Host range recombinants of fowl plague (influenza A) virus

Influenza Infection in Humans Induces Broadly Cross-Reactive and Protective Neuraminidase-Reactive Antibodies

Antibodies to the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) glycoproteins are the major mediators of protection against influenza virus infection. Here, we report that current influenza vaccines poorly display key NA epitopes and rarely induce NA-reactive B cells. Conversely, influenza virus infection induces NA-reactive B cells at a frequency that approaches (H1N1) or exceeds (H3N2) that of HA-reactive B cells. NA-reactive antibodies display broad binding activity spanning the entire history of influenza A virus circulation in humans, including the original pandemic strains of both H1N1 and H3N2 subtypes. The antibodies robustly inhibit the enzymatic activity of NA, including oseltamivir-resistant variants, and provide robust prophylactic protection, including against avian H5N1 viruses, in vivo. When used therapeutically, NA-reactive antibodies protected mice from lethal influenza virus challenge even 48 hr post infection. These findings strongly suggest that influenza vaccines should be optimized to improve targeting of NA for durable and broad protection against divergent influenza strains.

Coronavirus Host Range Expansion and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Emergence: Biochemical Mechanisms and Evolutionary Perspectives

Coronaviruses have frequently expanded their host range in recent history, with two events resulting in severe disease outbreaks in human populations. Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) emerged in 2003 in Southeast Asia and rapidly spread around the world before it was controlled by public health intervention strategies. The 2012 Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) outbreak represents another prime example of virus emergence from a zoonotic reservoir. Here, we review the current knowledge of coronavirus cross-species transmission, with particular focus on MERS-CoV. MERS-CoV is still circulating in the human population, and the mechanisms governing its cross-species transmission have been only partially elucidated, highlighting a need for further investigation. We discuss biochemical determinants mediating MERS-CoV host cell permissivity, including virus spike interactions with the MERS-CoV cell surface receptor dipeptidyl peptidase 4 (DPP4), and evolutionary mechanisms that may facilitate host range expansion, including recombination, mutator alleles, and mutational robustness. Understanding these mechanisms can help us better recognize the threat of emergence for currently circulating zoonotic strains.

Influenza hemagglutinin (HA) stem region mutations that stabilize or destabilize the structure of multiple HA subtypes

Influenza A viruses enter host cells through endosomes, where acidification induces irreversible conformational changes of the viral hemagglutinin (HA) that drive the membrane fusion process. The prefusion conformation of the HA is metastable, and the pH of fusion can vary significantly among HA strains and subtypes. Furthermore, an accumulating body of evidence implicates HA stability properties as partial determinants of influenza host range, transmission phenotype, and pathogenic potential. Although previous studies have identified HA mutations that can affect HA stability, these have been limited to a small selection of HA strains and subtypes. Here we report a mutational analysis of HA stability utilizing a panel of expressed HAs representing a broad range of HA subtypes and strains, including avian representatives across the phylogenetic spectrum and several human strains. We focused on two highly conserved residues in the HA stem region: HA2 position 58, located at the membrane distal tip of the short helix of the hairpin loop structure, and HA2 position 112, located in the long helix in proximity to the fusion peptide. We demonstrate that a K58I mutation confers an acid-stable phenotype for nearly all HAs examined, whereas a D112G mutation consistently leads to elevated fusion pH. The results enhance our understanding of HA stability across multiple subtypes and provide an additional tool for risk assessment for circulating strains that may have other hallmarks of human adaptation. Furthermore, the K58I mutants, in particular, may be of interest for potential use in the development of vaccines with improved stability profiles.

IMPORTANCE

The influenza A hemagglutinin glycoprotein (HA) mediates the receptor binding and membrane fusion functions that are essential for virus entry into host cells. While receptor binding has long been recognized for its role in host species specificity and transmission, membrane fusion and associated properties of HA stability have only recently been appreciated as potential determinants. We show here that mutations can be introduced at highly conserved positions to stabilize or destabilize the HA structure of multiple HA subtypes, expanding our knowledge base for this important phenotype. The practical implications of these findings extend to the field of vaccine design, since the HA mutations characterized here could potentially be utilized across a broad spectrum of influenza virus subtypes to improve the stability of vaccine strains or components.

Viral determinants of influenza A virus host range

Typical avian influenza A viruses are restricted from replicating efficiently and causing disease in humans. However, an avian virus can become adapted to humans by mutating or recombining with currently circulating human viruses. These viruses have the potential to cause pandemics in an immunologically naïve human population. It is critical that we understand the molecular basis of host-range restriction and how this can be overcome. Here, we review our current understanding of the mechanisms by which influenza viruses adapt to replicate efficiently in a new host. We predominantly focus on the influenza polymerase, which remains one of the least understood host-range barriers.

Influenza HA subtypes demonstrate divergent phenotypes for cleavage activation and pH of fusion: implications for host range and adaptation

The influenza A virus (IAV) HA protein must be activated by host cells proteases in order to prime the molecule for fusion. Consequently, the availability of activating proteases and the susceptibility of HA to protease activity represents key factors in facilitating virus infection. As such, understanding the intricacies of HA cleavage by various proteases is necessary to derive insights into the emergence of pandemic viruses. To examine these properties, we generated a panel of HAs that are representative of the 16 HA subtypes that circulate in aquatic birds, as well as HAs representative of the subtypes that have infected the human population over the last century. We examined the susceptibility of the panel of HA proteins to trypsin, as well as human airway trypsin-like protease (HAT) and transmembrane protease, serine 2 (TMPRSS2). Additionally, we examined the pH at which these HAs mediated membrane fusion, as this property is related to the stability of the HA molecule and influences the capacity of influenza viruses to remain infectious in natural environments. Our results show that cleavage efficiency can vary significantly for individual HAs, depending on the protease, and that some HA subtypes display stringent selectivity for specific proteases as activators of fusion function. Additionally, we found that the pH of fusion varies by 0.7 pH units among the subtypes, and notably, we observed that the pH of fusion for most HAs from human isolates was lower than that observed from avian isolates of the same subtype. Overall, these data provide the first broad-spectrum analysis of cleavage-activation and membrane fusion characteristics for all of the IAV HA subtypes, and also show that there are substantial differences between the subtypes that may influence transmission among hosts and establishment in new species.

IAV is associated with significant morbidity and mortality, and represents a challenging public health threat that affects social and economic welfare each year, particularly during IAV pandemics. Although we know that all human strains derive, either directly or via intermediate hosts, from avian viral sources, we know very little about the phenotypic characteristics of the 16 HA subtypes that circulate in aquatic birds and have potential to infect mammals. HA membrane fusion properties, in conjunction with the characteristics for protease activation of HA, a requirement for fusion, are critical factors involved in the ecology and transmission of IAVs, and need to be understood if we are to derive explanations for how pandemic viruses emerge in humans. We examined the cleavage-activation and membrane fusion characteristics for the 16 HA subtypes by transiently expressing HA proteins in cells. Our findings show that the cleavability of the HAs vary considerably between subtypes and depending on the protease. Additionally, analysis of the pH of fusion for each subtype showed that HA stability varied significantly among the subtypes, as well as within subtypes from viruses isolated from different species. Overall, these data have implications for host range, potential for adaptation, and persistence in natural environments.

Intra- and interhost evolutionary dynamics of equine influenza virus

Determining the evolutionary basis of cross-species transmission and immune evasion is key to understanding the mechanisms that control the emergence of either new viruses or novel antigenic variants with pandemic potential. The hemagglutinin glycoprotein of influenza A viruses is a critical host range determinant and a major target of neutralizing antibodies. Equine influenza virus (EIV) is a significant pathogen of the horse that causes periodical outbreaks of disease even in populations with high vaccination coverage. EIV has also jumped the species barrier and emerged as a novel respiratory pathogen in dogs, canine influenza virus. We studied the dynamics of equine influenza virus evolution in horses at the intrahost level and how this evolutionary process is affected by interhost transmission in a natural setting. To this end, we performed clonal sequencing of the hemagglutinin 1 gene derived from individual animals at different times postinfection. Our results show that despite the population consensus sequence remaining invariant, genetically distinct subpopulations persist during the course of infection and are also transmitted, with some variants likely to change antigenicity. We also detected a natural case of mixed infection in an animal infected during an outbreak of equine influenza, raising the possibility of reassortment between different strains of virus. In sum, our data suggest that transmission bottlenecks may not be as narrow as originally perceived and that the genetic diversity required to adapt to new host species may be partially present in the donor host and potentially transmitted to the recipient host.

Pandemic swine influenza virus (H1N1): A threatening evolution

"Survival of the fittest" is an old axiom laid down by the great evolutionist Charles Darwin and microorganisms seem to have exploited this statement to a great extent. The ability of viruses to adapt themselves to the changing environment has made it possible to inhabit itself in this vast world for the past millions of years. Experts are well versed with the fact that influenza viruses have the capability to trade genetic components from one to the other within animal and human population. In mid April 2009, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the World Health Organization had recognized a dramatic increase in number of influenza cases. These current 2009 infections were found to be caused by a new strain of influenza type A H1N1 virus which is a re-assortment of several strains of influenza viruses commonly infecting human, avian, and swine population. This evolution is quite dependent on swine population which acts as a main reservoir for the reassortment event in virus. With the current rate of progress and the efforts of heath authorities worldwide, we have still not lost the race against fighting this virus. This article gives an insight to the probable source of origin and the evolutionary progress it has gone through that makes it a potential threat in the future, the current scenario and the possible measures that may be explored to further strengthen the war against pandemic.

Influenza infection in wild raccoons

Raccoons (Procyon lotor) are common, widely distributed animals that frequently come into contact with wild waterfowl, agricultural operations, and humans. Serosurveys showed that raccoons are exposed to avian influenza virus. We found antibodies to a variety of influenza virus subtypes (H10N7, H4N6, H4N2, H3, and H1) with wide geographic variation in seroprevalence. Experimental infection studies showed that raccoons become infected with avian and human influenza A viruses, shed and transmit virus to virus-free animals, and seroconvert. Analyses of cellular receptors showed that raccoons have avian and human type receptors with a similar distribution as found in human respiratory tracts. The potential exists for co-infection of multiple subtypes of influenza virus with genetic reassortment and creation of novel strains of influenza virus. Experimental and field data indicate that raccoons may play an important role in influenza disease ecology and pose risks to agriculture and human health.

Ecology, epidemiology and human health implications of avian influenza viruses: why do we need to share genetic data?

Avian influenza (AI) is a listed disease of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) that has become a disease of great importance both for animal and human health. Until recent times, AI was considered a disease of birds with zoonotic implications of limited significance. The emergence and spread of the Asian lineage highly pathogenic AI H5N1 virus has dramatically changed this perspective; not only has it been responsible of the death or culling of millions of birds, but this virus has also been able to infect a variety of non-avian hosts including human beings. The implications of such a panzootic reflect themselves in animal health issues, notably in the reduction of a protein source for developing countries and in the management of the pandemic potential. Retrospective studies have shown that avian progenitors play an important role in the generation of pandemic viruses for humans, and therefore these infections in the avian reservoir should be subjected to control measures aiming at eradication of the Asian H5N1 virus from all sectors rather than just eliminating or reducing the impact of the disease in poultry. Collection and analysis of information in a transparent environment and close collaboration between the medical and veterinary scientific community are crucial to support the global AI crisis.

Animal and Human Health Implications of Avian Influenza Infections

Avian influenza (AI) is a listed disease of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) that has become a disease of great importance both for animal and human health. Until recent times, AI was considered a disease of birds with zoonotic implications of limited significance. The emergence and spread of the Asian lineage highly pathogenic AI (HPAI) H5N1 virus has dramatically changed this perspective; not only has it been responsible of the death or culling of millions of birds, but this virus has also been able to infect a variety of non-avian hosts including human beings. The implications of such a panzootic reflect themselves in animal health issues, notably in the reduction of a protein source for developing countries and in the management of the pandemic potential. Retrospective studies have shown that avian progenitors play an important role in the generation of pandemic viruses for humans, and therefore these infections in the avian reservoir should be subjected to control measures aiming at eradication of the Asian H5N1 virus from all sectors rather than just eliminating or reducing the impact of the disease in poultry.

Up to new tricks - a review of cross-species transmission of influenza A viruses

Influenza is a highly contagious disease that has burdened both humans and animals since ancient times. In humans, the most dramatic consequences of influenza are associated with periodically occurring pandemics. Pandemics require the emergence of an antigenically novel virus to which the majority of the population lacks protective immunity. Historically, influenza A viruses from animals have contributed to the generation of human pandemic viruses and they may do so again in the future. It is, therefore, critical to understand the epidemiological and molecular mechanisms that allow influenza A viruses to cross species barriers. This review summarizes the current knowledge of influenza ecology, and the viral factors that are thought to determine influenza A virus species specificity.

The challenge of avian influenza to the veterinary community

Avian influenza (AI) is a listed disease of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) that has become a disease of great importance both for animal and human health. The increased relevance of AI in the fields of animal and human health has highlighted the lack of scientific information on several aspects of the disease, which has hampered the adequate management of some of the recent crises. Millions of animals have died, and there is growing concern over the loss of human lives and over the management of the pandemic potential. The present paper aims to identify areas of knowledge of veterinary competence that need to be improved in order to generate information to support the global AI crisis, and highlights the major changes in AI legislation, including regulations related to trade. It also reviews the human health implications of AI, including the mechanisms by which a human pandemic virus may be generated, and the food safety issues related to this infection. The application of control policies, ranging from stamping out to emergency and prophylactic vaccination, are discussed on the basis of data generated in recent outbreaks, and in the light of new regulations, also in view of the maintenance of good animal welfare. Poultry veterinarians working for the industry or for the public sector represent the first line of defence against the pandemic threat and for the prevention and control of this infection in poultry and in wild birds. However, given the current situation, it is imperative that close collaboration is sought and achieved by health officials involved in the veterinary, agricultural and medical aspects of the disease. Only through the exchange of data, experiences, views and information will it be possible to combat this zoonosis, which represents a major threat to public health and animal well-being.

Novel origin of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus nucleoprotein gene

The nucleoprotein (NP) gene of the 1918 pandemic influenza A virus has been amplified and sequenced from archival material. The NP gene is known to be involved in many aspects of viral function and to interact with host proteins, thereby playing a role in host specificity. The 1918 NP amino acid sequence differs at only six amino acids from avian consensus sequences, consistent with reassortment from an avian source shortly before 1918. However, the nucleotide sequence of the 1918 NP gene has more than 170 differences from avian strain consensus sequences, suggesting substantial evolutionary distance from known avian strain sequences. Both the gene and protein sequences of the 1918 NP fall within the mammalian clade upon phylogenetic analysis. The evolutionary distance of the 1918 NP sequences from avian and mammalian strain sequences is examined, using several different parameters. The results suggest that the 1918 strain did not retain the previously circulating human NP. Nor is it likely to have obtained its NP by reassortment with an avian strain similar to those now characterized. The results are consistent with the existence of a currently unknown host for influenza, with an NP similar to current avian strain NPs at the amino acid level but with many synonymous nucleotide differences, suggesting evolutionary isolation from the currently characterized avian influenza virus gene pool.

The origin of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus: a continuing enigma

Influenza A virus is a major public health threat, killing more than 30,000 per year in the USA alone, sickening millions and inflicting substantial economic costs. Novel influenza virus strains emerge periodically to which humans have little immunity, resulting in devastating pandemics. The 1918 pandemic killed nearly 700,000 Americans and 40 million people worldwide. Pandemics in 1957 and 1968, while much less devastating than 1918, also caused tens of thousands of deaths in the USA. The influenza A virus is capable of enormous genetic variability, both by continuous, gradual mutation and by reassortment of gene segments between viruses. Both the 1957 and 1968 pandemic strains are thought to have originated as reassortants, in which one or both human-adapted viral surface proteins were replaced by proteins from avian influenza virus strains. Analyses of the surface proteins of the 1918 pandemic strain, however, suggest that this strain may have had a different origin. The haemagglutinin gene segment of the virus may have come directly from an avian source different from those currently circulating. Alternatively, the virus, or some of its gene segments, may have evolved in an intermediate host before emerging as a human pathogen. Determining whether pandemic influenza virus strains can emerge via different pathways will affect the scope and focus of surveillance and prevention efforts.

Role of quail in the interspecies transmission of H9 influenza A viruses: molecular changes on HA that correspond to adaptation from ducks to chickens

H9 influenza viruses have become endemic in land-based domestic poultry in Asia and have sporadically crossed to pigs and humans. To understand the molecular determinants of their adaptation to land-based birds, we tested the replication and transmission of several 1970s duck H9 viruses in chickens and quail. Quail were more susceptible than chickens to these viruses, and generation of recombinant H9 viruses by reverse genetics showed that changes in the HA gene are sufficient to initiate efficient replication and transmission in quail. Seven amino acid positions on the HA molecule corresponded to adaptation to land-based birds. In quail H9 viruses, the pattern of amino acids at these seven positions is intermediate between those of duck and chicken viruses; this fact may explain the susceptibility of quail to duck H9 viruses. Our findings suggest that quail provide an environment in which the adaptation of influenza viruses from ducks generates novel variants that can cross the species barrier.

Emergence of influenza A viruses

Pandemic influenza in humans is a zoonotic disease caused by the transfer of influenza A viruses or virus gene segments from animal reservoirs. Influenza A viruses have been isolated from avian and mammalian hosts, although the primary reservoirs are the aquatic bird populations of the world. In the aquatic birds, influenza is asymptomatic, and the viruses are in evolutionary stasis. The aquatic bird viruses do not replicate well in humans, and these viruses need to reassort or adapt in an intermediate host before they emerge in human populations. Pigs can serve as a host for avian and human viruses and are logical candidates for the role of intermediate host. The transmission of avian H5N1 and H9N2 viruses directly to humans during the late 1990s showed that land-based poultry also can serve between aquatic birds and humans as intermediate hosts of influenza viruses. That these transmission events took place in Hong Kong and China adds further support to the hypothesis that Asia is an epicentre for influenza and stresses the importance of surveillance of pigs and live-bird markets in this area.

Efficacy of zanamivir against avian influenza A viruses that possess genes encoding H5N1 internal proteins and are pathogenic in mammals

In 1997, an avian H5N1 influenza virus, A/Hong Kong/156/97 (A/HK/156/97), caused six deaths in Hong Kong, and in 1999, an avian H9N2 influenza virus infected two children in Hong Kong. These viruses and a third avian virus [A/Teal/HK/W312/97 (H6N1)] have six highly related genes encoding internal proteins. Additionally, A/Chicken/HK/G9/97 (H9N2) virus has PB1 and PB2 genes that are highly related to those of A/HK/156/97 (H5N1), A/Teal/HK/W312/97 (H6N1), and A/Quail/HK/G1/97 (H9N2) viruses. Because of their similarities with the H5N1 virus, these H6N1 and H9N2 viruses may have the potential for interspecies transmission. We demonstrate that these H6N1 and H9N2 viruses are pathogenic in mice but that their pathogenicities are less than that of A/HK/156/97 (H5N1). Unadapted virus replicated in lungs, but only A/HK/156/97 (H5N1) was found in the brain. After three passages (P3) in mouse lungs, the pathogenicity of the viruses increased, with both A/Teal/HK/W312/97 (H6N1) (P3) and A/Quail/HK/G1/97 (H9N2) (P3) viruses being found in the brain. The neuraminidase inhibitor zanamivir inhibited viral replication in Madin-Darby canine kidney cells in virus yield assays (50% effective concentration, 8.5 to 14.0 microM) and inhibited viral neuraminidase activity (50% inhibitory concentration, 5 to 10 nM). Twice daily intranasal administration of zanamivir (50 and 100 mg/kg of body weight) completely protected infected mice from death. At a dose of 10 mg/kg, zanamivir completely protected mice from infection with H9N2 viruses and increased the mean survival day and the number of survivors infected with H6N1 and H5N1 viruses. Zanamivir, at all doses tested, significantly reduced the virus titers in the lungs and completely blocked the spread of virus to the brain. Thus, zanamivir is efficacious in treating avian influenza viruses that can be transmitted to mammals.

Pandemic threat posed by avian influenza A viruses

Influenza pandemics, defined as global outbreaks of the disease due to viruses with new antigenic subtypes, have exacted high death tolls from human populations. The last two pandemics were caused by hybrid viruses, or reassortants, that harbored a combination of avian and human viral genes. Avian influenza viruses are therefore key contributors to the emergence of human influenza pandemics. In 1997, an H5N1 influenza virus was directly transmitted from birds in live poultry markets in Hong Kong to humans. Eighteen people were infected in this outbreak, six of whom died. This avian virus exhibited high virulence in both avian and mammalian species, causing systemic infection in both chickens and mice. Subsequently, another avian virus with the H9N2 subtype was directly transmitted from birds to humans in Hong Kong. Interestingly, the genes encoding the internal proteins of the H9N2 virus are genetically highly related to those of the H5N1 virus, suggesting a unique property of these gene products. The identification of avian viruses in humans underscores the potential of these and similar strains to produce devastating influenza outbreaks in major population centers. Although highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses had been identified before the 1997 outbreak in Hong Kong, their devastating effects had been confined to poultry. With the Hong Kong outbreak, it became clear that the virulence potential of these viruses extended to humans.

Targeted infection of endothelial cells by avian influenza virus A/FPV/Rostock/34 (H7N1) in chicken embryos

The tissue tropism and spread of infection of the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A/FPV/Rostock/34 (H7N1) (FPV) were analyzed in 11-day-old chicken embryos. As shown by in situ hybridization, the virus caused generalized infection that was strictly confined to endothelial cells in all organs. Studies with reassortants of FPV and the apathogenic avian strain A/chick/Germany/N/49 (H10N7) revealed that endotheliotropism was linked to FPV hemagglutinin (HA). To further analyze the factors determining endotheliotropism, the HA-activating protease furin was cloned from chicken tissue. Ubiquitous expression of furin and other proprotein convertases in the chick embryo indicated that proteolytic activation of HA was not responsible for restriction of infection to the endothelium. To determine the expression of virus receptors in embryonic tissues, histochemical analysis of alpha2,3- and alpha2,6-linked neuraminic acid was carried out by lectin-binding assays. These receptors were found on endothelial cells and on several epithelial cells, but not on tissues surrounding endothelia. Finally, we analyzed the polarity of virus maturation in endothelial cells. Studies on cultured human endothelial cells employing confocal laser scanning microscopy revealed that HA is specifically targeted to the apical surface of these cells, and electron microscopy of embryonic tissues showed that virus maturation occurs also at the luminar side. Taken together, these observations indicate that endotheliotropism of FPV in the chicken embryo is determined, on one hand, by the high cleavability of HA, which mediates virus entry into the vascular system, and, on the other hand, by restricted receptor expression and polar budding, which prevent spread of infection into tissues surrounding endothelia.

Influenza A pandemics of the 20th century with special reference to 1918: virology, pathology and epidemiology

Influenza A virus initiated worldwide epidemics (pandemics) in 1918, 1957, 1968 and 1977. A revised calculation of the 1918-1919 pandemic estimates that 40 million persons died and 500 million were infected. The mortalities in 1957 and 1968 were nearly 6 million. Biological and genetic characteristics of the causative agents of the more recent pandemics, have been well studied but little is known about the causative agent of the Great Pandemic in 1918. Genetic characterisation of the 1918 virus has been achieved by sourcing virus RNA from formalin fixed lung samples or by exhuming frozen victims of the outbreak from Arctic regions. Initial analysis of the HA gene from two USA sources indicates a virus related to swine and human influenza with no base insertion at the HA1-HA2 cleavage junction which, at least in avian influenza A, characterises high virulence. Important unanswered questions are whether the 1918 virus spread pantropically perhaps to include the brain and hence cause encephalitis including the later lethargic forms, or whether infection was confined to the respiratory tract. Re-examination of reports of respiratory disease in England and France in 1916-1917 may indicate a non-Spanish origin of the pandemic and a period of 2 years for the virus to be seeded worldwide. In contrast the other two pandemic viruses in 1957 and 1968 appeared to originate in Asia. New anti-neuraminidase drugs in conjunction with amantadine and novel developments with influenza vaccines would be expected to ameliorate the disease in a future pandemic.

Role of hemagglutinin cleavage for the pathogenicity of influenza virus

Although human epidemics of influenza occur on nearly an annual basis and result in a significant number of "excess deaths," the viruses responsible are not generally considered highly pathogenic. On occasion, however, an outbreak occurs that demonstrates the potential lethality of influenza viruses. The human pandemic of 1918 spread worldwide and killed millions, and the limited human outbreak of highly pathogenic avian viruses in Hong Kong at the end of 1997 is a warning that this could happen again. In avian species such as chickens and turkeys, several outbreaks of highly pathogenic influenza viruses have been documented. Although the reason for the lethality of the human 1918 viruses remains unclear, the pathogenicity of the avian viruses, including those that caused the human 1997 outbreak, relates primarily to properties of the hemagglutinin glycoprotein (HA). Cleavage of the HA precursor molecule HA0 is required to activate virus infectivity, and the distribution of activating proteases in the host is one of the determinants of tropism and, as such, pathogenicity. The HAs of mammalian and nonpathogenic avian viruses are cleaved extracellularly, which limits their spread in hosts to tissues where the appropriate proteases are encountered. On the other hand, the HAs of pathogenic viruses are cleaved intracellularly by ubiquitously occurring proteases and therefore have the capacity to infect various cell types and cause systemic infections. The x-ray crystal structure of HA0 has been solved recently and shows that the cleavage site forms a loop that extends from the surface of the molecule, and it is the composition and structure of the cleavage loop region that dictate the range of proteases that can potentially activate infectivity. Here influenza virus pathogenicity is discussed, with an emphasis on the role of HA0 cleavage as a determining factor.

Persistent infection promotes cross-species transmissibility of mouse hepatitis virus

Persistent infection with mouse hepatitis virus (MHV) strain A59 in murine DBT (delayed brain tumor) cells resulted in the emergence of host range variants, designated V51A and V51B, at 210 days postinfection. These host range mutants replicated efficiently in normally nonpermissive Chinese hamster ovary (CHO), in human hepatocarcinoma (HepG2), and to a lesser extent in human breast carcinoma (MCF7) cell lines. Little if any replication was noted in baby hamster kidney (BHK), green African monkey kidney (COS-7), feline kidney (CRFK), and swine testicular (ST) cell lines. By fluorescent antibody (FA) staining, persistent viruses V10B and V30B, isolated at days 38 and 119 days postinfection, also demonstrated very low levels of replication in human HepG2 cells. These data suggest that persistence may rapidly select for host range expansion of animal viruses. Pretreatment of HepG2 cells with a polyclonal antibody directed against human carcinoembryonic antigens (CEA) or with some monoclonal antibodies (Col-1, Col-4, Col-12, and Col-14) that bind human CEA significantly inhibited V51B infection. Under identical conditions, little or no blockade was evident with other monoclonal antibodies (kat4c or Col-6) which also bind the human CEA glycoproteins. In addition, an antibody (EDDA) directed against irrelevant antigens did not block V51B replication. Pretreatment with the Col-4 and Col-14 antibodies did not block Sindbis virus replication in HepG2 cells or MHV infection in DBT cells, suggesting that one or more CEA glycoproteins likely functioned as receptors for V51B entry into human cell lines. To test this hypothesis, the human biliary glycoprotein (Bgp) and CEA genes were cloned and expressed in normally nonpermissive BHK cell lines by using noncytopathic Sindbis virus replicons (pSinRep19). By growth curves and FA staining, human CEA and to a much lesser extent human Bgp functioned as receptors for V51B entry. Furthermore, V51B replication was blocked with polyclonal antiserum directed against human CEA and Bgp. Under identical conditions, the parental MHV strain A59 failed to replicate in BHK cells expressing human Bgp or CEA. These data suggest that MHV persistence may promote virus cross-species transmissibility by selecting for virus variants that recognize phylogenetic homologues of the normal receptor.

Episodic evolution mediates interspecies transfer of a murine coronavirus

Molecular mechanisms permitting the establishment and dissemination of a virus within a newly adopted host species are poorly understood. Mouse hepatitis virus (MHV) strains (MHV-A59, MHV-JHM, and MHV-A59/MHV-JHM) were passaged in mixed cultures containing progressively increasing concentrations of nonpermissive Syrian baby hamster kidney (BHK) cells and decreasing concentrations of permissive murine DBT cells. From MHV-A59/MHV-JHM mixed infection, variant viruses (MHV-H1 and MHV-H2) which replicated efficiently in BHK cells were isolated. Under identical treatment conditions, the parental MHV-A59 or MHV-JHM strains failed to produce infectious virus or transcribe detectable levels of viral RNA or protein. The MHV-H isolates were polytrophic, replicating efficiently in normally nonpermissive Syrian hamster smooth muscle (DDT-1), Chinese hamster ovary (CHO), human adenocarcinoma (HRT), primate kidney (Vero), and murine 17Cl-1 cell lines. Little if any virus replication was detected in feline kidney (CRFK) and porcine testicular (ST) cell lines. The variant virus, MHV-H2, transcribed seven mRNAs equivalent in relative abundance and size to those synthesized by the parental virus strains. MHV-H2 was an RNA recombinant virus containing a crossover site in the S glycoprotein gene. At the molecular level, episodic evolution and positive Darwinian natural selection were apparent within the MHV-H2 S and HE glycoprotein genes. These findings differ from the hypothesis that neutral changes are the predominant feature of molecular evolution and argue that changing ecologies actuate episodic evolution in the MHV spike glycoprotein genes that govern interspecies transfer and spread into alternative hosts.

Molecular evolution of influenza viruses

There are two different mechanisms by which influenza viruses might evolve: (1) Because the RNA genome of influenza viruses is segmented, new strains can suddenly be produced by reassortment, as happens, for example, during antigenic shift, creating new pandemic strains. (2) New viruses evolve relatively slowly by stepwise mutation and selection, for example, during antigenic or genetic drift. Influenza A viruses were found in various vertebrate species, where they form reservoirs that do not easily mix. While human influenza A viruses do not spread in birds and vice versa, the species barrier to pigs is relatively low, so that pigs might function as "mixing vessels" for the creation of new pandemic reassortants in Southeast Asia, where the probability is greatest for double infection of pigs by human and avian influenza viruses. Phylogenetic studies revealed that about 100 years ago, an avian influenza A virus had crossed the species barrier, presumably first to pigs, and from there to humans, forming the new stable human and classical swine lineages. In 1979, again, an avian virus showed up in the North European swine population, forming another stable swine lineage. The North European swine isolates from 1979 until about 1985 were genetically extremely unstable. A hypothesis is put forward stating that a mutator mutation is necessary to enable influenza virus to cross the species barrier by providing the new host with sufficient variants from which it can select the best fitting ones. As long as the mutator mutation is still present, such a virus should be able to cross the species barrier a second time, as happened about 100 years ago. Although the most recent swine isolates from northern Germany are again genetically stable, we nevertheless should be on the lookout to see if a North European swine virus shows up in the human population in the near future.

NPI-1, the human homolog of SRP-1, interacts with influenza virus nucleoprotein

We used the yeast interactive trap system to identify a cellular protein which interacts with the nucleoprotein of influenza A viruses. This protein, nucleoprotein interactor 1 (NPI-1) is the human homolog of the yeast protein SRP1. SRP1 was previously identified as a suppressor of temperature-sensitive RNA polymerase I mutations (R. Yano, M. Oakes, M. Yamaghishi, J. Dodd, and M. Nomura, Mol. Cell. Biol. 12, 5640-5651, 1992). A full-length cDNA clone of NPI-1 was generated from HeLa cell poly A + RNA. The viral nucleoprotein, which had been partially purified from influenza A/PR/8/34 virus-infected embryonated eggs, could be coprecipitated from solution by glutathione agarose beads complexed with a bacterially expressed glutathione-S-transferase-NPI-1 fusion protein, confirming the results of the yeast genetic system. Antisera raised against NPI-1 identified a 60-kDa polypeptide from total cellular extracts of both HeLa and MDBK cells. The viral nucleoprotein was coimmunoprecipitated from influenza A/WSN/33 virus-infected MDBK cells by anti-NPI-1 sera, demonstrating an interaction of these two proteins in infected cells. Similarly, NPI-1 was coimmunoprecipitated from MDBK cells by anti-NP sera. These experiments suggest that NPI-1 plays a role during influenza virus replication.

Analysis of influenza A virus nucleoproteins for the assessment of molecular genetic mechanisms leading to new phylogenetic virus lineages

The nucleoprotein (NP) gene of influenza A viruses is decisive for separating two large individually evolving reservoirs in birds and humans. A phylogenetic analysis of the NP gene revealed that all mammalian influenza viruses originated--directly or indirectly--from an avian ancestor. The stable introduction of an avian influenza A virus into a mammalian species seems to be a relatively rare event, the latest one occurred in 1979 when such an avian virus was introduced into pigs in Northern Europe which gave rise to a new lineage. At least two concomitant events are required for such a new and stable introduction: (1) The new species has to become infected, and (2) a mutation in the polymerase complex has to establish a labile variant, which is prone to provide a large number of different variants, from which some can adapt rapidly to the new host (or to any unusual environments). Since such mutator mutations might be advantageous only during stress periods, variants with a less error prone polymerase might emerge again after adaptation. Examples for such fluctuations in terms of mutational and evolutionary rates are discussed in this brief review.

Frequent isolation of intertypic poliovirus recombinants with serotype 2 specificity from vaccine-associated polio cases

Five representatives from a collection of 21 Sabin type 2-like poliovirus strains isolated from paralytic poliomyelitis cases in two regions of the USSR have been subjected to limited nucleotide sequencing. All proved to be intertypic recombinants having the genes encoding capsid proteins of Sabin 2 origin and a 3'-end portion of the genome derived from either type 1 (3 isolates) or type 3 (2 isolates) Sabin strains. The crossover points in all the 5 genomes have been mapped to different loci of the P3 region. At least 6 additional isolates from the same collection (and 2 isolates from healthy contacts), appeared to have a type 2/type 1 recombinant genome, as judged by oligonucleotide mapping. The biological significance of frequent occurrence of recombinants among field isolates of vaccine-related strains is discussed.

Two subtypes of nucleoproteins (NP) of influenza A viruses

The nucleoprotein (NP) genes of nine influenza A virus strains isolated from different species have been sequenced and the deduced amino acid sequences have been compared to published NP sequences and sequences in press. Two "subtypes" of NPs can clearly be defined, one "subtype" comprises the NPs found with all tested human and one porcine strain, and another "subtype" comprises the NPs found with all tested avian and equine, and some porcine strains and a mink virus. There are no significant differences between these two groups concerning secondary structure predictions. Pig viruses were the only ones whose NP can belong to the one or the other "subtype." Therefore, pigs can be regarded as "mixing vessels," where the two independently evolving reservoirs of influenza A viruses can meet for the creation of new pandemic strains by reassortment.

Effect of dimethylsulfoxide (DMSO) on virus replication and maturation

At intermediate concentrations of DMSO the yields of infectious virus and biologically active hemagglutinin and neuraminidase of an influenza A virus (fowl plague virus) and of reassortants therefrom are enhanced severalfold, even though viral protein synthesis is not significantly affected. A corresponding enhancing effect was also found with New castle disease and Semliki Forest viruses. At elevated concentrations of DMSO virus yield decreases, and under these conditions the synthesis of the late influenza virus proteins is specifically inhibited. The results indicate that DMSO can facilitate the assembly of virus particles, and viral components, which are normally produced in surplus amounts, now contribute to the maturation of infectious particles.

The molecular biology of influenza virus pathogenicity

It is an accepted concept that the pathogenicity of a virus is of polygenic nature. Because of their segmented genome, influenza viruses provide a suitable system to prove this concept. The studies employing virus mutants and reassortants have indicated that the pathogenicity depends on the functional integrity of each gene and on a gene constellation optimal for the infection of a given host. As a consequence, virtually every gene product of influenza virus has been reported to contribute to pathogenicity, but evidence is steadily growing that a key role has to be assigned to hemagglutinin. As the initiator of infection, hemagglutinin has a double function: (1) promotion of adsorption of the virus to the cell surface, and (2) penetration of the viral genome through a fusion process among viral and cellular membranes. Adsorption is based on the binding to neuraminic acid-containing receptors, and different virus strains display a distinct preference for specific oligosaccharides. Fusion capacity depends on proteolytic cleavage by host proteases, and variations in amino acid sequence at the cleavage site determine whether hemagglutinin is activated in a given cell. Differences in cleavability and presumably also in receptor specificity are important determinants for host tropism, spread of infection, and pathogenicity. The concept that proteolytic activation is a determinant for pathogenicity was originally derived from studies on avian influenza viruses, but there is now evidence that it may also be relevant for the disease in humans because bacterial proteases have been found to promote the development of influenza pneumonia in mammals.

Molecular aspects of the epidemiology of virus disease

With regard to molecular epidemiology, influenza A viruses belong to the best-studied virus systems. At least two large reservoirs of influenza A viruses have been built up in nature, one in humans and another one in water fowls. The latter one is very heterogenous, consisting of viruses belonging to 13 hemagglutinin (HA) and 9 neuraminidase (NA) subtypes in almost all possible combinations. The segmented structure of the influenza virus genome allows the creation of new influenza strains by reassortment. By replacement of the HA gene of human strains new pandemic viruses can be generated (antigenic shift). The particular structure of the HA enables the human influenza A-viruses to create variants which can escape the immune response of the host (antigenic drift). The nucleoprotein is responsible for keeping those two large reservoirs apart. Mixing of genes of viruses from these two reservoirs seems to happen predominantly by double infection of pigs, which apparently are tolerant for infection by either human or avian influenza viruses. The molecular mechanisms described for influenza viruses can be explained by the particular structure of their genome and their components and cannot be generalized. Each virus has developed its own strategy to multiply and to spread.

A new concept of the epidemic process of influenza A virus

Influenza A virus was discovered in 1933, and since then four major variants have caused all the epidemics of human influenza A. Each had an era of solo world prevalence until 1977 as follows: H0N1 (old style) strains until 1946, H1N1 (old style) strains until 1957, H2N2 strains until 1968, then H3N2 strains, which were joined in 1977 by a renewed prevalence of H1N1 (old style) strains. Serological studies show that H2N2 strains probably had had a previous era of world prevalence during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and had then been replaced by H3N2 strains from about 1900 to 1918. From about 1907 the H3N2 strains had been joined, as now, by H1N1 (old style) strains until both had been replaced in 1918 by a fifth major variant closely related to swine influenza virus A/Hswine1N1 (old style), which had then had an era of solo world prevalence in mankind until about 1929, when it had been replaced by the H0N1 strains that were first isolated in 1933. Eras of prevalence of a major variant have usually been initiated by a severe pandemic followed at intervals of a year or two by successive epidemics in each of which the nature of the virus is usually a little changed (antigenic drift), but not enough to permit frequent recurrent infections during the same era. Changes of major variant (antigenic shift) are large enough to permit reinfection. At both major and minor changes the strains of the previous variant tend to disappear and to be replaced within a single season, worldwide in the case of a major variant, or in the area of prevalence of a previous minor variant. Pandemics, epidemics and antigenic variations all occur seasonally, and influenza and its viruses virtually disappear from the population of any locality between epidemics, an interval of many consecutive months. A global view, however, shows influenza continually present in the world population, progressing each year south and then north, thus crossing the equator twice yearly around the equinoxes, the tropical monsoon periods. Influenza arrives in the temperate latitudes in the colder months, about 6 months separating its arrival in the two hemispheres. None of this behaviour is explained by the current concept that the virus is surviving like measles virus by direct spread from the sick providing endless chains of human influenza A.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)

The nucleoprotein as a possible major factor in determining host specificity of influenza H3N2 viruses

In an attempt to assess the importance of the nucleoprotein (NP) in the determination of host specificity, a series of experiments was performed on influenza A viruses of the H3N2 subtype. We have examined rescue of mutants of A/FPV/Rostock/34 with temperature-sensitive (ts) lesions in the nucleoprotein (NP) gene by double infection of chick embryo cells with H3N2 strains isolated from different species. The ts mutants could be rescued by all avian H3N2 strains but not by any of the human H3N2 isolates. Only two of the swine H3N2 strains tested were able to rescue our mutants. The NP gene of these two swine isolates resembled the NP gene of the avian strains genetically in the hybridization test. However, their NPs reacted differently with a set of monoclonal antibodies when compared with NPs of avian H3N2 strains. Concerning multiplication in ducks they behaved like the other swine and human strains. The phosphopeptide fingerprints of all swine isolates tested were alike and were different from those of human or avian origin. Our observations are compatible with the idea that human H3N2 strains might not be able to cross the species barrier to birds directly, and possibly also not the other way around, without prior reassortment in pigs, which seem to have a broader host range concerning the compatibility of the NP gene in reassortants.

Abortive infection of L cells by influenza B virus: defect in bud formation

Host-dependent restriction of influenza B virus replication in L cells was analysed in comparison with productive infection in MDCK or 1-5C-4 cells. The synthesis and intracellular distribution of virus-specific proteins and the production of cytoplasmic ribonucleoproteins in nonpermissive L cells were similar to those in permissive MDCK cells. However, an electron microscopic study of infected L cells showed neither extracellular virions nor budding virus particles on the cell surface, in contrast to MDCK cells which produced numerous virus particles. PAGE analysis of the plasma membrane isolated from the cells demonstrated no significant difference in the composition of viral polypeptides between permissive 1-5C-4 and nonpermissive L cells. It was noted that the abortiveness of influenza B virus infection in L cells may be due to a defect in host cell function involved in the initiation of virus budding.

Mouse neurotropic recombinants of influenza A viruses

Recombinants with known gene constellations between fowl plague virus (FPV) and various prototype influenza virus strains have been examined for neurovirulence in suckling mice. Strongly neurotropic recombinants were obtained from crosses between FPV and the strains virus N, Hong Kong, and PR8, but not between FPV and equi 2 or swine viruses. All highly neurotropic recombinants had RNA segment 4 (HA) derived from FPV and RNA segment 2 (Ptra gene) from the other prototype strain. The derivation of two other RNA segments of the polymerase complex, namely RNA segments 3 (Pol 2) and 5 (NP) and also segment 8 (NS) can modulate these properties. For example, if in recombinants between FPV and virus N in addition to RNA segment 2 also RNA segments 3 and/or 8 are derived from virus N, neurovirulence is further enhanced, while replacement of RNA segment 5 of FPV by the corresponding segment of virus N decreases or abolishes neurovirulence. The derivation of the other genes does not seem to be relevant for neurovirulence in the crosses mentioned above. Of the prototype strains tested, the turkey England (t. Engl.) strain is the only one which was highly neurotropic for suckling mice. Recombinants between FPV and t. Engl. which have kept the HA gene of t. Engl. were still neurotropic, while those with the HA gene of FPV were completely avirulent. The results obtained demonstrated that 1. the creation of influenza virus recombinants neurotropic for mice is not a rare event; 2. one of the parents should multiply well in mouse lungs; 3. the presence of a cleavable hemagglutinin is necessary, but not sufficient. In the pair FPV/turkey England the hemagglutinin of turkey England seems to determine neurovirulence.

Replication of avian influenza A viruses in mammals

The recent appearance of an avian influenza A virus in seals suggests that viruses are transmitted from birds to mammals in nature. To examine this possibility, avian viruses of different antigenic subtypes were evaluated for their ability to replicate in three mammals-pigs, ferrets, and cats. In each of these mammals, avian strains replicated to high titers in the respiratory tract (10(5) to 10(7) 50% egg infective doses per ml of nasal wash), with peak titers at 2 to 4 days post-inoculation, similar to the pattern of human and other mammalian viruses in these animals. Most avian strains were recovered for 5 to 9 days post-inoculation. One avian H1N1 virus initially replicated poorly in pigs, but was adapted to this host and even transmitted to other pigs. Replication of the avian viruses occurred in the respiratory tracts of mammals, whereas, in birds, they replicate in the intestinal tract as well. The infected mammals had no significant disease signs and produced low levels of humoral antibodies; however, challenge experiments in ferrets indicated that they were immune. These studies suggest that influenza A viruses currently circulating in avian species represent a source of viruses capable of infecting mammals, thereby contributing to the influenza A antigenic pool from which new pandemic strains may originate.

Intrinsic interference between swine influenza and fowl plague virus

Multiplication of swine influenza (SW) virus is inhibited by fowl plaque virus (FPV) at the level of RNA synthesis when host cells are infected with both viruses at a high multiplicity of infection. Under these conditions reassortment between the two viruses cannot be detected. The inhibitory effect of FPV is highly reduced and recombinants between the two viruses could be obtained when the cells were superinfected with FPV 1--2 hours after infection with SW virus, or after simultaneous infection with a low multiplicity of infection. The phenomenon is compatible with the intrinsic interference.

Defective interfering influenza viruses and host cells: establishment and maintenance of persistent influenza virus infection in MDBK and HeLa cells

WSN (H0N1) influenza virus upon undiluted passages in different species of cells, namely, bovine kidney (MDBK), chicken embryo (CEF), and HeLa cells, produced a varying amount of defective interfering (DI) virus which correlated well with the ability of the species of cell to produce infectious virus. However, the nature of the influenza DI viral RNA produced from a single clonal stock was essentially identical in all three cells types, suggesting that these cells do not exert a great selective pressure in the amplification of specific DI viral RNAs either at early or late passages. DI viruses produced from one subtype (H0N1) could interfere with the replication of infectious viruses belonging to other subtypes (H1N1, H3N2). DI viral RNAs could also replicate with the helper function of other subtype viruses. The persistent infection of MDBK and HeLa cells could be initiated by coinfecting cells with both temperature-sensitive mutants (ts-) and DI influenza viruses. Persistently infected cultures cultures at early passages (up to passage 7) showed a cyclical pattern of cell lysis and virus production (crisis), whereas, at later passages (after passage 20), they produced little or no virus and were resistant to infection by homologous virus but not by heterologous virus. The majority of persistently infected cells, however, contained the complete viral genome since they expressed viral antigens and produced infectious centers. Selection of a slow-growing temperature-sensitive variant rather than the presence of DI virus or interferon appears to be critical in maintaining persistent influenza infection in these cells.

Neurovirulence mutant of vesicular stomatitis virus with an altered target cell tropism in vivo

Intracerebral infection of weanling Swiss mice with a temperature-sensitive (ts) mutant of vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV), ts pi364, resulted in a unique neuropathological syndrome not previously described with other VSV mutants. Mice infected with wild-type VSV died from an acute encephalitis characterized by neuronal necrosis and efficient virus replication in both brain and spinal cord. In contrast, with VSV ts pi364, the most prominent histopathological feature was destruction of the ependyma of the lateral ventricles. Virus antigen was also limited to the leptomeninges and the lateral ventricles. Infected mice survived and developed hydrocephalus. Replication of ts pi364 in the brain was 10- to 100- fold less than that of wild-type VSV, and appearance of virus in the spinal cord was delayed. VSV ts pi364 was isolated from mouse cells persistently infected with VSV. Another VSV ts pi mutant, isolated from the same persistent infection, behaved in vivo like wild-type VSV, even though both mutants were very similar in plaque size, reversion frequency, cut-off temperature, and synthesis of virus-specific proteins at semipermissive temperature. These results strongly suggest that VSV ts pi364 has a second, non-ts mutation which results in a restricted target cell range in vivo; wild-type VSV can infect both neurons and ependymal cells, whereas ts pi364 does not replicate in neurons.