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Bach T. Same-tracking real kinds in the social sciences. Synthese 2022; 200:118. [PMID: 35431350 PMCID: PMC8992423 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03521-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/25/2020] [Revised: 11/23/2021] [Accepted: 11/24/2021] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
The kinds of real or natural kinds that support explanation and prediction in the social sciences are difficult to identify and track because they change through time, intersect with one another, and they do not always exhibit their properties when one encounters them. As a result, conceptual practices directed at these kinds will often refer in ways that are partial, equivocal, or redundant. To improve this epistemic situation, it is important to employ open-ended classificatory concepts, to understand when different research programs are tracking the same real kind, and to maintain an ongoing commitment to interact causally with real kinds to focus reference on those kinds. A tempting view of these non-idealized epistemic conditions should be avoided: that they signal an ontological structure of the social world so plentiful that it would permit ameliorated (norm-driven, conceptually engineered) classificatory schemes to achieve their normative aims regardless of whether they defer (in ways to be described) to real-kind classificatory schemes. To ground these discussions, the essay appeals to an overlooked convergence in the systematic naturalistic frameworks of Richard Boyd and Ruth Millikan.
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Affiliation(s)
- Theodore Bach
- Firelands College, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH United States
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2
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Viciana H. Animal culture: But of which kind? Stud Hist Philos Sci 2021; 90:208-218. [PMID: 34735960 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.10.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/20/2020] [Revised: 10/14/2021] [Accepted: 10/17/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
Is animal culture a real entity or is it rather just in the eye of the beholder? The concept of culture began to be increasingly used in the context of animal behaviour research around the 1960s. Despite its success, it is not clear that it represents what philosophers have traditionally thought to be a natural kind. In this article I will show, however, how conceiving of animal culture in this fashion has played a role in the "culture wars", and what lessons we can draw from this. First, an analysis of the epistemological landscape of author keywords related to the concept of animal cultures is presented, thus vindicating the centrality of the concept in describing a broad range of findings. A minimal definition that encompasses the multiple strands of research incorporating the notion of culture is proposed. I then systematically enumerate the ways in which culture thus conceived cannot be considered a natural kind in the study of animal behaviour. This is accomplished by reviewing the efforts and possibilities of anchoring the elusive idea in specific mechanisms, homologies, selection pressures, homeostatic property clusters, or alternatively, its reduction or elimination. Finally, a plausible interpretation of the scientific status of the animal culture concept is suggested that is compatible with both its well established use in animal behaviour research and its inferential limitations. Culture plays the role of a well-established epistemic kind, a node that connects different areas of research on common themes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hugo Viciana
- Departamento de Filosofía, Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Universidad de Sevilla, 41018, Sevilla, Spain.
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3
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Lemeire O. The causal structure of natural kinds. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2021; 85:200-207. [PMID: 33966776 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.10.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/02/2020] [Revised: 10/23/2020] [Accepted: 10/25/2020] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
One primary goal for metaphysical theories of natural kinds is to account for their epistemic fruitfulness. According to cluster theories of natural kinds, this epistemic fruitfulness is grounded in the regular and stable co-occurrence of a broad set of properties. In this paper, I defend the view that such a cluster theory is insufficient to adequately account for the epistemic fruitfulness of kinds. I argue that cluster theories can indeed account for the projectibility of natural kinds, but not for several other epistemic operations that natural kinds support. Natural kinds also play a role in scientific explanations and categorizations. A theory of natural kinds can only account for these additional kind-based epistemic practices if it also analyzes their causal structure.
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4
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Weiskopf DA. Representing and coordinating ethnobiological knowledge. Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 2020; 84:101328. [PMID: 32771278 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2020.101328] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/01/2019] [Revised: 06/03/2020] [Accepted: 06/29/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
Indigenous peoples possess enormously rich and articulated knowledge of the natural world. A major goal of research in anthropology and ethnobiology as well as ecology, conservation biology, and development studies is to find ways of integrating this knowledge with that produced by academic and other institutionalized scientific communities. Here I present a challenge to this integration project. I argue, by reference to ethnographic and cross-cultural psychological studies, that the models of the world developed within specialized academic disciplines do not map onto anything existing within traditional beliefs and practices for coping with nature. Traditional ecological knowledge is distributed across a heterogeneous array of overlapping practices within Indigenous cultures, including spiritual and ritual practices that invoke categories, properties, and causal-explanatory models that do not in general converge with those of the academic sciences. In light of this divergence I argue that we should abandon the integration project, and conclude by sketching a notion of knowledge coordination as a possible successor framework.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel A Weiskopf
- Department of Philosophy and Neuroscience Institute, Georgia State University, PO Box 3994, Atlanta, GA, 30302-3994, USA.
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Ahn S. How non-epistemic values can be epistemically beneficial in scientific classification. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2020; 84:57-65. [PMID: 33218466 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.08.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/12/2019] [Revised: 07/13/2020] [Accepted: 08/02/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Soohyun Ahn
- Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive, Northwest Calgary, Alberta, T2N 1N4, Canada.
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Lipski J. Natural diversity: A neo-essentialist misconstrual of homeostatic property cluster theory in natural kind debates. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2020; 82:94-103. [PMID: 32773070 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.01.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/18/2019] [Revised: 12/17/2019] [Accepted: 01/28/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
In natural kind debates, Boyd's famous Homeostatic Property Cluster theory (HPC) is often misconstrued in two ways: Not only is it thought to make for a normative standard for natural kinds, but also to require the homeostatic mechanisms underlying nomological property clusters to be uniform. My argument for the illegitimacy of both overgeneralizations, both on systematic as well as exegetical grounds, is based on the misconstrued view's failure to account for functional kinds in science. I illustrate the combination of these two misconstruals with recent entries into the natural kind debate about emotions. Finally, I examine and reject Stich's "Kornblith-Devitt method" as a potential justification of these misconstruals.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joachim Lipski
- Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Graduate School of Systemic Neuroscience (GSN-LMU), Munich Center for Neurosciences - Brain & Mind (MCN), Research Center for Neurophilosophy and Ethics of Neuroscience, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Research Center for Neurophilosophy and Ethics of Neuroscience, Germany.
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Abstract
Natural/social kind essentialism is the view that natural kind categories, both living and non-living natural kinds, as well as social kinds (e.g., race, gender), are essentialized. On this view, artifactual kinds are not essentialized. Our view-teleological essentialism-is that a broad range of categories are essentialized in terms of teleology, including artifacts. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments typically used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking-involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), and inferences about offspring (study 3)-we find support for the view that a broad range of categories-living natural kinds, non-living natural kinds, and artifactual kinds-are essentialized in terms of teleology. Study 4 tests a unique prediction of teleological essentialism and also provides evidence that people make inferences about purposes which in turn guide categorization judgments.
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Affiliation(s)
- David Rose
- Department of Philosophy, Florida State University
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Varga S. "Relaxed" natural kinds and psychiatric classification. Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 2018; 72:49-54. [PMID: 30396827 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2018.10.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/27/2017] [Revised: 07/12/2018] [Accepted: 10/01/2018] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
This paper starts out highlighting a particular criticism that psychiatry faces and continues by investigating approaches to classification in psychiatry that operate with a "relaxed" (non-essentialist) notion of natural kind. Two accounts are examined, one by Rachel Cooper (2005; 2013) and one based on the work of Richard Boyd (1991; 1999; 2003; 2010). While these accounts do not directly pursue such a goal, the main aim is to probe whether deploying a "relaxed" notion of natural kind would be able to neutralize the criticism. While the conclusion is in the negative, the analysis raises doubts that it is possible to completely neutralize this criticism without assuming an overly simplistic view of the causal structure of the world.
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Affiliation(s)
- Somogy Varga
- Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 327 Clement Hall, Memphis, TN, 38152, USA.
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Suzuki DG, Tanaka S. A Phenomenological and Dynamic View of Homology: Homologs as Persistently Reproducible Modules. Biol Theory 2017; 12:169-180. [PMID: 28890670 PMCID: PMC5569646 DOI: 10.1007/s13752-017-0265-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/12/2017] [Accepted: 04/24/2017] [Indexed: 01/11/2023]
Abstract
Homology is a fundamental concept in biology. However, the metaphysical status of homology, especially whether a homolog is a part of an individual or a member of a natural kind, is still a matter of intense debate. The proponents of the individuality view of homology criticize the natural kind view of homology by pointing out that homologs are subject to evolutionary transformation, and natural kinds do not change in the evolutionary process. Conversely, some proponents of the natural kind view of homology argue that a homolog can be construed both as a part of an individual and a member of a natural kind. They adopt the Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) theory of natural kinds, and the theory seems to strongly support their construal. Note that this construal implies the acceptance of essentialism. However, looking back on the history of the concept of homology, we should not overlook the fact that the individuality view was proposed to reject the essentialist interpretation of homology. Moreover, the essentialist notions of natural kinds can, in our view, mislead biologists about the phenomena of homology. Consequently, we need a non-essentialist view of homology, which we name the "persistently reproducible module" (PRM) view. This view highlights both the individual-like and kind-like aspects of homologs while stripping down both essentialist and anti-essentialist interpretations of homology. In this article, we articulate the PRM view of homology and explain why it is recommended over the other two views.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daichi G. Suzuki
- The Nobel Institute for Neurophysiology, Department of Neuroscience, Karolinska Institute, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Senji Tanaka
- Faculty of Letters, Keio University, Minato, Tokyo, Japan
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Lemeire O. Beyond the realism debate: The metaphysics of 'racial' distinctions. Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 2016; 59:47-56. [PMID: 27565209 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2016.08.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/18/2015] [Revised: 08/03/2016] [Accepted: 08/05/2016] [Indexed: 06/06/2023]
Abstract
The current metaphysical race debate is very much focused on the realism question whether races exist. In this paper I argue against the importance of this question. Philosophers, biologists and anthropologists expect that answering this question will tell them something substantive about the metaphysics of racial classifications, and will help them to decide whether it is justified to use racial categories in scientific research and public policy. I argue that there are two reasons why these expectations are not fulfilled. First of all, the realism question about race leads to a very broad philosophical debate about the semantics of general terms and the criteria for real kinds, rather than to a debate about the metaphysics of racial categories specifically. Secondly, there is a type of race realism that is so toothless that it is almost completely uninformative about the metaphysics of race. In response to these worries, I argue that the metaphysical race debate should rather be focused on the question in what way and to what extent 'racial' distinctions can ground the epistemic practices of various scientific disciplines. I spell out what I mean by this, and go on to demonstrate that trying to answer this question leads to a more fruitful metaphysical debate.
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Affiliation(s)
- Olivier Lemeire
- KU Leuven, Institute of Philosophy, Centre for Logic and Analytical Philosophy, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium.
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Ludwig D. Overlapping ontologies and Indigenous knowledge. From integration to ontological self-determination. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2016; 59:36-45. [PMID: 27692212 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2016.06.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/29/2016] [Revised: 06/09/2016] [Accepted: 06/10/2016] [Indexed: 05/05/2023]
Abstract
Current controversies about knowledge integration reflect conflicting ideas of what it means to "take Indigenous knowledge seriously". While there is increased interest in integrating Indigenous and Western scientific knowledge in various disciplines such as anthropology and ethnobiology, integration projects are often accused of recognizing Indigenous knowledge only insofar as it is useful for Western scientists. The aim of this article is to use tools from philosophy of science to develop a model of both successful integration and integration failures. On the one hand, I argue that cross-cultural recognition of property clusters leads to an ontological overlap that makes knowledge integration often epistemically productive and socially useful. On the other hand, I argue that knowledge integration is limited by ontological divergence. Adequate models of Indigenous knowledge will therefore have to take integration failures seriously and I argue that integration efforts need to be complemented by a political notion of ontological self-determination.
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Affiliation(s)
- David Ludwig
- Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
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Boem F, Ratti E, Andreoletti M, Boniolo G. Why genes are like lemons. Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 2016; 57:88-95. [PMID: 27155220 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2016.04.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/28/2015] [Revised: 04/22/2016] [Accepted: 04/25/2016] [Indexed: 06/05/2023]
Abstract
In the last few years, the lack of a unitary notion of gene across biological sciences has troubled the philosophy of biology community. However, the debate on this concept has remained largely historical or focused on particular cases presented by the scientific empirical advancements. Moreover, in the literature there are no explicit and reasonable arguments about why a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene is needed. In our paper, we claim that a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene does not contribute to biology. Unlike the question, for example, "What is a biological function?", we argue that the question "What is a gene?" could be answered by means of empirical research, in the sense that biologists' labour is enough to shed light on it.
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Affiliation(s)
- F Boem
- Dipartimento di Oncologia ed Emato-oncologia, Università di Milano, Italy
| | - E Ratti
- Center for Theology, Science and Human Flourishing, University of Notre Dame, USA.
| | - M Andreoletti
- Dipartimento di Scienze della Salute, Universita' di Milano, Italy; Department of Experimental Oncology, European Institute of Oncology, Italy
| | - G Boniolo
- Dipartimento di Scienze Biomediche e Chirurgico Specialistiche, Università of Ferrara, Italy; Institute for Advanced Study, Technische Universität München, Germany
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Flórez Quintero DT. [Are Mental Disorders Natural Kinds?]. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2015; 44:66-71. [PMID: 26578221 DOI: 10.1016/j.rcp.2014.09.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/08/2014] [Revised: 09/09/2014] [Accepted: 09/29/2014] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
A problem for both philosophers of Psychiatry and Psychiatrists within the domain of nosology is to determine which could be the more appropriate model to classify mental illnesses. Such an endeavor also requires questioning the very nature of mental illness. While trying to cope with the philosophical challenges of such a task, Peter Zachar purports to show that the nosological work in Psychiatry should not adhere to the model of natural kinds. He even considers that it is mistaken to treat mental disorders as natural kinds. Nonetheless, Zachar's view on the existence of natural kinds-even in domains where there is little room for doubting about their existence, like Chemistry-is very unstable. In 2001 he holds that there are no natural kinds, but in 2008 he argues that his objections to the model of natural kinds are more the manifestation of his skepticism against a tradition. Although the problem of the existence of natural kinds shall not be dealt with in this article, a brief description on how deflated is Zachar's view on this matter in 2008 is presented, with the central part of the article devoted to reconstruct and examine his rationale for the thesis that mental disorders are not natural kinds. In the critical section of this paper, it is suggested that, although Zachar's thesis may be right, the arguments he gives to support it are quite flawed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daian Tatiana Flórez Quintero
- Magíster en Filosofía; Estudiante Doctorado en Filosofía, Universidad Nacional de Colombia-Sede Bogotá, Bogotá, Colombia; Profesora Departamento de Filosofía, Universidad de Caldas, Manizales, Colombia; Profesora Asociada Departamento de Ciencias Humanas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia-Sede Manizales, Manizales, Colombia.
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Abstract
In this article, I argue that depression and suicide are natural kinds insofar as they are classes of abnormal behavior underwritten by sets of stable biological mechanisms. In particular, depression and suicide are neurobiological kinds characterized by disturbances in serotonin functioning that affect various brain areas (i.e., the amygdala, anterior cingulate, prefrontal cortex, and hippocampus). The significance of this argument is that the natural (biological) basis of depression and suicide allows for reliable projectable inferences (i.e., predictions) to be made about individual members of a kind. In the context of assisted suicide, inferences about the decision-making capacity of depressed individuals seeking physician-assisted suicide are of special interest. I examine evidence that depression can hamper the decision-making capacity of individuals seeking assisted suicide and discuss some implications.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jonathan Y Tsou
- Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Iowa State University, 402 Catt Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1306, USA.
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