions about the duration of QOF benefit following its hypothetical discontinuation. The ICER for continuing the programme fell below £30,000/QALY when QOF incentive payments were 36% lower (while preserving QOF mortality benefits), and in scenarios where the QOF resulted in substantial reductions in health-care spending or non-fatal cardiovascular disease events. Continuing the QOF was cost-effective in 18%, 3% and 0% of probabilistic sensitivity analysis iterations using thresholds of £30,000/QALY, £20,000/QALY and £13,000/QALY, respectively.

CONCLUSIONS

Compared to stopping the QOF and returning all associated incentive payments to the National Health Service, continuing the QOF is not cost-effective. To improve population health efficiently, the UK should redesign the QOF or pursue alternative interventions.

Pay-for-performance as a cost-effective implementation strategy: results from a cluster randomized trial

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been recommended as a promising strategy to improve implementation of high-quality care. This study examined the incremental cost-effectiveness of a P4P strategy found to be highly effective in improving the implementation and effectiveness of the Adolescent Community Reinforcement Approach (A-CRA), an evidence-based treatment (EBT) for adolescent substance use disorders (SUDs).

METHODS

Building on a $30 million national initiative to implement A-CRA in SUD treatment settings, urn randomization was used to assign 29 organizations and their 105 therapists and 1173 patients to one of two conditions (implementation-as-usual (IAU) control condition or IAU+P4P experimental condition). It was not possible to blind organizations, therapists, or all research staff to condition assignment. All treatment organizations and their therapists received a multifaceted implementation strategy. In addition to those IAU strategies, therapists in the IAU+P4P condition received US $50 for each month that they demonstrated competence in treatment delivery (A-CRA competence) and US $200 for each patient who received a specified number of treatment procedures and sessions found to be associated with significantly improved patient outcomes (target A-CRA). Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs), which represent the difference between the two conditions in average cost per treatment organization divided by the corresponding average difference in effectiveness per organization, and quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) were the primary outcomes.

RESULTS

At trial completion, 15 organizations were randomized to the IAU condition and 14 organizations were randomized to the IAU+P4P condition. Data from all 29 organizations were analyzed. Cluster-level analyses suggested the P4P strategy led to significantly higher average total costs compared to the IAU control condition, yet this average increase of 5% resulted in a 116% increase in the average number of months therapists demonstrated competence in treatment delivery (ICER = $333), a 325% increase in the average number of patients who received the targeted dosage of treatment (ICER = $453), and a 325% increase in the number of days of abstinence per patient in treatment (ICER = $8.134). Further supporting P4P as a cost-effective implementation strategy, the cost per QALY was only $8681 (95% confidence interval $1191-$16,171).

CONCLUSION

This study provides experimental evidence supporting P4P as a cost-effective implementation strategy.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

NCT01016704 .

Universal Health Coverage in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa: Assessment of Global Health Experts' Confidence in Policy Options

Many countries rely on standard recipes for accelerating progress toward universal health coverage (UHC). With limited generalizable empirical evidence, expert confidence and consensus plays a major role in shaping country policy choices. This article presents an exploratory attempt conducted between April and September 2016 to measure confidence and consensus among a panel of global health experts in terms of the effectiveness and feasibility of a number of policy options commonly proposed for achieving UHC in low- and middle-income countries, such as fee exemptions for certain groups of people, ring-fenced domestic health budgets, and public-private partnerships. To ensure a relative homogeneity of contexts, we focused on French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa. We initially used the Delphi method to arrive at expert consensus, but since no consensus emerged after 2 rounds, we adjusted our approach to a statistical analysis of the results from our questionnaire by measuring the degree of consensus on each policy option through 100 (signifying total consensus) minus the size of the interquartile range of the individual scores. Seventeen global health experts from various backgrounds, but with at least 20 years' experience in the broad region, participated in the 2 rounds of the study. The results provide an initial "mapping" of the opinions of a group of experts and suggest interesting lessons. For the 18 policy options proposed, consensus emerged only on strengthening the supply of quality primary health care services (judged as being effective with a confidence score of 79 and consensus score of 90), and on fee exemptions for the poorest (judged as being fairly easy to implement with a confidence score of 66 and consensus score of 85). For none of the 18 common policy options was there consensus on both potential effectiveness and feasibility, with very diverging opinions concerning 5 policy options. The lack of confidence and consensus within the panel seems to reflect the lack of consistent evidence on the proposed policy options. This suggests that experts' opinions should be framed within strengthened inclusive and "evidence-informed deliberative processes" where the trade-offs along the 3 dimensions of UHC-extending the population covered against health hazards, expanding the range of services and benefits covered, and reducing out-of-pocket expenditures-can be discussed in a transparent and contextualized setting.

Economic evaluation of a pre-ESRD pay-for-performance programme in advanced chronic kidney disease patients

Background

The National Health Insurance Administration in Taiwan initiated a nationwide pre-end-stage renal disease (ESRD) pay-for-performance (P4P) programme at the end of 2006 to improve quality of care for chronic kidney disease (CKD) patients. This study aimed to examine this programme's effect on patients' clinical outcomes and its cost-effectiveness among advanced CKD patients.

Methods

We conducted a longitudinal observational matched cohort study using two nationwide population-based datasets. The major outcomes of interests were incidence of dialysis, all-cause mortality, direct medical costs, life years (LYs) and incremental cost-effectiveness ratio comparing matched P4P and non-P4P advanced CKD patients. Competing-risk analysis, general linear regression and bootstrapping statistical methods were used for the analysis.

Results

Subdistribution hazard ratio (95% confidence intervals) for advanced CKD patients enrolled in the P4P programme, compared with those who did not enrol, were 0.845 (0.779-0.916) for incidence of dialysis and 0.792 (0.673-0.932) for all-cause mortality. LYs for P4P and non-P4P patients who initiated dialysis were 2.83 and 2.74, respectively. The adjusted incremental CKD-related costs and other-cause-related costs were NT$114 704 (US$3823) and NT$32 420 (US$1080) for P4P and non-P4P patients who initiated dialysis, respectively, and NT$-3434 (US$114) and NT$45 836 (US$1572) for P4P and non-P4P patients who did not initiate dialysis, respectively, during the 3-year follow-up period.

Conclusions

P4P patients had lower risks of both incidence of dialysis initiation and death. In addition, our empirical findings suggest that the P4P pre-ESRD programme in Taiwan provided a long-term cost-effective use of resources and cost savings for advanced CKD patients.

Incentive Design and Quality Improvements: Evidence from State Medicaid Nursing Home Pay-for-Performance Programs

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have become a popular policy tool aimed at improving health care quality. We analyze how incentive design affects quality improvements in the nursing home setting, where several state Medicaid agencies have implemented P4P programs that vary in incentive structure. Using the Minimum Data Set and the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting data from 2001 to 2009, we examine how the weights put on various performance measures that are tied to P4P bonuses, such as clinical outcomes, inspection deficiencies, and staffing levels, affect improvements in those measures. We find larger weights on clinical outcomes often lead to larger improvements, but small weights can lead to no improvement or worsening of some clinical outcomes. We find a qualifier for P4P eligibility based on having few or no severe inspection deficiencies is more effective at decreasing inspection deficiencies than using weights, suggesting simple rules for participation may incent larger improvement.

Performance-based financing in low-income and middle-income countries: isn't it time for a rethink?

This paper questions the view that performance-based financing (PBF) in the health sector is an effective, efficient and equitable approach to improving the performance of health systems in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs). PBF was conceived as an open approach adapted to specific country needs, having the potential to foster system-wide reforms. However, as with many strategies and tools, there is a gap between what was planned and what is actually implemented. This paper argues that PBF as it is currently implemented in many contexts does not satisfy the promises. First, since the start of PBF implementation in LMICs, concerns have been raised on the basis of empirical evidence from different settings and disciplines that indicated the risks, cost and perverse effects. However, PBF implementation was rushed despite insufficient evidence of its effectiveness. Second, there is a lack of domestic ownership of PBF. Considering the amounts of time and money it now absorbs, and the lack of evidence of effectiveness and efficiency, PBF can be characterised as a donor fad. Third, by presenting itself as a comprehensive approach that makes it possible to address all aspects of the health system in any context, PBF monopolises attention and focuses policy dialogue on the short-term results of PBF programmes while diverting attention and resources from broader processes of change and necessary reforms. Too little care is given to system-wide and long-term effects, so that PBF can actually damage health services and systems. This paper ends by proposing entry points for alternative approaches.

Effect of incentive payments on chronic disease management and health services use in British Columbia, Canada: Interrupted time series analysis

We studied the effects of incentive payments to primary care physicians for the care of patients with diabetes, hypertension, and Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) in British Columbia, Canada. We used linked administrative health data to examine monthly primary care visits, continuity of care, laboratory testing, pharmaceutical dispensing, hospitalizations, and total h ealth care spending. We examined periods two years before and two years after each incentive was introduced, and used segmented regression to assess whether there were changes in level or trend of outcome measures across all eligible patients following incentive introduction, relative to pre-intervention periods. We observed no increases in primary care visits or continuity of care after incentives were introduced. Rates of ACR testing and antihypertensive dispensing increased among patients with hypertension, but none of the other modest increases in laboratory testing or prescriptions dispensed reached statistical significance. Rates of hospitalizations for stroke and heart failure among patients with hypertension fell relative to pre-intervention patterns, while hospitalizations for COPD increased. Total hospitalizations and hospitalizations via the emergency department did not change. Health care spending increased for patients with hypertension. This large-scale incentive scheme for primary care physicians showed some positive effects for patients with hypertension, but we observe no similar changes in patient management, reductions in hospitalizations, or changes in spending for patients with diabetes and COPD.

Characterization and effectiveness of pay-for-performance in ophthalmology: a systematic review

Background

To identify, characterize and compare existing pay-for-performance approaches and their impact on the quality of care and efficiency in ophthalmology.

Methods

A systematic evidence-based review was conducted. English, French and German written literature published between 2000 and 2015 were searched in the following databases: Medline (via PubMed), NCBI web site, Scopus, Web of Knowledge, Econlit and the Cochrane Library. Empirical as well as descriptive articles were included. Controlled clinical trials, meta-analyses, randomized controlled studies as well as observational studies were included as empirical articles. Systematic characterization of identified pay-for-performance approaches (P4P approaches) was conducted according to the “Model for Implementing and Monitoring Incentives for Quality” (MIMIQ). Methodological quality of empirical articles was assessed according to the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) checklists.

Results

Overall, 13 relevant articles were included. Eleven articles were descriptive and two articles included empirical analyses. Based on these articles, four different pay-for-performance approaches implemented in the United States were identified. With regard to quality and incentive elements, systematic comparison showed numerous differences between P4P approaches. Empirical studies showed isolated cost or quality effects, while a simultaneous examination of these effects was missing.

Conclusion

Research results show that experiences with pay-for-performance approaches in ophthalmology are limited. Identified approaches differ with regard to quality and incentive elements restricting comparability. Two empirical studies are insufficient to draw strong conclusions about the effectiveness and efficiency of these approaches.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12913-017-2333-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Payment methods for outpatient care facilities

BACKGROUND

Outpatient care facilities provide a variety of basic healthcare services to individuals who do not require hospitalisation or institutionalisation, and are usually the patient's first contact. The provision of outpatient care contributes to immediate and large gains in health status, and a large portion of total health expenditure goes to outpatient healthcare services. Payment method is one of the most important incentive methods applied by purchasers to guide the performance of outpatient care providers.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the impact of different payment methods on the performance of outpatient care facilities and to analyse the differences in impact of payment methods in different settings.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), 2016, Issue 3, part of the Cochrane Library (searched 8 March 2016); MEDLINE, OvidSP (searched 8 March 2016); Embase, OvidSP (searched 24 April 2014); PubMed (NCBI) (searched 8 March 2016); Dissertations and Theses Database, ProQuest (searched 8 March 2016); Conference Proceedings Citation Index (ISI Web of Science) (searched 8 March 2016); IDEAS (searched 8 March 2016); EconLit, ProQuest (searched 8 March 2016); POPLINE, K4Health (searched 8 March 2016); China National Knowledge Infrastructure (searched 8 March 2016); Chinese Medicine Premier (searched 8 March 2016); OpenGrey (searched 8 March 2016); ClinicalTrials.gov, US National Institutes of Health (NIH) (searched 8 March 2016); World Health Organization (WHO) International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP) (searched 8 March 2016); and the website of the World Bank (searched 8 March 2016).In addition, we searched the reference lists of included studies and carried out a citation search for the included studies via ISI Web of Science to find other potentially relevant studies. We also contacted authors of the main included studies regarding any further published or unpublished work.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for outpatient health facilities. We defined outpatient care facilities in this review as facilities that provide health services to individuals who do not require hospitalisation or institutionalisation. We only included methods used to transfer funds from the purchaser of healthcare services to health facilities (including groups of individual professionals). These include global budgets, line-item budgets, capitation, fee-for-service (fixed and unconstrained), pay for performance, and mixed payment. The primary outcomes were service provision outcomes, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, costs for providers, and any adverse effects.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

At least two review authors independently extracted data and assessed the risk of bias. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the comparisons and outcomes and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different categories of outcomes. We used a fixed-effect model for meta-analysis within a study if a study included more than one indicator in the same category of outcomes. We used a random-effects model for meta-analysis across studies. If the data for meta-analysis were not available in some studies, we calculated the median and interquartile range. We reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative change for continuous outcomes.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 21 studies from Afghanistan, Burundi, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and the United States of health facilities providing primary health care and mental health care. There were three kinds of payment comparisons. 1) Pay for performance (P4P) combined with some existing payment method (capitation or different kinds of input-based payment) compared to the existing payment methodWe included 18 studies in this comparison, however we did not include five studies in the effects analysis due to high risk of bias. From the 13 studies, we found that the extra P4P incentives probably slightly improved the health professionals' use of some tests and treatments (adjusted RR median = 1.095, range 1.01 to 1.17; moderate-certainty evidence), and probably led to little or no difference in adherence to quality assurance criteria (adjusted percentage change median = -1.345%, range -8.49% to 5.8%; moderate-certainty evidence). We also found that P4P incentives may have led to little or no difference in patients' utilisation of health services (adjusted RR median = 1.01, range 0.96 to 1.15; low-certainty evidence) and may have led to little or no difference in the control of blood pressure or cholesterol (adjusted RR = 1.01, range 0.98 to 1.04; low-certainty evidence). 2) Capitation combined with P4P compared to fee-for-service (FFS)One study found that compared with FFS, a capitated budget combined with payment based on providers' performance on antibiotic prescriptions and patient satisfaction probably slightly reduced antibiotic prescriptions in primary health facilities (adjusted RR 0.84, 95% confidence interval 0.74 to 0.96; moderate-certainty evidence). 3) Capitation compared to FFSTwo studies compared capitation to FFS in mental health centres in the United States. Based on these studies, the effects of capitation compared to FFS on the utilisation and costs of services were uncertain (very low-certainty evidence).

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Our review found that if policymakers intend to apply P4P incentives to pay health facilities providing outpatient services, this intervention will probably lead to a slight improvement in health professionals' use of tests or treatments, particularly for chronic diseases. However, it may lead to little or no improvement in patients' utilisation of health services or health outcomes. When considering using P4P to improve the performance of health facilities, policymakers should carefully consider each component of their P4P design, including the choice of performance measures, the performance target, payment frequency, if there will be additional funding, whether the payment level is sufficient to change the behaviours of health providers, and whether the payment to facilities will be allocated to individual professionals. Unfortunately, the studies included in this review did not help to inform those considerations.Well-designed comparisons of different payment methods for outpatient health facilities in low- and middle-income countries and studies directly comparing different designs (e.g. different payment levels) of the same payment method (e.g. P4P or FFS) are needed.

Effect of pay-for-performance on cervical cancer screening participation in France

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been increasingly used across different healthcare settings to incentivize the provision of targeted services. In this study, we investigated the effect of a nationwide P4P scheme for general practitioners implemented in 2012 in France, on cervical cancer screening practices. Using data from a nationally representative permanent sample of health insurance beneficiaries, we analyzed smear test use of eligible women for the years 2006-2014. Our longitudinal sample was an unbalanced panel comprising 180,167 women eligible from 1 to 9 years each. We took into account that during our study period some women were exposed to another incentive for screening participation: the implementation in 2010 of organized screening (OS) in a limited number of areas. To evaluate the effect of P4P, we defined three different measures of smear utilization. For each measure, we specified binary panel-data models to estimate annual probabilities and to compare each estimate to the 2011 baseline level. To explore the combined effect of P4P and OS in areas exposed to both incentives, we computed interaction terms between year dummies and area of residence. We found that P4P had a modest positive effect on recommended screening participation. This effect is likely to be transient as annual smear use, both for the whole sample and among women overdue for screening, increased only in 2013 and decreased again in 2014. The combined effect of P4P and OS on screening participation was not cumulative during the first years of coexistence.

Impact of Provider Incentives on Quality and Value of Health Care

The use of financial incentives to improve quality in health care has become widespread. Yet evidence on the effectiveness of incentives suggests that they have generally had limited impact on the value of care and have not led to better patient outcomes. Lessons from social psychology and behavioral economics indicate that incentive programs in health care have not been effectively designed to achieve their intended impact. In the United States, Medicare's Hospital Readmission Reduction Program and Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, created under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), provide evidence on how variations in the design of incentive programs correspond with differences in effect. As financial incentives continue to be used as a tool to increase the value and quality of health care, improving the design of programs will be crucial to ensure their success.

In Tanzania, the many costs of pay-for-performance leave open to debate whether the strategy is cost-effective

Pay-for-performance programs in health care are widespread in low- and middle-income countries. However, there are no studies of these programs' costs or cost-effectiveness. We conducted a cost-effectiveness analysis of a pay-for-performance pilot program in Tanzania and modeled costs of its national expansion. We reviewed project accounts and reports, interviewed key stakeholders, and derived outcomes from a controlled before-and-after study. In 2012 US dollars, the financial cost of the pay-for-performance pilot was $1.2 million, and the economic cost was $2.3 million. The incremental cost per additional facility-based birth ranged from $540 to $907 in the pilot and from $94 to $261 for a national program. In a low-income setting, the costs of managing the program and generating and verifying performance data were substantial. Pay-for-performance programs can stimulate the generation and use of health information by health workers and managers for strategic planning purposes, but the time involved could divert attention from service delivery. Pay-for-performance programs may become more cost-effective when integrated into routine systems over time.

Examination of the Synthetic Control Method for Evaluating Health Policies with Multiple Treated Units

This paper examines the synthetic control method in contrast to commonly used difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation, in the context of a re-evaluation of a pay-for-performance (P4P) initiative, the Advancing Quality scheme. The synthetic control method aims to estimate treatment effects by constructing a weighted combination of control units, which represents what the treated group would have experienced in the absence of receiving the treatment. While DiD estimation assumes that the effects of unobserved confounders are constant over time, the synthetic control method allows for these effects to change over time, by re-weighting the control group so that it has similar pre-intervention characteristics to the treated group. We extend the synthetic control approach to a setting of evaluation of a health policy where there are multiple treated units. We re-analyse a recent study evaluating the effects of a hospital P4P scheme on risk-adjusted hospital mortality. In contrast to the original DiD analysis, the synthetic control method reports that, for the incentivised conditions, the P4P scheme did not significantly reduce mortality and that there is a statistically significant increase in mortality for non-incentivised conditions. This result was robust to alternative specifications of the synthetic control method. © 2015 The Authors. Health Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Heterogeneity in general practitioners' preferences for quality improvement programs: a choice experiment and policy simulation in France

Despite increasing popularity, quality improvement programs (QIP) have had modest and variable impacts on enhancing the quality of physician practice. We investigate the heterogeneity of physicians' preferences as a potential explanation of these mixed results in France, where the national voluntary QIP - the CAPI - has been cancelled due to its unpopularity. We rely on a discrete choice experiment to elicit heterogeneity in physicians' preferences for the financial and non-financial components of QIP. Using mixed and latent class logit models, results show that the two models should be used in concert to shed light on different aspects of the heterogeneity in preferences. In particular, the mixed logit demonstrates that heterogeneity in preferences is concentrated on the pay-for-performance component of the QIP, while the latent class model shows that physicians can be grouped in four homogeneous groups with specific preference patterns. Using policy simulation, we compare the French CAPI with other possible QIPs, and show that the majority of the physician subgroups modelled dislike the CAPI, while favouring a QIP using only non-financial interventions. We underline the importance of modelling preference heterogeneity in designing and implementing QIPs.

Does performance-based financing increase value for money in low- and middle- income countries? A systematic review

Governments of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are widely implementing performance-based financing (PBF) to improve healthcare services. However, it is unclear whether PBF provides good value for money compared to status quo or other interventions aimed at strengthening the healthcare system in LMICs. The objective of this systematic review is to identify and synthesize the existing literature that examines whether PBF represents an efficient manner of investing resources. We considered PBF to be efficient when improved care quality or quantity was achieved with equal or lower costs, or alternatively, when the same quality of care was achieved using less financial resources. A manual search of the reference lists of two recent systematic reviews on economic evaluations of PBF was conducted to identify articles that met our inclusion and exclusion criteria. Subsequently, a search strategy was developed with the help of a librarian. The following databases and search engines were used: PubMed, EconLit, Google Scholar and Google. Experts on economic evaluations were consulted for validation of the selected studies. A total of seven articles from five LMICs were selected for this review. We found the overall strength of the evidence to be weak. None of the articles were full economic evaluations; they did not make clear connections between the costs and effects of PBF. Only one study reported using a randomized controlled trial, but issues with the randomization procedure were reported. Important alternative interventions to strengthen the capacities of the healthcare system have not been considered. Few studies examined the costs and consequences of PBF in the long term. Important costs and consequences were omitted from the evaluations. Few LMICs are represented in the literature, despite wide implementation. Lastly, most articles had at least one author employed by an organization involved in the implementation of PBF, thereby resulting in potential conflicts of interest. Stronger empirical evidence on whether PBF represents good value for money in LMICs is needed.

Paying for Performance to Improve the Delivery and Uptake of Family Planning in Low and Middle Income Countries: A Systematic Review

Paying for performance is a strategy to meet the unmet need for family planning in low and middle income countries; however, rigorous evidence on effectiveness is lacking. Scientific databases and grey literature were searched from 1994 to May 2016. Thirteen studies were included. Payments were linked to units of targeted services, usually modified by quality indicators. Ancillary components and payment indicators differed between studies. Results were mixed for family planning outcome measures. Paying for performance was associated with improved modern family planning use in one study, and increased user and coverage rates in two more. Paying for performance with conditional cash transfers increased family planning use in another. One study found increased use in the upper wealth group only. However, eight studies reported no impact on modern family planning use or prevalence. Secondary outcomes of equity, financial risk protection, satisfaction, quality, and service organization were mixed. Available evidence is inconclusive and limited by the scarcity of studies and by variation in intervention, study design, and outcome measures. Further studies are warranted.

National Institutes of Health Blood and Marrow Transplant Late Effects Initiative: The Healthcare Delivery Working Group Report

Hematopoietic cell transplantation (HCT) survivors are at risk for development of late complications and require lifelong monitoring for screening and prevention of late effects. There is an increasing appreciation of the issues related to healthcare delivery and coverage faced by HCT survivors. The 2016 National Institutes of Health Blood and Marrow Transplant Late Effects Initiative included an international and broadly representative Healthcare Delivery Working Group that was tasked with identifying research gaps pertaining to healthcare delivery and to identify initiatives that may yield a better understanding of the long-term value and costs of care for HCT survivors. There is a paucity of literature in this area. Critical areas in need of research include pilot studies of novel and information technology supported models of care delivery and coverage for HCT survivors along with development and validation of instruments that capture patient-reported outcomes. Investment in infrastructure to support this research, such as linkage of databases including electronic health records and routine inclusion of endpoints that will inform analyses focused around care delivery and coverage, is required.

Quality target negotiation in health care: evidence from the English NHS

We examine how public sector third-party purchasers and hospitals negotiate quality targets when a fixed proportion of hospital revenue is required to be linked to quality. We develop a bargaining model linking the number of quality targets to purchaser and hospital characteristics. Using data extracted from 153 contracts for acute hospital services in England in 2010/2011, we find that the number of quality targets is associated with the purchaser's population health and its budget, the hospital type, whether the purchaser delegated negotiation to an agency, and the quality targets imposed by the supervising regional health authority.

A population-based analysis of incentive payments to primary care physicians for the care of patients with complex disease

BACKGROUND

In 2007, the province of British Columbia implemented incentive payments to primary care physicians for the provision of comprehensive, continuous, guideline-informed care for patients with 2 or more chronic conditions. We examined the impact of this program on primary care access and continuity, rates of hospital admission and costs.

METHODS

We analyzed all BC patients who qualified for the incentive based on their diagnostic profile. We tracked primary care contacts and continuity, hospital admissions (total, via the emergency department and for targeted conditions), and cost of physician services, hospital care and pharmaceuticals, for 24 months before and 24 months after the intervention.

RESULTS

Of 155 754 eligible patients, 63.7% had at least 1 incentive payment billed. Incentive payments had no impact on primary care contacts (change in contacts per patient per month: 0.016, 95% confidence interval [CI] -0.047 to 0.078) or continuity of care (mean monthly change: 0.012, 95% CI -0.001 to 0.024) and were associated with increased total rates of hospital admission (change in hospital admissions per 1000 patients per month: 1.46, 95% CI 0.04 to 2.89), relative to preintervention trends. Annual costs per patient did not decline (mean change: $455.81, 95% CI -$2.44 to $914.08).

INTERPRETATION

British Columbia's $240-million investment in this program improved compensation for physicians doing the important work of caring for complex patients, but did not appear to improve primary care access or continuity, or constrain resource use elsewhere in the health care system. Policymakers should consider other strategies to improve care for this patient population.

Implementation of recommended type 2 diabetes care for people with severe mental illness - a qualitative exploration with healthcare professionals

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this study was to explore the barriers and facilitators healthcare professionals experience when managing type 2 diabetes in people with severe mental illness (SMI).

METHODS

A qualitative semi-structured interview approach was employed. Questions were structured according to the Theoretical Domains Framework (TDF), which outlines 14 domains that can act as barriers and facilitators to changing behaviour. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. The data were coded according to the 14 domains of the TDF, belief statements were created within each domain and the most relevant belief statements within each domain identified through a consensus approach. Analyses were conducted by two researchers, and discrepancies agreed with a third researcher.

RESULTS

Sixteen healthcare professionals, from a range of services, involved in the care of people with type 2 diabetes and SMI took part in an interview. Inter-rater reliability for each of the domains varied (25 %-74 %). All fourteen domains were deemed relevant, with 42 specific beliefs identified as important to the target behaviour. Participants identified having relevant knowledge and skills for diabetes management, prioritising this area of health, and reviewing health behaviours to develop action plans, as particularly important. At an organisational level, integrated care provision and shared information technology (IT) services between mental health and physical services, and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the different professions, with designated time to undertake the work were identified as crucial.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings highlight that healthcare professionals' experience a range of barriers and enablers when attempting to manage type 2 diabetes in people with SMI. These include organisational factors and individual beliefs, suggesting that interventions need to be targeted at both an organisation and individual level in order to change behaviour. Further work is needed to model these relationships in a larger sample of participants in line with the MRC guidance for developing complex interventions.

Estimating causal effects: considering three alternatives to difference-in-differences estimation

Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimators provide unbiased treatment effect estimates when, in the absence of treatment, the average outcomes for the treated and control groups would have followed parallel trends over time. This assumption is implausible in many settings. An alternative assumption is that the potential outcomes are independent of treatment status, conditional on past outcomes. This paper considers three methods that share this assumption: the synthetic control method, a lagged dependent variable (LDV) regression approach, and matching on past outcomes. Our motivating empirical study is an evaluation of a hospital pay-for-performance scheme in England, the best practice tariffs programme. The conclusions of the original DiD analysis are sensitive to the choice of approach. We conduct a Monte Carlo simulation study that investigates these methods’ performance. While DiD produces unbiased estimates when the parallel trends assumption holds, the alternative approaches provide less biased estimates of treatment effects when it is violated. In these cases, the LDV approach produces the most efficient and least biased estimates.

Reimbursement systems influence prosthodontic treatment of adult patients

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate the influence of reimbursement system and organizational structure on oral rehabilitation of adult patients with tooth loss.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Patient data were retrieved from the databases of the Swedish Social Insurance Agency. The data consisted of treatment records of patients aged 19 years and above claiming reimbursement for dental care from July 1, 2007 until June 30, 2009. Before July 1, 2008, a proportionately higher level of subsidy was available for dental care in patients 65 years and above, but thereafter the system was changed, so that the subsidy was the same, regardless of the patient's age. Prosthodontic treatment in patients 65 years and above was compared with that in younger patients before and after the change of the reimbursement system. Prosthodontic treatment carried out in the Public Dental Health Service and the private sector was also analyzed.

RESULTS

Data were retrieved for 722,842 adult patients, covering a total of 1,339,915 reimbursed treatment items. After the change of the reimbursement system, there was a decrease in the proportion of items in patients 65 years and above in relation to those under 65. Overall, there was a minimal change in the proportion of treatment items provided by the private sector compared to the public sector following the change of the reimbursement system.

CONCLUSIONS

Irrespective of service provider, private or public, financial incentive such as the reimbursement system may influence the provision of prosthodontic treatment, in terms of volume of treatment.

Cost-Effectiveness of a Diabetes Pay-For-Performance Program in Diabetes Patients with Multiple Chronic Conditions

Pay for performance (P4P) has been used as a strategy to improve quality for patients with chronic illness. Little was known whether care provided to individuals with multiple chronic conditions in a P4P program were cost-effective. This study investigated cost effectiveness of a diabetes P4P program for caring patients with diabetes alone (DM alone) and diabetes with comorbid hypertension and hyperlipidemia (DMHH) from a single payer perspective in Taiwan. Analyzing data using population-based longitudinal databases, we compared costs and effectiveness between P4P and non-P4P diabetes patient groups in two cohorts. Propensity score matching (PSM) was used to match comparable control groups for intervention groups. Outcomes included life-years, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), program intervention costs, cost-savings and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs). QALYs for P4P patients and non-P4P patients were 2.80 and 2.71 for the DM alone cohort and 2.74 and 2.66 for the DMHH patient cohort. The average incremental intervention costs per QALYs was TWD$167,251 in the DM alone cohort and TWD$145,474 in the DMHH cohort. The average incremental all-cause medical costs saved by the P4P program per QALYs were TWD$434,815 in DM alone cohort and TWD$506,199 in the DMHH cohort. The findings indicated that the P4P program for both cohorts were cost-effective and the resulting return on investment (ROI) was 2.60:1 in the DM alone cohort and 3.48:1 in the DMHH cohort. We conclude that the diabetes P4P program in both cohorts enabled the long-term cost-effective use of resources and cost-savings, especially for patients with multiple comorbid conditions.

[Pay-for-performance in health care services: a review of the best evidence available]

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely used around the world seeking to improve health outcomes, and in Brazil it is the basis of the National Program for Improving Access and Quality (PMAQ). The literature published between 1998 and January 2013 that evaluated the effectiveness of P4P to produce results or patterns of access and quality in health was scrutinized. A total of 138 studies, with the inclusion of a further 41 studies (14 systematic reviews, 07 clinical trials and 20 observational studies) were retrieved and analyzed Among the more rigorous studies, favorable conclusions for P4P were less frequent, whereas observational studies were more favorable to positive effects of P4P on the quality of, and access to, health services. Methodological limitations of observational studies may have contributed to these results, but the range of results is more linked to the conceptual and contextual aspects of the use of the P4P schemes reviewed, the heterogeneity of P4P models and results. P4P can be helpful in promoting the achievement of objectives in health care systems, especially in the short term and for specific actions requiring less effort of health care providers, but should be used with caution and with a rigorous planning model, also considering undesirable or adverse effects.

Does pay-for-performance benefit patients with multiple chronic conditions? Evidence from a universal coverage health care system

INTRODUCTION

Numerous studies have examined the impact of pay-for-performance (P4P) programmes, yet little is known regarding their effects on continuity of care (COC) and the role of multiple chronic conditions (MCCs). This study aimed to examine the effects of a P4P programme for diabetes care on health care provision, COC and health care outcomes in diabetic patients with and without comorbid hypertension.

METHODS

This study utilized a large-scale natural experiment with a 4-year follow-up period under a compulsory universal health insurance programme in Taiwan. The intervention groups consisted of patients with diabetes who were enrolled in the P4P programme in 2005. The comparison groups were selected via propensity score matching with patients who were seen by the same group of physicians. A difference-in-differences analysis was conducted using generalized estimating equation models to examine the effects of the P4P programme.

RESULTS

Significant impacts were observed after the implementation of the P4P programme for diabetic patients with and without hypertension. The programme increased the number of necessary examinations/tests and improved the COC between patients and their physicians. The programme significantly reduced the likelihood of diabetes-related hospital admissions and emergency department visits [odds ratio (OR): 0.71; 95% confidence interval (CI): 0.63-0.80 for diabetic patients with hypertension; OR: 0.74; 95% CI: 0.64-0.86 for patients without hypertension]. However, the effects of the P4P programme diminished to some extent in the second year after its implementation.

CONCLUSION

This study suggests that a financial incentive programme may improve the provision of necessary health care, COC and health care outcomes for diabetic patients both with and without comorbid hypertension. Health authorities could develop policies to increase participation in P4P programmes and encourage continued improvement in health care outcomes.

Working under a clinic-level quality incentive: primary care clinicians' perceptions

BACKGROUND

A key consideration in designing pay-for-performance programs is determining what entity the incentive should be awarded to-individual clinicians or to groups of clinicians working in teams. Some argue that team-level incentives, in which clinicians who are part of a team receive the same incentive based on the team's performance, are most effective; others argue for the efficacy of clinician-level incentives. This study examines primary care clinicians' perceptions of a team-based quality incentive awarded at the clinic level.

METHODS

This research was conducted with Fairview Health Services, where 40% of the primary care compensation model was based on clinic-level quality performance. We conducted 48 in-depth interviews to explore clinicians' perceptions of the clinic-level incentive, as well as an online survey of 150 clinicians (response rate 56%) to investigate which entity the clinicians would consider optimal to target for quality incentives.

RESULTS

Clinicians reported the strengths of the clinic-based quality incentive were quality improvement for the team and less patient "dumping," or shifting patients with poor outcomes to other clinicians. The weaknesses were clinicians' lack of control and colleagues riding the coattails of higher performers. There were mixed reports on the model's impact on team dynamics. Although clinicians reported greater interaction with colleagues, some described an increase in tension. Most clinicians surveyed (73%) believed that there should be a mix of clinic and individual-level incentives to maintain collaboration and recognize individual performance.

CONCLUSION

The study highlights the important advantages and disadvantages of using incentives based upon clinic-level performance. Future research should test whether hybrid incentives that mix group and individual incentives can maintain some of the best elements of each design while mitigating the negative impacts.

Effect of pay-for-outcomes and encouraging new providers on national health service smoking cessation services in England: a cluster controlled study

Background

Payment incentives are known to influence healthcare but little is known about the impact of paying directly for achieved outcomes. In England, novel purchasing (commissioning) of National Health Service (NHS) stop smoking services, which paid providers for quits achieved whilst encouraging new market entrants, was implemented in eight localities (primary care trusts (PCTs)) in April 2010. This study examines the impact of the novel commissioning on these services.

Methods

Accredited providers were paid standard tariffs for each smoker who was supported to quit for four and 12 weeks. A cluster-controlled study design was used with the eight intervention PCTs (representing 2,138,947 adult population) matched with a control group of all other (n=64) PCTs with similar demographics which did not implement the novel commissioning arrangements. The primary outcome measure was changes in quits at four weeks between April 2009 and March 2013. A secondary outcome measure was the number of new market entrants within the group of the largest two providers at PCT-level.

Results

The number of four-week quits per 1,000 adult population increased per year on average by 9.6% in the intervention PCTs compared to a decrease of 1.1% in the control PCTs (incident rate ratio 1∙108, p<0∙001, 95% CI 1∙059 to 1∙160). Eighty-five providers held ‘any qualified provider’ contracts for stop smoking services across the eight intervention PCTs in 2011/12, and 84% of the four-week quits were accounted for by the largest two providers at PCT-level. Three of these 10 providers were new market entrants. To the extent that the intervention incentivized providers to overstate quits in order to increase income, caution is appropriate when considering the findings.

Conclusions

Novel commissioning to incentivize achievement of specific clinical outcomes and attract new service providers can increase the effectiveness and supply of NHS stop smoking services.

Cost-effectiveness of diabetes pay-for-performance incentive designs

BACKGROUND

Taiwan's National Health Insurance (NHI) Program implemented a diabetes pay-for-performance program (P4P) based on process-of-care measures in 2001. In late 2006, that P4P program was revised to also include achievement of intermediate health outcomes.

OBJECTIVES

This study examined to what extent these 2 P4P incentive designs have been cost-effective and what the difference in effect may have been.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD

Analyzing data using 3 population-based longitudinal databases (NHI's P4P dataset, NHI's claims database, and Taiwan's death registry), we compared costs and effectiveness between P4P and non-P4P diabetes patient groups in each phase. Propensity score matching was used to match comparable control groups for intervention groups. Outcomes included life-years, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), program intervention costs, cost-savings, and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios.

RESULTS

QALYs for P4P patients and non-P4P patients were 2.08 and 1.99 in phase 1 and 2.08 and 2.02 in phase 2. The average incremental intervention costs per QALYs was TWD$335,546 in phase 1 and TWD$298,606 in phase 2. The average incremental all-cause medical costs saved by the P4P program per QALYs were TWD$602,167 in phase 1 and TWD$661,163 in phase 2. The findings indicated that both P4P programs were cost-effective and the resulting return on investment was 1.8:1 in phase 1 and 2.0:1 in phase 2.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that the diabetes P4P program in both phases enabled the long-term cost-effective use of resources and cost-savings regardless of whether a bonus for intermediate outcome improvement was added to a process-based P4P incentive design.