“I could never have expected it to happen”: The reversal of the hindsight bias

Only Familiar Information is a "Curse": Children's Ability to Predict What Their Peers Know

The ability to make inferences about what one's peers know is critical for social interaction and communication. Three experiments (n = 309) examined the curse of knowledge, the tendency to be biased by one's knowledge when reasoning about others' knowledge, in children's estimates of their peers' knowledge. Four- to 7-year-olds were taught the answers to factual questions and estimated how many peers would know the answers. When children learned familiar answers, they showed a curse of knowledge in their peer estimates. But, when children learned unfamiliar answers to the same questions, they did not show a curse of knowledge. These data shed light on the mechanisms underlying perspective taking, supporting a fluency misattribution account of the curse of knowledge.

Infinity: A Cognitive Challenge

Dealing with infinity, an inherently abstract concept which defies concrete representation, involves distinct cognitive difficulties. I first review the research on the development of children's understanding of the endlessness of numbers and of the infinite gap between a large finite set and an infinite set. Second, I consider the contradictions with which mathematicians and philosophers have to cope when attempting to manipulate infinity concepts in a coherent way. These difficulties are highlighted by analyzing one perplexing paradox. Finally, I discuss the intellect's puzzling ability to transcend the limits of our finitely based intuitions, as manifested in science and higher mathematics, and the need to thoroughly explore the emergence of that kind of human capability.

The Effectiveness of Collective Retrospection as a Mechanism of Organizational Learning

Retrospective reviews of projects have been proposed as mechanisms for organizational learning, and there is the possibility that in a collective setting some of the cognitive limitations associated with individuals’ retrospections can be mitigated. In a qualitative analysis of retrospective reviews held in three design organizations, evidence emerged both of successes and failures in the extent to which reviews led to convincing explanations of events and remedies for future projects. The review processes showed that individuals could successfully correct errors in others’ beliefs and that in the organizational setting they were sensitive to hindsight bias. They also showed that simulation was an important mechanism by which remedies could be tested, and surrogate experiences added to the concrete experiences of the project under review. However, the information available to the participants often was not diagnostic, the participants’interpretation of events tended to be ahistorical, and their explanations were overly specific.

A retrieval-based approach to eliminating hindsight bias

Individuals exhibit hindsight bias when they are unable to recall their original responses to novel questions after correct answers are provided to them. Prior studies have eliminated hindsight bias by modifying the conditions under which original judgments or correct answers are encoded. Here, we explored whether hindsight bias can be eliminated by manipulating the conditions that hold at retrieval. Our retrieval-based approach predicts that if the conditions at retrieval enable sufficient discrimination of memory representations of original judgments from memory representations of correct answers, then hindsight bias will be reduced or eliminated. Experiment 1 used the standard memory design to replicate the hindsight bias effect in middle-school students. Experiments 2 and 3 modified the retrieval phase of this design, instructing participants beforehand that they would be recalling both their original judgments and the correct answers. As predicted, this enabled participants to form compound retrieval cues that discriminated original judgment traces from correct answer traces, and eliminated hindsight bias. Experiment 4 found that when participants were not instructed beforehand that they would be making both recalls, they did not form discriminating retrieval cues, and hindsight bias returned. These experiments delineate the retrieval conditions that produce-and fail to produce-hindsight bias.

Perceiving events as both inevitable and unforeseeable in hindsight: The Leipzig candidacy for the Olympics

We present a new conceptualization of hindsight bias in terms of three separate hindsight components (foreseeability impressions, perceptions of necessity and memory distortions) and report three kinds of supporting evidence from an internet study (N = 101) of the unsuccessful application of the City of Leipzig to host the Olympic Games: (1) strongly diverging hindsight effects, (2) low intercorrelations between the components, and (3) dissociative effects of third variables on them. Specifically, experiencing the failure of the application as personally negative (due to a pro-application attitude and previous commitment), led to perceiving it as inevitable but also as unforeseeable. This surprising result helps to resolve seeming contradictions between previous findings (Louie, 1999; Mark et al., 2003; Tykocinski, 2001) by relating the opposite hindsight effects to differences in the nature and functions (dissonance reduction vs. coping with disappointment) of the foreseeability and necessity components.

How many hindsight biases are there?

The answer is three: questioning a conceptual default assumption in hindsight bias research, we argue that the hindsight bias is not a unitary phenomenon but consists of three separable and partially independent subphenomena or components, namely, memory distortions, impressions of foreseeability and impressions of necessity. Following a detailed conceptual analysis including a systematic survey of hindsight characterizations in the published literature, we investigated these hindsight components in the context of political elections. We present evidence from three empirical studies that impressions of foreseeability and memory distortions (1) show hindsight effects that typically differ in magnitude and sometimes even in direction, (2) are essentially uncorrelated, and (3) are differentially influenced by extraneous variables. A fourth study found similar dissociations between memory distortions and impressions of necessity. All four studies thus provide support for a separate components view of the hindsight bias. An important consequence of such a view is that apparent contradictions in research findings as well as in theoretical explanations (e.g., cognitive vs. social-motivational) might be alleviated by taking differences between components into account. We also suggest conditions under which the components diverge or converge.

Evolving Judgments of Terror Risks: Foresight, Hindsight, and Emotion

The authors examined the evolution of cognitive and emotional responses to terror risks for a nationally representative sample of Americans between late 2001 and late 2002. Respondents' risk judgments changed in ways consistent with their reported personal experiences. However, they did not recognize these changes, producing hindsight bias in memories for their judgments. An intensive debiasing procedure failed to restore a foresightful perspective. A fear-inducing manipulation increased risk estimates, whereas an anger-inducing manipulation reduced them-both in predictions (as previously observed) and in memories and judgments of past risks. Thus, priming emotions shaped not only perceptions of an abstract future but also perceptions of a concrete past. These results suggest how psychological research can help to ensure an informed public.

Hindsight bias: how knowledge and heuristics affect our reconstruction of the past

Once people know the outcome of an event, they tend to overestimate what could have been anticipated in foresight. Although typically considered to be a robust phenomenon, this hindsight bias is subject to moderating circumstances. In their meta-analysis, Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) observed that the more experience people have with the task under consideration, the smaller is the resulting hindsight bias. This observation is one benchmark against which the explanatory power of process models of hindsight bias can be measured. Therefore, we used it to put the recently proposed RAFT model (Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000) to another test. Our findings were consistent with the "expertise effect." Specifically, we observed-using computer simulations of the RAFT model-that the more comprehensive people's knowledge is in foresight, the smaller is their hindsight bias. In addition, we made two counterintuitive observations: First, the relation between foresight knowledge and hindsight bias appears to be independent of how knowledge is processed. Second, even if foresight knowledge is false, it can reduce hindsight bias. We conclude with a discussion of the functional value of hindsight bias.

Hindsight Bias in Gustatory Judgments

Abstract. Being in hindsight, people tend to overestimate what they had known in foresight. This phenomenon has been studied for a wide variety of knowledge domains (e.g., episodes with uncertain outcomes, or solutions to almanac questions). As a result of these studies, hindsight bias turned out to be a robust phenomenon. In this paper, we present two experiments that successfully extended the domain of hindsight bias to gustatory judgments. Participants tasted different food items and were asked to estimate the quantity of a certain ingredient, for example, the residual sugar in a white wine. Judgments in both experiments were systematically biased towards previously presented low or high values that were labeled as the true quantities. Thus, hindsight bias can be considered a phenomenon that extends well beyond the judgment domains studied so far.

Hindsight bias after receiving self-relevant health risk information: A motivational perspective

The phenomenon of hindsight bias was explored in the context of self-relevant health risk information. Participants in a community screening estimated their cholesterol level (foresight measure) before receiving positive or negative feedback based on their actual cholesterol level. Hindsight estimations were then assessed twice: once immediately after the feedback, and again several weeks later. While the unexpected positive feedback group showed no systematic recall bias, hindsight estimations of individuals receiving unexpectedly negative feedback showed a dynamic change over time. Immediately after the feedback, participants' recollection of their expected cholesterol level were shifted towards their actual cholesterol level (hindsight bias). In contrast, several weeks later, foresight estimations were recalled as less accurate than they had been (reversed hindsight bias). These data might reflect a change of the motivational focus from "hot affect" and fear control, which occur immediately after receiving negative feedback, to danger control, which occurs some time after the feedback, as proposed by the dual process model.

"I couldn't have seen it coming": The impact of negative self-relevant outcomes on retrospections about foreseeability

We examined a phenomenon related to hindsight bias, specifically, retrospective judgements about the foreseeability of an outcome. We predicted that negative, self-relevant outcomes would be judged as less foreseeable by the recipient of the outcome than by others, unlike either positive outcomes or outcomes that are not self-relevant. In the context of a "stock market decision-making game", the hypothetical stock selected by one of two players showed an extreme increase or decrease. As predicted, the player who received an extreme negative outcome reported that this outcome was less foreseeable than did the opponent and an observer, for whom the outcome was less self-relevant. For no other kind of outcome was there a difference between the recipient of an outcome, the opponent, and the observer. The findings have several implications, including the possibility that hindsight bias should be considered as a special case of retrospective foreseeability.

Surprise, defence, or making sense: What removes hindsight bias?

This paper examines predictions concerning the absence of hindsight bias. Some hypothesise that because hindsight bias increases with outcome "surprisingness", only unsurprising outcomes will remove it. Others suggest the opposite-that very surprising outcomes will reduce or reverse the bias. A proposed sense-making model suggests that unexpected outcomes (i.e., initially surprising) invoke greater sensemaking, which typically produces greater hindsight bias. If the process is not successful, however, the bias may be reduced or reversed. Expected outcomes will also produce little hindsight bias, but only because they invoke relatively little sensemaking in the first place. Feelings of surprise arising from sensemaking (i.e., resultant surprise) should be inversely related to hindsight bias. Results of four experiments provide support for the model. A secondary goal was to determine the boundaries of a defensive-processing mechanism also thought to reduce hindsight bias for negative, self-relevant outcomes. Results suggest that a sense of responsibility for the outcome may be necessary for defensive processing to be activated.

Strength of hindsight bias as a consequence of meta-cognitions

Hindsight bias is the tendency of people to falsely believe that they would have correctly predicted the outcome of an event once it is known. The present paper addresses the ongoing debate as to whether the hindsight bias is due to memory impairment or biased reconstruction. The memory impairment approach maintains that outcome information alters the memory trace of the initial judgement, whereas the biased reconstruction approach assumes that people who have forgotten their initial judgements are forced to guess and, in the presence of outcome information, are likely to use this information as an anchor. Whereas the latter approach emphasises the role of meta-cognitive considerations, meta-cognitions are not included in the memory impairment explanation. Two experiments show that the biased reconstruction approach provides a better explanation for empirical findings in hindsight bias research than does the memory impairment explanation.

SARA: A cognitive process model to simulate the anchoring effect and hindsight bias

The cognitive process model "SARA" aims to explain the anchoring effect and hindsight bias by making detailed assumptions about the representation and alteration of item-specific knowledge. The model assumes that all processes, namely generating an estimate, encoding new information (i.e., the "anchor"), and reconstructing a previously generated estimate, are based on a probabilistic sampling process. Sampling probes long-term memory in order to retrieve information into working memory. Retrieval depends on the associative strength between this information and the currently active retrieval cues. Encoding the anchor may alter this associative pattern ("selective activation") or the anchor may serve as a retrieval cue, thus directing memory search ("biased reconstruction"). Both processes lead to systematically changed retrieval probabilities, thus causing the anchoring effect or hindsight bias. The model is completely formalised and implemented as a computer program. A series of simulations demonstrates the power of SARA to reproduce empirical findings and to predict new ones.

Hindsight Bias Around the World

Hindsight bias refers to the tendency to overestimate in hindsight what one has known in foresight. Recently, two experiments extended the research to include samples from different cultures ( Choi & Nisbett, 2000 ; Heine & Lehman, 1996 ). Asking their participants what they would have guessed before they knew the outcome (“hypothetical design”), Choi and Nisbett (2000 ) found that Koreans, in comparison to North Americans, exhibited more hindsight bias. Heine and Lehman (1996 ), however, reported that Japanese people in comparison to Canadians showed marginally less hindsight bias. In a second study, in which participants were asked to recall what they had estimated before they knew the outcome (“memory design”), the latter authors found no difference in hindsight bias between Japanese people and Canadians. We extended these studies with 225 Internet participants, in a hypothetical design, from four different continents (Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America). Hindsight bias was large and similar for all samples except for German and Dutch participants who showed no hindsight bias at all. While the latter effect may be based on peculiarities of the material and of the participants, the former underscores the worldwide stability of the phenomenon. In addition a follow-up surprise rating (paper and pencil) in China (35 participants) and Germany (20 participants) revealed that only less surprising items led to hindsight bias while more surprising ones did not. We suggest that the basic cognitive processes leading to hindsight bias are by-products of the evolutionary-evolved capacity of adaptive learning. On top of these basic processes, individual meta-cognitions (e.g., elicited by surprise) or motives (e.g., a self-serving motive) may further moderate the amount of bias, thus explaining the diverging results of Choi and Nisbett (2000 ), Heine and Lehman (1996 ), and our own study.