The Dual Track Theory of Moral Decision-Making: a Critique of the Neuroimaging Evidence

A comparative review on neuroethical issues in neuroscientific and neuroethical journals

This study is a pilot literature review that compares the interest of neuroethicists and neuroscientists. It aims to determine whether there is a significant gap between the neuroethical issues addressed in philosophical neuroethics journals and neuroscience journals. We retrieved 614 articles from two specialist neuroethics journals (Neuroethics and AJOB Neuroscience) and 82 neuroethics-focused articles from three specialist neuroscience journals (Neuron, Nature Neuroscience, and Nature Reviews Neuroscience). We classified these articles in light of the neuroethical issue in question before we compared the neuroethical issues addressed in philosophical neuroethics with those addressed by neuroscientists. A notable result is a parallelism between them as a general tendency. Neuroscientific articles cover most neuroethical issues discussed by philosophical ethicists and vice versa. Subsequently, there are notable discrepancies between the two bodies of neuroethics literature. For instance, theoretical questions, such as the ethics of moral enhancement and the philosophical implications of neuroscientific findings on our conception of personhood, are more intensely discussed in philosophical-neuroethical articles. Conversely, neuroscientific articles tend to emphasize practical questions, such as how to successfully integrate ethical perspectives into scientific research projects and justifiable practices of animal-involving neuroscientific research. These observations will help us settle the common starting point of the attempt at "ethics integration" in emerging neuroscience, contributing to better governance design and neuroethical practice.

Relationship of Leadership and Envy: How to Resolve Workplace Envy with Leadership-A Bibliometric Review Study

In recent years, workplace envy has gradually become a hot research topic for organizational behavior. Scholars have explored the antecedents and consequences of envy following the traditional research paradigm. The latest leadership theory also provides new ideas for its development. Although the traditional methods continue to optimize the research on the relationship between leadership and envy, they still do not fully reflect the binary logical relationship between the two and cannot offer sufficient explanatory power for the psychological activities and behaviors of employees and supervisors. In this paper, two pieces of bibliometric software, CiteSpace (American, Drexel University) and Histcite (American, Clarivate Analytics), were used in order to analyze the previous literature in regard to providing a theoretical basis, the main content, and the stages of development. Based on the integration, we propose a dual-track theoretical model of leadership and envy as the prediction framework for future research. The research has returned to the intelligent attribute of leadership and believes that effective leadership can adjust the existence of various types of envy and transform it into the actual productivity of the workplace.

Activating reflective thinking with decision justification and debiasing training

Manipulations for activating reflective thinking, although regularly used in the literature, have not previously been systematically compared. There are growing concerns about the effectiveness of these methods as well as increasing demand for them. Here, we study five promising reflection manipulations using an objective performance measure — the Cognitive Reflection Test 2 (CRT-2). In our large-scale preregistered online experiment (N = 1,748), we compared a passive and an active control condition with time delay, memory recall, decision justification, debiasing training, and combination of debiasing training and decision justification. We found no evidence that online versions of the two regularly used reflection conditions — time delay and memory recall — improve cognitive performance. Instead, our study isolated two less familiar methods that can effectively and rapidly activate reflective thinking: (1) a brief debiasing training, designed to avoid common cognitive biases and increase reflection, and (2) simply asking participants to justify their decisions.

Moral Judgments

Research on morality has increased rapidly over the past 10 years. At the center of this research are moral judgments-evaluative judgments that a perceiver makes in response to a moral norm violation. But there is substantial diversity in what has been called moral judgment. This article offers a framework that distinguishes, theoretically and empirically, four classes of moral judgment: evaluations, norm judgments, moral wrongness judgments, and blame judgments. These judgments differ in their typical objects, the information they process, their speed, and their social functions. The framework presented here organizes the extensive literature and provides fresh perspectives on measurement, the nature of moral intuitions, the status of moral dumbfounding, and the prospects of dual-process models of moral judgment. It also identifies omitted questions and sets the stage for a broader theory of moral judgment, which the coming decades may bring forth.

The relationship between cognitive style and political orientation depends on the measures used

The present research investigated the reason for mixed evidence concerning the relationship between analytic cognitive style (ACS) and political orientation in previous research. Most past research operationalized ACS with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), which has been criticized as relying heavily on numeracy skills, and operationalized political orientation with the single-item self-placement measure, which has been criticized as masking the distinction between social and economic conservatism. The present research recruited an Amazon Mechanical Turk sample and, for the first time, simultaneously employed three separate ACS measures (CRT, CRT2, Baserate conflict problems), a measure of attitudes toward self-critical and reflective thinking (the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale; AOT), and separate measures of social and economic conservatism, as well the standard measure of political orientation. As expected, the total ACS score (combination of the separate measures) was negatively related to social, but not economic, conservatism. However, the CRT by itself was not related to conservatism, in parallel with some past findings, while the two other measures of ACS showed the same pattern as the combined score. Trait reflectiveness (AOT) was related negatively to all measures of political conservatism (social, economic, and general). Results clearly suggest that the conclusion reached regarding the ACS-political orientation relationship depends on the measure(s) used, with the measure most commonly employed in past research (CRT) behaving differently than other measures. Future research must further pursue the implications of the known differences (e.g., reliance on numeracy vs. verbal skills) of ACS measures and distinguish different senses of reflectiveness.

Dual processes and moral conflict: Evidence for deontological reasoners’ intuitive utilitarian sensitivity

The prominent dual process model of moral cognition suggests that reasoners intuitively detect that harming others is wrong (deontological System-1 morality) but have to engage in demanding deliberation to realize that harm can be acceptable depending on the consequences (utilitarian System-2 morality). But the nature of the interaction between the processes is not clear. To address this key issue we tested whether deontological reasoners also intuitively grasp the utilitarian dimensions of classic moral dilemmas. In three studies subjects solved moral dilemmas in which utilitarian and deontological considerations cued conflicting or non-conflicting decisions while performing a demanding concurrent load task. Results show that reasoners’ sensitivity to conflicting moral perspectives, as reflected in decreased decision confidence and increased experienced processing difficulty, was unaffected by cognitive load. We discuss how these findings argue for a hybrid dual process model interpretation in which System-1 cues both a deontological and utilitarian intuition.

Framing Effect in the Trolley Problem and Footbridge Dilemma

The present study investigated the effect of dilemma type, framing, and number of saved lives on moral decision making. A total of 591 undergraduates, with a mean age of 20.56 (SD = 1.37) were randomly assigned to 12 groups on the basis of a grid of two dilemma types (the trolley problem or the footbridge dilemma) by three frames (positive, neutral, or negative frame) by two different numbers of workers (5 or 15 people). The main effects of dilemma type, frame, and number of saved workers were all significant. The interaction of dilemma type and number of saved workers and the interaction of the three independent factors were significant. Results indicated that moral judgment is affected by framing. Specifically, people were more inclined to utilitarianism in the positive or neutral frame and more inclined to intuitionism in the negative frame. Furthermore, this effect can be moderated by dilemma type and number of saved lives. Implications of our results are discussed.

How Large Is the Role of Emotion in Judgments of Moral Dilemmas?

Moral dilemmas often pose dramatic and gut-wrenching emotional choices. It is now widely accepted that emotions are not simply experienced alongside people's judgments about moral dilemmas, but that our affective processes play a central role in determining those judgments. However, much of the evidence purporting to demonstrate the connection between people's emotional responses and their judgments about moral dilemmas has recently been called into question. In the present studies, we reexamined the role of emotion in people's judgments about moral dilemmas using a validated self-report measure of emotion. We measured participants' specific emotional responses to moral dilemmas and, although we found that moral dilemmas evoked strong emotional responses, we found that these responses were only weakly correlated with participants' moral judgments. We argue that the purportedly strong connection between emotion and judgments of moral dilemmas may have been overestimated.

Oscillatory correlates of moral decision-making: Effect of personality

The role of emotion in moral decision-making is still a matter of debate. Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001) argue that 'personal' moral judgments are driven by emotional responses, while 'impersonal' judgments are largely driven by cognitive processes. In this study, oscillatory correlates of decision-making were compared in moral personal, moral impersonal, and nonmoral conditions, as well as in trials associated with utilitarian (i.e., favoring the 'greater good' over individual rights) and non-utilitarian choices. Event-related synchronization in delta and theta bands was greater in the right temporal lobe in personal than in both nonmoral and impersonal moral condition. Graph-theoretical analysis of connectivity patterns showed the prominent role of the orbitofrontal and cingulate cortices in personal moral decision-making, implying greater emotional and self-processing. Higher conscientiousness and intellect and lower behavioral activation were associated with greater difference in oscillatory responses between utilitarian and non-utilitarian choices in personal than in impersonal condition, indicating that sensitivity to moral issues and the ability to grasp the nuances of moral situation are essential for understanding the implications of utilitarian choices in personal and impersonal conditions.

Emotion and moral judgment

Research in psychology and cognitive science has consistently demonstrated the importance of emotion in a wide range of everyday judgments, including moral judgment. Most current accounts of moral judgment hold that emotion plays an important role, but the nature and extent of this role are still debated. We outline three increasingly strong claims about the role of emotion in moral judgment and assess the evidence for each. According to the first and least controversial claim, emotions follow from moral judgments, such that witnessing immorality can lead to negative emotions and witnessing moral virtue can lead to positive ones. According to the second claim, emotions amplify moral judgments, for instance, by making immoral acts seem even more immoral. Finally, on the last claim, emotions can actually moralize nonmoral behaviors-that is, they give nonmoral acts a moral status. Although this claim seems to be the most intriguing one theoretically, empirical support for it is still very limited. In this review, we discuss research findings that are in line with each of these views, we highlight recurring themes across these three categories of evidence, and we identify some open questions and areas for future research. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:169-178. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1216 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.