Right (to a) Diagnosis? Establishing Correct Diagnoses in Chronic Disorders of Consciousness

A comparative review on neuroethical issues in neuroscientific and neuroethical journals

This study is a pilot literature review that compares the interest of neuroethicists and neuroscientists. It aims to determine whether there is a significant gap between the neuroethical issues addressed in philosophical neuroethics journals and neuroscience journals. We retrieved 614 articles from two specialist neuroethics journals (Neuroethics and AJOB Neuroscience) and 82 neuroethics-focused articles from three specialist neuroscience journals (Neuron, Nature Neuroscience, and Nature Reviews Neuroscience). We classified these articles in light of the neuroethical issue in question before we compared the neuroethical issues addressed in philosophical neuroethics with those addressed by neuroscientists. A notable result is a parallelism between them as a general tendency. Neuroscientific articles cover most neuroethical issues discussed by philosophical ethicists and vice versa. Subsequently, there are notable discrepancies between the two bodies of neuroethics literature. For instance, theoretical questions, such as the ethics of moral enhancement and the philosophical implications of neuroscientific findings on our conception of personhood, are more intensely discussed in philosophical-neuroethical articles. Conversely, neuroscientific articles tend to emphasize practical questions, such as how to successfully integrate ethical perspectives into scientific research projects and justifiable practices of animal-involving neuroscientific research. These observations will help us settle the common starting point of the attempt at "ethics integration" in emerging neuroscience, contributing to better governance design and neuroethical practice.

Online public reactions to fMRI communication with patients with disorders of consciousness: Quality of life, end-of-life decision making, and concerns with misdiagnosis

BACKGROUND

Recently, the news media have reported on the discovery of covert awareness and the establishment of limited communication using a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) neuroimaging technique with several brain-injured patients thought to have been in a vegetative state. This discovery has raised many ethical, legal, and social questions related to quality of life, end-of-life decision making, diagnostic and prognostic accuracy in disorders of consciousness, resource allocation, and other issues. This project inquires into the public responses to these discoveries.

METHODS

We conducted a thematic analysis of online comments (n = 779) posted in response to 15 news articles and blog posts regarding the case of a Canadian patient diagnosed for 12 years as in a vegetative state, but who was reported in 2012 as having been able to communicate via fMRI. The online comments were coded using an iteratively refined codebook structured around 14 main themes.

RESULTS

Among the most frequent public reactions revealed in the online comments were discussions of the quality of life of patients with disorders of consciousness, whether life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn (and whether the fMRI communication technique should be used to ask patients about this), and misgivings about the accuracy of diagnosis in disorders of consciousness and brain death.

CONCLUSIONS

These public perspectives are relevant to the obligations of clinicians, lawyers, and public policymakers to patients, families, and the public. Future work should consider how best to alleviate families' concerns as this type of research shakes their faith in diagnostic accuracy, to clarify the legal rules relating to advance directives in this context, and to address the manner in which public messaging might help to alleviate any indirect impact on confidence in the organ donation system.

Relative Values: Perspectives on a Neuroimaging Technology From Above and Within the Ethical Landscape

In this paper we contribute to "sociology in bioethics" and help clarify the range of ways sociological work can contribute to ethics scholarship. We do this using a case study of an innovative neurotechnology, functional magnetic resonance imaging, and its use to attempt to diagnose and communicate with severely brain-injured patients. We compare empirical data from interviews with relatives of patients who have a severe brain injury with perspectives from mainstream bioethics scholars. We use the notion of an "ethical landscape" as an analogy for the different ethical positions subjects can take-whereby a person's position relative to the landscape makes a difference to the way they experience and interact with it. We show that, in comparison to studying abstract ethics "from above" the ethical landscape, which involves universal generalizations and global judgements, studying ethics empirically "from the ground," within the ethical landscape foregrounds a more plural and differentiated picture. We argue it is important not to treat empirical ethics as secondary to abstract ethics, to treat on-the-ground perspectives as useful only insofar as they can inform ethics from above. Rather, empirical perspectives can illuminate the plural vantage points in ethical judgments, highlight the "lived" nature of ethical reasoning, and point to all ethical vantage points as being significant. This is of epistemic importance to normative ethics, since researchers who pay attention to the various positions in and trajectories through the ethical landscape are unlikely to think about ethics in terms of abstract agency-as can happen with top-down ethics-or to elide agency with the agency of policymakers. Moreover, empirical perspectives may have transformative implications for people on the ground, especially where focus on the potential harms and benefits they face brings their experiences and interests to the forefront of ethical and policy discussion.

A diagnostic illusory? The case of distinguishing between "vegetative" and "minimally conscious" states

Throughout affluent societies there are growing numbers of people who survive severe brain injuries only to be left with long-term chronic disorders of consciousness. This patient group who exist betwixt and between life and death are variously diagnosed as in 'comatose', 'vegetative', and, more recently, 'minimally conscious' states. Drawing on a nascent body of sociological work in this field and developments in the sociology of diagnosis in concert with Bauman's thesis of 'ambivalence' and Turner's work on 'liminality', this article proposes a concept we label as diagnostic illusory in order to capture the ambiguities, nuanced complexities and tensions that the biomedical imperative to name and classify these patients give rise to. Our concept emerged through a reading of debates within medical journals alongside an analysis of qualitative data generated by way of a study of accounts of those close to patients: primarily relatives (N = 51); neurologists (N = 4); lawyers (N = 2); and others (N = 5) involved in their health care in the UK.