Preserved color imagery in an achromatopsic

Visual mental imagery: Evidence for a heterarchical neural architecture

Theories of Visual Mental Imagery (VMI) emphasize the processes of retrieval, modification, and recombination of sensory information from long-term memory. Yet, only few studies have focused on the behavioral mechanisms and neural correlates supporting VMI of stimuli from different semantic domains. Therefore, we currently have a limited understanding of how the brain generates and maintains mental representations of colors, faces, shapes - to name a few. Such an undetermined scenario renders unclear the organizational structure of neural circuits supporting VMI, including the role of the early visual cortex. We aimed to fill this gap by reviewing the scientific literature of five semantic domains: visuospatial, face, colors, shapes, and letters imagery. Linking theory to evidence from over 60 different experimental designs, this review highlights three main points. First, there is no consistent activity in the early visual cortex across all VMI domains, contrary to the prediction of the dominant model. Second, there is consistent activity of the frontoparietal networks and the left hemisphere's fusiform gyrus during voluntary VMI irrespective of the semantic domain investigated. We propose that these structures are part of a domain-general VMI sub-network. Third, domain-specific information engages specific regions of the ventral and dorsal cortical visual pathways. These regions partly overlap with those found in visual perception studies (e.g., fusiform face area for faces imagery; lingual gyrus for color imagery). Altogether, the reviewed evidence suggests the existence of domain-general and domain-specific mechanisms of VMI selectively engaged by stimulus-specific properties (e.g., colors or faces). These mechanisms would be supported by an organizational structure mixing vertical and horizontal connections (heterarchy) between sub-networks for specific stimulus domains. Such a heterarchical organization of VMI makes different predictions from current models of VMI as reversed perception. Our conclusions set the stage for future research, which should aim to characterize the spatiotemporal dynamics and interactions among key regions of this architecture giving rise to visual mental images.

Color Vision Deficits

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

Color provides important information about the identity of the objects we encounter. After early processing stages in the retinal cones, thalamus, and occipital cortex, retinal signals reach the ventral temporal cortex for high-level color and object processing, which links color perception with top-down expectations and knowledge. In the language-dominant hemisphere, some of these regions communicate with the language systems; by assigning verbal labels to percepts, these circuits speed up stimulus categorization, and permit fast and accurate inter-individual communication. This paper provides a review of color processing deficits, from dysfunction of wavelength discrimination in the retinal photoreceptors to deficits of high-level processing in the ventral temporal cortex.

RECENT FINDINGS

Neuroimaging evidence defined the existence and localization of color-preferring domains in the ventral occipito-temporal cortex. Evidence from the performance of a brain-damaged patient with color anomia but preserved color categorization demonstrated the independence of color categorization from color naming in the adult brain. Evidence from patients with brain damage suggests that high-level color processing may be divided into at least three functional domains: perceptual color experience, color naming, and color knowledge.

Normal colour perception in developmental prosopagnosia

Developmental prosopagnosia (DP) is a selective neurodevelopmental condition defined by lifelong impairments in face recognition. Despite much research, the extent to which DP is associated with broader visual deficits beyond face processing is unclear. Here we investigate whether DP is accompanied by deficits in colour perception. We tested a large sample of 92 DP individuals and 92 sex/age-matched controls using the well-validated Ishihara and Farnsworth–Munsell 100-Hue tests to assess red–green colour deficiencies and hue discrimination abilities. Group-level analyses show comparable performance between DP and control individuals across both tests, and single-case analyses indicate that the prevalence of colour deficits is low and comparable to that in the general population. Our study clarifies that DP is not linked to colour perception deficits and constrains theories of DP that seek to account for a larger range of visual deficits beyond face recognition.

Towards Strong Inference in Research on Embodiment - Possibilities and Limitations of Causal Paradigms

A central question in the cognitive sciences is which role embodiment plays for high-level cognitive functions, such as conceptual processing. Here, we propose that one reason why progress regarding this question has been slow is a lacking focus on what Platt (1964) called “strong inference”. Strong inference is possible when results from an experimental paradigm are not merely consistent with a hypothesis, but they provide decisive evidence for one particular hypothesis compared to competing hypotheses. We discuss how causal paradigms, which test the functional relevance of sensory-motor processes for high-level cognitive functions, can move the field forward. In particular, we explore how congenital sensory-motor disorders, acquired sensory-motor deficits, and interference paradigms with healthy participants can be utilized as an opportunity to better understand the role of sensory experience in conceptual processing. Whereas all three approaches can bring about valuable insights, we highlight that the study of congenitally and acquired sensorimotor disorders is particularly effective in the case of conceptual domains with strong unimodal basis (e.g., colors), whereas interference paradigms with healthy participants have a broader application, avoid many of the practical and interpretational limitations of patient studies, and allow a systematic and step-wise progressive inference approach to causal mechanisms.

Aphantasia: The science of visual imagery extremes

Visual imagery allows us to revisit the appearance of things in their absence and to test out virtual combinations of sensory experience. Visual imagery has been linked to many cognitive processes, such as autobiographical and visual working memory. Imagery also plays symptomatic and mechanistic roles in neurologic and mental disorders and is utilized in treatment. A large network of brain activity spanning frontal, parietal, temporal, and visual cortex is involved in generating and maintain images in mind. The ability to visualize has extreme variations, ranging from completely absent (aphantasia) to photo-like (hyperphantasia). The anatomy and functionality of visual cortex, including primary visual cortex, have been associated with individual differences in visual imagery ability, pointing to a potential correlate for both aphantasia and hyperphantasia. Preliminary evidence suggests that lifelong aphantasia is associated with prosopagnosia and reduction in autobiographical memory; hyperphantasia is associated with synesthesia. Aphantasic individuals can also be highly imaginative and are able to complete many tasks that were previously thought to rely on visual imagery, demonstrating that visualization is only one of many ways of representing things in their absence. The study of extreme imagination reminds us how easily invisible differences can escape detection.

Color vision

Color is a fundamental aspect of normal visual experience. This chapter provides an overview of the role of color in human behavior, a survey of current knowledge regarding the genetic, retinal, and neural mechanisms that enable color vision, and a review of inherited and acquired defects of color vision including a discussion of diagnostic tests.

Visual mental imagery influences attentional guidance in a visual-search task

Visual mental imagery resembles visual working memory (VWM). Because both visual mental imagery and VWM involve the representation and manipulation of visual information, it was hypothesized that they would exert similar effects on visual attention. Several previous studies have demonstrated that working-memory representations guide attention toward a memory-matching task-irrelevant stimulus during visual-search tasks. Therefore, mental imagery may also guide attention toward imagery-matching stimuli. In the present study, five experiments were conducted to investigate the effects of visual mental imagery on visual attention during a visual-search task. Participants were instructed to visualize a color or an object clearly associated with a specific color, after which they were asked to detect a colored target in the visual-search task. Reaction times for target detection were shorter when the color of the target matched the imagined color, and when the color of the target was similar to that strongly associated with the imagined object, than when the color of the target did not match that of the mental representation. This effect was not observed when participants were not instructed to imagine a color. These results suggest that similar to VWM, visual mental imagery guides attention toward imagery-matching stimuli.

Controlled semantic cognition relies upon dynamic and flexible interactions between the executive 'semantic control' and hub-and-spoke 'semantic representation' systems

Built upon a wealth of neuroimaging, neurostimulation, and neuropsychology data, a recent proposal set forth a framework termed controlled semantic cognition (CSC) to account for how the brain underpins the ability to flexibly use semantic knowledge (Lambon Ralph et al., 2017; Nature Reviews Neuroscience). In CSC, the ‘semantic control’ system, underpinned predominantly by the prefrontal cortex, dynamically monitors and modulates the ‘semantic representation’ system that consists of a ‘hub’ (anterior temporal lobe, ATL) and multiple ‘spokes’ (modality-specific areas). CSC predicts that unfamiliar and exacting semantic tasks should intensify communication between the ‘control’ and ‘representation’ systems, relative to familiar and less taxing tasks. In the present study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to test this hypothesis. Participants paired unrelated concepts by canonical colours (a less accustomed task – e.g., pairing ketchup with fire-extinguishers due to both being red) or paired well-related concepts by semantic relationship (a typical task – e.g., ketchup is related to mustard). We found the ‘control’ system was more engaged by atypical than typical pairing. While both tasks activated the ATL ‘hub’, colour pairing additionally involved occipitotemporal ‘spoke’ regions abutting areas of hue perception. Furthermore, we uncovered a gradient along the ventral temporal cortex, transitioning from the caudal ‘spoke’ zones preferring canonical colour processing to the rostral ‘hub’ zones preferring semantic relationship. Functional connectivity also differed between the tasks: Compared with semantic pairing, colour pairing relied more upon the inferior frontal gyrus, a key node of the control system, driving enhanced connectivity with occipitotemporal ‘spoke’. Together, our findings characterise the interaction within the neural architecture of semantic cognition – the control system dynamically heightens its connectivity with relevant components of the representation system, in response to different semantic contents and difficulty levels.

Unconscious Imagination and the Mental Imagery Debate

Traditionally, philosophers have appealed to the phenomenological similarity between visual experience and visual imagery to support the hypothesis that there is significant overlap between the perceptual and imaginative domains. The current evidence, however, is inconclusive: while evidence from transcranial brain stimulation seems to support this conclusion, neurophysiological evidence from brain lesion studies (e.g., from patients with brain lesions resulting in a loss of mental imagery but not a corresponding loss of perception and vice versa) indicates that there are functional and anatomical dissociations between mental imagery and perception. Assuming that the mental imagery and perception do not overlap, at least, to the extent traditionally assumed, then the question arises as to what exactly mental imagery is and whether it parallels perception by proceeding via several functionally distinct mechanisms. In this review, we argue that even though there may not be a shared mechanism underlying vision for perception and conscious imagery, there is an overlap between the mechanisms underlying vision for action and unconscious visual imagery. On the basis of these findings, we propose a modification of Kosslyn's model of imagery that accommodates unconscious imagination and explore possible explanations of the quasi-pictorial phenomenology of conscious visual imagery in light of the fact that its underlying neural substrates and mechanisms typically are distinct from those of visual experience.

GRAPES-Grounding representations in action, perception, and emotion systems: How object properties and categories are represented in the human brain

In this article, I discuss some of the latest functional neuroimaging findings on the organization of object concepts in the human brain. I argue that these data provide strong support for viewing concepts as the products of highly interactive neural circuits grounded in the action, perception, and emotion systems. The nodes of these circuits are defined by regions representing specific object properties (e.g., form, color, and motion) and thus are property-specific, rather than strictly modality-specific. How these circuits are modified by external and internal environmental demands, the distinction between representational content and format, and the grounding of abstract social concepts are also discussed.

Localization and patterns of Cerebral dyschromatopsia: A study of subjects with prospagnosia

OBJECTIVE

Cerebral dyschromatopsia is sometimes associated with acquired prosopagnosia. Given the variability in structural lesions that cause acquired prosopagnosia, this study aimed to investigate the structural correlates of prosopagnosia-associated dyschromatopsia, and to determine if such colour processing deficits could also accompany developmental prosopagnosia. In addition, we studied whether cerebral dyschromatopsia is typified by a consistent pattern of hue impairments.

METHODS

We investigated hue discrimination in a cohort of 12 subjects with acquired prosopagnosia and 9 with developmental prosopagnosia, along with 42 matched controls, using the Farnsworth-Munsell 100-hue test.

RESULTS

We found impaired hue discrimination in six subjects with acquired prosopagnosia, five with bilateral and one with a unilateral occipitotemporal lesion. Structural MRI analysis showed maximum overlap of lesions in the right and left lingual and fusiform gyri. Fourier analysis of their error scores showed tritanopic-like deficits and blue-green impairments, similar to tendencies displayed by the healthy controls. Three subjects also showed a novel fourth Fourier component, indicating additional peak deficits in purple and green-yellow regions. No subject with developmental prosopagnosia had impaired hue discrimination.

CONCLUSIONS

In our subjects with prosopagnosia, dyschromatopsia occurred in those with acquired lesions of the fusiform gyri, usually bilateral but sometimes unilateral. The dyschromatopsic deficit shows mainly an accentuation of normal tritatanopic-like tendencies. These are sometimes accompanied by additional deficits, although these could represent artifacts of the testing procedure.

What is embodied about cognition?

It is currently debated whether the meanings of words and objects are represented, in whole or in part, in a modality-specific format-the embodied cognition hypothesis. I argue that the embodied/disembodied cognition debate is either largely resolved in favor of the view that concepts are represented in an amodal format, or at a point where the embodied and disembodied approaches are no longer coherently distinct theories. This merits reconsideration of what the available evidence can tell us about the structure of the conceptual system. We know that the conceptual system engages, online, with sensory and motor content. This frames a new question: How is it that the human conceptual system is able to disengage from the sensorimotor system? Answering this question would say something about how the human mind is able to detach from the present and extrapolate from finite experience to hypothetical states of how the world could be. It is the independence of thought from perception and action that makes human cognition special-and that independence is guaranteed by the representational distinction between concepts and sensorimotor representations.

When concepts lose their color: a case of object-color knowledge impairment

Color is important in our daily interactions with objects, and plays a role in both low- and high-level visual processing. Previous neuropsychological studies have shown that color perception and object-color knowledge can doubly dissociate, and that both can dissociate from processing of object form. We present a case study of an individual who displayed an impairment for knowledge of the typical colors of objects, with preserved color perception and color naming. Our case also presented with a pattern of, if anything, worse performance for naming living items compared to non-living things. The findings of the experimental investigation are evaluated in light of two theories of conceptual organization in the brain: the Sensory/Functional Theory and the Domain-Specific Hypothesis. The dissociations observed in this case compel a model in which sensory/motor modality and semantic domain jointly constrain the organization of object knowledge.

The color "fruit": object memories defined by color

Most fruits and other highly color-diagnostic objects have color as a central aspect of their identity, which can facilitate detection and visual recognition. It has been theorized that there may be a large amount of overlap between the neural representations of these objects and processing involved in color perception. In accordance with this theory we sought to determine if the recognition of highly color diagnostic fruit objects could be facilitated by the visual presentation of their known color associates. In two experiments we show that color associate priming is possible, but contingent upon multiple factors. Color priming was found to be maximally effective for the most highly color diagnostic fruits, when low spatial-frequency information was present in the image, and when determination of the object's specific identity, not merely its category, was required. These data illustrate the importance of color for determining the identity of certain objects, and support the theory that object knowledge involves sensory specific systems.

The representation of object concepts in the brain

Evidence from functional neuroimaging of the human brain indicates that information about salient properties of an object-such as what it looks like, how it moves, and how it is used-is stored in sensory and motor systems active when that information was acquired. As a result, object concepts belonging to different categories like animals and tools are represented in partially distinct, sensory- and motor property-based neural networks. This suggests that object concepts are not explicitly represented, but rather emerge from weighted activity within property-based brain regions. However, some property-based regions seem to show a categorical organization, thus providing evidence consistent with category-based, domain-specific formulations as well.

Category-specific cortical mapping: color-naming areas

OBJECT

It has been hypothesized that a certain degree of specialization exists within language areas, depending on some specific lexical repertories or categories. To spare hypothetical category-specific cortical areas and to gain a better understanding of their organization, the authors studied patients who had undergone electrical stimulation mapping for brain tumors and they compared an object-naming task with a category-specific task (color naming).

METHODS

Thirty-six patients with no significant preoperative language deficit were prospectively studied during a 2-year period. Along with a reading task, both object- and color-naming tasks were used in brain mapping. During color naming, patients were asked to identify 11 visually presented basic colors. The modality specificity of the color-naming sites found was subsequently tested by asking patients to retrieve the color attributes of objects. High individual variability was observed in language organization among patients and in the tasks performed. Significant interferences in color naming were found in traditional language regions-that is, Broca (p < 0.003) and Wernicke centers (p = 0.05)--although some color-naming areas were occasionally situated outside of these regions. Color-naming interferences were exclusively localized in small cortical areas (< 1 cm2). Anatomical segregation of the different naming categories was apparent in 10 patients; in all, 13 color-specific naming areas (that is, sites evoking no object-naming interference) were detected in the dominant-hemisphere F3 and the supramarginal, angular, and posterior parts of the temporal gyri. Nevertheless, no specific brain region was found to be consistently involved in color naming (p > 0.05). At five sites, although visually presented color-naming tasks were impaired by stimulation, auditory color naming (for example, "What color is grass?") was performed with no difficulty, showing that modality-specific areas can be found during naming.

CONCLUSIONS

Within language areas, a relative specialization of cortical language areas for color naming can be found during electrical stimulation mapping.

Can 'football-team color-code' compensate for anomia? The case study of FN, a patient with color anomia

A case study is reported on large ischemic infracts involving cortical and subcortical areas of the parietal lobes bilaterally, especially left temporo-parietal and right parietal. On examination, the diagnosis of vascular dementia with color anomia, optic aphasia for colors, was established. The patient (FN) showed great difficulty in understanding a scene as a whole and in describing complex scenes. FN's oral comprehension skills at word and sentence level were satisfactory and he exhibited communicative effectiveness during conversation. He could read letter by letter, but could not make simple judgments of shapes. FN exhibited a marked inability to name colors presented to him visually and to indicate or point to the color requested from the examiner. The most interesting of all the patient's characteristics was the strategy--a football-team color-code--he had developed for compensating for his inability to name colors.

Behavioral Deficits and Cortical Damage Loci in Cerebral Achromatopsia

Lesions to ventral occipital cortex can produce severe deficits in color vision, a syndrome known as cerebral achromatopsia. Because most studies examine relatively few cases, however, uncertainty remains about precisely which cortical loci, when damaged, produce the syndrome. In addition, the extents of the associated perceptual deficits remain unclear. To address these issues, we performed a meta-analysis of 92 case reports from the literature. The severity of color vision deficits of the cases varied greatly, although nearly all showed some deficit in color discrimination. Almost all cases tested also showed some loss of spatial vision. Lesion overlap analyses revealed a relatively small region of high overlap in ventral occipital cortex. The region of high overlap was located near areas identified by neuroimaging studies as important for color perception. For comparison, we performed a similar analysis of prosopagnosia, a disorder of face perception, and found several regions of high lesion overlap adjacent to the region associated with achromatopsia. Because the behavioral deficits in achromatopsia are often incomplete and never restricted to color vision, the region of high lesion overlap may be one critical stage within a stream of many visual areas that participate nonexclusively in color perception.

The relationship between visual perception and visual mental imagery: a reappraisal of the neuropsychological evidence

Visual perception and visual mental imagery, the faculty whereby we can revisualise a visual item from memory, have often been regarded as cognitive functions subserved by common mechanisms. Thus, the leading cognitive model of visual mental imagery holds that visual perception and visual imagery share a number of mental operations, and rely upon common neural structures, including early visual cortices. In particular, a single visual buffer would be used "bottom-up" to display visual percepts and "top-down" to display internally generated images. The proposed neural substrate for this buffer consists of some cortical visual areas organised retinotopically, that is, the striate and extrastriate occipital areas. Empirical support for this model came from the report of brain-damaged patients showing an imagery deficit which parallels a perceptual impairment in the same cognitive domain. However, recent reports of patients showing double dissociations between perception and imagery abilities challenged the perception-imagery equivalence hypothesis from the functional point of view. From the anatomical point of view, the available evidence suggests that occipital damage is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce imagery deficits. On the other hand, extensive left temporal damage often accompanies imagery deficits for object form or colour. Thus, visual mental imagery abilities might require the integrity of brain areas related to vision, but at an higher level of integration than previously proposed.

Anomalous perception in synaesthesia: a cognitive neuroscience perspective

An enduring question in cognitive neuroscience is how the physical properties of the world are represented in the brain to yield conscious perception. In most people, a particular physical stimulus gives rise to a unitary, unimodal perceptual experience. So, light energy leads to the sensation of seeing, whereas sound waves produce the experience of hearing. However, for individuals with the rare phenomenon of synaesthesia, specific physical stimuli consistently induce more than one perceptual experience. For example, hearing particular sounds might induce vivid experiences of colour, taste or odour, as might the sight of visual symbols, such as letters or digits. Here we review the latest findings on synaesthesia, and consider its possible genetic, neural and cognitive bases. We also propose a neurocognitive framework for understanding such anomalous perceptual experiences.

The dissociation of color from form and function knowledge

We report on two brain-damaged subjects who exhibit the uncommon pattern of loss of object color knowledge, but spared color perception and naming. The subject P.C.O., as in previously reported patients, is also impaired in processing other perceptual and functional properties of objects. I.O.C., in contrast, is the first subject on record to have impaired object color knowledge, but spared knowledge of object form, size and function. This pattern of performance is consistent with the view that semantic information about color and other perceptual properties of objects is grounded in modality-specific systems. Lesion analysis suggests that such grounding requires the integrity of the mesial temporal regions of the left hemisphere.

Odor memory induces brain activation as measured by functional MRI

PURPOSE

Our goal was to use functional MRI (fMRI) to measure brain activation in response to imagination of odors in humans.

METHOD

fMR brain scans were obtained in 21 normal subjects (9 men, 12 women) using multislice FLASH MRI in response to imagination of odors of banana and peppermint and to the actual smells of the corresponding odors of amyl acetate and menthone, respectively, in three coronal sections selected from anterior to posterior temporal brain regions. Similar studies were obtained in two patients with hyposmia using FLASH MRI and in one patient with hyposmia using echo planar imaging, both before and after theophylline treatment, which returned smell function to or toward normal in each patient. Activation images were derived using correlation analysis, and ratios of areas of brain activated to total brain areas were calculated.

RESULTS

Activation was present in each section in all normal subjects and in each patient after imagination of each vapor. In normal subjects, brain activation in response to imagination of odors was significantly less than that in response to the actual smell of these odors, and activation following imagination of banana odor was significantly greater in men than in women, as was previously reported for the actual smell of the odor of amyl acetate. However, in relative terms, albeit at an absolute lower brain activation level, the ratio of brain activation by imagination of banana to activation by actual amyl acetate odor was about twice as high in women as in men. Before treatment, in patients with hyposmia, brain activation in response to odor imagination was greater than after presentation of the actual odor itself. After treatment, in patients with hyposmia in whom smell acuity returned to or toward normal, brain activation in response to odor imagination was not significantly different quantitatively from that before treatment; however, brain activation in response to the actual odor was significantly greater than that in response to imagination of the corresponding odor. Brain regions activated by both odor imagination and actual corresponding odor were similar and consistent with regions previously described as responding to odors.

CONCLUSION

These studies indicate that (a) odors can be imagined and similar brain regions are activated by both imagined and corresponding actual odors; (b) imagination of odors elicits quantitatively less brain activation than do actual smells of corresponding odors in normal subjects; (c) absolute brain activation in men by odor imagination is greater than in women for some odors, but on a relative basis, the ratio for odor imagination to actual smell in women is twice that in men; (d) odor imagination, once the odor has been experienced, is present, recallable, and capable of inducing a relatively constant degree of brain activation even in the absence of the ability to recognize an actual corresponding odor.

Cortical regions associated with perceiving, naming, and knowing about colors

Positron emission tomography (PET) was used to investigate whether retrieving information about a specific object attribute requires reactivation of brain areas that mediate perception of that attribute. During separate PET scans, subjects passively viewed colored and equiluminant gray-scale Mondrians, named colored and achromatic objects, named the color of colored objects, and generated color names associated with achromatic objects. Color perception was associated with activations in the lingual and fusiform gyri of the occipital lobes, consistent with previous neuroimaging and human lesion studies. Retrieving information about object color (generating color names for achromatic objects relative to naming achromatic objects) activated the left inferior temporal, left frontal, and left posterior parietal cortices, replicating previous findings from this laboratory. When subjects generated color names for achromatic objects relative to the low-level baseline of viewing gray-scale Mondrians, additional activations in the left fusiform/lateral occipital region were detected. However, these activations were lateral to the occipital regions associated with color perception and identical to occipital regions activated when subjects simply named achromatic objects relative to the same low-level baseline. This suggests that the occipital activations associated with retrieving color information were due to the perception of object form rather than to the top-down influence of brain areas that mediate color perception. Taken together, these results indicate that retrieving previously acquired information about an object's typical color does not require reactivation of brain regions that subserve color perception.

Multiple-domain dissociation between impaired visual perception and preserved mental imagery in a patient with bilateral extrastriate lesions

A brain-damaged patient is described whose pattern of performance provides insight into both the functional mechanisms and the neural structures involved in visual mental imagery. The patient became severely agnosic, alexic, achromatopsic and prosopagnosic following bilateral brain lesions in the temporo-occipital cortex. However, her mental imagery for the same visual entities that she could not perceive was perfectly preserved. This clear-cut dissociation held across all the major domains of high-level vision: object recognition, reading, colour and face processing. Our findings, together with other reports on domain-specific dissociations and functional brain imaging studies, provide evidence to support the view that visual perception and visual mental imagery are subserved by independent functional mechanisms, which do not share the same cortical implementation. In particular, our results suggest that mental imagery abilities need not be mediated by early visual cortices.

Preserved imagery for colours in a patient with cerebral achromatopsia

We report the case of a patient who, after sequential bilateral strokes in the occipital regions sparing the primary visual cortex, developed a severe deficit of colour perception. At variance with other reports of acquired achromatopsic patients, she showed a perfectly vivid visual imagery for colours. These findings, together with similar data in domains other than colour processing, challenge the theories which posit that the same cognitive processes are involved in both the perception and the retrieval from memory of a given stimulus.