Emergence and Adaptation

Eco-evolution from deep time to contemporary dynamics: The role of timescales and rate modulators

Eco-evolutionary dynamics, or eco-evolution for short, are often thought to involve rapid demography (ecology) and equally rapid heritable phenotypic changes (evolution) leading to novel, emergent system behaviours. We argue that this focus on contemporary dynamics is too narrow: Eco-evolution should be extended, first, beyond pure demography to include all environmental dimensions and, second, to include slow eco-evolution which unfolds over thousands or millions of years. This extension allows us to conceptualise biological systems as occupying a two-dimensional time space along axes that capture the speed of ecology and evolution. Using Hutchinson's analogy: Time is the 'theatre' in which ecology and evolution are two interacting 'players'. Eco-evolutionary systems are therefore dynamic: We identify modulators of ecological and evolutionary rates, like temperature or sensitivity to mutation, which can change the speed of ecology and evolution, and hence impact eco-evolution. Environmental change may synchronise the speed of ecology and evolution via these rate modulators, increasing the occurrence of eco-evolution and emergent system behaviours. This represents substantial challenges for prediction, especially in the context of global change. Our perspective attempts to integrate ecology and evolution across disciplines, from gene-regulatory networks to geomorphology and across timescales, from today to deep time.

A Bridge Too Far - Revisited: Reframing Bruer's Neuroeducation Argument for Modern Science of Learning Practitioners

In Education and the Brain: A Bridge Too Far, John Bruer argues that, although current neuroscientific findings must filter through cognitive psychology in order to be applicable to the classroom, with increased knowledge the neuroscience/education bridge can someday be built. Here, we suggest that translation cannot be understood as a single process: rather, we demonstrate that at least four different ‘bridges’ can conceivably be built between these two fields. Following this, we demonstrate that, far from being a matter of information lack, a prescriptive neuroscience/education bridge (the one most relevant to Bruer’s argument) is a practical and philosophical impossibility due to incommensurability between non-adjacent compositional levels-of-organization: a limitation inherent in all sciences. After defining this concept in the context of biology, we apply this concept to the learning sciences and demonstrate why all brain research must be behaviorally translated before prescriptive educational applicability can be elucidated. We conclude by exploring examples of how explicating different forms of translation and adopting a levels-of-organization framework can be used to contextualize and beneficially guide research and practice across all learning sciences.

Programming the emergence in morphogenetically architected complex systems

Large sets of elements interacting locally and producing specific architectures reliably form a category that transcends the usual dividing line between biological and engineered systems. We propose to call them morphogenetically architected complex systems (MACS). While taking the emergence of properties seriously, the notion of MACS enables at the same time the design (or "meta-design") of operational means that allow controlling and even, paradoxically, programming this emergence. To demonstrate our claim, we first show that among all the self-organized systems studied in the field of Artificial Life, the specificity of MACS essentially lies in the close relation between their emergent properties and functional properties. Second, we argue that to be a MACS a system does not need to display more than weak emergent properties. Third, since the notion of weak emergence is based on the possibility of simulation, whether computational or mechanistic via machines, we see MACS as good candidates to help design artificial self-architected systems (such as robotic swarms) but also harness and redesign living ones (such as synthetic bacterial films).

Mapping an expanding territory: computer simulations in evolutionary biology

The pervasive use of computer simulations in the sciences brings novel epistemological issues discussed in the philosophy of science literature since about a decade. Evolutionary biology strongly relies on such simulations, and in relation to it there exists a research program (Artificial Life) that mainly studies simulations themselves. This paper addresses the specificity of computer simulations in evolutionary biology, in the context (described in Sect. 1) of a set of questions about their scope as explanations, the nature of validation processes and the relation between simulations and true experiments or mathematical models. After making distinctions, especially between a weak use where simulations test hypotheses about the world, and a strong use where they allow one to explore sets of evolutionary dynamics not necessarily extant in our world, I argue in Sect. 2 that (weak) simulations are likely to represent in virtue of the fact that they instantiate specific features of causal processes that may be isomorphic to features of some causal processes in the world, though the latter are always intertwined with a myriad of different processes and hence unlikely to be directly manipulated and studied. I therefore argue that these simulations are merely able to provide candidate explanations for real patterns. Section 3 ends up by placing strong and weak simulations in Levins' triangle, that conceives of simulations as devices trying to fulfil one or two among three incompatible epistemic values (precision, realism, genericity).