A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science

Theoretical strategies for an embodied cognitive neuroscience: Mechanistic explanations of brain-body-environment systems

Cognitive neuroscience seeks to explain mind, brain, and behavior. But how do we generate explanations? In this integrative theoretical paper, we review the commitments of the 'New Mechanist' movement within the philosophy of science, focusing specifically on the role of mechanistic models in scientific explanation. We highlight how this approach differs from other explanatory approaches within the field, showing its unique contributions to the efforts of scientific explanation. We then argue that the commitments of the Embodied Cognition framework converge with the commitments of the New Mechanist movement in a way that provides a necessary explanatory strategy available to cognitive neuroscience. We then discuss a number of consequences of this convergence, including issues related to the inadequacy of statistical prediction, neuroscientific reduction, the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience, and psychological and neuroscientific ontology. We hope that our integrative thesis provides researchers with a theoretical strategy for an embodied cognitive neuroscience.

Body as First Teacher: The Role of Rhythmic Visceral Dynamics in Early Cognitive Development

Embodied cognition-the idea that mental states and processes should be understood in relation to one's bodily constitution and interactions with the world-remains a controversial topic within cognitive science. Recently, however, increasing interest in predictive processing theories among proponents and critics of embodiment alike has raised hopes of a reconciliation. This article sets out to appraise the unificatory potential of predictive processing, focusing in particular on embodied formulations of active inference. Our analysis suggests that most active-inference accounts invoke weak, potentially trivial conceptions of embodiment; those making stronger claims do so independently of the theoretical commitments of the active-inference framework. We argue that a more compelling version of embodied active inference can be motivated by adopting a diachronic perspective on the way rhythmic physiological activity shapes neural development in utero. According to this visceral afferent training hypothesis, early-emerging physiological processes are essential not only for supporting the biophysical development of neural structures but also for configuring the cognitive architecture those structures entail. Focusing in particular on the cardiovascular system, we propose three candidate mechanisms through which visceral afferent training might operate: (a) activity-dependent neuronal development, (b) periodic signal modeling, and (c) oscillatory network coordination.

On the Role of Interoception in Body and Object Perception: A Multisensory-Integration Account

Various "embodied perception" phenomena suggest that what people sense of their body shapes what they perceive of the environment and that what they perceive of the environment shapes what they perceive of their bodies. For example, an observer's own hand can be felt where a fake hand is seen, events produced by own body movements seem to occur earlier than they did, and feeling a heavy weight at an observer's back may prompt hills to look steeper. Here we argue that such and various other phenomena are instances of multisensory integration of interoceptive signals from the body and exteroceptive signals from the environment. This overarching view provides a mechanistic description of what embodiment in perception means and how it works. It suggests new research questions while questioning a special role of the body itself and various phenomenon-specific explanations in terms of ownership, agency, or action-related scaling of visual information.

Evidence for the embodiment of the automatic approach bias

Tendencies of approach and avoidance seem to be a universal characteristic of humans. Specifically, individuals are faster in avoiding than in approaching negative stimuli and they are faster in approaching than in avoiding positive stimuli. The existence of this automatic approach-avoidance bias has been demonstrated in many studies. Furthermore, this bias is thought to play a key role in psychiatric disorders like drug addiction and phobias. However, its mechanisms are far from clear. Theories of embodied cognition postulate that the nature of gestures plays a key role in this process. To shed light on the role of the involved gesture we employed a 2 × 2 factorial design with two types of stimuli. Participants had either to approach positive and avoid negative stimuli (congruent conditions) or to avoid positive stimuli and approach negative stimuli (incongruent conditions). Further, they responded either with a joystick or a button press on a response pad. Participants reacted faster in congruent conditions, i.e., avoiding negative stimuli and approaching positive stimuli, than in incongruent conditions. This replicates the known approach and avoidance bias. However, direct analysis of the button press condition revealed no reaction time advantage for congruent trials compared to incongruent trials. In contrast, in the joystick condition participants were significantly faster performing congruent reactions than incongruent reactions. This interaction, a significant reaction time advantage, when the response is enacted by moving a joystick towards or away from the body provides evidence that approach-avoidance tendencies have a crucial bodily component.

An Embodied Cognition Perspective on the Role of Interoception in the Development of the Minimal Self

Interoception is an often neglected but crucial aspect of the human minimal self. In this perspective, we extend the embodiment account of interoceptive inference to explain the development of the minimal self in humans. To do so, we first provide a comparative overview of the central accounts addressing the link between interoception and the minimal self. Grounding our arguments on the embodiment framework, we propose a bidirectional relationship between motor and interoceptive states, which jointly contribute to the development of the minimal self. We present empirical findings on interoception in development and discuss the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self. Moreover, we make theoretical predictions that can be tested in future experiments. Our goal is to provide a comprehensive view on the mechanisms underlying the minimal self by explaining the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self.

Embodying Bounded Rationality: From Embodied Bounded Rationality to Embodied Rationality

Views of embodied cognition vary in degree of radicalism. The goal of this article is to explore how the range of moderate and radical views of embodied cognition can inform new approaches to rationality. In this exploration, Herbert Simon's bounded rationality is taken for its complete disembodiedness as a reference base against which to measure the increasing embodied content of new approaches to rationality. We use the label “embodied bounded rationality” to explore how moderate embodiment can reform Simon's bounded rationality while, on the opposite side of the embodied spectrum, the label “embodied rationality” is employed to explore how radical embodiment can more deeply transform the idea of what is rational. In between the two poles, the labels “body rationality” and “extended rationality” are introduced to explore how also intermediate embodiment can fruitfully inform the research on rationality.

A Developmental Embodied Choice Perspective Explains the Development of Numerical Choices

The goal of this paper is to explore how an embodied view can redirect our understanding of decision making. To achieve this goal, we contribute a developmental embodied choice perspective. Our perspective integrates embodiment and bounded rationality from a developmental view in which the body provides cues that are used in abstract choices. Hereby, the cues evolve with the body that is not static and changes through development. To demonstrate the body’s involvement in abstract choices, we will consider choices in numerical settings in which the body is not necessarily needed for the solution. For this, we consider the magnitude-judgment task in which one has to choose the larger of two magnitudes. In a nutshell, our perspective will pinpoint how the concept of embodied choices can explain the development of numerical choices.

Neural Dynamics of Target Detection via Wireless EEG in Embodied Cognition

Embodied cognitive attention detection is important for many real-world applications, such as monitoring attention in daily driving and studying. Exploring how the brain and behavior are influenced by visual sensory inputs becomes a major challenge in the real world. The neural activity of embodied mind cognitive states can be understood through simple symbol experimental design. However, searching for a particular target in the real world is more complicated than during a simple symbol experiment in the laboratory setting. Hence, the development of realistic situations for investigating the neural dynamics of subjects during real-world environments is critical. This study designed a novel military-inspired target detection task for investigating the neural activities of performing embodied cognition tasks in the real-world setting. We adopted independent component analysis (ICA) and electroencephalogram (EEG) dipole source localization methods to study the participant's event-related potentials (ERPs), event-related spectral perturbation (ERSP), and power spectral density (PSD) during the target detection task using a wireless EEG system, which is more convenient for real-life use. Behavioral results showed that the response time in the congruent condition (582 ms) was shorter than those in the incongruent (666 ms) and nontarget (863 ms) conditions. Regarding the EEG observation, we observed N200-P300 wave activation in the middle occipital lobe and P300-N500 wave activation in the right frontal lobe and left motor cortex, which are associated with attention ERPs. Furthermore, delta (1-4 Hz) and theta (4-7 Hz) band powers in the right frontal lobe, as well as alpha (8-12 Hz) and beta (13-30 Hz) band powers in the left motor cortex were suppressed, whereas the theta (4-7 Hz) band powers in the middle occipital lobe were increased considerably in the attention task. Experimental results showed that the embodied body function influences human mental states and psychological performance under cognition attention tasks. These neural markers will be also feasible to implement in the real-time brain computer interface. Novel findings in this study can be helpful for humans to further understand the interaction between the brain and behavior in multiple target detection conditions in real life.

Identifying animal complex cognition requires natural complexity

The search for human cognitive uniqueness often relied on low ecological tests with subjects experiencing unnatural ontogeny. Recently, neuroscience demonstrated the significance of a rich environment on the development of brain structures and cognitive abilities. This stresses the importance to consider the prior knowledge that subjects bring in any experiment. Second, recent developments in multivariate statistics control precisely for a number of factors and their interactions. Making controls in natural observations equivalent and sometimes superior to captive experimental studies without the drawbacks of the latter methods. Thus, we can now investigate complex cognition by accounting for many different factors, as required when solving tasks in nature. Combining both progresses allows us to move toward an “experience-specific cognition”, recognizing that cognition varies extensively in nature as individuals adapt to the precise challenges they experience in life. Such cognitive specialization makes cross-species comparisons more complex, while potentially identifying human cognitive uniqueness.

What If We Look at the Body? An Embodied Perspective of Collaborative Learning

The bodily experiences and implications of understanding the functioning of the human brain–body mechanism has been a center of attention in the field of cognitive neurosciences for over two decades. Research in this field has enlarged the theories of learning and development, and contributed to changes in educational practices involving language processing, mathematics, and spatial thinking; however, these changes have not yet been applied to the analysis of transversal competencies such as collaborative learning. The aim of this paper is to bridge the theoretical and applied advances in the field of embodied cognition, specifically collaborative learning. The definitions, theoretical frameworks, and current methodological approaches in the field of collaborative learning are reviewed, with a particular focus on those studies that have investigated interactive dynamics in collaborative situations. The need to take the field further by exploring the theoretical perspective of embodied cognition as a possibility that can open the field is also presented. The relevance of investigating learning in groups by analyzing bodily engagements and intersubjectivity is demonstrated and methodological considerations are raised.

Proprioception in Action: A Matter of Ecological and Social Interaction

The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical and formal framework to understand how the proprioceptive and kinesthetic system learns about body position and possibilities for movement in ongoing action and interaction. Whereas most weak embodiment accounts of proprioception focus on positionalist descriptions or on its role as a source of parameters for internal motor control, we argue that these aspects are insufficient to understand how proprioception is integrated into an active organized system in continuous and dynamic interaction with the environment. Our strong embodiment thesis is that one of the main theoretical principles to understand proprioception, as a perceptual experience within concrete situations, is the coupling with kinesthesia and its relational constitution—self, ecological, and social. In our view, these aspects are underdeveloped in current accounts, and an enactive sensorimotor theory enriched with phenomenological descriptions may provide an alternative path toward explaining this skilled experience. Following O'Regan and Noë (2001) sensorimotor contingencies conceptualization, we introduce three distinct notions of proprioceptive kinesthetic-sensorimotor contingencies (PK-SMCs), which we describe conceptually and formally considering three varieties of perceptual experience in action: PK-SMCs-self, PK-SMCs-self-environment, and PK-SMC-self-other. As a proof of concept of our proposal, we developed a minimal PK model to discuss these elements in detail and show their explanatory value as important guides to understand the proprioceptive/kinesthetic system. Finally, we also highlight that there is an opportunity to develop enactive sensorimotor theory in new directions, creating a bridge between the varieties of experiences of oneself and learning skills.

Realigning the Neural Paradigm for Death

Whole brain failure constitutes the diagnostic criterion for death determination in most clinical settings across the globe. Yet the conceptual foundation for its adoption was slow to emerge, has evoked extensive scientific debate since inception, underwent policy revision, and remains contentious in praxis even today. Complications result from the need to relate a unitary construal of the death event with an adequate account of organismal integration and that of the human organism in particular. Advances in the neuroscience of higher human faculties, such as the self, personal identity, and consciousness, and dynamical philosophy of science accounts, however, are yielding a portrait of higher order global integration shared between body and brain. Such conceptual models of integration challenge a praxis relying exclusively on a neurological criterion for death.

Action perception and motor imagery: Mental practice of action

Motor cognition is related to the planning and generation of actions as well as to the recognition and imagination of motor acts. Recently, there is evidence that the motor system participates not only in overt actions but also in mental processes supporting covert actions. Within this framework, we have investigated the cortical areas engaged in execution, observation, and imagination of the same action, by the use of the high resolution quantitative ¹⁴C-deoxyglucose method in monkeys and by fMRI in humans, throughout the entire primate brain. Our data demonstrated that observing or imagining an action excites virtually the same sensory-motor cortical network which supports execution of that same action. In general agreement with the results of five relevant meta-analyses that we discuss extensively, our results imply mental practice, i.e. internal rehearsal of the action including movements and their sensory effects. We suggest that we actively perceive and imagine actions by selecting and running off-line restored sensory-motor memories, by mentally simulating the actions. We provide empirical evidence that mental simulation of actions underlies motor cognition, and conceptual representations are grounded in sensory-motor codes. Motor cognition may, therefore, be embodied and modal. Finally, we consider questions regarding agency attribution and the possible causal or epiphenomenal role the involved sensory-motor network could play in motor cognition.

The Movement-Image Compatibility Effect: Embodiment Theory Interpretations of Motor Resonance With Digitized Photographs, Drawings, and Paintings

To evoke the impression of movement in the "immobile" image is one of the central motivations of the visual art, and the activating effect of images has been discussed in art psychology already some 100 years ago. However, this topic has up to now been largely neglected by the researchers in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. This study investigates - from an interdisciplinary perspective - the formation of lateralized instances of motion when an observer perceives movement in an image. A first step was to identify images that evoke a perception of movement in a certain direction and to give this a rating. Reaction times leading to the engagement of a joystick following the presentation of images are used to evidence the postulated movement occasioned by the perception of movement in an image. Where the required direction of joystick moves matched the expected perception of movement direction in the image, significantly shorter reaction times were recorded. The experiment was able to prove a "movement-image compatibility effect" in observers of images. Based on this, the paper revisits and brings up to date the theses on motor sensory response to images which were developed in art psychology at the beginning of the 20th century. It furthermore contributes an embodiment theory interpretation to the prevalent representational explanation of compatibility effects.

Tanztherapie in der Psychosomatik

Zusammenfassung. Sowohl die Tanztherapie, als auch die Embodiment-Forschung und die Psychosomatische Medizin stellen die Wechselwirkung von Körper, Psyche und Umwelt ins Zentrum ihrer Aufmerksamkeit. Ausgewählte Facetten des Embodiment werden in Bezug gesetzt zu tanztherapeutischen Interventionen bei psychosomatisch erkrankten Patientinnen und Patienten und durch Fallbeispiele veranschaulicht. Es werden zuträgliche und kritische Bedeutungen der Embodiment-Forschung für die Weiterentwicklung der Tanztherapie und mögliche Beiträge der Tanztherapie zur Embodiment-Forschung betrachtet.

Are Older Adults Less Embodied? A Review of Age Effects through the Lens of Embodied Cognition

Embodied cognition is a theoretical framework which posits that cognitive function is intimately intertwined with the body and physical actions. Although the field of psychology is increasingly accepting embodied cognition as a viable theory, it has rarely been employed in the gerontological literature. However, embodied cognition would appear to have explanatory power for aging research given that older adults typically manifest concurrent physical and mental changes, and that research has indicated a correlative relationship between such changes. The current paper reviews age-related changes in sensory processing, mental representation, and the action-perception relationship, exploring how each can be understood through the lens of embodied cognition. Compared to younger adults, older adults exhibit across all three domains an increased tendency to favor visual processing over bodily factors, leading to the conclusion that older adults are less embodied than young adults. We explore the significance of this finding in light of existing theoretical models of aging and argue that embodied cognition can benefit gerontological research by identifying further factors that can explain the cause of age-related declines.

From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind

Predictive processing (PP) approaches to the mind are increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. This surge of interest is accompanied by a proliferation of philosophical arguments, which seek to either extend or oppose various aspects of the emerging framework. In particular, the question of how to position predictive processing with respect to enactive and embodied cognition has become a topic of intense debate. While these arguments are certainly of valuable scientific and philosophical merit, they risk underestimating the variety of approaches gathered under the predictive label. Here, we first present a basic review of neuroscientific, cognitive, and philosophical approaches to PP, to illustrate how these range from solidly cognitivist applications-with a firm commitment to modular, internalistic mental representation-to more moderate views emphasizing the importance of 'body-representations', and finally to those which fit comfortably with radically enactive, embodied, and dynamic theories of mind. Any nascent predictive processing theory (e.g., of attention or consciousness) must take into account this continuum of views, and associated theoretical commitments. As a final point, we illustrate how the Free Energy Principle (FEP) attempts to dissolve tension between internalist and externalist accounts of cognition, by providing a formal synthetic account of how internal 'representations' arise from autopoietic self-organization. The FEP thus furnishes empirically productive process theories (e.g., predictive processing) by which to guide discovery through the formal modelling of the embodied mind.

How "Paternalistic" Is Spatial Perception? Why Wearing a Heavy Backpack Doesn't-and Couldn't-Make Hills Look Steeper

A chief goal of perception is to help us navigate our environment. According to a rich and ambitious theory of spatial perception, the visual system achieves this goal not by aiming to accurately depict the external world, but instead by actively distorting the environment's perceived spatial layout to bias action selection toward favorable outcomes. Scores of experimental results have supported this view-including, famously, a report that wearing a heavy backpack makes hills look steeper. This perspective portrays the visual system as unapologetically paternalistic: Backpacks make hills harder to climb, so vision steepens them to discourage ascent. The "paternalistic" theory of spatial perception has, understandably, attracted controversy; if true, it would radically revise our understanding of how and why we see. Here, this view is subjected to a kind and degree of scrutiny it has yet to face. After characterizing and motivating the case for paternalistic vision, I expose several unexplored defects in its theoretical framework, arguing that extant accounts of how and why spatial perception is ability-sensitive are deeply problematic and that perceptual phenomenology belies the view's claims. The paternalistic account of spatial perception not only isn't true-it couldn't be true, even if its empirical findings were accepted at face value.

Embodied simulation in exposure-based therapies for posttraumatic stress disorder-a possible integration of cognitive behavioral theories, neuroscience, and psychoanalysis

Exposure to the trauma memory is the common denominator of most evidence-based interventions for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Although exposure-based therapies aim to change associative learning networks and negative cognitions related to the trauma memory, emotional interactions between patient and therapist have not been thoroughly considered in past evaluations of exposure-based therapy. This work focuses on recent discoveries of the mirror-neuron system and the theory of embodied simulation (ES). These conceptualizations may add a new perspective to our understanding of change processes in exposure-based treatments for PTSD patients. It is proposed that during exposure to trauma memories, emotional responses of the patient are transferred to the therapist through ES and then mirrored back to the patient in a modulated way. This process helps to alleviate the patient's sense of loneliness and enhances his or her ability to exert control over painful, trauma-related emotional responses. ES processes may enhance the integration of clinical insights originating in psychoanalytic theories-such as holding, containment, projective identification, and emotional attunement-with cognitive behavioral theories of learning processes in the alleviation of painful emotional responses aroused by trauma memories. These processes are demonstrated through a clinical vignette from an exposure-based therapy with a trauma survivor. Possible clinical implications for the importance of face-to-face relationships during exposure-based therapy are discussed.

A Computational Account of Borderline Personality Disorder: Impaired Predictive Learning about Self and Others Through Bodily Simulation

Social dysfunction is a prominent and disabling aspect of borderline personality disorder. We reconsider traditional explanations for this problem, especially early disruption in the way an infant feels physical care from its mother, in terms of recent developments in computational psychiatry. In particular, social learning may depend on reinforcement learning though embodied simulations. Such modeling involves calculations based on structures outside the brain such as face and hands, calculations on one's own body that are used to make inferences about others. We discuss ways to test the role of embodied simulation in BPD and potential implications for treatment.

Is it normal to be a principal mindreader? Revising theories of social cognition on the basis of schizophrenia and high functioning autism-spectrum disorders

Schizophrenia and high functioning autism-spectrum disorders (ASD) are neurodevelopmental conditions that mainly impair social competence, while general intelligence (IQ) is spared. Both disorders have a strong ancillary role in theoretical research on social cognition. Recently the debate has started to be inflected by embodied and phenomenological approaches, which claim that the standard portrayal of all social understanding as so-called 'mindreading', i.e. the attribution of mental states to others in the service of explaining and predicting their behavior, is misguided. Instead it is emphasized that we normally perceive others directly as conscious and goal-directed persons, without requiring any theorizing and/or simulation. This paper evaluates some of the implications of abnormal experiences reported by people with schizophrenia and ASD for the current debate in cognitive science. For these people the practice of explicit mindreading seems to be a compensatory strategy that ultimately fails to compensate for - and may even exacerbate - their impairment of intuitive and interactive social understanding. Phenomenological psychopathology thereby supports the emerging view that 'mindreading' is not the principal form of normal social understanding.