Evolutionary game analysis of WEEE recycling tripartite stakeholders under variable subsidies and processing fees

Evolutionary game analysis of multi-stakeholders in the WEEE recycling industry under propaganda subsidies and environmental damage taxes

With an increase in the amount of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), the waste of resources and environmental hazards caused by WEEE cannot be ignored. Meanwhile, the lack of environmental awareness among consumers and the existence of informal recyclers pose a great challenge to the government in governing the WEEE recycling industry. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of the government and formal and informal recyclers. Then, the payoff matrix, replicator dynamic equations and all the equilibrium points are obtained, and a stability analysis of the equilibrium points is performed to derive the evolutionary stability strategies (ESSs) and their formation conditions. Finally, the influence of important parameters on the WEEE recycling industry is examined through numerical analysis. The results suggest that the government cannot ignore the existence of informal recyclers but should take governance measures to intervene in informal recycling and guide such recyclers to upgrade their processing technology. Moreover, the willingness of informal recyclers to invest in processing technology increases with the increase in environmental damage taxes. Second, the government should provide formal recyclers with appropriate promotional subsidies. Third, the government should control its own cost of governance and reduce its financial burden. Fourth, with government subsidies, formal recyclers should decide whether to make promotional investments based on the investment cost and the sum of the benefits from the investment and government subsidy. Finally, under government tax pressure and the influence of formal recyclers' promotional investments, informal recyclers should actively invest in processing technology.

Generation estimation and metals recycling potentials evaluation of retired mobile phones in Korea

The goal of this work is to evaluate generation and metals recycling potentials of retired mobile phones in Korea. The generation estimation is conducted with the sales&new method and statistic data, such as sales of mobile phones and amount of the subscribers. The result shows that there are 17.99 million of mobile phones retired in 2022, compared 13.12 million in 2001. Accordingly, the deduced lifetime has minimum and maximum values in 2003 and 2020, which are 2.02 and 4.33 years, compared with 4.16 years in 2022 and 2.21 years in 2001. The deduced lifetime trends to increase with the increased values of subscribers and the fluctuated values of sales. The crosscheck testifies to the veracity of the result in comparison with the actual condition. The amount and dynamic of critical metals are also calculated with the content and amount of retired mobile phones.

Optimal Decision-Making of Closed-Loop Supply Chains in E-Commerce Platform Considering Sales Cooperations under Environmental Effects and WEEE Regulations

Nowadays, to achieve carbon neutrality, e-commerce platforms participate in the sales and recycling of electrical and electronic products in consideration of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) regulations and environmental effects. This study builds a Stackelberg game model for an e-commerce closed-loop supply chain (ECLSC) under different sales cooperation modes between a manufacturer of electrical and electronic products and an e-commerce platform. Reverse induction is used to obtain the optimal decision-making and profit of the ECLSC under three sales cooperation modes, considering the influence of environmental effects on optimal decision and objective functions. The results show the following: the sales cooperation mode and environmental cost do not affect the WEEE recovery prices of manufacturers and e-commerce platforms, nor do they affect government subsidy standards for dismantling WEEEs; they are, however, positively correlated with environmental benefits. Furthermore, the wholesale and retail prices of electrical and electronic products under different sales cooperation modes are related to sales cooperation modes and environmental costs. Moreover, the processing fees imposed on the manufacturers are related to the environmental costs of the electrical and electronic products; the thresholds of environmental costs of products for government to levy processing fees are different under different sales cooperation modes. Finally, the environmental cost of products required by the government's levying of processing fees are the lowest under a hybrid model. Generally speaking, under WEEE regulations, governments should levy more processing fees for electrical and electronic products with higher environmental costs. Meanwhile, increased environmental benefits will always increase the profits of supply chain members, but increased environmental costs do not always reduce the profits of supply chain members, and multichannel product sales do not always generate profits for manufacturers.