Message Position, Information Processing, and Persuasion

Falling Vocal Intonation Signals Speaker Confidence and Conditionally Boosts Persuasion

People are often advised to project confidence with their bodies and voices to convince others. Prior research has focused on the high and low thinking processes through which vocal confidence signals (e.g., fast speed, falling intonation, low pitch) can influence attitude change. In contrast, this research examines how the vocal confidence of speakers operates under more moderate elaboration levels, revealing that falling intonation only benefits persuasion under certain circumstances. In three experiments, we show that falling (vs. rising) vocal intonation at the ends of sentences can signal speaker confidence. Under moderate elaboration conditions, falling (vs. rising) vocal intonation increased message processing, bolstering the benefit of strong over weak messages, increasing the proportion of message-relevant thoughts, and increasing thought-attitude correspondence. In sum, the present work examined an unstudied role of vocal confidence in guiding persuasion, revealing new processes by which vocal signals increase or fail to increase persuasion.

Defensive Confidence and Certainty in Unchanged Attitudes: The Role of Affect-Cognition Matching

Despite much prior research on matching appeals to the affective-cognitive orientation of attitudes, little attention has focused on the consequences of affect-cognition (mis)matching when individuals resist persuasion. We propose that unlike a matched attack, an attack that is mismatched to the affective-cognitive orientation of attitudes would result in low defensive confidence individuals holding onto their unchanged attitudes with less certainty than high defensive confidence individuals. As hypothesized, low defensive confidence participants were less certain after an affective than a cognitive attack for a cognitive issue (Study 1), and the opposite was true for an affective issue (Study 2). Both patterns occurred again when the affective-cognitive orientation of attitudes was manipulated (Study 3) or measured as an individual difference (Study 4). Moreover, perceived knowledge mediated the effects on attitude certainty (Study 4). We end by discussing implications for our understanding of affect-cognition matching and attitude certainty.

Too Much Information! The Interplay of Argument Quality and Subjective Difficulty in Attitude Judgment

Paradoxically, people sometimes express weaker attitudes after generating more supporting arguments, a phenomenon usually attributed to subjective difficulty of generating them. We propose, however, that generating too many arguments compromises their evidentiary quality, which additionally explains attitude change. In Studies 1 and 2, Mechanical Turk participants generated 12 arguments supporting social issues. The results showed that, as more arguments were generated, the time of generating them increased, but the self-perceived argument quality declined. Although both correlated with attitudes, and each other, only argument quality uniquely predicted attitudes. Study 3 applied these insights to the “ease of retrieval paradigm,” showing that attitude change associated with generating 12 (versus 3) arguments was mediated by argument quality and its relationship with difficulty, although a main effect of argument number was not observed. The results show how reasoning involves an interplay of cognitive and metacognitive dynamics that produce self-generated attitude change in counterintuitive ways.

The Informative Process Model as a New Intervention for Attitude Change in Intractable Conflicts: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Peacemaking is especially challenging in situations of intractable conflict. Collective narratives in this context contribute to coping with challenges societies face, but also fuel conflict continuation. We introduce the Informative Process Model (IPM), proposing that informing individuals about the socio-psychological processes through which conflict-supporting narratives develop, and suggesting that they can change via comparison to similar conflicts resolved peacefully, can facilitate unfreezing and change in attitudes. Study 1 established associations between awareness of conflict costs and conflict-supporting narratives, belief in the possibility of resolving the conflict peacefully and support for pursuing peace among Israeli-Jews and Palestinians. Studies 2 and 3 found that exposure to IPM-based original videos (vs. control) led Israeli-Jews to deliberation of the information presented, predicting acceptance of the IPM-based message, which, in turn, predicted support for negotiations. Study 3 also found similar effects across IPM-based messages focusing on different conflict-supporting themes. We discuss the implications to attitude change in intractable conflicts.

Forbid/Allow Asymmetry in Persuasion

Abstract. Previous research showed that responses to questions about forbidding something differed from those to the seemingly equivalent questions about allowing the same object (forbid/allow asymmetry). We postulate that the effect of the forbid vs. allow framing may be also consequential for the processing of attitude related information and attitude change. The forbid frame (compared with the allow frame) may increase the impact of negative (vs. positive) arguments and/or reduce the impact of initial attitudes on the elaboration the presented information. To test these predictions we conducted three experiments (one preregistered, total N = 655). Participants were reading both pro and con arguments, differing in consistency with their initial attitudes, and concerning three different attitude objects: genetically modified organisms (GMOs), euthanasia, and barbecuing in public places. The results show that the forbid (vs. allow) frame decreases the tendency for generating thoughts prevailingly consistent with participants,’ initial attitudes (Experiment 2). It also reduces bias in the evaluation and interpretation of the presented arguments and yields more similar assessments of arguments that are consistent and inconsistent with initial attitudes (Experiment 3). As a result, the attitudes are more susceptible to change within the forbid frame (they move more in the direction opposite to the initial attitude) than within the allow frame (Experiments 1-3). The results for the first time show the existence of forbid vs. allow asymmetry in persuasion. This effect has practical consequences, e.g., when designing referenda.

Undermining Your Case to Enhance Your Impact: A Framework for Understanding the Effects of Acts of Receptiveness in Persuasion

Past research has uncovered actions that would seem to undermine but in fact frequently enhance persuasion. For example, expressing doubt about one's view or presenting arguments against it would seem to weaken one's case, but can sometimes promote it. We propose a framework for understanding these findings. We posit that these actions constitute acts of receptiveness-behaviors that signal openness to new information and opposing viewpoints. We review four classes of acts of receptiveness: conveying uncertainty, acknowledging mistakes, highlighting drawbacks, and asking questions. We identify conditions under which and mechanisms through which these actions boost persuasion. Acts of receptiveness appear to be more persuasive when they come from expert or high-status sources, rather than non-expert or low-status sources, and to operate through two primary mechanisms: increased involvement and enhanced source perceptions. Following a review of this work, we delineate potentially novel acts of receptiveness and outline directions for future research.

Metacognitive Reflection as a Moderator of Attitude Strength Versus Attitude Bolstering: Implications for Attitude Similarity and Attraction

"Strong" attitudes often have greater impact than "weak" attitudes. However, emerging research suggests that weak (uncertain) attitudes can substantially influence thinking or behavior. We propose metacognitive reflection as a moderator between traditional strength patterns and these emerging attitude bolstering patterns. Across six studies, research participants encountered a target person who agreed or disagreed with participants' attitudes. When focused on evaluating the target, attitudes predicted target evaluations better when the attitude was held with certainty (Study 1A), or after certainty had been primed (Studies 2A and 3; strength effects). However, when engaged in attitudinal social comparison (metacognitive reflection), attitudes better predicted target evaluation when the attitudes were held with doubt (Study 1B), or after doubt had been primed (Studies 2B and 3; bolstering effects). Expected change in certainty served as a mediator of attitude effects in metacognitive reflection but not target-focus conditions when doubt had been primed (Study 4).

The Curvilinear Relationship Between Attitude Certainty and Attitudinal Advocacy

Do people advocate more on behalf of their own attitudes and opinions when they feel certain or uncertain? Although considerable past research suggests that people are more likely to advocate when they feel highly certain, there also is evidence for the opposite effect-that people sometimes advocate more when they experience a loss of certainty. The current research seeks to merge these insights. Specifically, we explore the possibility that the relationship between attitude certainty and attitudinal advocacy is curvilinear. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find evidence for a J-shaped curve: Advocacy intentions (and behavior) peak under high certainty, bottom out under moderate certainty, and show an uptick under low (relative to moderate) certainty. We document this relationship and investigate its potential mechanisms in three studies by examining advocacy intentions and the actual advocacy messages participants write when they feel high, moderate, or low certainty.

Source Credibility and Persuasion

Highly credible communicators have been found to elicit greater confidence and attitudes that are based more on recipients’ thoughts (i.e., self-validation) compared with non-credible sources. However, source credibility may produce different effects on thought confidence and persuasion depending on the position of an advocacy. When messages are proattitudinal, credible sources should initiate self-validation because recipients may be motivated to confirm (bolster) their existing views. Conversely, when appeals are counterattitudinal, recipients may be motivated to defend their opinions and disconfirm information. In these contexts, greater self-validation may emerge when a communicator lacks rather than possesses credibility. When a message was counterattitudinal and contained weak arguments, evidence of self-validation was found with low source credibility (Studies 1 and 2) and among participants high in defense motivation (Study 2). In response to strong, proattitudinal arguments, findings were consistent with high credibility producing self-validation when bolstering motivation was high (Study 3).

Evaluating the message or the messenger? Implications for self-validation in persuasion

Characteristics of persuasive message sources have been extensively studied. However, little attention has been paid to situations when people are motivated to form an evaluation of the communicator rather than the communicated issue. We postulated that these different foci can affect how a source validates message-related cognitions. Participants focused on the source (Studies 1 and 2) or the issue (Study 2) while reading weak or strong message arguments. Later, the communicator was described as low or high in credibility. When focused on the source, highly motivated participants were more confident and their attitudes were more reflective of thoughts when argument quality matched (e.g., weak arguments-low credibility) rather than mismatched (e.g., weak arguments-high credibility) source credibility. Conversely, when participants were focused on the issue, self-validation was greater when credibility was high rather than low-regardless of argument quality. Implications of these findings for the study and practice of persuasion are discussed.