Striking the balance with epistemic injustice in healthcare: the case of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis

A critical and systematic literature review of epistemic justice applied to healthcare: recommendations for a patient partnership approach

Invalidation from healthcare practitioners is an experience shared by many patients, especially those marginalized or living with contested conditions (e.g., chronic pain, fibromyalgia, etc.). Invalidation can include not taking someone's testimony seriously, imposing one's thoughts, discrediting someone's emotions, or not perceiving someone's testimony as equal and competent. Epistemic injustices, that is, the disqualification of a person as a knower, are a form of invalidation. Epistemic injustices have been used as a theoretical framework to understand invalidation that occurs in the patient-healthcare provider relationship. However, to date, the different recommendations to achieve epistemic justice have not been listed, analyzed, nor compared yet. This paper aims at better understanding the state of the literature and to critically review possible avenues to achieve epistemic justice in healthcare. A systematic and critical review of the existing literature on epistemic justice was conducted. The search in four databases identified 629 articles, from which 35 were included in the review. Strategies to promote epistemic justice that can be applied to healthcare are mapped in the literature and sorted in six different approaches to epistemic justice, including virtuous, structural, narrative, cognitive, and partnership approaches, as well as resistance strategies. These strategies are critically appraised. A patient partnership approach based on the Montreal Model, implemented at all levels of healthcare systems, seems promising to promote epistemic justice in healthcare.

How do we know whether treatment has failed? Paradoxical outcomes in counseling with young people

Background

In both routine practice contexts and research studies, evidence from standardized self-report symptom measures, administered pre- and post-treatment, is predominantly used to determine whether psychotherapy has been successful. Understanding the nature of unsuccessful psychotherapy requires an ability to evaluate the credibility of outcome data generated by such techniques. An important body of research has identified discrepancies between outcomes assessed through symptom measures and those obtained from other sources. However, not enough is known about the extent to which such paradoxical outcomes exist.

Objective

This study analyzes the relationship between outcomes, as assessed by a standardized self-report measure, and as assessed by ratings of young people's descriptions of change at post-counseling interviews.

Methods

Participants were 50 young people (13-16 years old) who had taken part in a trial of up to 10 weeks of school-based humanistic counseling. Our primary standardized measure was the Young Person's CORE (YP-CORE). To assess young people's experiences of counseling change, three independent raters scrutinized transcripts of post-counseling interviews, and scored levels of helpfulness on a 1 (Not at all helpful) to 10 (Extremely helpful) scale. Inter-rater reliabilities were 0.94 (Cronbach's Alpha) and 0.96 (McDonald's Omega). Sensitivity analyses were conducted to explore relationships between helpfulness ratings and other outcome measures, i.e., satisfaction with counseling (ESQ) and the Goal-Based-Outcome Tool (GBO), and process measures, i.e., the Working Alliance Inventory (WAI-S) and the Barret Lennard Relationship Inventory (BLRI).

Results

Multilevel analysis indicated that helpfulness ratings were not significantly associated with changes in YP-CORE scores. Analyzed categorically, 38% of those showing reliable improvement on the standardized measure were below the median for self-described helpfulness, and 47% of those not showing reliable change were at or above the median for self-described helpfulness. Sensitivity analyses demonstrated closer correlations between helpfulness ratings and other outcome measures (ESQ and GBO), and between helpfulness ratings and process measures (WAI-S and BLRI).

Discussion

Our results raise questions about reliance on symptom change outcome measures for defining treatment success and failure, given their disparity with clients' own descriptions of the helpfulness of therapy. Implications for practice and research are discussed.

Contesting misrecognition online: Experiences of epistemic in/justice by vloggers with contested illnesses

Contested illnesses, such as fibromyalgia, myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS), and chronic Lyme disease (CLD), are surrounded by polemic debates regarding their etiology, symptomology, treatment, and even their existence. People who suffer from these contested illnesses arguably also suffer from "epistemic injustice." This concept, coined by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, captures how people's knowledge may be discredited because of identity prejudices. In our paper, this concept is used to understand how seven Dutch women with contested illnesses experience the emancipatory potential of their vlogging practices. Our findings show how these women understood their vlogging as a means to break with epistemic smothering, understood as the propensity to cater ones testimony to one's audience (Dotson, 2011), and as a means to attain and enhance epistemic justice. However, our findings also show how vlogging about contested illnesses did not seem to allow these women to fully break with their epistemic smothering practices, and that the ableist design and gendered norms of YouTube were experienced as obstacles to attaining epistemic justice. We conclude that, even though social media do seem to hold emancipatory potential for these women, the experiences of individual users are diverse and ambiguous.

Epistemic solidarity in medicine and healthcare

In this article, I apply the concept of solidarity to collective knowledge practices in healthcare. Generally, solidarity acknowledges that people are dependent on each other in many respects, and it captures those support practices that people engage in out of concern for others in whom they recognise a relevant similarity. Drawing on the rich literature on solidarity in bioethics and beyond, this article specifically discusses the role that epistemic solidarity can play in healthcare. It thus focuses, in particular, on solidarity’s relationship with justice and injustice. In this regard, it is argued (1) that justice and solidarity are two equally important and complementary values that should both be considered in healthcare practices and institutions and (2) that solidarity often arises in unjust situations and can be a means to bring about justice. I transfer these ‘general’ insights about solidarity to knowledge practices in healthcare and link them to the discussion about epistemic injustices in healthcare and how to overcome them. I argue that epistemic solidarity can play an important role in overcoming epistemic injustices as well as—and independently from its contribution to justice—in knowledge production in medicine more generally. To demonstrate how epistemic solidarity can add to our understanding of collective knowledge practices, I discuss two examples: patients sharing their medical data for research purposes and healthcare professionals’ engagement with patients to better understand their afflictions.

Understanding Long Covid: Nosology, social attitudes and stigma

The debate around Long Covid has so far shown resistance to accept parallels between Long Covid and a set of existing conditions which have historically been subject to stigma. This resistance risks endorsing the stigma associated with such existing conditions, and as such, these dynamics of stigma ought to be dismantled in order to facilitate the development of effective clinical resources for all such implicated conditions. As well as affecting proceedings at the structural level, I discuss how the aforementioned problems also risk affecting patients at the personal level by motivating the reconfiguration and restriction of patient illness narratives. The problems I identify therefore risk affecting both collective and individual understanding of Long Covid.

Mapping out epistemic justice in the clinical space: using narrative techniques to affirm patients as knowers

Epistemic injustice sits at the intersection of ethics, epistemology, and social justice. Generally, this philosophical term describes when a person is wrongfully discredited as a knower; and within the clinical space, epistemic injustice is the underlying reason that some patient testimonies are valued above others. The following essay seeks to connect patterns of social prejudice to the clinical realm in the United States: illustrating how factors such as race, gender identity, and socioeconomic status influence epistemic credence and associatively, the quality of healthcare a person receives.

After describing how epistemic injustice disproportionately harms already vulnerable patients, I propose a narrative therapy intervention. This intervention can help providers re-frame their relationships with patients, in such that they come to view patients as valuable sources of unique knowledge. Though I identify this intervention as a valuable step in addressing clinical epistemic injustice, I call upon medical educators and practitioners to further uplift the voices, perspectives, and stories of marginalized patients.

Epistemic in/justice in patient participation. A discourse analysis of the Dutch ME/CFS Health Council advisory process

In healthcare settings, patient participation is increasingly adopted as a possible remedy to ill people suffering from 'epistemic injustices' - that is to their unfair harming as knowers. In exploring and interpreting patient participation discourses within the 2013-2018 Dutch Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME)/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) Health Council advisory process, this paper assesses the epistemological emancipatory value of this participatory practice. It reveals that in the analysed case, patient representatives predominantly offer biomedical knowledge about ME/CFS. They frame this condition as primarily somatic, and accordingly, perceive appropriate diagnostic criteria, research avenues and treatment options as quantifiable, objectifiable and explicitly non-psychogenic. This paper argues that such a dominant biomedical patient participatory practice is ambiguous in terms of its ability to correct epistemic injustices towards ill people. Biomedicalized patient participation may enhance people's credibility and their ability to make sense of their illness, but it may also undermine their valid position within participatory practices as well as lead to (sustaining) biased and reductive ideas about who ill people are and what kind of knowledge they hold. The final section of this paper offers a brief reflection on how to navigate such biomedicalized participatory practices in order to attain more emancipatory ones.

Threats to epistemic agency in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs

A good therapeutic relationship in mental health services is a predictor of positive clinical outcomes for people who seek help for distressing experiences, such as voice hearing and paranoia. One factor that may affect the quality of the therapeutic relationship and raises further ethical issues is the impact of the clinical encounter on users' sense of self, and in particular on their sense of agency. In the paper, we discuss some of the reasons why the sense of epistemic agency may be especially fragile in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs. We argue that it is important to identify and avoid behaviours that can undermine young people's contributions as epistemic agents in the clinical encounter.