1
|
Iliadi S. Psychopathology and Metaphysics: Can One Be a Realist About Mental Disorder? J Med Philos 2024; 49:283-297. [PMID: 38530639 PMCID: PMC11032104 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhae013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/28/2024] Open
Abstract
Metaphysical realism about mental disorder is the thesis that mental disorder exists mind-independently. There are two ways to challenge metaphysical realism about mental disorder. The first is by denying that mental disorder exists. The second is by denying that mental disorder exists mind-independently. Or, differently put, by arguing that mental disorder is mind-dependent. The aim of this paper is three-fold: (a) to examine three ways in which mental disorder can be said to be mind-dependent (namely, by being causally dependent on the human mind, by being weakly dependent on human attitudes, and by being strongly dependent on human attitudes), (b) to clarify their differences, and (c) to discuss their implications regarding metaphysical realism about mental disorder. I argue that mental disorder being mind-dependent in the first two senses is compatible with metaphysical realism about mental disorder, whereas mental disorder being mind-dependent in the third sense is not.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Simoni Iliadi
- National Technical University of Athens, Athens, Greece
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Bognon-Küss C. "Naked life": the vital meaning of nutrition in Claude Bernard's physiology. Hist Philos Life Sci 2024; 46:18. [PMID: 38587716 DOI: 10.1007/s40656-024-00611-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/31/2022] [Accepted: 01/17/2024] [Indexed: 04/09/2024]
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to elucidate the vital meaning and strategic role that nutrition holds in Claude Bernard's "biological philosophy", in the sense Auguste Comte gave to this expression, i.e. the theoretical part of biology. I propose that Bernard's nutritive perspective on life should be thought of as an "interfield" object, following Holmes' category. Not only does nutrition bridge disciplines like physiology and organic chemistry, as well as levels of inquiry ranging from special physiology to the organism's total level, including the cell and protoplasm, but it also forms the genetic and structural foundation for Bernard's two fundamental axioms in general physiology: the necessary complementarity of destruction and creation (1) and the uniformity of this physiological law across all life forms, be it plants or animals (2). Because Bernard's nutritive theory is a major pivot for the re-ordering of life and its characterization, I argue that it must be located and understood in the scientific and metaphysical context of his time, of which he claims to be the heir and challenger-what I propose to characterize as the "epistemic space" of nutrition, on the background of which Bernard builds his own "logic". I then set out this logic of nutrition, focusing on three interrelated bernardian theses: the establishment of the theory of indirect nutrition as the basis for the notion of "milieu intérieur"; the enduring conception of nutrition as a continuous generation; the emphasis on nutrition as a way of reshaping the form/matter relationship.
Collapse
|
3
|
Pérez-Escobar JA. Minimal logical teleology in artifacts and biology connects the two domains and frames mechanisms via epistemic circularity. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2024; 104:23-37. [PMID: 38430647 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.02.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/05/2022] [Revised: 11/20/2023] [Accepted: 02/09/2024] [Indexed: 03/05/2024]
Abstract
The understanding of artifacts and biological phenomena has often influenced each other. This work argues that at the core of these epistemic bridges there are shared teleological notions and explanations manifested in analogies between artifacts and biological phenomena. To this end, I first propose a focus on the logical structure of minimal teleological explanations, which renders said epistemic bridges more evident than an ontological or metaphysical approach to teleology, and which can be used to describe scientific practices in different areas by virtue of formal generality and minimalism (section 2). Second, I show how this approach highlights some epistemic features shared by the understanding of artifacts and biological phenomena, like a specific kind of epistemic circularity, and how functional analogies between artifacts and biological phenomena translate such epistemic circularity from one domain to the other (section 3). Third, I conduct a case study on the scientific practice around the brain's "compass", showing how the understanding of artifacts influences purpose ascription and measurement, and frames mechanisms in biology, especially in areas where purpose ascription is most difficult, like cognitive neuroscience (sections 4 and 5).
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- José Antonio Pérez-Escobar
- Centre Cavaillès, UAR 3608 République des Savoirs, École Normale Supérieure, PSL University, 45 Rue d'Ulm, 75005, Paris, France; Chair of History and Philosophy of Mathematical Sciences, ETH Zurich, Clausiusstrasse 59, 8092, Zurich, Switzerland; Department of Personality, Evaluation and Psychological Treatment, University of Seville, calle Camilo José Cela S/N, 41018, Seville, Spain.
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Bräutigam M. Heterodox underdetermination: Metaphysical options for discernibility and (non-)entanglement. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2024; 103:77-84. [PMID: 38061161 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.09.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/23/2023] [Revised: 09/18/2023] [Accepted: 09/18/2023] [Indexed: 02/10/2024]
Abstract
Broadly speaking, there are three views on whether Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is violated in the case of similar particles. According to the earliest view, PII is always violated (call this the no discernibility view); according to the more recent weak discernibility view, PII is at least valid in a weak sense. No and weak discernibility have been referred to as orthodoxy. Steven French has argued that although PII is violated, similar particles can still be regarded as individuals, or, alternatively, as non-individuals: French famously concluded therefore that metaphysics is underdetermined by physics. Call this thesis orthodox underdetermination. Most recently, some authors have turned against orthodoxy by arguing that PII is valid in more than a weak sense - call this the new discernibility view, also referred to as heterodoxy. Since heterodoxy is backed up by physical considerations, metaphysics now seems to be determined by physics: physics indicates that PII is valid. In this paper, I argue that with respect to entangled states, there are two ways to establish PII's validity, which yield two different ontological interpretations of entanglement. Therefore, a form of underdetermination returns within the heterodox framework. I argue that heterodox underdetermination deserves some attention, because the two ontological interpretations might yield different explanations of the violation of Bell inequalities.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Maren Bräutigam
- University of Cologne, Department of Philosophy, Albertus-Magnus-Platz 50923, Cologne, Germany.
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Gentile N, Lucero S. On compatibility between realism and fictionalism: A response to Suárez' proposal. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2024; 103:168-175. [PMID: 38194853 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.12.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/30/2022] [Revised: 11/29/2023] [Accepted: 12/16/2023] [Indexed: 01/11/2024]
Abstract
In a series of articles, Mauricio Suárez defends the neutrality of fictionalism with respect to the scientific realism-anti-realism debate. Suárez understands fictionalism from a strictly methodological point of view, linked to the practice of model building in the context of the philosophy of science. He moves away from the type of fictionalism analysed in other areas of philosophy such as metaphysics, the philosophy of language, aesthetics or the philosophy of mathematics. Following Vaihinger's position, he emphasizes the inferential role of fiction in scientific modelling and argues that scientific fictionalism is not incompatible with scientific realism, as is often believed. We argue against Suárez's position and reject the ubiquitous character assigned to fictions in scientific discourse, as well as the deflationary view of scientific realism defended by Suárez. We conclude that when the semantic, epistemic, and metaphysical aspects at stake in the realism-antirealism debate are taken into account, the alleged compatibility between scientific realism and fictionalism starts to generate some tension.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Nélida Gentile
- University of Buenos Aires, Department of Philosophy, Puán 480, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina.
| | - Susana Lucero
- University of Buenos Aires, Department of Philosophy, Puán 480, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina.
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Hazelwood C. Newton's "law-first" epistemology and "matter-first" metaphysics. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2023; 101:40-47. [PMID: 37677875 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.08.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/24/2022] [Revised: 07/18/2023] [Accepted: 08/22/2023] [Indexed: 09/09/2023]
|
7
|
Bolduc G, Angleraux C. Claude Bernard's non reception of Darwinism. Hist Philos Life Sci 2023; 45:29. [PMID: 37382672 DOI: 10.1007/s40656-023-00588-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/15/2022] [Accepted: 06/03/2023] [Indexed: 06/30/2023]
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to explain why, while Charles Darwin was well recognized as a scientific leader of his time, Claude Bernard never really regarded Darwinism as a scientific theory. The lukewarm reception of Darwin at the Académie des Sciences of Paris and his nomination to a chair only after 8 years contrasts with his prominence, and Bernard's attitude towards Darwin's theory of species evolution belongs to this French context. Yet we argue that Bernard rejects the scientific value of Darwinian principles mainly for epistemological reasons. Like Darwin, Bernard was interested in hereditary processes, and planned to conduct experiments on these processes that could lead to species transformation. But the potential creation of new forms of life would not vindicate Darwinism since biologists can only explain the origin of morphotypes and morphological laws by the means of untestable analogies. Because it can be the object neither of experiments nor of any empirical observation, phylogeny remains out of science's scope. Around 1878 Bernard foresaw a new general physiology based on the study of protoplasm, which he saw as the agent of all basic living phenomena. We will analyze why Bernard regarded Darwinism as part of metaphysics, yet still referred to Darwinians in his latter works in 1878. Basically, the absence of a scientific reception of Darwinism in Bernard's work should not obscure its philosophical reception, which highlights the main principles of Bernard's epistemology.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Ghyslain Bolduc
- Edouard-Montpetit College, Longueuil, Canada.
- Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur la science et la technologie, Université du Québec à Montréal, C.P. 8888, succ. Centre-ville, Montreal, QC, H3C 3P8, Canada.
| | - Caroline Angleraux
- iBrain U1253, Tours, France
- Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques, 13, rue du Four, 75006, Paris, France
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
van den Berg H. The essentialism of early modern psychiatric nosology. Hist Philos Life Sci 2023; 45:12. [PMID: 36947297 PMCID: PMC10033471 DOI: 10.1007/s40656-023-00562-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/10/2022] [Accepted: 02/08/2023] [Indexed: 06/18/2023]
Abstract
Are psychiatric disorders natural kinds? This question has received a lot of attention within present-day philosophy of psychiatry, where many authors debate the ontology and nature of mental disorders. Similarly, historians of psychiatry, dating back to Foucault, have debated whether psychiatric researchers conceived of mental disorders as natural kinds or not. However, historians of psychiatry have paid little to no attention to the influence of (a) theories within logic, and (b) theories within metaphysics on psychiatric accounts of proper method, and on accounts of the nature and classification of mental disorders. Historically, however, logic and metaphysics have extensively shaped methods and interpretations of classifications in the natural sciences. This paper corrects this lacuna in the history of psychiatry, and demonstrates that theories within logic and metaphysics, articulated by Christian Wolff (1679-1754), have significantly shaped the conception of medical method and (psychiatric) nosology of the influential nosologist Boissier De Sauvages (1706-1767). After treating Sauvages, I discuss the method of the influential nosologist William Cullen (1710-1790), and demonstrate the continuity between the classificatory methods of Sauvages and Cullen. I show that both Sauvages and Cullen were essentialists concerning medical diseases in general and psychiatric disorders in particular, contributing to the history of conceptions of the ontology and nature of mental disorders.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Hein van den Berg
- Department of Philosophy, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, , University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 143, Postbus 94201 , 1090 GE, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Jacobs C. The metaphysics of fibre bundles. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2023; 97:34-43. [PMID: 36525712 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.11.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/22/2021] [Revised: 09/13/2022] [Accepted: 11/24/2022] [Indexed: 06/17/2023]
Abstract
Recently, Dewar (2019) has suggested that one can apply the strategy of 'sophistication'-as exemplified by sophisticated substantivalism as a response to the diffeomorphism invariance of General Relativity-to gauge theories such as electrodynamics. This requires a shift to the formalism of fibre bundles. In this paper, I develop and defend this suggestion. Where my approach differs from previous discussions is that I focus on the metaphysical picture underlying the fibre bundle formalism. In particular, I aim to affirm the physical reality of gauge properties. I argue that this allows for a local and separable explanation of the Aharonov-Bohm effect. Its puzzling features are explained by a form of holism inherent to fibre bundles.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Caspar Jacobs
- Merton College, University of Oxford, Merton Street, Oxford, OX1 4JD, UK.
| |
Collapse
|
10
|
Brummett A, Eberl JT. The many metaphysical commitments of secular clinical ethics: Expanding the argument for a moral-metaphysical proceduralism. Bioethics 2022; 36:783-793. [PMID: 35527699 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13046] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/15/2021] [Revised: 02/15/2022] [Accepted: 04/08/2022] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
The rich moral diversity of academic bioethics poses a paradox for the practice of giving moral recommendations in secular clinical ethics: How are ethicists to provide moral guidance in a pluralistic society? The field has responded to this challenge with a "procedural approach," but defining this term stirs debate. Some have championed a contentless proceduralism, where ethicists work only to help negotiate resolutions among stakeholders without making any moral recommendations. Others have defended a moral proceduralism by claiming that ethicists should make moral recommendations that are grounded in bioethical consensus (e.g., relevant law, policy, professional consensus statements, and bioethics literature), which is secured using moral principles such as respect for persons or justice. In contrast, we develop a moral-metaphysical proceduralism by identifying many metaphysical commitments in points of secular bioethical consensus. The moral-metaphysical view of secular clinical ethics is important because it challenges the discipline to accept the substantive philosophical foundations required to support giving moral recommendations in a pluralistic context, which may lead to further insights about the nature of the field.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Abram Brummett
- Oakland University William Beaumont School of Medicine, Royal Oak Beaumont Hospital, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, USA
| | - Jason T Eberl
- Albert Gnaegi Center for Health Care Ethics, Saint Louis University, St Louis, Missouri
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
Rosochotsky A. R. J. Boscovich on physical symmetries. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2022; 93:149-162. [PMID: 35460925 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.03.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/15/2021] [Revised: 01/29/2022] [Accepted: 03/06/2022] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
R. J. Boscovich (1711-1787) is best known for his unified theory of natural phenomena of 1758, based on the notion of centrally interacting point-particles. While addressing contemporaneous scientific questions, his natural philosophy also systematically integrated many methodological and metaphysical ideas related to the pursuits of natural philosophy. One such excursion is Boscovich's treatment of what we today consider physical symmetries. In this paper I suggest a comprehensive interpretation of his comments on physical symmetries. I give special emphasis to Boscovich's notable inclusion of a re-scaling transformation among better known symmetries of Newtonian physics and show that it instantiates a generalization of standard dynamical symmetries. My interpretation shows that Boscovich's position results not only from his theory of matter (or basic ontology) but also from his explicit metaphysics and epistemology of space and time and his views on nomological possibility.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Aviram Rosochotsky
- Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas, The Lester and Sally Entin Faculty of Humanities, Tel Aviv University, Haim Levanon 55, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv Yafo, 69978, Israel.
| |
Collapse
|
12
|
Dunlap L. Is the Information-Theoretic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics an ontic structural realist view? Stud Hist Philos Sci 2022; 91:41-48. [PMID: 34844136 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.11.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/02/2021] [Revised: 11/08/2021] [Accepted: 11/08/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
The Information-Theoretic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics from (Bub & Pitowsky, 2010) has been criticized in two ways related to the ontological picture it supplies. This paper explores whether Ontic Structural Realism can supplement the metaphysics of ITIQM in a way that would satisfy its critics. The many similarities between the two views are detailed. And it is argued that the ITIQM view ca. 2010 does seem to be compatible with OSR, but as the view evolved in Bub's Bananaworld (2016), its fundamental metaphysical commitments shifted, making it a less clean fit with OSR.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Lucas Dunlap
- University of Cincinnati, Department of Philosophy, 2600 Clifton Ave., Cincinnati, OH, 45221, USA.
| |
Collapse
|
13
|
Duerr PM, Ehmann A. The physics and metaphysics of Tychistic Bohmian Mechanics. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2021; 90:168-183. [PMID: 34695624 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.09.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/22/2020] [Revised: 08/12/2021] [Accepted: 09/28/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
The paper takes up Bell's (1987) "Everett (?) theory" and develops it further. The resulting theory is about the system of all particles in the universe, each located in ordinary, 3-dimensional space. This many-particle system as a whole performs random jumps through 3N-dimensional configuration space - hence "Tychistic Bohmian Mechanics" (TBM). The distribution of its spontaneous localisations in configuration space is given by the Born Rule probability measure for the universal wavefunction. Contra Bell, the theory is argued to satisfy the minimal desiderata for a Bohmian theory within the Primitive Ontology framework (for which we offer a metaphysically more perspicuous formulation than is customary). TBM's formalism is that of ordinary Bohmian Mechanics (BM), without the postulate of continuous particle trajectories and their deterministic dynamics. This "rump formalism" receives, however, a different interpretation. We defend TBM as an empirically adequate and coherent quantum theory. Objections voiced by Bell and Maudlin are rebutted. The "for all practical purposes"-classical, Everettian worlds (i.e. quasi-classical histories) exist sequentially in TBM (rather than simultaneously, as in the Everett interpretation). In a temporally coarse-grained sense, they quasi-persist. By contrast, the individual particles themselves cease to persist.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Patrick M Duerr
- Oriel College, Oriel Square, OX1 4EW, University of Oxford, UK.
| | | |
Collapse
|
14
|
Schroeren D. Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy and the ontological foundations of orthodoxy. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2021; 90:235-246. [PMID: 34740147 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.09.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/15/2021] [Revised: 09/09/2021] [Accepted: 09/10/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
This paper develops quantum state individualism, a fundamental ontology for what is usually known as 'orthodox quantum mechanics.' The central import of this ontology is that allows for a systematic evaluation of some of the main conclusions of the recent literature on quantum metaphysical indeterminacy. In particular, quantum state individualism supports the 'gappy' version of Jessica Wilson's determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy; it implies that fundamental reality is perfectly precise; and third, it provides a non-disjunctive definition of determinables and thereby shields Wilson's account against the charge that it requires either a departure from classical logic or a revision of the quantum formalism.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- David Schroeren
- Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Rue de Candolle 2, 1211, Genève 4, Switzerland.
| |
Collapse
|
15
|
Kornu K. Anatomy of Being, Metaphysics of Death: The Case of Avicenna's Logical Dissection. J Bioeth Inq 2021; 18:655-669. [PMID: 34674154 DOI: 10.1007/s11673-021-10134-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/07/2020] [Accepted: 04/28/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
Elucidating a metaphysics of medicine is vital for framing a coherent medical ethics. In this paper, I examine the historical case of Avicenna, the eleventh century physician-philosopher. Avicenna radicalizes the dissective power of reason using a logicized Aristotelian metaphysics to clarify concepts at the metaphysical level, which I call his anatomy of being. One of the practical consequences of Avicenna's metaphysics is a dehumanizing eschatology of death. I outline the main elements of Avicenna's thought that constitute his anatomy of being. Through an examination of his logic, metaphysics, and psychology, I show how Avicenna develops a dissective logic. I conclude that one's epistemology, as a method of knowing, entails a metaphysics, and, in turn, results in an ethical stance to the object of knowledge. For Avicenna, mental dissective logic applied to humans results in dehumanization, thereby destroying the humanistic impulse of medicine.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Kimbell Kornu
- Albert Gnaegi Center for Health Care Ethics, Saint Louis University, 3545 Lafayette Ave, St. Louis, MO, 63104, USA.
| |
Collapse
|
16
|
Swaim DG. What is narrative possibility? Stud Hist Philos Sci 2021; 89:257-266. [PMID: 34534881 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.08.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/22/2020] [Revised: 06/30/2021] [Accepted: 08/16/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
In this paper I offer a new account of narrative possibility that I call the "ecological approach." I situate it relative to alternative "metaphysical" and "epistemological" approaches, and argue that it has advantages in comparison. It saves some of the important insights from each, but serves the purposes of narrative explanation better than either, specifically because it delimits the explanatory modal space of narrative explanation correctly, whereas the others do not.
Collapse
|
17
|
Faye J, Jaksland R. What Bohr wanted Carnap to learn from quantum mechanics. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2021; 88:110-119. [PMID: 34147731 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.05.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/20/2020] [Revised: 05/25/2021] [Accepted: 05/25/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
Niels Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics is often cast as positivist and sometimes explicitly claimed to be influenced by logical positivists due to some similarities in their thinking. While it is certainly the case that some logical positivists attempted to recruit Bohr, this paper argues that Bohr had interests of his own in the logical positivists. Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics focuses on observation, the use of classical concepts in quantum mechanics, and indeterminacy of quantum processes as opposed to uncertainty of measurement. His view thereby shares some common ground with the logical positivists' views on verification, the observation language, and anti-metaphysics. But Bohr also emphasized complementarity: that certain pairs of concepts - such as position and momentum - are mutually exclusive in quantum mechanics since they, according to Bohr, are only meaningful relative to different experimental arrangements. Bohr believed that complementary brought a general epistemological lesson for all of science that an objective description of nature is not separable from the observational and experimental conditions under which we explore nature. Motivated by the common ground between himself and logical positivism, Bohr tried to persuade the logical positivists and Carnap in particular to adopt and champion complementarity as well as part of their unity of science program. Though his efforts ultimately proved in vain, Bohr's attempts to influence logical positivism disprove the claim that his engagement with them was reluctant and purposefully limited.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Jan Faye
- Department of Communication, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark.
| | - Rasmus Jaksland
- Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Faculty of Humanities, NTNU - Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway.
| |
Collapse
|
18
|
Garrett JR, McNolty LA. Principles over Propositions: Or, How to Reject Metaphysical Neutrality in Bioethics. Am J Bioeth 2021; 21:31-34. [PMID: 34036880 DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2021.1915412] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
|
19
|
Eberl JT. Metaphysics, Reason, and Religion in Secular Clinical Ethics. Am J Bioeth 2021; 21:17-18. [PMID: 34036879 DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2021.1915423] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
|
20
|
Watson JC, Guidry-Grimes L. Navigating Contested Harms and Competing Metaphysics: Humility and Ethics Consultation. Am J Bioeth 2021; 21:34-36. [PMID: 34036890 DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2021.1915427] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
|
21
|
Carrasco MA, Valera L. Diagnosing death: the "fuzzy area" between life and decomposition. Theor Med Bioeth 2021; 42:1-24. [PMID: 33851346 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-021-09541-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/03/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
This paper aims to determine whether it is necessary to propose the extreme of putrefaction as the only unmistakable sign in diagnosing the death of the human organism, as David Oderberg does in a recent paper. To that end, we compare Oderberg's claims to those of other authors who align with him in espousing the so-called theory of hylomorphism but who defend either a neurological or a circulatory-respiratory criterion for death. We then establish which interpretation of biological phenomena is the most reasonable within the metaphysical framework of hylomorphism. In this regard, we hold that technology does not obscure the difference between life and death or confect metaphysically anomalous beings, such as living human bodies who are not organisms or animals of the human species who are informed by a vegetative soul, but instead demands a closer and more careful look at the "fuzzy area" between a healthy (living) organism and a decaying corpse. In the light of hylomorphism, we conclude that neurological and circulatory-respiratory criteria are not good instruments for diagnosing death, since they can offer only probabilistic prognoses of death. Of the two, brain death is further away from the moment of death as it merely predicts cardiac arrest that will likely result in death. Putrefaction, the criterion that Oderberg proposes, is at the opposite end of the fuzzy area. This is undoubtedly a true diagnosis of death, but it is not necessary to wait for putrefaction proper-a relatively late stage of decomposition-to be sure that death has already occurred. Rather, early cadaveric phenomena demonstrate that the matter composing a body is subject to the basic forces governing all matter in its environment and has thus succumbed to the universal current of entropy, meaning that the entropy-resisting activity has ceased to constitute an organismal unity. When this unity is lost, there is no possibility of return.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- María A Carrasco
- Centro de Bioética e Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile
| | - Luca Valera
- Centro de Bioética e Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile.
| |
Collapse
|
22
|
Calamari M. The Metaphysical Challenge of Loop Quantum Gravity. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2021; 86:68-83. [PMID: 33965666 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.02.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/25/2021] [Revised: 02/11/2021] [Accepted: 02/11/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
Many consider the apparent disappearance of time and change in quantum gravity the main metaphysical challenge since it seems to lead to a form of Parmenidean view according to which the physical world simply is, nothing changes, moves, becomes, happens. In this paper, I argue that the main metaphysical challenge of Rovelli's philosophical view of loop quantum gravity is to lead exactly to the opposite view, namely, a form of Heraclitean view, or rather, of radical process metaphysics according to which there is becoming (process, change, event) but not being (substance, stasis, thing). However, this does not entail that time is real. Fundamentally, time does not exist. I show how Rovelli's understanding of loop quantum gravity supports the view that there is change without time, so that the physical world can be timeless yet ever-changing. I conclude by arguing that it is such a process-oriented conception that constitutes the revolutionary metaphysical challenge and philosophical significance of loop quantum gravity, while the alleged Parmenidean view turns out to be nothing but the endpoint of a long-standing metaphysical orthodoxy.
Collapse
|
23
|
|
24
|
Lemeire O. The causal structure of natural kinds. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2021; 85:200-207. [PMID: 33966776 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.10.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/02/2020] [Revised: 10/23/2020] [Accepted: 10/25/2020] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
One primary goal for metaphysical theories of natural kinds is to account for their epistemic fruitfulness. According to cluster theories of natural kinds, this epistemic fruitfulness is grounded in the regular and stable co-occurrence of a broad set of properties. In this paper, I defend the view that such a cluster theory is insufficient to adequately account for the epistemic fruitfulness of kinds. I argue that cluster theories can indeed account for the projectibility of natural kinds, but not for several other epistemic operations that natural kinds support. Natural kinds also play a role in scientific explanations and categorizations. A theory of natural kinds can only account for these additional kind-based epistemic practices if it also analyzes their causal structure.
Collapse
|
25
|
Lazaridis C. Defining Death: Reasonableness and Legitimacy. J Clin Ethics 2021; 32:109-113. [PMID: 34129526] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
The recently published World Brain Death Project aims in alleviating inconsistencies in clinical guidelines and practice in the determination of death by neurologic criteria. However, critics have taken issue with a number of epistemic and metaphysical assertions that critics argue are either false, ad hoc, or confused. In this commentary, I discuss the nature of a definition of death; the plausibility of neurologic criteria as a sensible social, medical, and legal policy; and within a Rawlsian liberal framework, reasons for personal choice or accommodation among neurologic and circulatory definitions. Declaration of human death cannot rest on contested metaphysics or unmeasurable standards, instead it should be regarded as a plausible and widely accepted social construct that conforms to best available and pragmatic medical science and practice. The definition(s) and criteria should be transparent, publicly justifiable, and potentially allow for the accommodation of reasonable choice. This is an approach that situates the definition of death as a political matter. The approach anticipates that no conceptualization of death can claim universal validity, since this is a question that cannot be settled solely on biologic or scientific grounds, rather it is a matter of normative preference, socially constructed and historically contingent.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Christos Lazaridis
- Neurocritical Care, Departments of Neurology/Neurosurgery, MacLean Center for Clinical Ethics, University of Chicago, 5841 S. Maryland Ave|MC 2030, Chicago, Illinois 60637 USA.
| |
Collapse
|
26
|
Triviño V, Suárez J. Holobionts: Ecological communities, hybrids, or biological individuals? A metaphysical perspective on multispecies systems. Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 2020; 84:101323. [PMID: 32788054 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2020.101323] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/30/2018] [Revised: 05/28/2020] [Accepted: 06/09/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
Holobionts are symbiotic assemblages composed by a macrobe host (animal or plant) plus its symbiotic microbiota. In recent years, the ontological status of holobionts has created a great amount of controversy among philosophers and biologists: are holobionts biological individuals or are they rather ecological communities of independent individuals that interact together? Chiu and Eberl have recently developed an eco-immunity account of the holobiont wherein holobionts are neither biological individuals nor ecological communities, but hybrids between a host and its microbiota. According to their account, the microbiota is not a proper part of the holobiont. Yet, it should be regarded as a set of scaffolds that support the individuality of the host. In this paper, we approach Chiu and Eberl's account from a metaphysical perspective and argue that, contrary to what the authors claim, the eco-immunity account entails that the microorganisms that compose the host's microbiota are proper parts of the holobiont. Second, we argue that by claiming that holobionts are hybrids, and therefore, not biological individuals, the authors seem to be assuming a controversial position about the ontology of hybrids, which are conventionally characterized as a type of biological individual. In doing so, our paper aligns with the contemporary tendency to incorporate metaphysical resources to shed light on current biological debates and builds on that to provide additional support to the consideration of holobionts as biological individuals from an eco-immunity perspective.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Vanessa Triviño
- Department of Philosophy, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos I, Spain
| | - Javier Suárez
- Department of Philosophy, University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany.
| |
Collapse
|
27
|
England R. Rethinking emotion as a natural kind: Correctives from Spinoza and hierarchical homology. Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 2020; 84:101327. [PMID: 32819843 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2020.101327] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/06/2020] [Revised: 05/22/2020] [Accepted: 06/19/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
It is commonly claimed that the folk category of emotion does not constitute a natural kind, due to the significant compositional differences between its members, especially basic and complex emotions. Arguably, however, this conclusion stems from the dualistic philosophical anthropology underlying the discussion, which presupposes a metaphysical "split" between mind and body. This is the case irrespective of whether a traditional or biological (homology-based) approach to natural kinds is adopted. Since the origins of this increasingly disputed anthropology can ultimately be traced to Descartes' substance dualism, its adverse effects can likewise be addressed using a contemporary theory of emotion developed from Spinoza, one of Descartes' earliest critics on this issue. Furthermore, a Spinozistic view of emotion accords with the recent shift to a hierarchical approach to homology, which recognises that the evolutionary lineage of complex biological units should be traced via relational qualities rather than physical characteristics. Both the Spinozistic approach to emotion and the hierarchical approach to homology show that the compositional variation in the folk category of emotion does not necessarily preclude it from constituting a natural kind.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Renee England
- School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, University of Queensland, St Lucia, Brisbane, 4067, Queensland, Australia.
| |
Collapse
|
28
|
Chatzigeorgiou K. How the Mind-World Problem Shaped the History of Science: A Historiographical Analysis of Edwin Arthur Burtt's The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science Part II. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2020; 83:133-143. [PMID: 32958276 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.05.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/17/2020] [Accepted: 05/14/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
This manuscript, divided into two parts, provides a contextual and historiographical analysis of Edwin Arthur Burtt's classic The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. My discussion corroborates the sparse technical literature on Burtt (Moriarty 1994; Villemaire, 2002), positioning his work in the aftermath of American idealism and the rise of realist, pragmatist and naturalist alternatives. However, I depart from the existing interpretations both in content and focus. Disagreeing with Moriarty, I maintain that Burtt's Metaphysical Foundations is not an idealist work. Moreover, I provide an alternative to Villemaire's mainly Deweyite/pragmatist reading, emphasizing the import of new realism and naturalism. Burtt's historical thesis should not be viewed as outlining a systematic philosophical position, but rather as a (coherent) culmination of numerous philosophical problematics. To support my conclusion, I provide a substantial summary of Burtt's text alongside a contextual analysis of the philosophical issues that preoccupied his teachers and peers in Columbia's philosophy department. I conclude with a historiographical section, rendering explicit the connections between Burtt's understanding of the scientific revolution, and his distinctive early 20th century American intellectual context.
Collapse
|
29
|
Chatzigeorgiou K. How the Mind-World Problem Shaped the History of Science: A Historiographical Analysis of Edwin Arthur Burtt's The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science Part I. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2020; 83:121-132. [PMID: 32958275 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.05.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/30/2019] [Revised: 03/21/2020] [Accepted: 05/14/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
This manuscript, divided into two parts, provides a contextual and historiographical analysis of Edwin Arthur Burtt's classic The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. My discussion corroborates the sparse technical literature on Burtt (Moriarty, 1994; Villemaire, 2002), positioning his work in the aftermath of American idealism and the rise of realist, pragmatist and naturalist alternatives. However, I depart from the existing interpretations both in content and focus. Disagreeing with Moriarty, I maintain that Burtt's Metaphysical Foundations is not an idealist work. Moreover, I provide an alternative to Villemaire's mainly Deweyite/pragmatist reading, emphasizing the import of new realism and naturalism. Burtt's historical thesis should not be viewed as outlining a systematic philosophical position, but rather as a (coherent) culmination of numerous philosophical problematics. To support my conclusion, I provide a substantial summary of Burtt's text alongside a contextual analysis of the philosophical issues that preoccupied his teachers and peers in Columbia's philosophy department. I conclude with a historiographical section, rendering explicit the connections between Burtt's understanding of the scientific revolution, and his distinctive early 20th century American intellectual context.
Collapse
|
30
|
Vecchi D. DNA is not an ontologically distinctive developmental cause. Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 2020; 81:101245. [PMID: 31899119 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2019.101245] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/20/2018] [Revised: 12/14/2019] [Accepted: 12/27/2019] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
In this article I critically evaluate the thesis that DNA is an ontologically distinctive developmental cause. I shall critically analyse different versions of the latter thesis by taking into consideration concrete developmental cases. I shall argue that DNA is neither a developmental determinant nor an ontologically distinctive developmental cause. Instead, I shall argue that mechanistic analysis shows that DNA's causal role in development depends on the higher robustness of the developmental processes in which it exerts its causal capacities. The focus on process and developmental system implies a metaphysical shift: rather than attributing to DNA molecules biochemically unique properties, I suggest that it might be better to think about DNA's causal role in development in terms of the causal capacities that DNA molecules manifest in a rich developmental milieu. I shall also suggest that my position is distinct both from the view advocating the instrumental primacy of DNA-centric biology and developmental constructionism. It is different from the former because it provides a substantial answer to the question of what makes DNA causally central in developmental processes. Finally, I argue that evolutionary considerations pose an important challenge to developmental constructionism.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Davide Vecchi
- Centro de Filosofia das Ciências, Departamento de História e Filosofia das Ciências, Faculdade de Ciências, Universidade de Lisboa, 1749-016, Lisboa, Portugal.
| |
Collapse
|
31
|
Lee C. Metaphysics to the rescue?: Four-dimensionalism and the twinning argument against conceptionism. Bioethics 2020; 34:542-548. [PMID: 32060935 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12712] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/01/2019] [Revised: 10/31/2019] [Accepted: 11/19/2019] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
The view that human beings begin to exist at fertilization (namely conceptionism) faces a serious challenge from the twinning argument, that identical twins coming from the same zygote must be numerically distinct from the zygote and so did not exist at fertilization. Recently, some philosophers have claimed that the twinning argument rests on a particular metaphysical theory of persistence, namely endurantism, on which a human being, for example, is wholly present at every moment of her existence. And we can easily refute the argument, they claim, by employing perdurantism or exdurantism, according to which a human being is a temporally extended entity with temporal parts or a momentarily existing stage who has other momentarily existing stages as counterparts. I argue that such claims are mistaken. The twinning argument does not rest on endurantism and can be formulated in terms of perdurantism to provide a good reason for perdurantists to reject conceptionism. And exdurantism does not have any advantage in defending conceptionism either, for it already concedes more than what the twinning argument aims to show.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Chunghyoung Lee
- Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Pohang University of Science and Technology, Republic of Korea
| |
Collapse
|
32
|
Kingma E, Finn S. Neonatal incubator or artificial womb? Distinguishing ectogestation and ectogenesis using the metaphysics of pregnancy. Bioethics 2020; 34:354-363. [PMID: 32249443 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12717] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/01/2019] [Revised: 10/25/2019] [Accepted: 11/08/2019] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
A 2017 Nature report was widely touted as hailing the arrival of the artificial womb. But the scientists involved claim their technology is merely an improvement in neonatal care. This raises an under-considered question: what differentiates neonatal incubation from artificial womb technology? Considering the nature of gestation-or metaphysics of pregnancy-(a) identifies more profound differences between fetuses and neonates/babies than their location (in or outside the maternal body) alone: fetuses and neonates have different physiological and physical characteristics; (b) characterizes birth as a physiological, mereological and topological transformation as well as a (morally relevant) change of location; and (c) delivers a clear distinction between neonatal incubation and ectogestation: the former supports neonatal physiology; the latter preserves fetal physiology. This allows a detailed conceptual classification of ectogenetive and ectogestative technologies according to which the 2017 system is not just improved neonatal incubation, but genuine ectogestation. But it is not an artificial womb, which is a term that is better put to rest. The analysis reveals that any ethical discussion involving ectogestation must always involve considerations of possible risks to the mother as well as her autonomy and rights. It also adds a third and potentially important dimension to debates in reproductive ethics: the physiological transition from fetus/gestateling to baby/neonate.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Elselijn Kingma
- Faculty of Humanities, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
| | - Suki Finn
- Faculty of Humanities, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
| |
Collapse
|
33
|
Durand G. [Chapter 8.Assessing the Patient’s Autonomy: The Physician in the face of metaphysics.]. J Int Bioethique Ethique Sci 2019; Vol. 30:169-180. [PMID: 31460734 DOI: 10.3917/jibes.302.0169] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022]
Abstract
Faced with complex situations, caregivers test one of the oldest philosophical questions: how to prove the freedom of a decision? In the care, it is a question of determining if the patient has understood the situation, evaluated the consequences of his choice and if his decision is taken in the absence of any constraint. In other words, is the patient’s decision an autonomous decision? But what are the tools that make it possible to evaluate this autonomy precisely and objectively? And also, how to promote a greater autonomy?
Collapse
|
34
|
Saad TC, Rodger D. Can conscientious objection lead to eugenic practices against LGBT individuals? Bioethics 2019; 33:524-528. [PMID: 30735251 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12557] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/02/2018] [Revised: 11/22/2018] [Accepted: 11/27/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Abram Brummett argues that new and future assisted reproductive technologies will provide challenging ethical questions relating to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons. Brummett notes that it is likely that some clinicians may wish to conscientiously object to offering assisted reproductive technologies to LGBT couples on moral or religious grounds, and argues that such appeals to conscience should be constrained. We argue that Brummett's case is unsuccessful because he: does not adequately interact with his opponents' views; equivocates on the meaning of 'natural'; fails to show that the practice he opposes is eugenic in any non-trivial sense; and fails to justify and explicate the relevance of the naturalism he proposes. We do not argue that conscience protections should exist for those objecting to providing LGBT people with artificial reproductive technologies, but only show that Brummett's arguments are insufficient to prove that they should not.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Toni C Saad
- Cardiff and Vale University Health Board, Cardiff, Wales, UK
| | - Daniel Rodger
- Allied Health Sciences, School of Health and Social Care, London South Bank University, London, UK
| |
Collapse
|
35
|
Taylor MD. Reconceiving bioethical proceduralism: an ontological perspective. Cuad Bioet 2019; 30:135-147. [PMID: 31206294 DOI: 10.30444/cb.28] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/24/2018] [Accepted: 02/23/2019] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Belmont Report that formally ushered in an era of principlism and proceduralism in the field of bioethics, an era which shaped the form of bioethical debate according to the combination of Enlightenment-inspired dualism and Liberal pragmatism characteristic of the United States. While ostensibly seeking to protect the vulnerable in a pluralistic society, in reality, recent critiques have argued, the development of bioethics has been directed at legitimizing the bureaucratization of ethics into a self-referential and isolated instrument for socio-political control. As a result, bioethical proceduralism often subverts the very values it is supposed to defend. These critiques, while valuable, do not reach the heart of the problem, which is rooted in the ontological level. The philosophical heritage of modern bioethics -the ontological presuppositions about human nature, freedom and the supposed ″neutrality″ towards any claims about the good, among others- must be rectified so bioethics may better achieve its stated goals and uphold its own principles. While recounting the entire ontological vision that would undergird such a renewal is beyond the scope of this paper, reconceiving the presuppositions behind the notions of freedom, consensus, and autonomy through an understanding of the human being as a person-in-community constitutively related to others opens a path through which principles and procedures can be preserved, not subverted, within bioethics today.
Collapse
|
36
|
Efird D, Holland S. Stages of life: A new metaphysics of conceptionism. Bioethics 2019; 33:529-535. [PMID: 30681177 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12556] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/04/2017] [Revised: 10/26/2018] [Accepted: 11/27/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
When a human being comes into existence is crucial in bioethics. Conceptionism is the view that a human being comes into existence at conception. The twinning argument is an influential objection to this view. All versions of the twinning argument rely on a metaphysics of material objects, namely, endurantism. Given this, a strategy for defending conceptionism against the twinning argument is to deny endurantism and adopt an alternative metaphysics of material objects. A version of this strategy which has been debated in this journal is to adopt perdurantism, or the 'multiple occupancy view', on which monozygotic twins share the zygote region as a temporal part. We present a novel version of this strategy: conceptionists can evade the twinning argument by adopting an exdurantist metaphysics of material objects. We suggest reasons for thinking that this is a plausible and, indeed, preferable way for conceptionists to avoid the twinning argument.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- David Efird
- Department of Philosophy at the University of York, York, UK
| | - Stephen Holland
- Departments of Philosophy and Health Sciences at the University of York, York, UK
| |
Collapse
|
37
|
Ritz HJ. Metaphysical and Cultural Aspects. Dtsch Arztebl Int 2019; 116:97. [PMID: 30892189 PMCID: PMC6435858 DOI: 10.3238/arztebl.2019.0097b] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
|
38
|
Abstract
Douglas Diekema has argued that it is not the best interest standard, but the harm principle that serves as the moral basis for ethicists, clinicians, and the courts to trigger state intervention to limit parental authority in the clinic. Diekema claims the harm principle is especially effective in justifying state intervention in cases of religiously motivated medical neglect in pediatrics involving Jehovah's Witnesses and Christian Scientists. I argue that Diekema has not articulated a harm principle that is capable of justifying state intervention in these cases. Where disagreements over appropriate care are tethered to metaphysical disagreements (as they are for Jehovah's Witnesses and Christian Scientists), it is moral-metaphysical standards, rather than merely moral standards, that are needed to provide substantive guidance. I provide a discussion of Diekema's harm principle to the broader end of highlighting an inconsistency between the theory and practice of secular bioethics when overriding religiously based medical decisions. In a secular state, ethicists, clinicians, and the courts are purportedly neutral with respect to moral-metaphysical positions, especially regarding those claims considered to be religious. However, the practice of overriding religiously based parental requests requires doffing the mantle of neutrality. In the search for a meaningful standard by which to override religiously based parental requests in pediatrics, bioethicists cannot avoid some minimal metaphysical commitments. To resolve this inconsistency, bioethicists must either begin permitting religiously based requests, even at the cost of children's lives, or admit that at least some moral-metaphysical disputes can be rationally adjudicated.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Abram Brummett
- Albert Gnaegi Center for Health Care Ethics, Saint Louis University, Saint Louis, MO, USA.
| |
Collapse
|
39
|
Abstract
This paper examines a specific kind of part-whole relations that exist in the molecular genetic domain. The central question is under which conditions a particular molecule, such as a DNA sequence, is a biological part of the human genome. I address this question by analyzing how biologists in fact partition the human genome into parts. This paper thus presents a case study in the metaphysics of biological practice. I develop a metaphysical account of genomic parthood by analyzing the investigative and reasoning practices in the ENCODE (ENCyclopedia Of DNA Elements) project. My account reveals two conditions that determine whether a molecule is a part of the human genome (i.e., a genomic part). First, genomic parts must possess a causal role function in the genome as a whole, that is, their functions must contribute to the genome directing the overall functioning of the cell. Second, genomic parts must have a specific chemical structure and be actual segments of the DNA sequence of the genome.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Marie I Kaiser
- Bielefeld University, Department of Philosophy, Postfach 10 01 31, D-33501, Bielefeld, Germany.
| |
Collapse
|
40
|
Graham G. How to make a particular case for person-centred patient care: A commentary on Alexandra Parvan. J Eval Clin Pract 2018; 24:1084-1086. [PMID: 29901242 DOI: 10.1111/jep.12962] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/08/2018] [Accepted: 05/11/2018] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
In recent years, a person-centred approach to patient care in cases of mental illness has been promoted as an alternative to a disease orientated approach. Alexandra Parvan's contribution to the person-centred approach serves to motivate an exploration of the approach's most apt metaphysical assumptions. I argue that a metaphysical thesis or assumption about both persons and their uniqueness is an essential element of being person-centred. I apply the assumption to issues such as the disorder/disease distinction and to the continuity of mental health and illness.
Collapse
|
41
|
Hershenov D. Self-ownership, relational dignity, and organ sales. Bioethics 2018; 32:430-436. [PMID: 29920716 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12457] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/19/2017] [Revised: 12/21/2017] [Accepted: 03/26/2018] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
Material property has traditionally been conceived of as separable from its owner and thus alienable in an exchange. So it seems that you could sell your watch or even your kidney because it can be removed from your wrist or abdomen and transferred to another. However, if we are each identical to a living human animal, self-ownership is impossible for self-separation is impossible. We thus cannot sell our parts if we don't own the whole that they compose. It would be incoherent to own all of your body's parts but not the whole body; and it would be arbitrary to own some but not all of your removable parts. These metaphysical obstacles to organ sales do not apply to the selling of the organs of the deceased. The human being goes out of existence at death and is not identical to the body's remains. Any objections to selling the organs of the deceased must instead be due to dignity rather than metaphysical or conceptual considerations. But the remains lack the intrinsic dignity of the human being, instead possessing, at best, relational dignity. Relational dignity would not provide sufficient reason to prohibit life-saving sales.
Collapse
|
42
|
Böhnert M, Hilbert C. "Other minds than ours": a controversial discussion on the limits and possibilities of comparative psychology in the light of C. Lloyd Morgan's work. Hist Philos Life Sci 2018; 40:44. [PMID: 30054748 DOI: 10.1007/s40656-018-0211-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/07/2017] [Accepted: 07/22/2018] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
C. Lloyd Morgan is mostly known for Morgan's canon (An introduction to comparative psychology, Walter Scott, Limited, London, 1894), still a popular and frequently quoted principle in comparative psychology and ethology. There has been a fair amount of debate on the canon's interpretation, function, and value regarding the research on animal minds, usually referring to it as an isolated principle. In this paper we rather shed light on Morgan's overall scientific program and his vision for comparative psychology. We argue that within his program Morgan identified crucial conceptual, ontological, and methodical issues, that are still fundamental to the current research on animal minds. This also highlights a new aspect of his role as one of the "founding fathers" of modern comparative psychology. In order to understand Morgan's program, we briefly outline the historical context in which he began his work on a science of comparative psychology. We will then emphasize to what extent his taxonomy of psychological capacities, the development of his metaphysics for a comparative psychology, and his newly introduced interdisciplinary procedures justify Morgan's distinctive approach to still rather sensitive issues. In doing so, we aim to provide a more comprehensive picture of Morgan's methodological signature and we contend that a proper understanding of his canon can only be gained by taking it as part of this program. We finally understand his most renown considerations as part of his struggle to ascertain the limits and possibilities of the discipline he contributed to set up, and thus emphasize the need to keep the discussion going, notably on the accessibility of other minds than one's own and on the limits of one's research perspectives.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Martin Böhnert
- Department of Philosophy, Universität Kassel, Henschelstr. 2, #2143, 34127, Kassel, Germany.
| | - Christopher Hilbert
- Department of Philosophy, Universität Kassel, Henschelstr. 2, #2117, 34127, Kassel, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
43
|
Abstract
Many practicing biologists accept that nothing in their discipline makes sense except in the light of evolution, and that natural selection is evolution's principal sense-maker. But what natural selection actually is (a force or a statistical outcome, for example) and the levels of the biological hierarchy (genes, organisms, species, or even ecosystems) at which it operates directly are still actively disputed among philosophers and theoretical biologists. Most formulations of evolution by natural selection emphasize the differential reproduction of entities at one or the other of these levels. Some also recognize differential persistence, but in either case the focus is on lineages of material things: even species can be thought of as spatiotemporally restricted, if dispersed, physical beings. Few consider-as "units of selection" in their own right-the processes implemented by genes, cells, species, or communities. "It's the song not the singer" (ITSNTS) theory does that, also claiming that evolution by natural selection of processes is more easily understood and explained as differential persistence than as differential reproduction. ITSNTS was formulated as a response to the observation that the collective functions of microbial communities (the songs) are more stably conserved and ecologically relevant than are the taxa that implement them (the singers). It aims to serve as a useful corrective to claims that "holobionts" (microbes and their animal or plant hosts) are aggregate "units of selection," claims that often conflate meanings of that latter term. But ITSNS also seems broadly applicable, for example, to the evolution of global biogeochemical cycles and the definition of ecosystem function.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- W Ford Doolittle
- Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS B3H 4R2, Canada;
| | - S Andrew Inkpen
- Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS B3H 4R2, Canada
- Department of Philosophy, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS B3H 4R2, Canada
| |
Collapse
|
44
|
Roache R. What sort of person could have a radically extended lifespan? J Med Ethics 2018; 44:217-218. [PMID: 29567749 DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2018-104840] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
|
45
|
Affiliation(s)
- A I Tauber
- Department of Medicine, Boston University School of Medicine, Massachusetts
| | | |
Collapse
|
46
|
Sauchelli A. The future-like-ours argument, animalism, and mereological universalism. Bioethics 2018; 32:199-204. [PMID: 29369389 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12417] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/21/2017] [Revised: 09/01/2017] [Accepted: 10/11/2017] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
Which metaphysical theories are involved-whether presupposed or implied-in Marquis' future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems to have to either (a) abandon diachronic universalism (DU) or (b) acquiesce and declare that contraception is morally wrong. I argue that the premises of Marquis' argument can be reasonably combined with a form of unrestricted composition and that the FLO argument is better viewed as including animalism, i.e., the thesis that we are animals.
Collapse
|
47
|
Burguete Miguel EE. [Critical Review of Gender Ideology in the Light of Metaphysical Realism]. Cuad Bioet 2018; 29:25-37. [PMID: 29406762] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/06/2016] [Accepted: 08/27/2017] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
The implementing of gender ideology in the imaginary of current welfare-state societies owes much to a long process in the history of thought, which has culminated in an accommodation of post-feminist discourse. This paper sets out the epistemological principles that are present in gender ideology, as a response to both its recent and more-remote antecedents. It is furthermore framed by an urge for emancipation that began with medieval scholasticism, the latest manifestation of which lies in the post-structuralist deconstructionism that outlines the concept of queer. This concept has dissociated the categories of sex and gender to the point of making them irrelevant for the determination of sexual identity, leaving the latter susceptible to being infinitely de- and reconstructed. This article also reviews the liberal-hedonistic context of the new postmodern setting, while showing how the concepts of ″a subjective feeling of happiness″ and ″a life fulfilled″ do not express similar content. The paper goes on to challenge the theory of gender from the perspective of metaphysic realism; stressing that the human being only appears as a real person via the possibility of anticipating another's contemplation, thereby cancelling out the abstraction of pure subjectivity. It finally offers its conclusions, with certain substantive recommendations in the field of education.
Collapse
|
48
|
Lehtonen J, Partanen J, Purhonen M, Valkonen-Korhonen M, Kononen M, Saarikoski S, Launiala K. Nascent body ego: Metapsychological and neurophysiological aspects. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis 2017; 87:1335-53. [PMID: 16997729 DOI: 10.1516/f6ch-ulxu-3uba-00vq] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/11/2022]
Abstract
For Freud, body ego was the organizing basis of the structural theory. He defined it as a psychic projection of the body surface. Isakower's and Lewin's classical findings suggest that the body surface experiences of nursing provide the infant with sensory-affective stimulation that initiates a projection of sensory processes towards the psychic realm. During nursing, somato-sensory, gustatory and olfactory modalities merge with a primitive somatic affect of satiation, whereas auditory modality is involved more indirectly and visual contact more gradually. Repeated regularly, such nascent experiences are likely to play a part in the organization of the primitive protosymbolic mental experience. In support of this hypothesis, the authors review findings from a neurophysiological study of infants before, during and after nursing. Nursing is associated with a significant amplitude change in the newborn electroencephalogram (EEG), which wanes before the age of 3 months, and is transformed at the age of 6 months into rhythmic 3-5 Hz hedonic theta-activity. Sucking requires active physiological work, which is shown in a regular rise in heart rate. The hypothesis of a sensory-affective organization of the nascent body ego, enhanced by nursing and active sucking, seems concordant with neurophysiological phenomena related to nursing.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Johannes Lehtonen
- Department of Psychiatry, Kuopio University Hospital, FIN-70211 , Kuopio, Finland.
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Collapse
|
49
|
Malinowska JK, Żuradzki T. The Practical Implications of the New Metaphysics of Race for a Postracial Medicine: Biomedical Research Methodology, Institutional Requirements, Patient-Physician Relations. Am J Bioeth 2017; 17:61-63. [PMID: 28829256 DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2017.1353181] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
|
50
|
Donhauser J. Differentiating and defusing theoretical Ecology's criticisms: A rejoinder to Sagoff's reply to Donhauser (2016). Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 2017; 63:70-79. [PMID: 28377086 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2017.03.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
In a (2016) paper in this journal, I defuse allegations that theoretical ecological research is problematic because it relies on teleological metaphysical assumptions. Mark Sagoff offers a formal reply. In it, he concedes that I succeeded in establishing that ecologists abandoned robust teleological views long ago and that they use teleological characterizations as metaphors that aid in developing mechanistic explanations of ecological phenomena. Yet, he contends that I did not give enduring criticisms of theoretical ecology a fair shake in my paper. He says this is because enduring criticisms center on concerns about the nature of ecological networks and forces, the instrumentality of ecological laws and theoretical models, and the relation between theoretical and empirical methods in ecology that that paper does not broach. Below I set apart the distinct criticisms Sagoff presents in his commentary and respond to each in turn.
Collapse
|