Affective behavior modification: a case for empirical investigation

The Relationship between Affect, Behaviour, and Cognition in Behavioural and Cognitive Treatments of Depression and Phobic Anxiety

Cognitive theories and therapies of emotional dysfunctions are based on the premise that the affective, behavioural, and cognitive response repertoires are fused and highly interdependent. Such views have been criticised with the argument that affect and cognition are relatively independent and that there is a much more direct and stronger link between affect and behaviour. In an attempt to clarify potential differences in the interplay between affect, behaviour, and cognition in unipolar depression and phobic anxiety, a quantitative review of the relative efficacy of performance-based (behavioural) versus cognitive intervention for these disorders was conducted. The relative superiority of cognitive over performance-based interventions in the treatment of unipolar depression supports the notion of a reasonably direct link between cognition and affect for this disorder providing a fairly effective pathway for treatment. On the other hand, the relative success of performance-based techniques in the treatment of phobias suggests that for these disorders the link between behaviour and affect is more direct and much stronger than the link between cognition and affect. It is concluded that the relative effectiveness of cognitive and performance-based intervention techniques depends on and points to differences in the specific type of affect-behaviour-cognition interface that underlies and is controlling depression and phobic anxiety.

Behavioural Marital Therapy: An Overview

Behavioural marital therapy (BMT) has developed from the application of social exchange and social learning theories to the understanding and modification of marital interaction. Encouraging high rates of exchange of positive behaviours, and training in communication skills, have been the major focuses of BMT till recently. While these strategies produce therapeutic change, there are still many couples whose marriages do not improve with this sort of therapy. Recent developments have focused on the role of cognitive, affective and situational variables in marital interaction. Outcome research has shown the value of cognitive and affective interventions in their own right, but it is unclear if the addition of these interventions will enhance the efficacy of BMT.

Comparing the incommensurable: where science and politics collide

Arguments about the possibility that cognitive variables may play a causal role in human behavior are unlikely to be resolved in favor of one side or the other, because they set against each other two incommensurable views of human agency. Contemporary cognitive models of psychology are based on an implicitly dualist view of human behavior, assuming the existence of a nonmaterial mental realm which has the capacity to act on the material world. Critics, by comparison, frequently argue from an epiphenomenalist position. While there may be sound scientific reasons for rejecting self-efficacy theory, and particularly for rejecting the utility of the concept that behavior is caused by efficacy expectations, this paper argues that epistemic criteria are frequently less important than a sense that a theory is compatible with a particular world view. I argue that cognitive theories are accepted by the psychological mainstream because their dualist basis accords with deeply held cultureal beliefs about the relationship between the person and the world. However, the social and political consequences of such models are rarely articulated, and there is a need for psychologists to develop a more explicit understanding of the relationship between psychological theories and their broader implications.

On cognitive theories and causation in human behavior

Modern theories of social behavior are based on the largely unquestioned assumption that human activity is determined by cognitive variables. Physiology, environment, and behavior are seen as peripheral to the understanding of cognition, seen as central to the understanding of human nature. This paper argues that these approaches to psychology are essentially metaphorical models of behavior, inadequate as explanatory theories, because they rely on untestable assumptions concerning the centrality to human behavior of hypothetical and unmeasurable cognitive variables. Their lack of precision does not allow for the testing of specific predictions. This paper argues that contemporary cognitive-behavioral and cognitive-social theories cannot be salvaged as explanatory models.

Theoretical weaknesses lead to practical problems: the example of self-efficacy theory

Bandura's self-efficacy concept has received widespread acceptance from psychologists dealing with a varied range of behaviors. This paper argues that, like many related models, its ability to explain human behavior is largely illusory. It has its basis in the argument that behavior arises from complex interactions between unobservable variables which are vaguely defined and cannot be assessed. For example, the process by which efficacy expectations arise from various sources of information, and the interaction of self-efficacy with levels of skill and motivation, are argued to be important, but there is no model to explain how these processes occur. Since unambiguous predictions cannot be made, it is impossible to test the model in a scientific sense. This weakness seriously compromises the practical usefulness of the theory.