Addiction and the Concept of Disorder, Part 1: Why Addiction is a Medical Disorder

Towards a dispositionalist (and unifying) account of addiction

Addiction theorists have often utilized the metaphor of the blind men and the elephant to illustrate the complex nature of addiction and the varied methodological approaches to studying it. A common purported upshot is skeptical in nature: due to these complexities, it is not possible to offer a unifying account of addiction. I think that this is a mistake. The elephant is real-there is a there there. Here, I defend a dispositionalist account of addiction as the systematic disposition to fail to control one's desires to engage in certain types of behaviors. I explain this position, defend the inclusion of desires and impaired control, and flesh out the notion of systematicity central to my account. I then illustrate how my dispositionalist framework can unify the disparate and seemingly incompatible accounts of addiction (and their respective methodological approaches). I close with a brief plan to extend and implement my account.

Addiction from the harmful dysfunction perspective: How there can be a mental disorder in a normal brain

Is addiction a medical disorder, and if so, what kind of disorder is it? Addiction is considered a brain disease by NIDA, based on observed brain changes in addicts that are interpreted as brain damage. Critics argue that the brain changes result instead from normal neuroplasticity and learning in response to the intense rewards provided by addictive substances, thus addiction is not a disorder but rather a series of normal-range if problematic choices. Relying on the harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder to evaluate disorder versus nondisorder status, I argue that even if one accepts the critics' reinterpretation of NIDA's brain evidence and rejects the brain disease account, the critics' conclusion that addiction is not a medical disorder but is rather a matter of problematic nondisordered choice does not follow. This is because there is a further possible account of addiction, the evolutionary "hijack" view, that holds that addiction is due to the availability of substances and stimuli that were unavailable during human species evolution and that coopt certain brain areas concerned with human motivation, creating biologically undesigned peremptory desires. I argue that if the hijack theory is correct, then it opens up the possibility that addiction could be a true motivational medical disorder for which there is no underlying neurological-level dysfunction. Finally, I explore the implications of this account for how we see the social responsibility for addiction and how we attempt to control it.

Trying to make sense of rodents' drug choice behavior

Since the first experimental hint for the existence of "an actual desire or striving for the drug" in nonhuman animals by Sidney Spragg in the late 1930s, much effort has been expended by lab researchers to try to model in a valid manner the key behavioral aspects and signs of addiction in animals, typically in rodents (i.e., mainly rats and, to a lesser extent, mice). Despite much advances, there still remains a lingering doubt about the disordered status of drug use in rodents. This is mainly because drug use occurs in a particular setting where animals have access to a drug for self-administration but without access to other valuable behavioral options that could compete with and divert from drug use. Here I review evidence showing that enriching the drug setting with other behavioral options can dramatically influence the pattern of drug choices in rodents. Overall, access to other options during drug access can divert the vast majority of rats from continued drug use. Only few individuals continue to engage in drug use despite access to and at the expense of other options. However, there exist certain high-risk settings in which virtually all animals are vulnerable to develop a harmful pattern of exclusive drug use that can even become fatal in the long run if not discontinued by an outside intervention. Paradoxically, it appears that the behavioral trait that is hypothesized to uniquely render rodents vulnerable to the latter settings (i.e., a narrow focus on the local, current choice, with no consideration of the global pattern of choice) would also protect most of them from using drugs in other choice settings. I conclude with an attempt to make sense of this peculiar setting-specific behavior and with some general propositions for future research.

Introduction: Testing and Refining Marc Lewis's Critique of the Brain Disease Model of Addiction

In this introduction we set out some salient themes that will help structure understanding of a complex set of intersecting issues discussed in this special issue on the work of Marc Lewis: (1) conceptual foundations of the disease model, (2) tolerating the disease model given socio-political environments, and (3) A third wave: refining conceptualization of addiction in the light of Lewis's model.