Scaffolded Memory and Metacognitive Feelings

Metacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective

Metacognitive feelings are affective experiences that concern the subject's mental processes and capacities. Paradigmatic examples include the feeling of familiarity, the feeling of confidence, or the tip-of-the-tongue experience. In this article, we advance an account of metacognitive feelings based on the predictive-processing framework. The core tenet of predictive processing is that the brain is a hierarchical hypothesis-testing mechanism, predicting sensory input on the basis of prior experience and updating predictions on the basis of the incoming prediction error. According to the proposed account, metacognitive feelings arise out of a process in which visceral changes serve as cues to predict the error dynamics relating to a particular mental process. The expected rate of prediction-error reduction corresponds to the valence at the core of the emerging metacognitive feeling. Metacognitive feelings use prediction dynamics to model the agent's situation in a way that is both descriptive and directive. Thus, metacognitive feelings are not only an appraisal of ongoing cognitive performance but also a set of action policies. These action policies span predictive trajectories across bodily action, mental action, and interoceptive changes, which together transform the epistemic landscape within which metacognitive feelings unfold.

Outsourcing Memory to External Tools: A Review of 'Intention Offloading'

How do we remember delayed intentions? Three decades of research into prospective memory have provided insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in this form of memory. However, we depend on more than just our brains to remember intentions. We also use external props and tools such as calendars and diaries, strategically placed objects, and technologies such as smartphone alerts. This is known as 'intention offloading'. Despite the progress in our understanding of brain-based prospective memory, we know much less about the role of intention offloading in individuals' ability to fulfil delayed intentions. Here, we review recent research into intention offloading, with a particular focus on how individuals decide between storing intentions in internal memory versus external reminders. We also review studies investigating how intention offloading changes across the lifespan and how it relates to underlying brain mechanisms. We conclude that intention offloading is highly effective, experimentally tractable, and guided by metacognitive processes. Individuals have systematic biases in their offloading strategies that are stable over time. Evidence also suggests that individual differences and developmental changes in offloading strategies are driven at least in part by metacognitive processes. Therefore, metacognitive interventions could play an important role in promoting individuals' adaptive use of cognitive tools.

On our susceptibility to external memory store manipulation: examining the influence of perceived reliability and expected access to an external store

Offloading memory to external stores (e.g., a saved file) allows us to evade the limitations of our internal memory. One cost of this strategy is that the external memory store used may be accessible to others and, thus, may be manipulated. Here we examine how reducing the perceived reliability of an external memory store and manipulating one's expectation for future access to such a store can influence participants' susceptibility to its manipulation (i.e., endorsing manipulated information as authentic). Across three pre-registered experiments, participants were able to store to-be-remembered information in an external store. On a critical trial, we surreptitiously manipulated the information in that store. Results demonstrated that an explicit notification of a previous manipulation of that store and the warning that the store will be inaccessible in the future can decrease susceptibility to manipulation of that store. Results are discussed in the context of the metacognitive monitoring and control of memory reports in situations that involve the distribution of memory demands across both internal and external spaces.

Individual differences in cognitive offloading: a comparison of intention offloading, pattern copy, and short-term memory capacity

The cognitive load of many everyday life tasks exceeds known limitations of short-term memory. One strategy to compensate for information overload is cognitive offloading which refers to the externalization of cognitive processes such as reminder setting instead of memorizing. There appears to be remarkable variance in offloading behavior between participants which poses the question whether there is a common factor influencing offloading behavior across different tasks tackling short-term memory processes. To pursue this question, we studied individual differences in offloading behavior between two well-established offloading paradigms: the intention offloading task which tackles memory for intentions and the pattern copy task which tackles continuous short-term memory load. Our study also included an unrelated task measuring short-term memory capacity. Each participant completed all tasks twice on two consecutive days in order to obtain reliability scores. Despite high reliability scores, individual differences in offloading behavior were uncorrelated between the two offloading tasks. In both tasks, however, individual differences in offloading behavior were correlated with the individual differences in an unrelated short-term memory task. Our results therefore show that offloading behavior cannot simply be explained in terms of a single common factor driving offloading behavior across tasks. We discuss the implications of this finding for future research investigating the interrelations of offloading behavior across different tasks.

From metacognitive beliefs to strategy selection: does fake performance feedback influence cognitive offloading?

The ubiquitous availability of technological aids requires individuals to constantly decide between either externalizing cognitive processes into these aids (i.e. cognitive offloading) or relying on their own internal cognitive resources. With the present research, we investigated the influence of metacognitive beliefs on individuals’ offloading behavior in an experimental setup (N = 159). We manipulated participants’ metacognitive beliefs about their memory abilities by providing fake performance feedback: below-average feedback, above-average feedback, or no feedback (control-group). We then measured offloading behavior, using a pattern copying task in which participants copied a color pattern from a model window into a workspace window. While solving this task, participants could rely either more on an internal memory strategy or more on an offloading strategy. Fake performance feedback affected the participants’ metacognitive evaluations about their memory abilities (below-group < control-group < above-group). Although fake performance feedback did not affect actual offloading behavior, the participants receiving below-average performance feedback reported that they had relied more on an offloading strategy than those participants receiving above-average performance feedback. Furthermore, the participants in the below-group reported lower general memory abilities than the other groups at the end of the experiment. We conclude that while fake performance feedback strongly influenced metacognitive beliefs, this did not transfer into a change of strategy selection, thus not influencing offloading behavior. We propose to consider not only metacognitive beliefs but also metacognitive experiences as potential determinants of cognitive offloading.

Offloading information to an external store increases false recall

Offloading to-be-remembered information is a ubiquitous memory strategy, yet in relying on external memory stores, our ability to recall from internal memory is often diminished. In the present investigation, we examine how offloading impacts true and false recall. Across three experiments, participants studied and wrote down word lists that were each strongly associated with an unstudied critical word. Recall in the Offloading condition (i.e., when they were told that they would have access to their written lists during recall) was contrasted with a No-Offloading condition (i.e., when they were told that they would not have access to their written lists during recall). We found that offloading decreased true recall of presented words while increasing false recall for unpresented critical words. Results are discussed in terms of offloading's differential effects on the formation of gist and verbatim traces during encoding.

Offloading memory leaves us vulnerable to memory manipulation

We often offload memory demands onto external artefacts (e.g., smartphones). While this practice allows us to subvert the limitations of our biological memory, storing memories externally exposes them to manipulation. To examine the impact of such manipulation, we report three experiments, two of which were pre-registered. Individuals performed a memory task where they could offload to-be-recalled information to an external store and on a critical trial, we surreptitiously manipulated the information in that store. Results demonstrated that individuals rarely noticed this manipulation. In addition, when individuals had information inserted into their external memory stores, they often encoded it into their biological memory, thereby leading to the creation of a false memory. The reported results highlight one of the cognitive consequences of offloading our memory to external artefacts.

A role for metamemory in cognitive offloading

Cognitive offloading refers to our reliance on the external environment in order to reduce cognitive demand. For instance, people write notes on paper or smartphones in order not to forget shopping lists or upcoming appointments. A plausible hypothesis is that such offloading relies on metamemory – our confidence in our future memory performance. However, this hypothesis has not been directly tested, and it remains unclear when and how people use external sources to aid their encoding and retrieval of information. In four experiments, here we asked participants to learn word pairs and decide whether to offload some of the pairs by “saving” them on a computer. In the memory test, they had the opportunity to use this saved information on half of trials. Participants adaptively saved the most difficult items and used this offloaded information to boost their memory performance. Crucially, participants' confidence judgments about their memory predicted their decisions to use the saved information, indicating that cognitive offloading is associated with metacognitive evaluation about memory performance. These findings were accommodated by a Bayesian computational model in which beliefs about the performance boost gained from using offloaded information are negatively coupled to an evaluation of memory ability. Together our findings highlight a close link between metamemory and cognitive offloading.

Exploring Human-Tech Hybridity at the Intersection of Extended Cognition and Distributed Agency: A Focus on Self-Tracking Devices

In an increasingly technology-textured environment, smart, intelligent and responsive technology has moved onto the body of many individuals. Mobile phones, smart watches, and wearable activity trackers (WATs) are just some of the technologies that are guiding, nudging, monitoring, and reminding individuals in their day-to-day lives. These devices are designed to enhance and support their human users, however, there is a lack of attention to the unintended consequences, the technology non-neutrality and the darker sides of becoming human-tech hybrids. Using the extended mind theory (EMT) and agential intra-action, we aimed at exploring how human-tech hybrids gain collective skills and how these are put to use; how agency is expressed and how this affects the interactions; and what the darker sides are of being a human-tech hybrid. Using a qualitative method, we analyzed the experiences of using a WAT, with a specific focus on how the tracker and the individual solve tasks, share competences, develop new skills, and negotiate for agency and autonomy. We contributed with new insight on human-tech hybridity and presented a concept referred to as the agency pendulum, reflecting the dynamism of agency. Finally, we demonstrated how the EMT and agential intra-action as a combined theoretical lens can be used to explore human-tech hybridity.

Cognitive Offloading

If you have ever tilted your head to perceive a rotated image, or programmed a smartphone to remind you of an upcoming appointment, you have engaged in cognitive offloading: the use of physical action to alter the information processing requirements of a task so as to reduce cognitive demand. Despite the ubiquity of this type of behavior, it has only recently become the target of systematic investigation in and of itself. We review research from several domains that focuses on two main questions: (i) what mechanisms trigger cognitive offloading, and (ii) what are the cognitive consequences of this behavior? We offer a novel metacognitive framework that integrates results from diverse domains and suggests avenues for future research.

Storing information in-the-world: Metacognition and cognitive offloading in a short-term memory task

We often store to-be-remembered information externally (e.g., written down on a piece of paper) rather than internally. In the present investigation, we examine factors that influence the decision to store information in-the-world versus in-the-head using a variant of a traditional short term memory task. In Experiments 1a and 1b participants were presented with to-be-remembered items and either had to rely solely on internal memory or had the option to write down the presented information. In Experiments 2a and 2b participants were presented with the same stimuli but made metacognitive judgments about their predicted performance and effort expenditure. The spontaneous use of external storage was related both to the number of items to be remembered and an individual's actual and perceived short-term-memory capacity. Interestingly, individuals often used external storage despite its use affording no observable benefit. Implications for understanding how individuals integrate external resources in pursuing cognitive goals are discussed.

Strategic use of reminders: Influence of both domain-general and task-specific metacognitive confidence, independent of objective memory ability

How do we decide whether to use external artifacts and reminders to remember delayed intentions, versus relying on unaided memory? Experiment 1 (N=400) showed that participants' choice to forgo reminders in an experimental task was independently predicted by subjective confidence and objective ability, even when the two measures were themselves uncorrelated. Use of reminders improved performance, explaining significant variance in intention fulfilment even after controlling for unaided ability. Experiment 2 (N=303) additionally investigated a pair of unrelated perceptual discrimination tasks, where the confidence and sensitivity of metacognitive judgments was decorrelated from objective performance using a staircase procedure. Participants with lower confidence in their perceptual judgments set more reminders in the delayed-intention task, even though confidence was unrelated to objective accuracy. However, memory confidence was a better predictor of reminder setting. Thus, propensity to set reminders was independently influenced by (a) domain-general metacognitive confidence; (b) task-specific confidence; and (c) objective ability.