Distributed Cognition and Memory Research: History and Current Directions

Can I Hold That Thought for You? Dementia and Shared Relational Agency

Agency is talked about by many as something that people living with dementia lose, once they've lost much else-autonomy, identity, and privacy, among other things. While the language of loss may capture some of what transpires in dementia, it can obscure how people living with dementia and their loved ones share agency through sharing capacities for memory, language, and decision-making. We suggest that one consequence of adopting a framework of loss is that it makes the default response to changes in agency the substitution of a family member's agency for the purported lost agency of someone living with dementia. We argue for an alternative framework in which sharing agency is recognized as a central feature of living with dementia. Building on the work of relational theorists, we argue for the value of thinking about agency in dementia as fundamentally shared, and explore potential implications for treatment, caregiver support, and building dementia-friendly environments.

Collective Memory: Metaphor or Real?

Collective memory researchers predominantly in the cultural and social sciences have commonly understood the concept of collective memory as a mere metaphor, as something not existing in itself as memory but useful only as a tool for referring to the way groups construct shared representations of their past. Few have however addressed the question of whether it is a metaphor or literal in its own right. This paper looks at the plausibility of the claim that collective memory is a mere metaphor by probing its presuppositions, where the representationalist theory of mind emerges as the ground for such a claim. Then appealing to the externalist model of the mind championed in recent studies of mind in disciplines as varied as philosophy, cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and collective intentionality studies, we try to expose the presuppositions of that claim, opening up possibilities for conceiving collective memory as not merely metaphorical but literal and naturally existing as memory.

How systemic cognition enables epistemic engineering

Epistemic engineering arises as systems and their parts develop functionality that is construed as valid knowledge. By hypothesis, epistemic engineering is a basic evolutionary principle. It ensures that not only living systems identify the differences that make differences but also ensure that distributed control enables them to construct epistemic change. In tracking such outcomes in human life, we stress that humans act within poly-centered, distributed systems. Similar to how people can act as inert parts of a system, they also actively bring forth intents and vicariant effects. Human cognitive agents use the systemic function to construct epistemic novelties. In the illustration, we used a published experimental study of a cyborg cockroach to consider how an evoneered system enables a human subject to perform as an adaptor with some "thought control" over the animal. Within a wide system, brains enable the techniques to arise ex novo as they attune to the dictates of a device. Human parts act as adaptors that simplify the task. In scaling up, we turn to a case of organizational cognition. We track how adaptor functions spread when drone-based data are brought to the maintenance department of a Danish utility company. While pivoting on how system operators combine experience with the use of software, their expertise sets off epistemically engineered results across the company and beyond. Vicariant effects emerge under the poly-centered control of brains, persons, equipment, and institutional wholes. As a part of culture, epistemic engineering works by reducing entropy.

Collaborative Remembering in Conversational Narration

This chapter introduces an epistemic perspective on narration and illustrates, based on data from storytelling in free natural conversation, how collaborative remembering can instantiate distributed cognition: first, when tellers deploy expressions of forgetfulness or explicitly enlist the aid of other participants; second, during various forms of collaborative turn sequencing with rapid speaker shift and a high degree of overlap; third, when conversational participants cooperate to produce a mosaic-like narrative consisting of their partially separate perspectives and contributions; and fourth, when they weave their voices into a single narrative thread in a Goffmanian team performance.

Distributed Cognition and Distributed Morality: Agency, Artifacts and Systems

There are various philosophical approaches and theories describing the intimate relation people have to artifacts. In this paper, I explore the relation between two such theories, namely distributed cognition and distributed morality theory. I point out a number of similarities and differences in these views regarding the ontological status they attribute to artifacts and the larger systems they are part of. Having evaluated and compared these views, I continue by focussing on the way cognitive artifacts are used in moral practice. I specifically conceptualise how such artifacts (a) scaffold and extend moral reasoning and decision-making processes, (b) have a certain moral status which is contingent on their cognitive status, and (c) whether responsibility can be attributed to distributed systems. This paper is primarily written for those interested in the intersection of cognitive and moral theory as it relates to artifacts, but also for those independently interested in philosophical debates in extended and distributed cognition and ethics of (cognitive) technology.

Storing information in-the-world: Metacognition and cognitive offloading in a short-term memory task

We often store to-be-remembered information externally (e.g., written down on a piece of paper) rather than internally. In the present investigation, we examine factors that influence the decision to store information in-the-world versus in-the-head using a variant of a traditional short term memory task. In Experiments 1a and 1b participants were presented with to-be-remembered items and either had to rely solely on internal memory or had the option to write down the presented information. In Experiments 2a and 2b participants were presented with the same stimuli but made metacognitive judgments about their predicted performance and effort expenditure. The spontaneous use of external storage was related both to the number of items to be remembered and an individual's actual and perceived short-term-memory capacity. Interestingly, individuals often used external storage despite its use affording no observable benefit. Implications for understanding how individuals integrate external resources in pursuing cognitive goals are discussed.