Clinical Ethics Consultation in Chronic Illness: Challenging Epistemic Injustice Through Epistemic Modesty

Leading paradigms of clinical ethics consultation closely follow a biomedical model of care. In this paper, we present a theoretical reflection on the underlying biomedical model of disease, how it shaped clinical practices and patterns of ethical deliberation within these practices, and the repercussions it has on clinical ethics consultations for patients with chronic illness. We contend that this model, despite its important contribution to capturing the ethical issues of day-to-day clinical ethics deliberation, might not be sufficient for patients presenting with chronic illnesses and navigating as "lay experts" of their medical condition(s) through the health care system. Not fully considering the sources of personal knowledge and expertise may lead to epistemic injustice within an ethical deliberation logic narrowly relying on a biomedical model of disease. In caring "for" and collaboratively "with" this patient population, we answer the threat of epistemic injustice with epistemic modesty and humility. We will propose ideas about how clinical ethics could contribute to an expansion of the biomedical model of care, so that important aspects of chronic illness experience would flow into clinical-ethical decision-making.

The emotional impact of baseless discrediting of knowledge: An empirical investigation of epistemic injustice

According to theoretical work on epistemic injustice, baseless discrediting of the knowledge of people with marginalized social identities is a central driver of prejudice and discrimination. Discrediting of knowledge may sometimes be subtle, but it is pernicious, inducing chronic stress and coping strategies such as emotional avoidance. In this research, we sought to deepen the understanding of epistemic injustice's impact by examining emotional responses to being discredited and assessing if marginalized social group membership predicts these responses. We conducted a novel series of three experiments (Total N = 1690) in which participants (1) shared their factual knowledge about how a game worked or their personal feelings about the game; (2) received discrediting feedback (invalidating remarks), validating feedback (affirming remarks), or insulting feedback (general negative social evaluation); and then (3) reported their affect. In all three studies, on average, affective responses to discrediting feedback were less negative than to insulting feedback, and more negative than to validating feedback. Participants who shared their knowledge reported more negative affect after discrediting feedback than participants who shared their feelings. There were consistent individual differences, including a twice-replicated finding of reduced negative affect after receiving discrediting and insulting feedback for Black men compared to White men and women and Black women. Black men's race-based traumatic symptom scores predicted their affective responses to discrediting and insulting feedback, suggesting that experience with discrimination contributed to the emotional processing of a key aspect of epistemic injustice: remarks conveying baseless discrediting of knowledge.

Patient-centered or population-centered? How epistemic discrepancies cause harm and sow mistrust

Medical distrust is often conceived of as a problem of misinformation or ignorance. In this paper, I depart from this framework, attributing distrust instead to epistemic divergence between lay people and experts. Using data from a contraceptive side effects Facebook group and in-depth physician interviews, I find that providers employ a "body-as-subject" lens informed by population-health goals, while group members employ a "body-as-agent" lens that privileges individuality and bodily autonomy. Provider epistemologies are privileged, creating epistemic injustice and harm for patients. Ultimately, this erodes trust in providers and the medical community more broadly.

Co-opting the "neuro" in neurodiversity and the complexities of epistemic injustice

This article tackles the theoretical thinking behind PPI and inclusion, input from people with neurodiverse conditions. By providing a perspective on how the prefix "Neuro" is positioned in a neutral and authoritative way (exemplified through our brief review of articles within Cortex), we explore how "epistemic injustice" (a concept used frequently in law, politics, philosophy and social science) can potentially arise. Epistemic injustice typically refers to a pernicious power dynamic whereby oppressed groups are silenced (Fricker 2007), either because certain voices are not given weight ("testimonial injustice"), or the ways in which they are allowed to speak (e.g., interpret their own experiences) are limited ("hermeneutical injustice") (Kidd and Carel 2016). We show how, for "neurodiversity", the mainstream "neuro" narratives are often positively felt by those deemed to be neurodiverse, and the lines between oppressor and oppressed break down, as both neuroscientists and people with neurodiverse conditions co-opt and influence each other's positions.

First-person disavowals of digital phenotyping and epistemic injustice in psychiatry

Digital phenotyping will potentially enable earlier detection and prediction of mental illness by monitoring human interaction with and through digital devices. Notwithstanding its promises, it is certain that a person's digital phenotype will at times be at odds with their first-person testimony of their psychological states. In this paper, we argue that there are features of digital phenotyping in the context of psychiatry which have the potential to exacerbate the tendency to dismiss patients' testimony and treatment preferences, which can be instances of epistemic injustice. We first explain what epistemic injustice is, and why it is argued to be an extensive problem in health and disability settings. We then explain why epistemic injustice is more likely to apply with even greater force in psychiatric contexts, and especially where digital phenotyping may be involved. Finally, we offer some tentative suggestions of how epistemic injustice can be minimised in digital psychiatry.

Taking embodiment seriously in public policy and practice: adopting a procedural approach to health and welfare

It is a common refrain amongst phenomenologists, disability theorists, and feminist legal theorists that medical practice pays insufficient attention to people's embodiment. The complaint that we take insufficient account of people's embodiment isn't limited to the clinical interaction. It has also been directed at healthcare regulation and welfare policy. In this paper, I examine the arguments for taking embodiment seriously in both medical practice and welfare policy, concluding we have good reasons to take better account of people's embodiment. I then set out two challenges to taking embodiment seriously in public policy. First, given the amount of variation in how people are embodied, there is strong possibility that adjusting policy to benefit particular individuals based on an appreciation of their embodied experiences could be detrimental towards other individuals. The second challenge concerns how to ensure that people's testimony about their first-person embodied experience is subject to adequate scrutiny without this resulting in epistemic injustice. I argue that the solution to both of these challenges is to devise a just procedure for soliciting people's testimony and taking it into account in the policy development process. As such, I also provide an outline of what a just procedure should look like.

Epistemic injustice in the therapeutic relationship in psychiatry

The notion of epistemic injustice was first applied to cases of discrimination against women and people of color but has since come to refer to wider issues related to social justice. This paper applies the concept of epistemic injustice to problems in the therapeutic relationship between psychiatrists and psychiatric patients. To this end, it is necessary to acknowledge psychiatrists as professionals with expertise in treating mental disorders, which impair the patient's rationality, sometimes leading to false beliefs, such as delusions. This paper classifies the characteristic features of the therapeutic relationship in psychiatry into three stages: those of a professional-client relationship, those of a doctor-patient relationship, and those of a psychiatrist-psychiatric patient relationship. Epistemic injustice is prevalent in psychiatric care owing to prejudice against patients with mental disorders. However, it is also predisposed by the roles that psychiatrists play in relation to psychiatric patients. This paper suggests some ameliorative measures based on the analysis.

Epistemic Injustice and Nonmaleficence

Epistemic injustice has undergone a steady growth in the medical ethics literature throughout the last decade as many ethicists have found it to be a powerful tool for describing and assessing morally problematic situations in healthcare. However, surprisingly scarce attention has been devoted to how epistemic injustice relates to physicians' professional duties on a conceptual level. I argue that epistemic injustice, specifically testimonial, collides with physicians' duty of nonmaleficence and should thus be actively fought against in healthcare encounters on the ground of professional conduct. I do so by fleshing out how Fricker's conception of testimonial injustice conflicts with the duty of nonmaleficence as defined in Beauchamp and Childress on theoretical grounds. From there, I argue that testimonial injustice produces two distinct types of harm, epistemic and non-epistemic. Epistemic harms are harms inflicted by the physician to the patient qua knower, whereas non-epistemic harms are inflicted to the patient qua patient. This latter case holds serious clinical implications and represent a failure of the process of due care on the part of the physician. I illustrate this through examples taken from the literature on fibromyalgia syndrome and show how testimonial injustice causes wrongful harm to patients, making it maleficent practice. Finally, I conclude on why nonmaleficence as a principle will not be normatively enough to fully address the problem of epistemic injustice in healthcare but nevertheless may serve as a good starting point in attempting to do so.

Contesting misrecognition online: Experiences of epistemic in/justice by vloggers with contested illnesses

Contested illnesses, such as fibromyalgia, myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS), and chronic Lyme disease (CLD), are surrounded by polemic debates regarding their etiology, symptomology, treatment, and even their existence. People who suffer from these contested illnesses arguably also suffer from "epistemic injustice." This concept, coined by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, captures how people's knowledge may be discredited because of identity prejudices. In our paper, this concept is used to understand how seven Dutch women with contested illnesses experience the emancipatory potential of their vlogging practices. Our findings show how these women understood their vlogging as a means to break with epistemic smothering, understood as the propensity to cater ones testimony to one's audience (Dotson, 2011), and as a means to attain and enhance epistemic justice. However, our findings also show how vlogging about contested illnesses did not seem to allow these women to fully break with their epistemic smothering practices, and that the ableist design and gendered norms of YouTube were experienced as obstacles to attaining epistemic justice. We conclude that, even though social media do seem to hold emancipatory potential for these women, the experiences of individual users are diverse and ambiguous.

"Come and share your story and make everyone cry": complicating service user educator storytelling in mental health professional education

It has become relatively common practice within health professional education to invite people who have used mental health and social care services (or service user educators) to share their stories with health professional learners and students. This paper reports on findings from a postcritical ethnographic study of the practice of service user involvement (SUI), in which we reflexively inquired into conceptualizations of service user educators' knowledge contributions to health professional education in the accounts of both service user- and health professional educators. This research was conducted in response to recent calls for greater scrutiny surrounding the risks, challenges, and complexities inherent in involving service users in health professional education spaces. 'Story/telling' was identified as a pronounced overarching construct in our analysis, which focuses on participants' reports of both the obvious and more subtle tensions and complexities they experience in relation to storytelling as a predominant tool or approach to SUI. Our findings are presented as three distinct, yet overlapping, themes related to these complexities or tensions: (a) performative expectations; (b) the invisible work of storytelling; and (c) broadening conceptualizations of service user educators' knowledge. Our findings and discussion contribute to a growing body of literature which problematizes the uncritical solicitation of service user educators' stories in health professional education and highlights the need for greater consideration of the emotional and epistemic labour expected of those who are invited to share their stories. This paper concludes with generative recommendations and reflexive prompts for health professional educators seeking to engage service user educators in health professional education through the practice of storytelling.

From Puzzle to Progress: How Engaging With Neurodiversity Can Improve Cognitive Science

In cognitive science, there is a tacit norm that phenomena such as cultural variation or synaesthesia are worthy examples of cognitive diversity that contribute to a better understanding of cognition, but that other forms of cognitive diversity (e.g., autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder/ADHD, and dyslexia) are primarily interesting only as examples of deficit, dysfunction, or impairment. This status quo is dehumanizing and holds back much-needed research. In contrast, the neurodiversity paradigm argues that such experiences are not necessarily deficits but rather are natural reflections of biodiversity. Here, we propose that neurodiversity is an important topic for future research in cognitive science. We discuss why cognitive science has thus far failed to engage with neurodiversity, why this gap presents both ethical and scientific challenges for the field, and, crucially, why cognitive science will produce better theories of human cognition if the field engages with neurodiversity in the same way that it values other forms of cognitive diversity. Doing so will not only empower marginalized researchers but will also present an opportunity for cognitive science to benefit from the unique contributions of neurodivergent researchers and communities.

Automated opioid risk scores: a case for machine learning-induced epistemic injustice in healthcare

Artificial intelligence-based (AI) technologies such as machine learning (ML) systems are playing an increasingly relevant role in medicine and healthcare, bringing about novel ethical and epistemological issues that need to be timely addressed. Even though ethical questions connected to epistemic concerns have been at the center of the debate, it is going unnoticed how epistemic forms of injustice can be ML-induced, specifically in healthcare. I analyze the shortcomings of an ML system currently deployed in the USA to predict patients' likelihood of opioid addiction and misuse (PDMP algorithmic platforms). Drawing on this analysis, I aim to show that the wrong inflicted on epistemic agents involved in and affected by these systems' decision-making processes can be captured through the lenses of Miranda Fricker's account of hermeneutical injustice. I further argue that ML-induced hermeneutical injustice is particularly harmful due to what I define as an automated hermeneutical appropriation from the side of the ML system. The latter occurs if the ML system establishes meanings and shared hermeneutical resources without allowing for human oversight, impairing understanding and communication practices among stakeholders involved in medical decision-making. Furthermore and very much crucially, an automated hermeneutical appropriation can be recognized if physicians are strongly limited in their possibilities to safeguard patients from ML-induced hermeneutical injustice. Overall, my paper should expand the analysis of ethical issues raised by ML systems that are to be considered epistemic in nature, thus contributing to bridging the gap between these two dimensions in the ongoing debate.

Epistemic injustice and the psychiatrist

BACKGROUND

Psychiatrists depend on their patients for clinical information and are obligated to regard them as trustworthy, except in special circumstances. Nevertheless, some critics of psychiatry have argued that psychiatrists frequently perpetrate epistemic injustice against patients. Epistemic injustice is a moral wrong that involves unfairly discriminating against a person with respect to their ability to know things because of personal characteristics like gender or psychiatric diagnosis.

METHODS

We review the concept of epistemic injustice and several claims that psychiatric practice is epistemically unjust.

RESULTS

While acknowledging the risk of epistemic injustice in psychiatry and other medical fields, we argue that most concerns that psychiatric practice is epistemically unjust are unfounded.

CONCLUSIONS

The concept of epistemic injustice does not add significantly to existing standards of good clinical practice, and that it could produce changes in practice that would be deleterious. Psychiatrists should resist calls for changes to clinical practice based on this type of criticism.

[Pandemia, ignorancia y sufrimiento evitable.]

COVID-19 pandemics gave us relevant lessons that are going to leave a durable mark in our individual and collective experience. Those lessons are both practical and endowed with a moral import. But the pandemic has left a trail of experiences poorly elaborated that leads, with some urgency, to forced silence and to the cancellation of emotional trauma. The aim of this paper was to disentangle the complex relationship that arises, under conditions of uncertainty, between knowledge and ignorance, both from the perspective of experts and of policy makers, and even of the ordinary people, struck or not by the SARS-CoV-2 virus. To that end, I distinguish between three different levels of analysis (agency, institutions, and ideological frameworks) so to argue that the mismatches that occur in all of them, and between them, are sources of avoidable harm. The purpose of this exploration was, therefore, to bring to the floor, relying on the conceptual tools of the political epistemology, both the aspects of the traumatic experience that still lack an adequate elaboration and the features that provide an improved resilience for individuals and societies in tackling with the frightful consequences of the pandemic.

Pro-Diversity Beliefs and the Diverse Person's Burden

Pro-diversity beliefs hold that greater diversity leads to better results in academia, business, politics and a variety of other contexts. This paper explores the possibility that pro-diversity beliefs can generate unfair expectations that marginalized people produce distinctive bonuses, a phenomenon we refer to as the "diverse person's burden". We suggest that a normic conception of diversity, according to which non-diversity entails social privilege, together with empirical research on psychological entitlement suggests an explanation of how the diverse person's burden can arise in many social settings. We also suggest structural and institutional remedies to address the diverse person's burden, as well as an individual virtue we label positional awareness.

Epistemic trauma and transracial adoption: Author(iz)ing folkways of knowledge and healing

BACKGROUND

Despite contested definitions, trauma is often conceptualized as an event that shocks or overloads human systems, shaping memory and meanings as the body and mind attempt to cope and survive. Adoption is often the presumed redress for childhood trauma. Thus, few scholars have examined how, or if, some conditions of adoption or the status itself might involve unique traumas or adversities.

OBJECTIVE

In this paper, I argue that the condition of being transracially adopted can represent intersectional minoritized statuses, which in turn activate potentially distinct formations of epistemic trauma- structurally and relationally transmitted harms to a person as a knower and to their capacities for claiming, making sense of, and healing through their lived experiences.

PARTICIPANTS AND SETTING

I draw from my personal and professional standpoints as a black, mixed-race, woman who was transracially adopted from public foster care as an infant, became a child welfare caseworker and later, a child welfare scholar.

METHODS

Using a critical and reflexive autoethnographic method I ask how theories of epistemic injustice might help to highlight conditions tied to the status "transracial adoptee" that distinguish adoption-specific trauma. By reflexively analyzing my experiences in the context of extant theory and research, this paper brings theories of epistemic injustice into conversation with an emic perspective on adoption.

RESULTS

In my experience, "transracial adoptee" and "mixed race" operated as statuses that occasioned epistemic injustices. I propose these conditions can become traumatic when they chronically and structurally disenfranchise claiming and cultivating folkways essential to one's healing and resilience across the life course.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper is a call to invest in advancing epistemologies of adoption and theories of trauma that are anchored within diverse adoption experiences. I also invite future scholarship to explore epistemic injustice in adoption as trauma, and to identify and disrupt the many spaces in which it may be enacted culturally, relationally, familially, and in a society through its laws, policies, practices, and scientific knowledge.

Medical Dispute Committees in the Netherlands: a qualitative study of patient expectations and experiences

BACKGROUND

Health care incidents, such as medical errors, cause tragedies all over the world. Recent legislation in the Netherlands has established medical dispute committees to provide for an appeals procedure offering an alternative to civil litigation and to meet the needs of clients. Dispute committees incorporate a hybrid procedure where one can file a complaint and a claim for damages resulting in a verdict without going to court. The procedure is at the crossroads of complaints law and civil litigation. This study seeks to analyze to what extent patients and family members' expectations and experiences with dispute committees match the goals of the new legislation.

METHODS

This qualitative, retrospective research includes in-depth, semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with patients or family members who filed a complaint with a dispute committee in the Netherlands. The researchers conducted an inductive, thematic analysis of the qualitative data.

RESULTS

A total of 26 interviews were held with 30 patients and family members. The results showed that participants particularly felt the need to be heard and to make a positive impact on health care. Some wished to be financially compensated, for others money was the last thing on their mind. The results demonstrated the existence of unequal power relationships between participants and both the defendant and dispute committee members. Participants reported the added value of (legal) support and expressed the need for dialogue at the hearing. Participants sometimes experienced closure after the proceedings, but often did not feel heard or felt a lack of a practical outcome and a tangible improvement.

CONCLUSIONS

This study shows that participants' expectations and experiences were not always met by the current set up of the dispute committee proceedings. Participants did not feel heard, while they did value the potential for monetary compensation. In addition, some participants did not experience an empowered position but rather a feeling of a power misbalance. The feeling of a power misbalance and not being heard might be explained by existing epistemic injustice, which is a concept that should be carefully considered in processes after health care incidents.

Citizen Science in Deliberative Systems: Participation, Epistemic Injustice, and Civic Empowerment

In this paper, we bring together the literature on citizen science and on deliberative democracy and epistemic injustice. We argue that citizen science can be seen as one element of "deliberative systems," as described by Mansbridge et al. But in order to fulfil its democratic potential, citizen science needs to be attentive to various forms of exclusion and epistemic injustice, as analyzed by Fricker, Medina and others. Moreover, to tap the potentials of citizen science from the perspective of deliberative democracy, it needs to move towards a more empowered approach, in which citizens do not only deliver data points, but also, in invited or uninvited settings, participate in discussions about the goals and implications of research. Integrating citizen science into the deliberative systems approach embeds it in a broader framework of democratic theory and suggests the transmission of certain practical strategies (e.g., randomized sampling). It can also contribute to realism about both the potentials and the limits of citizen science. As part of a deliberative system, citizen science cannot, and need not, be the only place in which reforms are necessary for creating stronger ties between science and society and for aligning science with democratic values.

Tackling the 'Planned Lack of Care': Could a Right to Development Treaty Promote Universal Social Protection Systems?

The opportunity offered by the adoption of a Treaty on the Right to Development could relaunch aspirations of sovereignty, self-determination and cooperative solidarity, breaking with the structural inequalities among and within nations. The aim of this article is to mobilize political actors in favour of the Treaty as a stepping-stone to achieve universal social protection systems.

Epistemic Injustice in Incident Investigations: A Qualitative Study

Serious incident investigations-often conducted by means of Root Cause Analysis methodologies-are increasingly seen as platforms to learn from multiple perspectives and experiences: professionals, patients and their families alike. Underlying this principle of inclusiveness is the idea that healthcare staff and service users hold unique and valuable knowledge that can inform learning, as well as the notion that learning is a social process that involves people actively reflecting on shared knowledge. Despite initiatives to facilitate inclusiveness, research shows that embracing and learning from diverse perspectives is difficult. Using the concept of 'epistemic injustice', pointing at practices of someone's knowledge being unjustly disqualified or devalued, we analyze the way incident investigations are organized and executed with the aim to understand why it is difficult to embrace and learn from the multiple perspectives voiced in incident investigations. We draw from 73 semi-structured interviews with healthcare leaders, managers, healthcare professionals, incident investigators and inspectors, document analyses and ethnographic observations. Our analysis identified several structures in the incident investigation process, that can promote or hinder an actor's epistemic contribution in the process of incident investigations. Rather than repeat calls to 'involve more' and 'listen better', we encourage policy makers to be mindful of and address the structures that can cause epistemic injustice. This can improve the outcome of incident investigations and can help to do justice to the lived experiences of the involved actors in the aftermath of a serious incident.

[Testimonial injustice against people with mental disorders in health care. A conceptual and ethical analysis]

Menschen mit psychischer Erkrankung sterben statistisch gesehen früher als die Allgemeinbevölkerung. Ein Grund hierfür ist, dass sie eine schlechtere somatische Gesundheitsversorgung erhalten. Wir argumentieren, dass ableistische Netzwerke sozialer Bedeutung zu einer Abwertung der epistemischen Kompetenz von Menschen mit psychischer Erkrankung führen. Diese Abwertung kann mit dem Konzept der testimonialen Ungerechtigkeit erfasst werden. Testimoniale Ungerechtigkeit bezeichnet das ungerechtfertigte Herabstufen der Glaubwürdigkeit einer*s Sprecher*in aufgrund eines Vorurteils gegen ihre*seine soziale Identität. Wir analysieren ethische und epistemische Folgen testimonialer Ungerechtigkeit als wichtige Ursachen der schlechteren Gesundheitsversorgung von Menschen mit psychischer Erkrankung. Testimoniale Ungerechtigkeit kann zu medizinischen Behandlungsfehlern führen und für Betroffene schwerwiegende gesundheitliche Folgen nach sich ziehen. Zudem kann sie zu einem Vertrauensverlust von Menschen mit psychischer Erkrankung in das Gesundheitssystem führen. Daher trägt testimoniale Ungerechtigkeit zur strukturellen Diskriminierung von Menschen mit psychischer Erkrankung bei. Vor diesem Hintergrund diskutieren wir, wie die somatische Gesundheitsversorgung unter ethischen Gesichtspunkten verbessert werden kann.

Externalizing your eating disorder: a qualitative interview study

BACKGROUND

Anorexia nervosa (AN) is a psychiatric disorder with an ego-syntonic nature, causing many patients to perceive their AN as part of their personal identity. Therefore, an important part of treatment is the externalization of the eating disorder, in order to help patients to perceive AN as an external influence. Studies on patient experiences of externalization in treatment for AN are sadly missing. The aims of this study were to investigate, first, patients' perspectives on the relation between identity and anorexia nervosa (AN) and second, their experiences of an externalizing approach during treatment.

METHOD

A qualitative interview study was conducted including fourteen patients with AN in either Family Based Treatment, the Maudsley Model for Anorexia Nervosa Treatment for Adults, Specialist Supportive Clinical Management-Severe Enduring or Cognitive Behavioural Therapy-Enhanced.

RESULTS

There are important differences in participants' perceptions on how AN is related to identity. AN was perceived as part of identity, as alien or as a different side of the self. Patients' experiences towards an externalizing approach were ambivalent. Externalization was considered helpful, whilst also evoking a negative response. Participants reported feeling as if all their behaviour was referred to as part of AN, which elicited feelings of not being taken seriously or being wrongfully accused of being dishonest.

CONCLUSIONS

First, there is considerable variation in the perceived relation between AN and identity. Second, an externalizing approach within treatment may lead to so called epistemic injustice. Awareness of these two facts is of importance for clinicians and the therapeutic relationship because that will help them to refrain from actions that can be perceived as epistemic injustice.

The downgrading of pain sufferers' credibility

BACKGROUND

The evaluation of pain remains one of the most difficult challenges that healthcare practitioners face. Chronic pain appears to affect more than 35% of the population in the West, and indeed, pain is the most common reason patients seek medical care. Despite its ubiquity, studies in the last decades reveal that many patients feel their pain is dismissed by healthcare practitioners and that, as a result, they are denied proper medical care. Buchman, Ho, and Goldberg (J Bioethic Inq 14:31-42, 2017) point to this phenomenon as a form of "epistemic injustice": an unfair and harmful downgrading of credibility affecting some individuals and groups, which prevents them from receiving appropriate and beneficial medical care.

METHODS

By exploring the existing literature on this downgrading of patients' credibility written by healthcare professionals and scholars in medical humanities, I identify and examine the reasons patients are often not believed about their pain and why healthcare is too-often unhelpful or hurtful to people presenting with chronic pain. I also explore to what extent it is possible to forge an alternative epistemological model.

RESULTS

I suggest that most of the causes of this downgrading of patient's credibility result from either the difficulty in communicating pain or the widespread belief that pathology is always the result of objective tissue damage. I examine whether pain has to be effectively communicated and have an objective cause in order for it to be deemed credible. In the end, I argue that in the case of pain, both communication and objectivity are highly problematic.

CONCLUSIONS

I conclude by suggesting that, although alternative epistemological models might be impossible to build, believing patients has both moral and clinical benefits, and this warrants further research.

On recovery: re-directing the concept by differentiation of its meanings

Recovery is a commonly used concept in both professional and everyday contexts. Yet despite its extensive use, it has not drawn much philosophical attention. In this paper, I question the common understanding of recovery, show how the concept is inadequate, and introduce new and much needed terminology. I argue that recovery glosses over important distinctions and even misrepresents the process of moving away from malady as "going back" to a former state of health. It does not invite important nuances needed to distinguish between biomedical, phenomenological, and social perspectives. In addition, I claim that there are many conditions where we are making use of the concept of recovery, although the person recovered from the condition in question, has not regained the same degree of soundness. I show how the concept of recovery leads to conceptual discrepancies that can result in worsening patients' conditions. To gain a fuller understanding, I propose to rethink the direction of the process in question. I define the process of moving away from malady as a move forward towards a new state of soundness. I also suggest three terms, corresponding to different perspectives, to describe this movement forward: 'curing' (biomedical perspective), 'healing' (first-person perspective), and 'habilitating' (social perspective). This new terminology provides a more nuanced understanding of the states of both malady and soundness and an attentiveness as to how they differ and relate.

"The missing 'I' in drug research and the epistemic justice of disclosure"

The multiple disciplines and epistemic communities of the drug research broad landscape outline the context of what we collectively and officially "know" about drug use. While there is a growing body of ethnography with people who use drugs (PWUD), researchers who are themselves out as drug users-and their unofficial expertise-are largely absent. Miranda Fricker's "epistemic injustice" framework (2007) illuminates this knowledge deficit, describing an inability to conceptualize a person's experience due to historic marginalization from the very knowledge-making that defines that experience. The disclosure of lived experience in self-reflexive critique offers an authentic way to explore the complex, intersectional politics of drug use, something that is representationally and critically missing in drug studies. Locating the missing "I" in drug research may help drug studies recognize and interrogate the hegemonies of academic discourses that influence the varieties of lived experience important to drug scholarship.

Threats to epistemic agency in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs

A good therapeutic relationship in mental health services is a predictor of positive clinical outcomes for people who seek help for distressing experiences, such as voice hearing and paranoia. One factor that may affect the quality of the therapeutic relationship and raises further ethical issues is the impact of the clinical encounter on users' sense of self, and in particular on their sense of agency. In the paper, we discuss some of the reasons why the sense of epistemic agency may be especially fragile in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs. We argue that it is important to identify and avoid behaviours that can undermine young people's contributions as epistemic agents in the clinical encounter.

The value of doing philosophy in mental health contexts

People experiencing mental distress and illness are frequently on the receiving end of stigma, epistemic injustice, and social isolation. A range of strategies are required to alleviate the subsequent marginalisation. We ran a series 'philosophy of mind' workshops, in partnership with a third-sector mental health organisation with the aim of using philosophical techniques to challenge mental health stigma and build resources for self-understanding and advocacy. Participants were those with lived experience of mental distress, or unusual beliefs and experiences; mental health advocates; and mental health service providers (such as counsellors, psychologists and psychiatrists). We draw on a shared perspective as a participant and facilitator of the workshop series to assess their impact. We discuss the following benefits: (i) the opportunity for structured discussion of experiences and models; (ii) dialogue across different mental health backgrounds; (iii) the potential to reduce self-stigma and to increase self-understanding and advocacy; and (iv) the potential to alleviate (some) epistemic injustice. We invite researchers and mental health practitioners to consider further opportunities to investigate the potential benefits of philosophy groups in mental health settings to establish whether they generalise.

Striking the balance with epistemic injustice in healthcare: the case of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis

Miranda Fricker's influential concept of epistemic injustice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) has recently seen application to many areas of interest, with an increasing body of healthcare research using the concept of epistemic injustice in order to develop both general frameworks and accounts of specific medical conditions and patient groups. This paper illuminates tensions that arise between taking steps to protect against committing epistemic injustice in healthcare, and taking steps to understand the complexity of one's predicament and treat it accordingly. Work on epistemic injustice is therefore at risk of obfuscating legitimate and potentially fruitful inquiry. This paper uses Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis as a case study, but I suggest that the key problems identified could apply to other cases within healthcare, such as those classed as Medically Unexplained Illnesses, Functional Neurological Disorders and Psychiatric Disorders. Future work on epistemic injustice in healthcare must recognise and attend to this tension to protect against unsatisfactory attempts to correct epistemic injustice.

(Un)bridgeable Chasms?: Doctor-Patient Interactions in Select Graphic Medical Narratives

Effective doctor patient relationships are predicated on doctors' relational engagement and affective/holistic communication with the patients. On the contrary, the contemporary healthcare and patient-clinician communication are at odds with the desirable professional goals, often resulting in dehumanization and demoralization of patients. Besides denigrating the moral agency of a patient such apathetic interactions and unprofessional approach also affect the treatment and well-being of the sufferer. Foregrounding multifaceted doctor-patient relationships, graphic pathographies are a significant cultural resource which recreate the embodied moment of clinical encounters as they also lay bare qualitative tensions between patient' illness experience with doctor's professional understanding of the same. Taking these cues, the present article drawing theoretical postulates of Rita Charon, Deborah Lupton, and Havi Carel close reads Peter Dunlap-Shohl's My Degeneration: A Journey Through Parkinson's (2015), Brian Fies' Mom's Cancer (2006), and Stan Mack's Janet & Me: An Illustrated Story of Love and Loss (2004) to investigate the nature of doctor-patient relationship vis-à-vis communication and the implications of bad doctoring/communicative practices on patient identity and emotions. Furthermore, the article also examines the aesthetic and functional role of comics in bringing into relief the graphically mediated doctor-patient relationship.

Information elaboration and epistemic effects of diversity

We suggest that philosophical accounts of epistemic effects of diversity have given insufficient attention to the relationship between demographic diversity and information elaboration (IE), the process whereby knowledge dispersed in a group is elicited and examined. We propose an analysis of IE that clarifies hypotheses proposed in the empirical literature and their relationship to philosophical accounts of diversity effects. Philosophical accounts have largely overlooked the possibility that demographic diversity may improve group performance by enhancing IE, and sometimes fail to explore the relationship between diversity and IE altogether. We claim these omissions are significant from both a practical and theoretical perspective. Moreover, we explain how the overlooked explanations suggest that epistemic benefits of diversity can depend on epistemically unjust social dynamics.

Are ME/CFS Patient Organizations "Militant"? : Patient Protest in a Medical Controversy

Myalgic encephalomyelitis or chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS) is a contested illness category. This paper investigates the common claim that patients with ME/CFS-and by extension, ME/CFS patient organizations (POs)-exhibit "militant" social and political tendencies. The paper opens with a history of the protracted scientific disagreement over ME/CFS. We observe that ME/CFS POs, medical doctors, and medical researchers exhibit clear differences in opinion over how to conceptualize this illness. However, we identify a common trope in the discourse over ME/CFS: the claim of "militant" patient activism. Scrutinizing this charge, we find no compelling evidence that the vast majority of patients with ME/CFS, or the POs representing them, have adopted any such militant political policies or behaviours. Instead, we observe key strategic similarities between ME/CFS POs in the United Kingdom and the AIDs activist organizations of the mid-1980s in the United States which sought to engage scientists using the platform of public activism and via scientific publications. Finally, we explore the contours of disagreement between POs and the medical community by drawing on the concept of epistemic injustice. We find that widespread negative stereotyping of patients and the marginalization and exclusion of patient voices by medical authorities provides a better explanation for expressions of frustration among patients with ME/CFS.

Investigating Trust, Expertise, and Epistemic Injustice in Chronic Pain

Trust is central to the therapeutic relationship, but the epistemic asymmetries between the expert healthcare provider and the patient make the patient, the trustor, vulnerable to the provider, the trustee. The narratives of pain sufferers provide helpful insights into the experience of pain at the juncture of trust, expert knowledge, and the therapeutic relationship. While stories of pain sufferers having their testimonies dismissed are well documented, pain sufferers continue to experience their testimonies as being epistemically downgraded. This kind of epistemic injustice has received limited treatment in bioethics. In this paper, we examine how a climate of distrust in pain management may facilitate what Fricker calls epistemic injustice. We critically interrogate the processes through which pain sufferers are vulnerable to specific kinds of epistemic injustice, such as testimonial injustice. We also examine how healthcare institutions and practices privilege some kinds of evidence and ways of knowing while excluding certain patient testimonies from epistemic consideration. We argue that providers ought to avoid epistemic injustice in pain management by striving toward epistemic humility. Epistemic humility, as a form of epistemic justice, may be the kind disposition required to correct the harmful prejudices that may arise through testimonial exchange in chronic pain management.