Artifacts and essentialism

Tell me your (cognitive) budget, and I'll tell you what you value

Consider the following two (hypothetical) generic causal claims: "Living in a neighborhood with many families with children increases purchases of bicycles" and "living in an affluent neighborhood with many families with children increases purchases of bicycles." These claims not only differ in what they suggest about how bicycle ownership is distributed across different neighborhoods (i.e., "the data"), but also have the potential to communicate something about the speakers' values: namely, the prominence they accord to affluence in representing and making decisions about the social world. Here, we examine the relationship between the level of granularity with which a cause is described in a generic causal claim (e.g., neighborhood vs. affluent neighborhood) and the value of the information contained in the causal model that generates that claim. We argue that listeners who know any two of the following can make reliable inferences about the third: 1) the level of granularity at which a speaker makes a generic causal claim, 2) the speaker's values, and 3) the data available to the speaker. We present results of four experiments (N = 1323) in the domain of social categories that provide evidence in keeping with these predictions.

Essential shape: The role of essentialist beliefs in preferences for misshapen produce

Understanding the reasons behind consumer rejection of misshapen produce is important because of its dramatic consequences on food waste. Drawing on psychological essentialism, we conduct seven studies to investigate the role of produce shape-related essentialist beliefs (i.e., the belief that produce shape is determined by an underlying and unobservable essence) in consumers' evaluations of misshapen produce. Our findings show that essentialist beliefs about produce shape are divided into four distinct dimensions (i.e., biological basis, discreteness, informativeness, and immutability). We find that endorsing discreteness beliefs decreases preferences for misshapen produce. Immutability beliefs produce the opposite effect, whereas informativeness and biological basis have little to no effect. These effects operate through typicality judgments. These findings suggest that considering essentialist beliefs have the potential to help enhance the acceptance of edible albeit misshapen produce.

Genetic essentialist beliefs about criminality predict harshness of recommended punishment

Genetic essentialism is a set of beliefs holding that certain categories have a heritable, intrinsic, and biological basis. The current studies explore people's genetic essentialist beliefs about criminality, how such essentialism relates to beliefs about appropriate punishment, and the kinds of judgments and motivations that underlie these associations. Study 1 validated a novel task, in which respondents estimated how possible it would be for a child to inherit criminal behavior from a sperm donor with whom they had no contact. Studies 2-4 used this task to address how genetic essentialist beliefs related to the harmfulness of a crime and the harshness of recommended punishment. Results indicated a tendency to essentialize both low- and high-harm crimes, though genetic essentialism was higher for more harmful crimes. Moreover, genetic essentialist beliefs predicted recommendations for harsher punishments, with retributive and protective motivations, as well as perceptions of recidivism risk, partially mediating this association. Further, Studies 3 and 4 found that genetic essentialism positively predicted support for harsh punishments such as the death penalty, as well as support for directing financial resources more toward law enforcement and less toward social support. Lay theories about criminality may have profound implications for decisions about appropriate punishment for wrongdoers, as well as broader policy decisions about crime, punishment, and resource allocation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Illusory Essences: A Bias Holding Back Theorizing in Psychological Science

The reliance in psychology on verbal definitions means that psychological research is unusually moored to how humans think and communicate about categories. Psychological concepts (e.g., intelligence, attention) are easily assumed to represent objective, definable categories with an underlying essence. Like the “vital forces” previously thought to animate life, these assumed essences can create an illusion of understanding. By synthesizing a wide range of research lines from cognitive, clinical, and biological psychology and neuroscience, we describe a pervasive tendency across psychological science to assume that essences explain phenomena. Labeling a complex phenomenon can appear as theoretical progress before there is sufficient evidence that the described category has a definable essence or known boundary conditions. Category labels can further undermine progress by masking contingent and contextual relationships and obscuring the need to specify mechanisms. Finally, we highlight examples of promising methods that circumvent the lure of essences and suggest four concrete strategies for identifying and avoiding essentialist intuitions in theory development.

A Dollar Is a Dollar Is a Dollar, or Is It? Insights From Children's Reasoning About "Dirty Money"

Money can take many forms-a coin or a bill, a payment for an automobile or a prize for an award, a piece from the 1989 series or the 2019 series, and so on-but despite this, money is designed to represent an amount and only that. Thus, a dollar is a dollar, in the sense that money is fungible. But when adults ordinarily think about money, they think about it in terms of its source, and in particular, its moral source (e.g., dirty money). Here we investigate the development of the belief that money carries traces of its moral history. We study children ages 5-6 and 8-9, who are sensitive to both object history and morality, and thus possess the component pieces needed to think that a dollar may not be like any other. Across three principal studies (and three additional studies in Appendix S1; N = 327; 219 five- and six-year-olds; 108 eight- and nine-year-olds), we find that children are less likely to want money with negative moral history, a pattern that was stronger and more consistent among 8- and 9-year-olds than 5- and 6-year-olds. These findings highlight pressing directions for future research that could help shed light on the mechanisms that contribute to the belief that money carries traces of its moral history.

Structural thinking about social categories: Evidence from formal explanations, generics, and generalization

Many theories of kind representation suggest that people posit internal, essence-like factors that underlie kind membership and explain properties of category members. Across three studies (N = 281), we document the characteristics of an alternative form of construal according to which the properties of social kinds are seen as products of structural factors: stable, external constraints that obtain due to the kind's social position. Internalist and structural construals are similar in that both support formal explanations (i.e., "category member has property P due to category membership C"), generic claims ("Cs have P"), and the generalization of category properties to individual category members when kind membership and social position are confounded. Our findings thus challenge these phenomena as signatures of internalist thinking. However, once category membership and structural position are unconfounded, different patterns of generalization emerge across internalist and structural construals, as do different judgments concerning category definitions and the dispensability of properties for category membership. We discuss the broader implications of these findings for accounts of formal explanation, generic language, and kind representation.

Intuitive biology, moral reasoning, and engineering life: Essentialist thinking and moral purity concerns shape risk assessments of synthetic biology technologies

The field of synthetic biology heralds a new era in our relationship with nature, as organisms are engineered to meet human goals. But little attention has been paid to potential cognitive constraints on reasoning about such technologies. Across four studies with American adults (N = 649), the present research investigates the proposal that essentialist reasoning and moral purity concerns conspire to shape risk assessments of engineered organisms. Moral purity concerns but not moral harm concerns predict moral wrongness judgments of adding a foreign gene to a plant (Studies 1, 2 & 4), as well as assessments of risk (Studies 1 and 2), and risk of harm from eating (Study 4). Adding a gene from a taxonomically distant organism is considered more morally wrong (Studies 2, 3 and 4), more risky (Studies 2 & 3), and more risky to eat (Study 4), than adding either a gene from a similar organism or a new-to-nature gene. Assessments of the risk of gene spread follow a different pattern, with the new-to-nature gene considered safest (Study 4). The findings support the proposal that gene change is reasoned about as essence change that threatens notions of moral purity, with direct implications for certain types of risk perceptions (eating), but not others (gene spread). The findings elucidate cognitive constraints on risk perceptions of synthetic biology, shed fresh light on essentialist and moral reasoning in a novel biological context, and demonstrate the need to differentiate between both risk context and risk type in cognitive accounts of risk perception.

Folk Theories of Artifact Creation: How Intuitions About Human Labor Influence the Value of Artifacts

What are the consequences of lay beliefs about how things are made? In this article, we describe a Western folk theory of artifact creation, highlighting how intuitive dualism regarding mental and physical labor (i.e., folk psychology) can lead to the perceived transmission of properties from makers to material artifacts (i.e., folk physics), and affect people's interactions with material artifacts. We show how this folk theory structures the conceptual domain of material artifacts by differentiating the contemporary lay concepts of art/craft and industrial production, and how it influences people's evaluations of different types of artifacts and their makers. We propose that the folk theory and lay concepts of art/craft and industrial production are best understood within a specific sociohistorical context, and review potential sources of cross-cultural and cross-temporal variation. We conclude by making recommendations for future research and examining the implications for promoting environmental sustainability and social justice in production systems.

Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Natural/social kind essentialism is the view that natural kind categories, both living and non-living natural kinds, as well as social kinds (e.g., race, gender), are essentialized. On this view, artifactual kinds are not essentialized. Our view-teleological essentialism-is that a broad range of categories are essentialized in terms of teleology, including artifacts. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments typically used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking-involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), and inferences about offspring (study 3)-we find support for the view that a broad range of categories-living natural kinds, non-living natural kinds, and artifactual kinds-are essentialized in terms of teleology. Study 4 tests a unique prediction of teleological essentialism and also provides evidence that people make inferences about purposes which in turn guide categorization judgments.

From Hitler’s Sweater to Dinosaur Fossils: An Essentialist Outlook on Authenticity

Over the past two decades, the concept of authenticity has been the subject of considerable disagreement and debate. Although there have been attempts at reconciling various existing approaches, the literature is still short on a definition that is both practical and precise. This article proposes to make significant headway to that effect by suggesting that authenticity can be accounted for by an underlying psychological phenomenon known as essentialism. In making our case, we first provide an overview of present-day objectivist and constructivist positions and point out their shortcomings, after which we introduce an essentialist account of authenticity. We then argue essentialism has profound benefits over contemporary views and might be the best overarching framework we have, if we intend to reach consensus on the meaning of authenticity.

Intuitions about personal identity are rooted in essentialist thinking across development

What aspects of a person determine whether they are the same person they were in the past? This is one of the fundamental questions of research on personal identity. To date, this literature has focused on identifying the psychological states (e.g., moral beliefs, memories) that people rely on when making identity judgments. But the notion of personal identity depends on more than just psychological states. Most people also believe that the physical matter that makes up an individual is an important criterion for judging identity; changes to the physical stuff in a person's body, even if they are not accompanied by any psychological changes, are judged to change who the person is at some level. Here, we investigate the sources of these beliefs and propose that they stem from the broader cognitive tendency to assume that unseen physical essences make things what they are-psychological essentialism. Four studies provided support for this claim. In Studies 1 and 2, exposing participants to essentialist reasoning led to stronger endorsement of physical continuity as a criterion for personal identity. Similarly, individual differences in participants' essentialist thinking predicted the extent of their reliance on physical continuity (Study 3), and this relationship was observed even among 6- to 9-year-old children (Study 4). These studies advance theory on the psychology of personal identity by identifying a reason why people assign a central role to physical composition when judging identity.

A cognitively-gated place? The role of need for closure in a biased perception of the place’s past

Biased memory of the past is often a starting point for intergroup conflicts. In three correlational studies, we examined the relationship between need for closure (NFC) and historical ethnocentric bias, a tendency to overestimate the role of one’s ethnic group in the multicultural history of the city of residence. In addition, we checked whether this relationship would be mediated by an individual preference for essentialist places. We found that higher NFC was related to increased historical ethnocentric bias. Moreover, this relation was mediated by preference for an essentialist type of a place. Our results may contribute to understanding the role of individual differences and preferred type of place in shaping a biased representation of the past. Furthermore, our research findings point to the importance of raising awareness of the multicultural past among high NFC individuals.

Understanding the Relationship Between Perceived Authenticity and Well-Being

A central tenet of many prominent philosophical and psychological traditions is that personal authenticity facilitates psychological well-being. This idea, however, is at odds with numerous perspectives arguing that it is difficult, if not impossible, to really know one's self, or the true self may not even exist. Moreover, empirical findings suggest that reports of authenticity are often contaminated by positively valenced behavior, further potentially undermining the validity of authenticity measures. Despite these concerns, we argue that subjective feelings of authenticity do uniquely contribute to well-being. Specifically, we argue that the relationship between perceived authenticity and well-being may be understood from a social-cognitive lay theory perspective that we label “true-self-as-guide,” that suggests people use these feelings of authenticity as a cue to evaluate whether they are living up to a shared cultural value of what it means to live a good life. We end with a call for future research on the antecedents of perceived authenticity, boundary conditions for the consequences of personal authenticity, and discuss cultural differences in true-self-as-guide lay theories.

Comparative metaphysics: Evolutionary and ontogenetic roots of essentialist thought about objects

How do animals and young children see the world around them in its most basic structure, and how do such world-views develop over time? These are questions of what could be called comparative and developmental metaphysics. The present paper gives an introduction to this newly emerging field of research. Special emphasis is put on thinking about the world as made up of discrete and enduring objects as the most fundamental form of objective thought. The paper discusses whether language is necessary for such basic forms of objective thought, and whether thinking about objects, in turn, may lay a foundation for psychological essentialism. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

FN400 amplitudes reveal the differentiation of semantic inferences within natural vs. artificial domains

Category-based inferences allow inductions about novel properties based on categorical memberships (e.g., knowing all trout have genes [premise] allows us to infer that all fish have genes [conclusion]). Natural (N) and artificial (A) domains are the most obvious and traditional distinctions in categorization. The distinct event-related potential (ERP) responses for N and A domains have not yet been examined during category-based inferences. In this study, the differences between ERP inference parameters within N and A domains were measured during inductive decision processing, while controlling the premise−conclusion similarity and premise typicality between those two domains. Twenty-two adults were asked to make a decision on whether a conclusion was definitely weak, possibly weak, possibly strong, or definitely strong, based on a premise. The behavioral results showed that semantic inferences within the N domain shared similar inductive strength, similar “correct” response rates, and similar reaction times with that within the A domain. However, the ERP results showed that semantic inferences elicited smaller frontal-distributed N400 (FN400) amplitudes within the N domain than within the A domain, which suggested that knowledge of the ontological domain of a category affects category-based inferences, and underlaid the increased categorical coherence and homogeneity in the N as compared to the A categories. Therefore, we have distinguished the cognitive course of semantic inferences between N and A domains.

Spoiled for choice: Identifying the building blocks of folk-economic beliefs

Boyer & Petersen suggest that folk-economic beliefs result from evolved domain-specific cognitive systems concerned with social exchange. However, a major challenge for their account is that each folk-economic belief can be explained by different combinations of evolved cognitive systems. We illustrate this by offering alternative explanations for several economic beliefs they discuss.

How language shapes the cultural inheritance of categories

It is widely recognized that language plays a key role in the transmission of human culture, but relatively little is known about the mechanisms by which language simultaneously encourages both cultural stability and cultural innovation. This paper examines this issue by focusing on the use of language to transmit categories, focusing on two universal devices: labels (e.g., shark, woman) and generics (e.g., "sharks attack swimmers"; "women are nurturing"). We propose that labels and generics each assume two key principles: norms and essentialism. The normative assumption permits transmission of category information with great fidelity, whereas essentialism invites innovation by means of an open-ended, placeholder structure. Additionally, we sketch out how labels and generics aid in conceptual alignment and the progressive "looping" between categories and cultural practices. In this way, human language is a technology that enhances and expands the categorization capacities that we share with other animals.

Young children's preference for unique owned objects

An important aspect of human thought is the value we place on unique individuals. Adults place higher value on authentic works of art than exact replicas, and young children at times value their original possessions over exact duplicates. What is the scope of this preference in early childhood, and when do children understand its subjective nature? On a series of trials, we asked three-year-olds (N=36) to choose between two toys for either themselves or the researcher: an old (visibly used) toy vs. a new (more attractive) toy matched in type and appearance (e.g., old vs. brand-new blanket). Focal pairs contrasted the child's own toy with a matched new object; Control pairs contrasted toys the child had never seen before. Children preferred the old toys for Focal pairs only, and treated their own preferences as not shared by the researcher. By 3years of age, young children place special value on unique individuals, and understand the subjective nature of that value.

The role of magical thinking in forecasting the future

This article explores the role of magical thinking in the subjective probabilities of future chance events. In five experiments, we show that individuals tend to predict a more lucky future (reflected in probability judgements of lucky and unfortunate chance events) for someone who happened to purchase a product associated with a highly moral person than for someone who unknowingly purchased a product associated with a highly immoral person. In the former case, positive events were considered more likely than negative events, whereas in the latter case, the difference in the likelihood judgement of positive and negative events disappeared or even reversed. Our results indicate that this effect is unlikely to be driven by participants' immanent justice beliefs, the availability heuristic, or experimenter demand. Finally, we show that individuals rely more heavily on magical thinking when their need for control is threatened, thus suggesting that lack of control represents a factor in driving magical thinking in making predictions about the future.

Keeping Track of Individuals: Insights from Developmental Psychology

According to Mammen and Mironenko (2015) our sensitivity to objects' history (i.e., objects' whereabouts across space and time) has been neglected in much of contemporary psychology. In this paper I present evidence from a developmental psychological perspective indicating that although the terminology is different, some research concerning these important issues has actually been conducted. First, research primarily under the heading 'essentialism' has shown that children are sensitive to at least some aspects of an object's history. Second, research on object individuation has revealed that for infants spatiotemporal information appears to have primacy relative to featural information. Finally, research on episodic development has provided evidence that a continuous (hence historical) sense of 'me' may be a necessary, although not sufficient, precondition in order to have episodic memories. It is argued that the available evidence converges, which only underscores the relevance and importance of the issues raised by Mammen and Mironenko (2015).

Refining and expanding the proposal of an inherence heuristic in human understanding

The inherence heuristic is a cognitive process that supplies quick and effortless explanations for a wide variety of observations. Due in part to biases in memory retrieval, this heuristic tends to overproduce explanations that appeal to the inherent features of the entities in the observations being explained (hence the heuristic's name). In this response, we use the commentators' input to clarify, refine, and expand the inherence heuristic model. The end result is a piece that complements the target article, amplifying its theoretical contribution.