Brief Report: Young Children with Autism Can Generate Intent-Based Moral Judgments

Disgust Processing and Potential Relationships with Behaviors in Autism

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

While there are reports of differences in emotion processing in autism, it is less understood whether the emotion of disgust, in particular, plays a significant role in these effects. Here, we review literature on potential disgust processing differences in autism and its possible associations with autistic traits.

RECENT FINDINGS

In autism, there is evidence for differences in physical disgust processing, pica behaviors, attention away from other's disgust facial expressions, and differences in neural activity related to disgust processing. In typically developing individuals, disgust processing is related to moral processing, but modulated by individual differences in interoception and alexithymia. Autistic individuals may experience atypical disgust, which may lead to difficulty avoiding contaminants and affect socio-emotional processing. In autism, such outcomes may lead to increased occurrences of illness, contribute to gastrointestinal issues, diminish vicarious learning of disgust expression and behaviors, and potentially contribute to differences in processes related to moral reasoning, though further research is needed.

Emotional descriptions increase accidental harm punishment and its cortico-limbic signatures during moral judgment in autism

Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) present difficulties in integrating mental state information in complex moral tasks. Yet, ASD research has not examined whether this process is influenced by emotions, let alone while capturing its neural bases. We investigated how language-induced emotions modulate intent-based moral judgment in ASD. In a fMRI task, 30 adults with ASD and 27 neurotypical controls read vignettes whose protagonists commit harm either accidentally or intentionally, and then decided how much punishment the protagonist deserved. Emotional content was manipulated across scenarios through the use of graphic language (designed to trigger arousing negative responses) vs. plain (just-the-facts, emotionless) language. Off-line functional connectivity correlates of task performance were also analyzed. In ASD, emotional (graphic) descriptions amplified punishment ratings of accidental harms, associated with increased activity in fronto-temporo-limbic, precentral, and postcentral/supramarginal regions (critical for emotional and empathic processes), and reduced connectivity among the orbitofrontal cortex and the angular gyrus (involved in mentalizing). Language manipulation did not influence intentional harm processing in ASD. In conclusion, in arousing and ambiguous social situations that lack intentionality clues (i.e. graphic accidental harm scenarios), individuals with ASD would misuse their emotional responses as the main source of information to guide their moral decisions. Conversely, in face of explicit harmful intentions, they would be able to compensate their socioemotional alterations and assign punishment through non-emotional pathways. Despite limitations, such as the small sample size and low ecological validity of the task, results of the present study proved reliable and have relevant theoretical and translational implications.

The Effect of Cognitive Load on Intent-Based Moral Judgment

When making a moral judgment, people largely care about two factors: Who did it (causal responsibility), and did they intend to (intention)? Since Piaget's seminal studies, we have known that as children mature, they gradually place greater emphasis on intention, and less on mere bad outcomes, when making moral judgments. Today, we know that this developmental shift has several signature properties. Recently, it has been shown that when adults make moral judgments under cognitive load, they exhibit a pattern similar to young children; that is, their judgments become notably more outcome based. Here, we show that all of the same signature properties that accompany the outcome-to-intent shift in childhood characterize the "intent-to-outcome" shift obtained under cognitive load in adults. These findings hold important implications for current theories of moral judgment.

Judging accidental harm: Due care and foreseeability of side effects

Both in philosophy and in cognitive psychology, models of moral judgment posit that individuals take into account both agents’ intentions and actions’ outcomes. The present research focused on a third crucial piece of information, agents’ negligence. In Study 1, participants judged the moral wrongness and punishability of agents’ actions that resulted in negative side effects. In the scenarios, we orthogonally manipulated whether the agent acted with or without due care and whether she had or did not have information to foresee the negative side effects of her actions. Participants judged careless agents more condemnable than careful agents, especially when negative side effects could have been easily foreseen. In Study 2, we manipulated due care in acting in cases where the agent’s primary intention was to bring about a certain outcome without knowing that such outcome would actually be harmful. Here information about the foreseeability of negative outcomes was not provided, and participants judged actions performed with care more wrong and punishable than actions performed without care. This suggests that sometimes acting carefully and nevertheless causing harm may constitute evidence of the presence of negative intentions in the agents or evidence of the fact that agents indeed could have foreseen the negative effects of their actions. Together, these findings indicate that carefulness in acting and foreseeability are highly intertwined in moral judgment, and highlight the need to improve existing processing models of moral judgment to account for people’s evaluation of agents and actions whenever negligence can be attributed.

Moral foundations theory in autism spectrum disorder: A qualitative investigation

LAY ABSTRACT

Morality is important for how humans treat each other and non-human animals. Differences in moral thinking have been found between autistic and neurotypical individuals. This research has relied on ways of thinking about moral psychology that suggest that mature morals develop as individuals learn to take the perspectives of others. Yet, even autistic individuals, who sometimes differ in their ability to take others' perspectives, make moral judgements that are similar to neurotypical individuals. Moral foundations theory suggests that moral psychology is not hierarchical but differs depending on culture. This theory could therefore help make sense of similarities and differences in autistic and neurotypical moral thinking. Moral foundations theory has not yet been investigated among autistic individuals. In this study, we interviewed autistic adults as a first attempt at understanding how moral foundations theory fits with autistic moral thinking. We found that all five moral foundations of moral foundations theory were represented in the interviews, yet certain foundations appeared more prominent than others. The autistic adults interviewed in our study discussed issues of care and fairness more than of loyalty, authority or purity when prompted to discuss moral transgressions. Future research should use quantitative methods to compare groups of autistic and neurotypical individuals to clarify similarities and differences in moral thinking between the groups.