Evolving cooperation: the role of individual recognition

Group Formation and the Evolution of Human Social Organization

Humans operate in groups that are oftentimes nested in multilayered collectives such as work units within departments and companies, neighborhoods within cities, and regions within nation states. With psychological science mostly focusing on proximate reasons for individuals to join existing groups and how existing groups function, we still poorly understand why groups form ex nihilo, how groups evolve into complex multilayered social structures, and what explains fission-fusion dynamics. Here we address group formation and the evolution of social organization at both the proximate and ultimate level of analysis. Building on models of fitness interdependence and cooperation, we propose that socioecologies can create positive interdependencies among strangers and pave the way for the formation of stable coalitions and groups through reciprocity and reputation-based partner selection. Such groups are marked by in-group bounded, parochial cooperation together with an array of social institutions for managing the commons, allowing groups to scale in size and complexity while avoiding the breakdown of cooperation. Our analysis reveals how distinct group cultures can endogenously emerge from reciprocal cooperation, shows that social identification and group commitment are likely consequences rather than causes of group cooperation, and explains when intergroup relations gravitate toward peaceful coexistence, integration, or conflict.

Bonobos and chimpanzees remember familiar conspecifics for decades

Recognition and memory of familiar conspecifics provides the foundation for complex sociality and is vital to navigating an unpredictable social world [Tibbetts and Dale, Trends Ecol. Evol. 22, 529-537 (2007)]. Human social memory incorporates content about interactions and relationships and can last for decades [Sherry and Schacter, Psychol. Rev. 94, 439-454 (1987)]. Long-term social memory likely played a key role throughout human evolution, as our ancestors increasingly built relationships that operated across distant space and time [Malone et al., Int. J. Primatol. 33, 1251-1277 (2012)]. Although individual recognition is widespread among animals and sometimes lasts for years, little is known about social memory in nonhuman apes and the shared evolutionary foundations of human social memory. In a preferential-looking eye-tracking task, we presented chimpanzees and bonobos (N = 26) with side-by-side images of a previous groupmate and a conspecific stranger of the same sex. Apes' attention was biased toward former groupmates, indicating long-term memory for past social partners. The strength of biases toward former groupmates was not impacted by the duration apart, and our results suggest that recognition may persist for at least 26 y beyond separation. We also found significant but weak evidence that, like humans, apes may remember the quality or content of these past relationships: apes' looking biases were stronger for individuals with whom they had more positive histories of social interaction. Long-lasting social memory likely provided key foundations for the evolution of human culture and sociality as they extended across time, space, and group boundaries.

Evidence for a selective link between cooperation and individual recognition

The ability to recognize others is a frequent assumption of models of the evolution of cooperation. At the same time, cooperative behavior has been proposed as a selective agent favoring the evolution of individual recognition abilities. Although theory predicts that recognition and cooperation may co-evolve, data linking recognition abilities and cooperative behavior with evidence of selection are elusive. Here, we provide evidence of a selective link between individual recognition and cooperation in the paper wasp Polistes fuscatus through a combination of clinal, common garden, and population genomics analyses. We identified latitudinal clines in both rates of cooperative nesting and color pattern diversity, consistent with a selective link between recognition and cooperation. In behavioral experiments, we replicated previous results demonstrating individual recognition in cooperative and phenotypically diverse P. fuscatus from New York. In contrast, wasps from a less cooperative and phenotypically uniform Louisiana population showed no evidence of individual recognition. In a common garden experiment, groups of wasps from northern populations formed more stable and individually biased associations, indicating that recognition facilitates group stability. The strength of recent positive selection on cognition-associated loci likely to mediate individual recognition is substantially greater in northern compared with southern P. fuscatus populations. Collectively, these data suggest that individual recognition and cooperative nesting behavior have co-evolved in P. fuscatus because recognition helps stabilize social groups. This work provides evidence of a specific cognitive phenotype under selection because of social interactions, supporting the idea that social behavior can be a key driver of cognitive evolution.

Identity signaling, identity reception, and the evolution of social recognition in a Neotropical frog

Animals recognize familiar individuals to perform a variety of important social behaviors. Social recognition is often mediated by communication between signalers who produce signals that contain identity information and receivers who categorize these signals based on previous experience. We tested two hypotheses about adaptations in signalers and receivers that enable the evolution of social recognition using two species of closely related territorial poison frogs. Male golden rocket frogs (Anomaloglossus beebei) recognize the advertisement calls of conspecific territory neighbors and display a "dear enemy effect" by responding less aggressively to neighbors than strangers, whereas male Kai rocket frogs (Anomaloglossus kaiei) do not. Our results did not support the identity signaling hypothesis: both species produced advertisement calls that contain similar amounts of identity information. Our results did support the identity reception hypothesis: both species exhibited habituation of aggression to playbacks simulating the arrival of a new neighbor, but only golden rocket frogs showed renewed aggression when they subsequently heard calls from a different male. These results suggest that an ancestral mechanism of plasticity in aggression common among frogs has been modified through natural selection to be specific to calls of individual males in golden rocket frogs, enabling a social recognition system.

Coevolution of cognitive abilities and identity signals in individual recognition systems

Social interactions are mediated by recognition systems, meaning that the cognitive abilities or phenotypic diversity that facilitate recognition may be common targets of social selection. Recognition occurs when a receiver compares the phenotypes produced by a sender with a template. Coevolution between sender and receiver traits has been empirically reported in multiple species and sensory modalities, though the dynamics and relative exaggeration of traits from senders versus receivers have received little attention. Here, we present a coevolutionary dynamic model that examines the conditions under which senders and receivers should invest effort in facilitating individual recognition. The model predicts coevolution of sender and receiver traits, with the equilibrium investment dependent on the relative costs of signal production versus cognition. In order for recognition to evolve, initial sender and receiver trait values must be above a threshold, suggesting that recognition requires some degree of pre-existing diversity and cognitive abilities. The analysis of selection gradients demonstrates that the strength of selection on sender signals and receiver cognition is strongest when the trait values are furthest from the optima. The model provides new insights into the expected strength and dynamics of selection during the origin and elaboration of individual recognition, an important feature of social cognition in many taxa. This article is part of the theme issue 'Signal detection theory in recognition systems: from evolving models to experimental tests'.

Automatic acoustic identification of individuals in multiple species: improving identification across recording conditions

Many animals emit vocal sounds which, independently from the sounds' function, contain some individually distinctive signature. Thus the automatic recognition of individuals by sound is a potentially powerful tool for zoology and ecology research and practical monitoring. Here, we present a general automatic identification method that can work across multiple animal species with various levels of complexity in their communication systems. We further introduce new analysis techniques based on dataset manipulations that can evaluate the robustness and generality of a classifier. By using these techniques, we confirmed the presence of experimental confounds in situations resembling those from past studies. We introduce data manipulations that can reduce the impact of these confounds, compatible with any classifier. We suggest that assessment of confounds should become a standard part of future studies to ensure they do not report over-optimistic results. We provide annotated recordings used for analyses along with this study and we call for dataset sharing to be a common practice to enhance the development of methods and comparisons of results.

Evolutionarily stable investments in recognition systems explain patterns of discrimination failure and success

Many animals are able to perform recognition feats that astound us-such as a rodent recognizing kin it has never met. Yet in other contexts, animals appear clueless as when reed warblers rear cuckoo chicks that bear no resemblance to their own species. Failures of recognition when it would seem adaptive have been especially puzzling. Here, we present a simple tug-of-war game theory model examining how individuals should optimally invest in affecting the accuracy of discrimination between desirable and undesirable recipients. In the game, discriminating individuals (operators) and desirable and undesirable recipients (targets and mimics, respectively) can all invest effort into their own preferred outcome. We demonstrate that stable inaccurate recognition will arise when undesirable recipients have large fitness gains from inaccurate recognition relative to the pay-offs that the other two parties receive from accurate recognition. The probability of accurate recognition is often determined by just the relative pay-offs to the desirable and undesirable recipients, rather than to the discriminator. Our results provide a new lens on long-standing puzzles including a lack of nepotism in social insect colonies, tolerance of brood parasites and male birds caring for extra-pair young in their nests, which our model suggests should often lack accurate discrimination. This article is part of the theme issue 'Signal detection theory in recognition systems: from evolving models to experimental tests'.

Dogs' recognition of human selfish and generous attitudes requires little but critical experience with people

There is some dispute regarding the role of experience in the development of dogs´ socio-cognitive abilities in their interaction with people. We sought to provide new evidence to this debate by comparing dogs with contrasting levels of experience with humans, in a task involving the discrimination of human generous and selfish attitudes. To this end, we compared the performance of adult family dogs against that of adult shelter dogs and puppies living in people´s homes. In training trials, the generous experimenter (G) signaled the bowl with food and allowed the dog to eat, whereas the selfish experimenter (S) also signaled the baited bowl, but she/he ate the food before the dog could have access to it. Then, subjects were allowed to freely choose between G and S in the choice test. The main finding was that adult subjects (both family and shelter dogs) developed a preference for G over S, but puppies did not. We conclude that the quality and/or quantity of everyday-contact with people did not affect the discrimination of human attitudes in the present protocol, but the amount of experience with people (in years) did matter. Finally, we discuss the relative role of domestication and ontogeny in the development of dogs´ socio-cognitive abilities.

Specific recognition of reproductive parasite workers by nest-entrance guards in the bumble bee Bombus terrestris

Background

The impact of social parasites on their hosts’ fitness is a strong selective pressure that can lead to the evolution of adapted defence strategies. Guarding the nest to prevent the intrusion of parasites is a widespread response of host species. If absolute rejection of strangers provides the best protection against parasites, more fine-tuned strategies can prove more adaptive. Guarding is indeed costly and not all strangers constitute a real threat. That is particularly true for worker reproductive parasitism in social insects since only a fraction of non-nestmate visitors, the fertile ones, can readily engage in parasitic reproduction. Guards should thus be more restrictive towards fertile than sterile non-nestmate workers. We here tested this hypothesis by examining the reaction of nest-entrance guards towards nestmate and non-nestmate workers with varying fertility levels in the bumble bee Bombus terrestris. Because social recognition in social insects mainly relies on cuticular lipids (CLs), chemical analysis was also conducted to examine whether workers’ CLs could convey the relevant information upon which guards could base their decision. We thus aimed to determine whether an adapted defensive strategy to worker reproductive parasitism has evolved in B. terrestris colonies.

Results

Chemical analysis revealed that the cuticular chemical profiles of workers encode information about both their colony membership and their current fertility, therefore providing potential recognition cues for a suitable adjustment of the guards’ defensive decisions. We found that guards were similarly tolerant towards sterile non-nestmate workers than towards nestmate workers. However, as predicted, guards responded more aggressively towards fertile non-nestmates.

Conclusion

Our results show that B. terrestris guards discriminate non-nestmates that differ in their reproductive potential and respond more strongly to the individuals that are a greatest threat for the colony. Cuticular hydrocarbons are the probable cues underlying the specific recognition of reproductive parasites, with the specific profile of highly fertile bees eliciting the agonistic response when combined with non-colony membership information. Our study therefore provides a first piece of empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that an adapted defensive strategy against worker reproductive parasitism exists in B. terrestris colonies.

Evolution of identity signals: frequency-dependent benefits of distinctive phenotypes used for individual recognition

Identifying broad-scale evolutionary processes that maintain phenotypic polymorphisms has been a major goal of modern evolutionary biology. There are numerous mechanisms, such as negative frequency-dependent selection, that may maintain polymorphisms, although it is unknown which mechanisms are prominent in nature. Traits used for individual recognition are strikingly variable and have evolved independently in numerous lineages, providing an excellent model to investigate which factors maintain ecologically relevant phenotypic polymorphisms. Theoretical models suggest that individuals may benefit by advertising their identities with distinctive, recognizable phenotypes. Here, we test the benefits of advertising one's identity with a distinctive phenotype. We manipulated the appearance of Polistes fuscatus paper wasp groups so that three individuals had the same appearance and one individual had a unique, easily recognizable appearance. We found that individuals with distinctive appearances received less aggression than individuals with nondistinctive appearances. Therefore, individuals benefit by advertising their identity with a unique phenotype. Our results provide a potential mechanism through which negative frequency-dependent selection may maintain the polymorphic identity signals in P. fuscatus. Given that recognition is important for many social interactions, selection for distinctive identity signals may be an underappreciated and widespread mechanism underlying the evolution of phenotypic polymorphisms in social taxa.

Evolutionary stability of egg trading and parceling in simultaneous hermaphrodites: The chalk bass revisited

Several species of simultaneously hermaphroditic seabasses living on coral reefs mate by alternating male and female roles with a partner. This is known as egg trading, one of the classic and most widely cited examples of social reciprocity among animals. Some of the egg-trading seabass species, including the chalk bass, Serranus tortugarum, switch mating roles repeatedly, having subdivided their clutch of eggs into parcels offered to the partner for fertilization. Here we attempt to understand these dynamics as a pair of evolutionary games, modifying some previous approaches to better reflect the biological system. We find that the trading of egg clutches is evolutionarily stable via byproduct mutualism and resistant to invasion by rare individuals that take the male role exclusively. We note why and how parceling may reflect sexual conflict between individuals in the mating pair. We estimate evolutionarily stable parcel numbers and show how they depend on parameter values. Typically, two or more sequential parcel numbers are evolutionarily stable, though the lowest of these yields the highest fitness. Assuming that parcel numbers are adjusted to local conditions, we predict that parcel numbers in nature are inversely related both to mating group density (except at low density) and predation risk.

Complex social behaviour can select for variability in visual features: a case study in Polistes wasps

The ability to recognize individuals is common in animals; however, we know little about why the phenotypic variability necessary for individual recognition has evolved in some animals but not others. One possibility is that natural selection favours variability in some social contexts but not in others. Polistes fuscatus wasps have variable facial and abdominal markings used for individual recognition within their complex societies. Here, I explore whether social behaviour can select for variability by examining the relationship between social behaviour and variability in visual features (marking variability) across social wasp taxa. Analysis using a concentrated changes test demonstrates that marking variability is significantly associated with nesting strategy. Species with flexible nest-founding strategies have highly variable markings, whereas species without flexible nest-founding strategies have low marking variability. These results suggest that: (i) individual recognition may be widespread in the social wasps, and (ii) natural selection may play a role in the origin and maintenance of the variable distinctive markings. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that species with flexible nesting strategies have reproductive transactions, a type of complex social behaviour predicted to require individual recognition. Therefore, the reproductive transactions of flexible species may select for highly variable individuals who are easy to identify as individuals. Further, selection for distinctiveness may provide an alternative explanation for the evolution of phenotypic diversity.

Hawks, doves, and mixed-symmetry games

The hawk-dove game has proved to be an important tool for understanding the role of aggression in social interactions. Here, the game is presented in a more general form (GHD) to facilitate analyses of interactions between individuals that may differ in "size", where size is interpreted as a surrogate for resource holding power. Three different situations are considered, based on the availability and use of information that interacting individuals have about their sizes: the classical symmetric case, in which no information about sizes is used, the asymmetric case, in which the individuals know their relative sizes and thus their chances of prevailing in combat, and a mixed-symmetry case, in which each individual only knows its own size (or only knows its opponent's size). I describe and use some recently developed methods for multitype games-evolutionary games involving two or more categories of players. With these methods and others, the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) that emerge for the three different cases are identified and compared. A proof of the form and uniqueness of the ESS for the mixed-symmetry case is presented. In this situation, one size category at most can play a mixed strategy; larger individuals are aggressive and smaller individuals are not. As the number of size categories approaches infinity and the size distribution becomes continuous, there is a threshold size, above which all individuals are aggressive, and below which they are not.

The evolution of quantitatively responsive cooperative trade

The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma reflects the essence of repeated cooperative interactions with selfish incentives. However, the classical form of this game assumes that individuals either cooperate or defect, whereas in practice different degrees of cooperation are usually possible. To overcome this limitation, we present a model of alternating cooperative trade in which individuals controlled the costs they incurred in benefiting their partners. Since the range of possible strategies is enormous, competitively successful solutions were identified using a genetic algorithm, a powerful search technique in which good performers are iteratively selected and recombined from an initial "strategy soup". Beginning with a population of asocial individuals, altruistic behaviour readily emerged. Like the pre-defined strategy of "Raise-the-Stakes", the emerging strategies evolved protection from cheats by investing relatively little in strangers and subsequently responding quantitatively to a partner's altruism. Unlike "Raise-the-Stakes", they began trading relations at intermediate levels and, when the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation was relatively low, mean investment was considerably below the maximum level. Our approach is novel in allowing us to predict not just whether cooperation will occur, but how cooperative individuals will be, in relation to factors such as the number of rounds and the cost effectiveness of cooperative trade.

The continuous prisoner's dilemma: I. linear reactive strategies

We present a general model for the Prisoner's Dilemma in which variable degrees of cooperation are possible, and payoffs are scaled accordingly. We describe a continuous strategy space, and divide this space into strategy families. We derive the payoff function for these families analytically, and study the evolutionary outcome when a wide range of strategies play against each other. Our results show that the initial degree of cooperation offered by a strategy is a decisive factor for evolutionary robustness: the most successful strategies in our model offer full cooperation as an initial move, but thereafter cooperate fully only if their opponent does the same. These strategies gradually raise the stakes when playing a strategy which is initially reticent to cooperate, but differ from the strategies predicted by other continuous models in that they are not only generous, but are also consistently optimistic and uncompromising.

Evolving cooperation: strategies as hierarchies of rules

To better understand the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative strategies and their behavioral components in populations subjected to individual selection, a new classifier-system model (EvA) was developed. In EvA, strategies are encoded as algorithms composed of a fixed number of rules relating behavior remembered from the recent past to the present action to be taken. Each algorithm is the genotype of an individual within the population, and these individuals play the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game against each other to determine their relative contributions to the next generation. The rules are hierarchical, with more specific rules, when they apply, overriding more general rules. Maximal mutual cooperation was obtained when interaction sequences for each pair of individuals playing the game were long, when only the immediately preceeding plays in the game were remembered, and when the algorithms consisted of an intermediate number of rules (20-40). Under other conditions, mutual cooperation was reduced--even becoming less frequent than would be expected if behavior were completely random, with very few rules per algorithm. The algorithms that evolved could sometimes be recognized as Tit-For-Tat, Simpleton, or other well-known strategies; but when memory of several previous events was invoked by algorithms based on a substantial number of rules, the resulting strategies were considerably more complex. This approach shows considerable promise for providing a much deeper understanding of how cooperation may evolve in nature. Moreover, classifier-system models could prove to be broadly useful for addressing many optimization questions in biology.

Spatialization and greater generosity in the stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma

The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has become the standard model for the evolution of cooperative behavior within a community of egoistic agents, frequently cited for implications in both sociology and biology. Due primarily to the work of Axelrod (1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1985), a strategy of tit for tat (TFT) has established a reputation as being particularly robust. Nowak and Sigmund (1992) have shown, however, that in a world of stochastic error or imperfect communication, it is not TFT that finally triumphs in an ecological model based on population percentages (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981), but 'generous tit for tat' (GTFT), which repays cooperation with a probability of cooperation approaching 1 but forgives defection with a probability of 1/3. In this paper, we consider a spatialized instantiation of the stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma, using two-dimensional cellular automata (Wolfram, 1984, 1986; Gutowitz, 1990) to model the spatial dynamics of populations of competing strategies. The surprising result is that in the spatial model it is not GTFT but still more generous strategies that are favored. The optimal strategy within this spatial ecology appears to be a form of 'bending over backwards', which returns cooperation for defection with a probability of 2/3--a rate twice as generous as GTFT.