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Berent I. Consciousness isn't "hard"-it's human psychology that makes it so! Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae016. [PMID: 38585293 PMCID: PMC10996123 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/04/2023] [Revised: 01/23/2024] [Accepted: 03/26/2024] [Indexed: 04/09/2024] Open
Abstract
Consciousness arguably presents a "hard problem" for scholars. An influential position asserts that the "problem" is rooted in ontology-it arises because consciousness "is" distinct from the physical. "Problem intuitions" are routinely taken as evidence for this view. In so doing, it is assumed that (i) people do not consider consciousness as physical and (ii) their intuitions faithfully reflect what exists (or else, intuitions would not constitute evidence). New experimental results challenge both claims. First, in some scenarios, people demonstrably view consciousness as a physical affair that registers in the body (brain). Second, "problem intuitions" are linked to psychological biases, so they cannot be trusted to reflect what consciousness is. I conclude that the roots of the "hard problem" are partly psychological. Accordingly, its resolution requires careful characterization of the psychological mechanisms that engender "problem intuitions."
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Affiliation(s)
- Iris Berent
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, 360 Huntington Ave., Boston, MA 02115, USA
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Berent I. The "Hard Problem of Consciousness" Arises from Human Psychology. Open Mind (Camb) 2023; 7:564-587. [PMID: 37637301 PMCID: PMC10449398 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00094] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/23/2023] [Accepted: 07/06/2023] [Indexed: 08/29/2023] Open
Abstract
Consciousness presents a "hard problem" to scholars. At stake is how the physical body gives rise to subjective experience. Why consciousness is "hard", however, is uncertain. One possibility is that the challenge arises from ontology-because consciousness is a special property/substance that is irreducible to the physical. Here, I show how the "hard problem" emerges from two intuitive biases that lie deep within human psychology: Essentialism and Dualism. To determine whether a subjective experience is transformative, people judge whether the experience pertains to one's essence, and per Essentialism, one's essence lies within one's body. Psychological states that seem embodied (e.g., "color vision" ∼ eyes) can thus give rise to transformative experience. Per intuitive Dualism, however, the mind is distinct from the body, and epistemic states (knowledge and beliefs) seem particularly ethereal. It follows that conscious perception (e.g., "seeing color") ought to seem more transformative than conscious knowledge (e.g., knowledge of how color vision works). Critically, the transformation arises precisely because the conscious perceptual experience seems readily embodied (rather than distinct from the physical body, as the ontological account suggests). In line with this proposal, five experiments show that, in laypeople's view (a) experience is transformative only when it seems anchored in the human body; (b) gaining a transformative experience effects a bodily change; and (c) the magnitude of the transformation correlates with both (i) the perceived embodiment of that experience, and (ii) with Dualist intuitions, generally. These results cannot solve the ontological question of whether consciousness is distinct from the physical. But they do suggest that the roots of the "hard problem" are partly psychological.
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Berent I. The illusion of the mind-body divide is attenuated in males. Sci Rep 2023; 13:6653. [PMID: 37095109 PMCID: PMC10126148 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-33079-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/23/2022] [Accepted: 04/06/2023] [Indexed: 04/26/2023] Open
Abstract
A large literature suggests that people are intuitive Dualists-they tend to perceive the mind as ethereal, distinct from the body. Here, we ask whether Dualism emanates from within the human psyche, guided, in part, by theory of mind (ToM). Past research has shown that males are poorer mind-readers than females. If ToM begets Dualism, then males should exhibit weaker Dualism, and instead, lean towards Physicalism (i.e., they should view bodies and minds alike). Experiments 1-2 show that males indeed perceive the psyche as more embodied-as more likely to emerge in a replica of one's body, and less likely to persist in its absence (after life). Experiment 3 further shows that males are less inclined towards Empiricism-a putative byproduct of Dualism. A final analysis confirms that males' ToM scores are lower, and ToM scores further correlate with embodiment intuitions (in Experiments 1-2). These observations (from Western participants) cannot establish universality, but the association of Dualism with ToM suggests its roots are psychological. Thus, the illusory mind-body divide may arise from the very workings of the human mind.
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Affiliation(s)
- Iris Berent
- Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, 125 Nightingale Hall, 360 Huntington Ave., Boston, MA, 02115, USA.
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Pitt B, Gibson E, Piantadosi ST. Exact Number Concepts Are Limited to the Verbal Count Range. Psychol Sci 2022; 33:371-381. [PMID: 35132893 PMCID: PMC9096449 DOI: 10.1177/09567976211034502] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/16/2021] [Accepted: 06/25/2021] [Indexed: 01/29/2023] Open
Abstract
Previous findings suggest that mentally representing exact numbers larger than four depends on a verbal count routine (e.g., "one, two, three . . ."). However, these findings are controversial because they rely on comparisons across radically different languages and cultures. We tested the role of language in number concepts within a single population-the Tsimane' of Bolivia-in which knowledge of number words varies across individual adults. We used a novel data-analysis model to quantify the point at which participants (N = 30) switched from exact to approximate number representations during a simple numerical matching task. The results show that these behavioral switch points were bounded by participants' verbal count ranges; their representations of exact cardinalities were limited to the number words they knew. Beyond that range, they resorted to numerical approximation. These results resolve competing accounts of previous findings and provide unambiguous evidence that large exact number concepts are enabled by language.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Pitt
- Department of Psychology, University of
California, Berkeley
| | - Edward Gibson
- Department of Brain and Cognitive
Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Himberg T, Laroche J, Bigé R, Buchkowski M, Bachrach A. Coordinated Interpersonal Behaviour in Collective Dance Improvisation: The Aesthetics of Kinaesthetic Togetherness. Behav Sci (Basel) 2018; 8:bs8020023. [PMID: 29425178 PMCID: PMC5836006 DOI: 10.3390/bs8020023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/01/2017] [Revised: 02/02/2018] [Accepted: 02/05/2018] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Collective dance improvisation (e.g., traditional and social dancing, contact improvisation) is a participatory, relational and embodied art form which eschews standard concepts in aesthetics. We present our ongoing research into the mechanisms underlying the lived experience of “togetherness” associated with such practices. Togetherness in collective dance improvisation is kinaesthetic (based on movement and its perception), and so can be simultaneously addressed from the perspective of the performers and the spectators, and be measured. We utilise these multiple levels of description: the first-person, phenomenological level of personal experiences, the third-person description of brain and body activity, and the level of interpersonal dynamics. Here, we describe two of our protocols: a four-person mirror game and a ‘rhythm battle’ dance improvisation score. Using an interpersonal closeness measure after the practice, we correlate subjective sense of individual/group connectedness and observed levels of in-group temporal synchronization. We propose that kinaesthetic togetherness, or interpersonal resonance, is integral to the aesthetic pleasure of the participants and spectators, and that embodied feeling of togetherness might play a role more generally in aesthetic experience in the performing arts.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tommi Himberg
- Department of Neuroscience and Biomedical Engineering, Aalto University, 02150 Espoo, Finland.
- ICI-Project, Labex Arts H2H, Université Paris 8, 93526 Saint-Denis, France.
| | - Julien Laroche
- ICI-Project, Labex Arts H2H, Université Paris 8, 93526 Saint-Denis, France.
- Akoustic Arts, 157 Boulevard MacDonald, 75019 Paris, France.
| | - Romain Bigé
- ICI-Project, Labex Arts H2H, Université Paris 8, 93526 Saint-Denis, France.
- EA 7410 SACRe, Université Paris Sciences et Lettres/École normale supérieure, 75230 Paris, France.
| | - Megan Buchkowski
- Department of Neuroscience and Biomedical Engineering, Aalto University, 02150 Espoo, Finland.
- ICI-Project, Labex Arts H2H, Université Paris 8, 93526 Saint-Denis, France.
- Department of Music, Mind and Technology, University of Jyväskylä, 40014 Jyväskylän yliopisto, Finland.
| | - Asaf Bachrach
- ICI-Project, Labex Arts H2H, Université Paris 8, 93526 Saint-Denis, France.
- UMR 7023 CNRS/Université Paris 8, 75017 Paris, France.
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The Role of Language in Structure-Dependent Cognition. INNOVATIONS IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 2017. [DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4939-7325-5_5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/13/2022]
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Macswan J, Rolstad K. Modularity and the Facilitation Effect: Psychological Mechanisms of Transfer in Bilingual Students. HISPANIC JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 2016. [DOI: 10.1177/0739986305275173] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
This article draws upon recent work in the cognitive neurosciences to suggest that the facilitation effect follows naturally within current psychological theory. A view of the mind as consisting of discrete mental modules, called psychological modularity, is defended with case study evidence of double dissociation. It is argued that transfer of academic subject knowledge occurs in bilingual settings as an epiphenomenon of mental architecture: Because content knowledge is independent of linguistic knowledge, it is accessible to any language or languages a person happens to know. As such, transfer should be seen as a metaphor for a process; it is simply a natural consequence of our mental architecture. Cummins’s developmental interdependence hypothesis, threshold hypothesis, and common underlying proficiency model are discussed. It is concluded that the facilitation effect is derived by the modularity thesis within a framework in which language is viewed as a cognitive domain separate from literacy and school subject matter knowledge.
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Low J, Goddard E, Melser J. Generativity and imagination in autism spectrum disorder: Evidence from individual differences in children's impossible entity drawings. BRITISH JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2010; 27:425-44. [PMID: 19998539 DOI: 10.1348/026151008x334728] [Citation(s) in RCA: 40] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Jason Low
- School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington 6140, New Zealand.
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Wolff P, Holmes KJ. Linguistic relativity. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2010; 2:253-265. [DOI: 10.1002/wcs.104] [Citation(s) in RCA: 102] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Phillip Wolff
- Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Kevin J. Holmes
- Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
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Indistinguishable from Magic: Computation is Cognitive Technology. Minds Mach (Dordr) 2010. [DOI: 10.1007/s11023-010-9185-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
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11
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Representational change, generality versus specificity, and nature versus nurture: Perennial issues in cognitive research. Behav Brain Sci 2010. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00036815] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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Arguments against linguistic “modularization”. Behav Brain Sci 2010. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00036724] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
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Beyond connectionist versus classical Al: A control theoretic perspective on development and cognitive science. Behav Brain Sci 2010. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00036761] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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19
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Developmental psychology for the twenty-first century. Behav Brain Sci 2010. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00036712] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Representational redescription, memory, and connectionism. Behav Brain Sci 2010. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00036773] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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Abstract
AbstractBeyond modularityattempts a synthesis of Fodor's anticonstructivist nativism and Piaget's antinativist constructivism. Contra Fodor, I argue that: (1) the study of cognitive development is essential to cognitive science, (2) the module/central processing dichotomy is too rigid, and (3) the mind does not begin with prespecified modules; rather, development involves a gradual process of “modularization.” Contra Piaget, I argue that: (1) development rarely involves stagelike domain-general change and (2) domainspecific predispositions give development a small but significant kickstart by focusing the infant's attention on proprietary inputs. Development does not stop at efficient learning. A fundamental aspect of human development (“representational redescription”) is the hypothesized process by which information that isina cognitive system becomes progressively explicit knowledgetothat system. Development thus involves two complementary processes of progressive modularization and progressive “explicitation.” Empirical findings on the child as linguist, physicist, mathematician, psychologist, and notator are discussed in support of the theoretical framework. Each chapter concentrates first on the initial state of the infant mind/brain and on subsequent domain-specific learning in infancy and early childhood. It then goes on to explore data on older children's problem solving and theory building, with particular focus on evolving cognitive flexibility. Emphasis is placed throughout on the status of representations underlying different capacities and on the multiple levels at which knowledge is stored and accessible. Finally, consideration is given to the need for more formal developmental models, and a comparison is made between representational redescription and connectionist simulations of development. In conclusion, I consider what is special about human cognition by speculating on the status of representations underlying the structure of behavior in other species.
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Modal knowledge and transmodularity. Behav Brain Sci 2010. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00036876] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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Rosselli M, Ardila A, Matute E, Inozemtseva O. Gender Differences and Cognitive Correlates of Mathematical Skills in School-Aged Children. Child Neuropsychol 2009; 15:216-31. [DOI: 10.1080/09297040802195205] [Citation(s) in RCA: 34] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
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Abstract
Many experiments with infants suggest that they possess quantitative abilities, and many experimentalists believe that these abilities set the stage for later mathematics: natural numbers and arithmetic. However, the connection between these early and later skills is far from obvious. We evaluate two possible routes to mathematics and argue that neither is sufficient: (1) We first sketch what we think is the most likely model for infant abilities in this domain, and we examine proposals for extrapolating the natural number concept from these beginnings. Proposals for arriving at natural number by (empirical) induction presuppose the mathematical concepts they seek to explain. Moreover, standard experimental tests for children's understanding of number terms do not necessarily tap these concepts. (2) True concepts of number do appear, however, when children are able to understand generalizations over all numbers; for example, the principle of additive commutativity (a+b=b+a). Theories of how children learn such principles usually rely on a process of mapping from physical object groupings. But both experimental results and theoretical considerations imply that direct mapping is insufficient for acquiring these principles. We suggest instead that children may arrive at natural numbers and arithmetic in a more top-down way, by constructing mathematical schemas.
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Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. Behav Brain Sci 2008; 31:109-30; discussion 130-178. [PMID: 18479531 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x08003543] [Citation(s) in RCA: 416] [Impact Index Per Article: 26.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
AbstractOver the last quarter century, the dominant tendency in comparative cognitive psychology has been to emphasize the similarities between human and nonhuman minds and to downplay the differences as “one of degree and not of kind” (Darwin 1871). In the present target article, we argue that Darwin was mistaken: the profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman animals masks an equally profound discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. To wit, there is a significant discontinuity in the degree to which human and nonhuman animals are able to approximate the higher-order, systematic, relational capabilities of a physical symbol system (PSS) (Newell 1980). We show that this symbolic-relational discontinuity pervades nearly every domain of cognition and runs much deeper than even the spectacular scaffolding provided by language or culture alone can explain. We propose a representational-level specification as to where human and nonhuman animals' abilities to approximate a PSS are similar and where they differ. We conclude by suggesting that recent symbolic-connectionist models of cognition shed new light on the mechanisms that underlie the gap between human and nonhuman minds.
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Rips LJ, Asmuth J, Bloomfield A. Giving the boot to the bootstrap: how not to learn the natural numbers. Cognition 2006; 101:B51-60. [PMID: 16412414 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2005.12.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 55] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2005] [Accepted: 12/01/2005] [Indexed: 01/29/2023]
Abstract
According to one theory about how children learn the concept of natural numbers, they first determine that "one", "two", and "three" denote the size of sets containing the relevant number of items. They then make the following inductive inference (the Bootstrap): The next number word in the counting series denotes the size of the sets you get by adding one more object to the sets denoted by the previous number word. For example, if "three" refers to the size of sets containing three items, then "four" (the next word after "three") must refer to the size of sets containing three plus one items. We argue, however, that the Bootstrap cannot pick out the natural number sequence from other nonequivalent sequences and thus cannot convey to children the concept of the natural numbers. This is not just a result of the usual difficulties with induction but is specific to the Bootstrap. In order to work properly, the Bootstrap must somehow restrict the concept of "next number" in a way that conforms to the structure of the natural numbers. But with these restrictions, the Bootstrap is unnecessary.
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Abstract
Does the ability to develop numerical concepts depend on our ability to use language? We consider the role of the vocabulary of counting words in developing numerical concepts. We challenge the 'bootstrapping' theory which claims that children move from using something like an object-file - an attentional process for responding to small numerosities - to a truly arithmetic one as a result of their learning the counting words. We also question the interpretation of recent findings from Amazonian cultures that have very restricted number vocabularies. Our review of data and theory, along with neuroscientific evidence, imply that numerical concepts have an ontogenetic origin and a neural basis that are independent of language.
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Pinker S, Jackendoff R. The faculty of language: what's special about it? Cognition 2005; 95:201-36. [PMID: 15694646 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2004.08.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 315] [Impact Index Per Article: 16.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/16/2004] [Accepted: 08/31/2004] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
We examine the question of which aspects of language are uniquely human and uniquely linguistic in light of recent suggestions by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch that the only such aspect is syntactic recursion, the rest of language being either specific to humans but not to language (e.g. words and concepts) or not specific to humans (e.g. speech perception). We find the hypothesis problematic. It ignores the many aspects of grammar that are not recursive, such as phonology, morphology, case, agreement, and many properties of words. It is inconsistent with the anatomy and neural control of the human vocal tract. And it is weakened by experiments suggesting that speech perception cannot be reduced to primate audition, that word learning cannot be reduced to fact learning, and that at least one gene involved in speech and language was evolutionarily selected in the human lineage but is not specific to recursion. The recursion-only claim, we suggest, is motivated by Chomsky's recent approach to syntax, the Minimalist Program, which de-emphasizes the same aspects of language. The approach, however, is sufficiently problematic that it cannot be used to support claims about evolution. We contest related arguments that language is not an adaptation, namely that it is "perfect," non-redundant, unusable in any partial form, and badly designed for communication. The hypothesis that language is a complex adaptation for communication which evolved piecemeal avoids all these problems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Steven Pinker
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, William James Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
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Abstract
BACKGROUND Arithmetical skills are essential to the effective exercise of citizenship in a numerate society. How these skills are acquired, or fail to be acquired, is of great importance not only to individual children but to the organisation of formal education and its role in society. METHOD The evidence on the normal and abnormal developmental progression of arithmetical abilities is reviewed; in particular, evidence for arithmetical ability arising from innate specific cognitive skills (innate numerosity) vs. general cognitive abilities (the Piagetian view) is compared. RESULTS These include evidence from infancy research, neuropsychological studies of developmental dyscalculia, neuroimaging and genetics. The development of arithmetical abilities can be described in terms of the idea of numerosity -- the number of objects in a set. Early arithmetic is usually thought of as the effects on numerosity of operations on sets such as set union. The child's concept of numerosity appears to be innate, as infants, even in the first week of life, seem to discriminate visual arrays on the basis of numerosity. Development can be seen in terms of an increasingly sophisticated understanding of numerosity and its implications, and in increasing skill in manipulating numerosities. The impairment in the capacity to learn arithmetic -- dyscalculia -- can be interpreted in many cases as a deficit in the concept in the child's concept of numerosity. The neuroanatomical bases of arithmetical development and other outstanding issues are discussed. CONCLUSIONS The evidence broadly supports the idea of an innate specific capacity for acquiring arithmetical skills, but the effects of the content of learning, and the timing of learning in the course of development, requires further investigation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brian Butterworth
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College, London, UK.
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Arvedson PJ. Young children with specific language impairment and their numerical cognition. JOURNAL OF SPEECH, LANGUAGE, AND HEARING RESEARCH : JSLHR 2002; 45:970-982. [PMID: 12381054 DOI: 10.1044/1092-4388(2002/079)] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/23/2023]
Abstract
This study examined the enumeration and numerical reasoning levels of children with specific language impairment (SLI) compared to those of two groups of typically developing children: children matched for age (AM) and children matched for grammatical ability (GM). The children completed four numerical tasks: reproduction of sets, numerosity of sets, an addition/subtraction condition of the numerosity of sets, and transformation effects (conservation of number). Between-group analyses indicate that the children in the SLI group performed better than the children in the GM group for all set sizes of all tasks with one exception (set size 7 of the odd/subtract task) and performed more poorly than the children in the AM group for 7 of the 16 trials. There was a strong correlation of count range with the reproduction of sets task for the children with SLI, but not for the children in the other two groups. The AM group consistently used verbal counting to facilitate numerical problem solving. Conversely prompting the children with SU to use verbal counting while completing any of the numerical tasks resulted in a 50% decline in accuracy. Children need opportunities to strengthen numerical constructs, such as those enhanced through verbal counting. However, children with SLI also need opportunities to fortify their nonverbal enumeration and numerical reasoning without requiring the use of their deficit area.
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Affiliation(s)
- Paula J Arvedson
- California State University at Los Angeles, Charter College of Education, 90032-8142, USA.
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41
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Abstract
Three experiments investigated the role of a specific language in human representations of number. Russian-English bilingual college students were taught new numerical operations (Experiment 1), new arithmetic equations (Experiments 1 and 2), or new geographical or historical facts involving numerical or non-numerical information (Experiment 3). After learning a set of items in each of their two languages, subjects were tested for knowledge of those items, and new items, in both languages. In all the studies, subjects retrieved information about exact numbers more effectively in the language of training, and they solved trained problems more effectively than untrained problems. In contrast, subjects retrieved information about approximate numbers and non-numerical facts with equal efficiency in their two languages, and their training on approximate number facts generalized to new facts of the same type. These findings suggest that a specific, natural language contributes to the representation of large, exact numbers but not to the approximate number representations that humans share with other mammals. Language appears to play a role in learning about exact numbers in a variety of contexts, a finding with implications for practice in bilingual education. The findings prompt more general speculations about the role of language in the development of specifically human cognitive abilities.
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Affiliation(s)
- E S Spelke
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, MIT, NE20-456, 3 Cambridge Center, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
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Abstract
Many philosophers and psychologists believe that only people with rich language skills are capable of abstract reasoning. A man with a severe linguistic impairment poses a striking challenge to this view.
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Affiliation(s)
- P Bloom
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, P.O.Box 208205, New Haven, CT 06520-8205, USA.
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43
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Abstract
Cognitive scientists argue that in the absence of language, non-human animal conceptual representations are either impoverished or completely absent. One might make comparable claims about human infants, who enter the world with different conceptual representations from adults. Nonetheless, we often treat human infants like miniature adults. This is a mistake. I argue that research on human cognition, and in particular its domain specific knowledge systems, can only succeed if it adopts a comparative perspective. To carry out this agenda, however, we require methods that can be used across species. Focusing on how numerical abilities evolved, I describe experiments on two non-human primates, representing different phylogenetic branches. Our experimental procedure--the preferential looking time technique--was designed to assess what prelinguistic human infants know about the physical and psychological world, but it is ideal for non-human animals, especially when one wishes to explore spontaneous cognitive capacities in the absence of training. Results reveal that up to a certain age, human infants and non-human primates are indistinguishable in terms of numerical competence. We must now focus on how language, together with other cognitive facilities, bring the human child to a level of numerical sophistication that exceeds non-human animals, and why non-human animal capacities stop where they do.
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Affiliation(s)
- M D Hauser
- Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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Redescribing development. Behav Brain Sci 1994. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00036852] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
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45
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A Fodorian guide to Switzerland: Jung and Piaget combined? Behav Brain Sci 1994. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00036657] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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46
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47
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Genes, development, and the “innate” structure of the mind. Behav Brain Sci 1994. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00036785] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
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48
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The power of explicit knowing. Behav Brain Sci 1994. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00036797] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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49
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Beyond methodological solipsism? Behav Brain Sci 1994. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00036803] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
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50
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Dissociation, self-attribution, and redescription. Behav Brain Sci 1994. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x0003675x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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