The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking: New Evidence, New Challenges, New Insights

'My child could have died': counterfactual thoughts and psychological distress in parents of trauma survivors

Background: After exposure to a potentially traumatic event, survivors may experience thoughts about 'what could have happened', referred to as counterfactual thoughts (CFTs). CFTs have been found to have a negative impact on survivors' mental health. This is the first study to investigate whether parents of trauma survivors experience CFTs and the association with psychological distress in this group.Objective: The main aim of the present study is to investigate CFTs in parents of trauma survivors and the relationship between the frequency and vividness of CFTs and psychological distress.Method: The participants (N = 310, 191 females) were parents of the youths targeted in the terror attack on Utøya island, Norway, in 2011. Frequency and vividness of CFTs, posttraumatic stress reactions (PTSR), and symptoms of anxiety and depression were measured 8.5-9 years post-terror.Results: The majority of the parents (74%) reported having experienced CFTs at some time point since the attack. For almost one-third of the parents, CFTs were still present more than eight years after the attack. Higher frequency and vividness of CFTs were uniquely associated with higher levels of PTSR, anxiety, and depression.Conclusion: The present findings suggest that frequent and vivid CFTs may contribute to mental health problems in parents of trauma survivors and should be addressed in therapy.

How people think about the truth of hypothetical impossibilities

People can think about hypothetical impossibilities and a curious observation is that some impossible conditionals seem true and others do not. Four experiments test the proposal that people think about impossibilities just as they do possibilities, by attempting to construct a consistent simulation of the impossible conjecture with its suggested outcome, informed by their knowledge of the real world. The results show that participants judge some impossible conditionals true with one outcome, for example, "if people were made of steel, they would not bruise easily" and false with the opposite outcome, "if people were made of steel they would bruise easily", and others false with either outcome, for example, "if houses were made of spaghetti, their engines would (not) be noisy". However, they can sometimes judge impossible conditionals true with either outcome, for example, "if Plato were identical to Socrates, he would (not) have a small nose", or "if sheep and wolves were alike, they would (not) eat grass". The results were observed for judgments about what could be true (Experiments 1 and 4), judgments of degrees of truth (Experiment 2), and judgments of what is true (Experiment 3). The results rule out the idea that people evaluate the truth of a hypothetical impossibility by relying on cognitive processes that compare the probability of each conditional to its counterpart with the opposite outcome.

Counterfactual imagination impairs memory for true actions: EEG and behavioural evidence

Imagined events can be misremembered as experienced, leading to memory distortions. However, less is known regarding how imagining counterfactual versions of past events can impair existing memories. We addressed this issue, and used EEG to investigate the neurocognitive processes involved when retrieving memories of true events that are associated with a competing imagined event. Participants first performed simple actions with everyday objects (e.g., rolling dice). A week later, they were shown pictures of some of the objects and either imagined the same action they had originally performed, or imagined a counterfactual action (e.g., stacking the dice). Subsequent tests showed that memory for performed actions was reduced after counterfactual imagination when compared to both veridical imagination and a baseline condition that had not been imagined at all, providing novel evidence that counterfactual imagination impairs true memories beyond simple forgetting over time. ERPs and EEG oscillations showed evidence of separate processes associated with memory retrieval versus post-retrieval processes that were recruited to support recall of memories that were challenging to access. The findings show that counterfactual imagination can cause impairments to sensorimotor-rich event memories, and provide new evidence regarding the neurocognitive mechanisms that are recruited when people need to distinguish memories of imagined versus true events.

Facts in counterfactuals-cognitive representations of Chinese counterfactuals

How do people represent counterfactuals? As languages differ in expressibility of counterfactuals-some languages employ explicit grammatical marking for counterfactuals while others do not-are some speakers' representations of counterfactuals less explicit? Prior studies examining this question with Chinese speakers-a language devoid of explicit counterfactual markings-found mixed results. Here we re-examined the issue by using a more sensitive test: people's sensitivity to detect anomalies in sentences. We asked Chinese speakers to rate the acceptability of sentences employing "ruguo (if)…jiu (then)" configuration-the typical but non-unique, non-explicit marking of counterfactuals. Critically, we varied the semantic adherence to real-world facts [factuality], with some sentences containing made-up conditions [-fact as in "If fish had legs, then…"] versus real facts [+ fact: "If dogs had legs, then…"]. If speakers represent counterfactuals clearly, they should give higher acceptability ratings to [- facts] than to [+ facts] sentences, because the ostensible point of counterfactuals is to express non-factual situations. That is, expressing a true fact under a syntactic counterfactual construction makes the sentence anomalous. Instead, we found that Chinese speakers gave the opposite ratings: factual "if…then" sentences were rated as more acceptable than non-factual ones. This suggests that Chinese speakers find the processing of counterfactuals to be more challenging than processing facts, and that their representation of counterfactuals may be less explicit. Overall, this research contributes to our understanding of the link between linguistic markings and cognitive representations.

Memory of Fictional Information: A Theoretical Framework

Much of the information people encounter in everyday life is not factual; it originates from fictional sources, such as movies, novels, and video games, and from direct experience such as pretense, role-playing, and everyday conversation. Despite the recent increase in research on fiction, there is no theoretical account of how memory of fictional information is related to other types of memory or of which mechanisms allow people to separate fact and fiction in memory. We present a theoretical framework that places memory of fiction in relation to other cognitive phenomena as a distinct construct and argue that it is an essential component for any general theory of human memory. We show how fictionality can be integrated in an existing memory model by extending Rubin's dimensional conceptual memory model. By this means, our model can account for explicit and implicit memory of fictional information of events, places, characters, and objects. Further, we propose a set of mechanisms involving various degrees of complexity and levels of conscious processing that mostly keep fact and fiction separated but also allow information from fiction to influence real-world attitudes and beliefs: content-based reasoning, source monitoring, and an associative link from the memory to the concept of fiction.

The Effect of Counterfactual Potency on Behavioral Intentions

This research examines how counterfactual potency (CP), the multiplicative effect of the likelihoods of the "if" and "then" clauses of counterfactuals, determines the effects of counterfactuals on behavioral intentions. In Study 1, we found that participants who read highly (vs. minimally) mutable vignettes perceived the counterfactuals as more likely and endorsed relevant intentions more. However, CP did not mediate the effect of mutability on intentions. In Studies 2 and 3, we found that CP directly affected intentions and also mediated the effects of mutability on intentions when mutability was specifically manipulated via controllability (Study 2) or norm violation (Study 3). Finally, Study 4 used archival reaction time data to show that more concrete counterfactuals were perceived as more likely and subsequently facilitated intentions. Taken together, the current research provides evidence that more likely counterfactuals facilitate behavioral intentions.

Crying over spilled milk? A network analysis of aversive well-being comparison, brooding rumination and depressive symptoms

BACKGROUND

Comparative thinking about one's well-being is ubiquitous. Comparisons that threaten an individual's self-motives are aversive and interact with rumination and depression. Aversive well-being comparisons include upward social, past temporal, counterfactual, and criteria-based comparisons, as well as downward prospective temporal comparisons. Although the frequency, discrepancy, and affective impact of aversive comparison total scores have been associated with brooding rumination and depression, no study has investigated the interaction of specific comparison standards (e.g., social or counterfactual) with symptom cascades of brooding and depressive symptoms.

METHODS

To examine this interaction, we conducted network analyses on the interplay between aversive well-being comparisons, brooding rumination, and depression. Specifically, we conducted a cross-sectional study in N = 500 dysphoric individuals and a longitudinal study in N = 921 participants at two timepoints, three months apart. Participants completed measures of depression, brooding, and the Comparison Standards Scale for Well-being, which assessed the frequency, perceived discrepancy, and affective impact of aversive well-being comparisons.

RESULTS

Feelings of worthlessness emerged as the most central attribute in the networks of the dysphoric sample. Longitudinally, brooding and depressive symptoms predicted aversive comparisons, but not the other way around, which accounted for social and other-referent counterfactual comparisons to a greater degree than for other comparison types.

LIMITATIONS

We used nonclinical samples.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings highlight the critical role of comparison standards in depression. Further research is warranted to detect potential intervention targets for mitigating negative effects of negative self-evaluation.

How people reason with counterfactual and causal explanations for Artificial Intelligence decisions in familiar and unfamiliar domains

Few empirical studies have examined how people understand counterfactual explanations for other people's decisions, for example, "if you had asked for a lower amount, your loan application would have been approved". Yet many current Artificial Intelligence (AI) decision support systems rely on counterfactual explanations to improve human understanding and trust. We compared counterfactual explanations to causal ones, i.e., "because you asked for a high amount, your loan application was not approved", for an AI's decisions in a familiar domain (alcohol and driving) and an unfamiliar one (chemical safety) in four experiments (n = 731). Participants were shown inputs to an AI system, its decisions, and an explanation for each decision; they attempted to predict the AI's decisions, or to make their own decisions. Participants judged counterfactual explanations more helpful than causal ones, but counterfactuals did not improve the accuracy of their predictions of the AI's decisions more than causals (Experiment 1). However, counterfactuals improved the accuracy of participants' own decisions more than causals (Experiment 2). When the AI's decisions were correct (Experiments 1 and 2), participants considered explanations more helpful and made more accurate judgements in the familiar domain than in the unfamiliar one; but when the AI's decisions were incorrect, they considered explanations less helpful and made fewer accurate judgements in the familiar domain than the unfamiliar one, whether they predicted the AI's decisions (Experiment 3a) or made their own decisions (Experiment 3b). The results corroborate the proposal that counterfactuals provide richer information than causals, because their mental representation includes more possibilities.

For Better and For Worse: Frequent Gamblers Use Dual Counterfactuals to Justify Continued Gambling

How might frequent gamblers convince themselves to keep playing despite persistent losses or after a win that should be savored? The purpose of this research is to examine the unexplored question of how frequent gamblers' use counterfactual thinking to motivate their desire to continue gambling. Using a sample of n = 69 high and n = 69 low frequency gamblers in a field setting, we found that infrequent gamblers tended to consider how the perceived outcome of losing "could have been better" (i.e., upward counterfactual thinking), and how a winning outcome "could have been worse" (i.e., downward counterfactual thinking). This pattern of counterfactual thinking is considered typical in many settings and may, in a gambling context, support a potentially more responsible approach by helping infrequent gamblers to learn from past mistakes to avoid significant future losses and to savor wins to protect returns gained. Alternatively, we found that frequent gamblers were more likely to generate 'dual counterfactuals' which include both upward and downward counterfactuals in response to losses and wins. We argue that this dual pattern of counterfactual thinking may allow frequent gamblers to more easily justify their desire to continue gambling. Findings suggest that challenging gamblers counterfactual thinking patterns could assist clinicians in moderating the potential for high-risk behaviors.

Using a counterfactual-based intervention to change eating intentions: Results from Hispanic and non-Hispanic undergraduate and community samples

Finding ways to improve eating behavior has become a major focus of interventions designed to improve health outcomes. Counterfactual thinking (i.e., mental simulations of how a past outcome could have been different) is a cognitive strategy that has been shown to improve behavior regulation and could be a promising intervention to improve eating behavior. The purpose of the current research was to examine the effect of a counterfactual-based intervention to shift contemplation to change eating behavior, motivation towards eating healthier, and intentions to engage in healthier eating behaviors. Participants in both studies were randomly assigned to either a counterfactual-based intervention or a control condition. In Study 1, those in the counterfactual-based intervention condition reported an increase in readiness to change their eating behavior, higher extrinsic motivation towards eating healthy, and higher intentions to eat healthy compared to those in the control condition. Within the counterfactual condition, individuals who self-identified as Hispanic had higher intentions to use their counterfactual strategies than those who identified as non-Hispanic. Study 2 found similar results using a more diverse community sample. Those in the counterfactual-based intervention condition reported an increase in readiness to change, intentions to eat healthy, and intentions to use their counterfactual strategies, with this effect being stronger for self-identified Hispanic participants. These studies provide initial evidence for the use of a counterfactual-based intervention to improve eating behavior in diverse populations.

Dissociated deficits of anticipated and experienced regret in at-risk suicidal individuals

Backgrounds

Decision-making deficits have been reported as trans-diagnostic characteristics of vulnerability to suicidal behaviors, independent of co-existing psychiatric disorders. Individuals with suicidal behaviors often regret their decision to attempt suicide and may have impairments in future-oriented processing. However, it is not clear how people with suicidal dispositions use future-oriented cognition and past experience of regret to guide decision-making. Here, we examined the processes of regret anticipation and experience in subclinical youth with and without suicidal ideation during value-based decision-making.

Methods

In total, 80 young adults with suicidal ideation and 79 healthy controls completed a computational counterfactual thinking task and self-reported measures of suicidal behaviors, depression, anxiety, impulsivity, rumination, hopelessness, and childhood maltreatment.

Results

Individuals with suicidal ideation showed a reduced ability to anticipate regret compared to healthy controls. Specifically, suicidal ideators’ experience of regret/relief was significantly different from that of healthy controls upon obtained outcomes, while their disappointment/pleasure experience was not significantly different from healthy controls.

Conclusion

These findings suggest that young adults with suicidal ideation have difficulty predicting the consequences or the future value of their behavior. Individuals with suicidal ideation showed impairments in value comparison and flat affect to retrospective rewards, whereas individuals with high suicidality showed blunted affect to immediate rewards. Identifying the counterfactual decision-making characteristics of at-risk suicidal individuals may help to elucidate measurable markers of suicidal vulnerability and identify future intervention targets.

Thinking Structurally: A Cognitive Framework for Understanding How People Attribute Inequality to Structural Causes

To make accurate causal inferences about social-group inequalities, people must consider structural causes. Structural causes are a distinct type of extrinsic cause-they are stable, interconnected societal forces that systematically advantage some social groups and disadvantage others. We propose a new cognitive framework to specify how people attribute inequality to structural causes. This framework is rooted in counterfactual theories of causal judgment and suggests that people will recognize structural factors as causal when they are perceived as "difference-making" for inequality above and beyond any intrinsic causes. Building on this foundation, our framework makes the following contributions. First, we propose specific types of evidence that support difference-making inferences about structural factors: within-group change (i.e., observing that disadvantaged groups' outcomes improve under better societal conditions) and well-matched between-group comparisons (i.e., observing that advantaged group members, who have similar baseline traits to the disadvantaged group, experience more favorable societal conditions and life outcomes). Second, we consider contextual, cognitive, and motivational barriers that may complicate the availability and acceptance of this evidence. We conclude by exploring how the framework might be applied in future research examining people's causal inferences about inequality.

Should I have been more careful or less careless? The comparative nature of counterfactual thoughts alters judgments of their impact

Counterfactual thoughts inherently imply a comparison of a given reality to an alternative state of affairs. Previous research mainly considered consequences of different counterfactual types, namely focus (other vs. self), structure (additive vs. subtractive), and direction (upward vs. downward). The current work investigates whether a 'more-than' versus 'less-than' comparative nature of counterfactual thoughts alters judgments of their impact. Four experiments demonstrated that self-generated other- (Studies 1 and 3) and self-focused (Study 2) upward counterfactuals are judged more impactful when they entail 'more-than' rather than 'less-than' comparisons. Judgments include plausibility and persuasiveness, as well as counterfactuals' likelihood to change future behavior and feelings. Self-reported ease of thought generation and (dis)fluency gauged by difficulty in thought generation was similarly affected. This more-less asymmetry reversed in Study 3 for downward counterfactual thoughts, with 'less-than' counterfactuals being judged more impactful and easier to generate. Further attesting to the role of ease, when spontaneously generating comparative counterfactuals, participants correctly provided more 'more-than' upward counterfactuals, but more 'less-than' downward counterfactuals (Study 4). These findings delineate one of the to date few conditions for a reversal of the more-less asymmetry and provide support for a correspondence principle, the simulation heuristic, and thus the role of ease in counterfactual thinking. They suggest that especially 'more-than' counterfactuals following negative events, and 'less-than' counterfactuals following positive events, are likely to have an important impact on people. (226 words).

Counterfactual comparisons and affective styles in the aftermath of traumatic events

Traumatic events often lead to counterfactual comparison (CFC), defined as comparing one’s current attributes to that of a hypothetical mentally simulated alternative that might have occurred but is counter to the facts. CFC can differ in its direction and in terms of the referent of action. The mentally simulated alternative may be evaluated as more favorable (upward CFC) or less favorable (downward CFC) and the counterfactual alteration (e.g., preventing the event) may have been performed by oneself (self-referent) or others (other-referent). The frequency and engendered affective valence of CFC differ between trauma survivors and correlate with PTSD symptoms. However, knowledge about the mechanism involved is lacking. Individuals differ in how they regulate the engendered affective valence following CFC, suggesting that dispositional affect regulation styles may be implicated in this relationship. We therefore examined the affective styles of adjusting, concealing, and tolerating and their relationship with CFC frequency and engendered affective valence. In 556 individuals who had encountered at least one traumatic event, we examined this question separately for (1) upward self-referent CFC, (2) upward other-referent CFC, (3) downward self-referent CFC and (4) downward other-referent CFC. Most effects were found for upward (rather than downward) CFC and particularly for upward self-referent CFC. The frequency of engaging in upward self-referent CFC was associated with all three affective styles and with engendered affective valence. Different emotion regulation processes appear to be associated with more frequent engagement in upward self-referent CFC and more negative engendered affective valence. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.

Motivational consequences of counterfactual mindsets: Does counterfactual structure influence the use of conservative or risky tactics?

Motivational states are important determinants of human behavior. Regulatory focus theory suggests that a promotion focus stimulates risky behavior, whereas a prevention focus fosters conservative tactics. Previous research linked counterfactual structure with regulatory focus. Extending this work, we predicted that additive counterfactual mindsets ("If only I had…") instigate risky tactics in subsequent situations, whereas subtractive counterfactual mindsets ("If only I had NOT…") lead to conservative tactics. We tested this prediction and the underlying assumptions in four preregistered studies (total N = 803) and obtained consistent null results. Additive and subtractive counterfactual mindsets did not elicit different tactics - neither on behavioral nor on self-report measures - and they did not influence participants' motivation compared to a neutral control condition. Likewise, our results put doubts on previous findings on counterfactuals and regulatory focus as well as regulatory focus and conservative or risky behavior. More general implications for research on counterfactuals and motivation are discussed.

Polarized imagination: partisanship influences the direction and consequences of counterfactual thinking

Four studies examine how political partisanship qualifies previously documented regularities in people's counterfactual thinking (n = 1186 Democrats and Republicans). First, whereas prior work finds that people generally prefer to think about how things could have been better instead of worse (i.e. entertain counterfactuals in an upward versus downward direction), studies 1a-2 find that partisans are more likely to generate and endorse counterfactuals in whichever direction best aligns with their political views. Second, previous research finds that the closer someone comes to causing a negative event, the more blame that person receives; study 3 finds that this effect is more pronounced among partisans who oppose (versus support) a leader who 'almost' caused a negative event. Thus, partisan reasoning may influence which alternatives to reality people will find most plausible, will be most likely to imagine spontaneously, and will view as sufficient grounds for blame. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

“If it weren’t for COVID-19…”: Counterfactual arguments influence support for climate change policies via cross-domain moral licensing or moral consistency effects

In two studies, we investigated whether counterfactual messages (i.e., “If… then…”) on the economic costs of past public policies influence support for future climate change policies. In Study 1, we tested whether the effect of upward counterfactual messages depended on their referring (or not) to the COVID-19 pandemic. Results showed lower support for a future climate change policy when the past expenses evoked by the upward counterfactual messages were attributed to COVID-19. In Study 2, we combined upward counterfactuals with downward counterfactuals presenting past economic efforts to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic as a moral credit. Results showed that exposure to downward counterfactuals decreased support for climate change policies among participants with low endorsement of anti-COVID-19 measures, whereas it increased support among participants with high endorsement. Discussion focuses on the conditions under which counterfactual communication may activate cross-dimensional moral licensing or moral consistency effects, influencing support for climate change policies.

Attributions for extreme weather events: science and the people

Both climate scientists and non-scientists (laypeople) attribute extreme weather events to various influences. Laypeople's attributions for these events are important as these attributions likely influence their views and actions about climate change and extreme events. Research has examined laypeople's attribution scepticism about climate change in general; however, few climate scientists are familiar with the processes underpinning laypeople's attributions for individual extreme events. Understanding these lay attributions is important for scientists to communicate their findings to the public. Following a brief summary of the way climate scientists calculate attributions for extreme weather events, we focus on cognitive and motivational processes that underlie laypeople's attributions for specific events. These include a tendency to prefer single-cause rather than multiple-cause explanations, a discounting of whether possible causes covary with extreme events, a preference for sufficient causes over probabilities, applying prevailing causal narratives, and the influence of motivational factors. For climate scientists and communicators who wish to inform the public about the role of climate change in extreme weather events, these patterns suggest several strategies to explain scientists' attributions for these events and enhance public engagement with climate change. These strategies include showing more explicitly that extreme weather events reflect multiple causal influences, that climate change is a mechanism that covaries with these events and increases the probability and intensity of many of these events, that human emissions contributing to climate change are controllable, and that misleading communications about weather attributions reflect motivated interests rather than good evidence.

Decision Reversibility and Satisfaction: The Mediating Role of Counterfactual Thinking and Anticipated Regret

Purpose

Extensive research has shown that reversible decisions yield lower post-decision satisfaction than irreversible decisions. However, to date, little is known about how decision reversibility affects post-decision satisfaction. Based on regret theory, this study aimed to examine the mediating role of counterfactual thinking and anticipated regret in the association between decision reversibility and satisfaction.

Methods

In this study (130 participants), participants were randomly assigned to two personnel decision situations with reversible and irreversible decision outcomes, and all participants completed questionnaires during the process of completing the decision task. The questionnaires used included the Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale, Anticipated Regret Scale, and satisfaction questionnaire. Finally, the data were statistically analyzed using the base package in R and PROCESS 3.5.

Results

The results show that (1) Compared to irreversible decisions, reversible decisions have a significant negative impact on satisfaction. (2) Counterfactual thinking plays a mediating role between decision reversibility and satisfaction. (3) Compared with irreversible decisions, reversible decisions further lowered the level of post-decision satisfaction through the chain mediating effects of counterfactual thinking and anticipated regret.

Conclusion

People's lowered levels of post-decision satisfaction in the reversible decision condition relate to increased levels of counterfactual thinking and anticipated regret. In addition, counterfactual thinking can play a mediating role alone, indicating that this variable may be critical in understanding the mechanisms by which decision reversibility affects satisfaction. This knowledge may be used to help people optimize their decision-making behavior.

How Duty-Free Policy Influences Travel Intention: Mediating Role of Perceived Value and Moderating Roles of COVID-19 Severity and Counterfactual Thinking

Counterfactual thinking is presumed to play a preparatory function in promoting people's behavioural intentions. This study specifically addresses the impacts of COVID-19 severity, tourists' counterfactual thinking about the pandemic, and tourists' perceived duty-free consumption value on the effect of a duty-free policy on travel intentions. Four hundred and ten participants took part in this study, which involved a 2 (duty-free policy: absent vs. present) × 2 (COVID-19 severity: high vs. low) design. Results reveal the following patterns: (a) compared to the absence of a duty-free policy in tourist destinations, enactment of a duty-free policy leads to stronger visit intentions through greater perceived value and (b) the effect of a duty-free policy on travel intention is moderated by tourists' counterfactual thinking and COVID-19 severity.

Episodic Past, Future, and counterfactual thinking in Relapsing-Remitting Multiple sclerosis

•

Performance in episodic past, future or counterfactual thinking in relapsing-remitting MS and controls was explored.

•

Behavioral and diffusion weighted imaging were used to evaluate associations between white matter integrity and group differences in performance.

•

Relative to controls, MS patients showed reductions in episodic details across all three simulations.

•

Reduced white matter integrity in three association tracts predicted this reduction in episodic details during counterfactual simulations.

Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a progressive disease characterized by widespread white matter lesions in the brain and spinal cord. In addition to well-characterized motor deficits, MS results in cognitive impairments in several domains, notably in episodic autobiographical memory. Recent studies have also revealed that patients with MS exhibit deficits in episodic future thinking, i.e., our capacity to imagine possible events that may occur in our personal future. Both episodic memory and episodic future thinking have been shown to share cognitive and neural mechanisms with a related kind of hypothetical simulation known as episodic counterfactual thinking: our capacity to imagine alternative ways in which past personal events could have occurred but did not. However, the extent to which episodic counterfactual thinking is affected in MS is still unknown. The current study sought to explore this issue by comparing performance in mental simulation tasks involving either past, future or counterfactual thoughts in relapsing-remitting MS. Diffusion weighted imaging (DWI) measures were also extracted to determine whether changes in structural pathways connecting the brain’s default mode network (DMN) would be associated with group differences in task performance. Relative to controls, patients showed marked reductions in the number of internal details across all mental simulations, but no differences in the number of external and semantic-based details. It was also found that, relative to controls, patients with relapsing-remitting MS reported reduced composition ratings for episodic simulations depicting counterfactual events, but not so for actual past or possible future episodes. Additionally, three DWI measures of white matter integrity—fractional anisotropy, radial diffusivity and streamline counts—showed reliable differences between patients with relapsing-remitting MS and matched healthy controls. Importantly, DWI measures associated with reduced white matter integrity in three association tracts on the DMN—the right superior longitudinal fasciculus, the left hippocampal portion of the cingulum and the left inferior longitudinal fasciculus—predicted reductions in the number of internal details during episodic counterfactual simulations. Taken together, these results help to illuminate impairments in episodic simulation in relapsing-remitting MS and show, for the first time, a differential association between white matter integrity and deficits in episodic counterfactual thinking in individuals with relapsing-remitting MS.

The Efficacy of Downward Counterfactual Thinking for Regulating Emotional Memories in Anxious Individuals

Aversive autobiographical memories sometimes prompt maladaptive emotional responses and contribute to affective dysfunction in anxiety and depression. One way to regulate the impact of such memories is to create a downward counterfactual thought-a mental simulation of how the event could have been worse-to put what occurred in a more positive light. Despite its intuitive appeal, counterfactual thinking has not been systematically studied for its regulatory efficacy. In the current study, we compared the regulatory impact of downward counterfactual thinking, temporal distancing, and memory rehearsal in 54 adult participants representing a spectrum of trait anxiety. Participants recalled regretful experiences and rated them on valence, arousal, regret, and episodic detail. Two to six days later, they created a downward counterfactual of the remembered event, thought of how they might feel about it 10 years from now, or simply rehearsed it. A day later, participants re-rated the phenomenological characteristics of the events. Across all participants, downward counterfactual thinking, temporal distancing, and memory rehearsal were equally effective at reducing negative affect associated with a memory. However, in individuals with higher trait anxiety, downward counterfactual thinking was more effective than rehearsal for reducing regret, and it was as effective as distancing in reducing arousal. We discuss these results in light of the functional theory of counterfactual thinking and suggest that they motivate further investigation into downward counterfactual thinking as a means to intentionally regulate emotional memories in affective disorders.

A Review of Functions of Speculative Thinking

Speculative thinking refers to thinking about past or future possibilities; it includes counterfactual thinking, prefactual thinking, and other types. In this narrative review, we discuss the traditional function of speculative thinking in improving future performance (i.e., the preparatory function). We also explore several non-preparatory functions of speculative thinking that have not been widely covered, namely the functions of conveying information and of supporting lying. In addition, we address temporal asymmetry; one perspective focuses on psychological distance in speculative thinking about the past and future, while another focuses on temporal asymmetry and reality/hypothetical differences in the preparatory function of speculative thinking. Overall, this review suggests that a broader functional theory is needed to address non-preparatory functions and the traditional preparatory function. Such a theory should cover all speculative thinking about the past and future rather than simply counterfactual thinking.

Similarities and differences in understanding negative and affirmative counterfactuals and causal assertions: Evidence from eye-tracking

Two eye-tracking experiments compared affirmative and negative counterfactuals, "if she had (not) arrived early, she would (not) have bought roses" and affirmative and negative causal assertions, "Because she arrived (did not arrive) early, she bought (did not buy) roses." When participants heard a counterfactual, they looked on screen at words corresponding to its conjecture ("roses"), and its presupposed facts ("no roses"), whereas for a causal assertion, they looked only at words corresponding to the facts. For counterfactuals, they looked at the conjecture first, and later the presupposed facts, and at the latter more than the former. The effect was more pronounced for negative counterfactuals than affirmative ones because the negative counterfactual's presupposed facts identify a specific item ("she bought roses"), whereas the affirmative counterfactual's presupposed facts do not ("she did not buy roses"). Hence, when participants were given a binary context, "she did not know whether to buy roses or carnations," they looked primarily at the presupposed facts for both sorts of counterfactuals. We discuss the implications for theories of negation, the dual meaning of counterfactuals, and their relation to causal assertions.

Memory and decision making interact to shape the value of unchosen options

The goal of deliberation is to separate between options so that we can commit to one and leave the other behind. However, deliberation can, paradoxically, also form an association in memory between the chosen and unchosen options. Here, we consider this possibility and examine its consequences for how outcomes affect not only the value of the options we chose, but also, by association, the value of options we did not choose. In five experiments (total n = 612), including a preregistered experiment (n = 235), we found that the value assigned to unchosen options is inversely related to their chosen counterparts. Moreover, this inverse relationship was associated with participants' memory of the pairs they chose between. Our findings suggest that deciding between options does not end the competition between them. Deliberation binds choice options together in memory such that the learned value of one can affect the inferred value of the other.

Comprensión de oraciones de esfuerzo en jóvenes y adultos mayores desde una perspectiva corpórea

Actualmente se desconoce la validez de las propuestas de la cognición corpórea y su relación con el lenguaje de los adultos mayores. Para responder a esto realizamos un experimento con los factores Esfuerzo, Imaginabilidad y Contexto Lingüístico. 50 adultos mayores (M= 66.18 años, DE= 4.39, 22 mujeres y 28 hombres) y 43 jóvenes (M= 21.28 años, DE= 1.08, 36 mujeres y 7 hombres) leyeron oraciones en la pantalla de un computador, presionando la barra espaciadora para decidir luego si una palabra se hallaba o no en la frase recién leída. Los resultados muestran efectos principales para los factores Imaginabilidad (β = 0.309; p < 0.05) y Contexto (β = -0.856; p < 0.001) en los tiempos de lectura del objeto directo, dos efectos de interacción Imaginabilidad-Esfuerzo (β = -0.732; p < 0.01) e Imaginabilidad-Contexto (β = 0.611; p < 0.05) para el complemento circunstancial y un efecto interactivo Imaginabilidad-Contexto (β = 0.727; p < 0.05) para la palabra de activación. Los resultados respaldan una visión de corporeidad débil con integración interactiva de las propiedades corpóreas y simbólicas de los textos. Es necesario ampliar la investigación a otros parámetros corpóreos, edades y lenguas para contrastar estos resultados.

Scientific reasoning and counterfactual reasoning in development

In this chapter, we bridge research on scientific and counterfactual reasoning. We review findings that children struggle with many aspects of scientific experimentation in the absence of formal instruction, but show sophistication in the ability to reason about counterfactual possibilities. We connect these two sets of findings by reviewing relevant theories on the relation between causal, scientific, and counterfactual reasoning before describing a growing body of work that indicates that prompting children to consider counterfactual alternatives can scaffold both the scientific inquiry process (hypothesis-testing and evidence evaluation) and science concept learning. This work suggests that counterfactual thought experiments are a promising pedagogical tool. We end by discussing several open questions for future research.

Prefrontal tDCS attenuates counterfactual thinking in female individuals prone to self-critical rumination

The tendency to ruminate (i.e., repetitive negative self-referential thoughts that perpetuate depressive mood) is associated with (a) an elevated propensity to maladaptively experience counterfactual thinking (CFT) and regret, and (b) hypo-activity of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). The goal of this study was to investigate whether anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the left DLPFC, in function of self-critical rumination tendencies, momentarily reduces counterfactual thinking and regret (assessed via self-report and psychophysiological indices). Eighty healthy participants with different levels of self-critical rumination received either anodal or sham tDCS while performing a decision making task in which they were repeatedly confronted with optimal, suboptimal, and non-optimal choice outcomes. The results showed that among rumination-prone individuals, anodal (versus sham) tDCS was associated with decreased CFT and attenuated psychophysiological reactivity to the differential choice outcomes. Conversely, among low rumination-prone individuals, anodal (versus sham) tDCS was associated with increased CFT and regret, but in absence of any effects on psychophysiological reactivity. Potential working mechanisms for these differential tDCS effects are discussed. Taken together, these results provide initial converging evidence for the adaptive effects of left prefrontal tDCS on CFT and regret to personal choice outcomes among individuals prone to engage in self-critical rumination.

Causal judgments about atypical actions are influenced by agents' epistemic states

A prominent finding in causal cognition research is people's tendency to attribute increased causality to atypical actions. If two agents jointly cause an outcome (conjunctive causation), but differ in how frequently they have performed the causal action before, people judge the atypically acting agent to have caused the outcome to a greater extent. In this paper, we argue that it is the epistemic state of an abnormally acting agent, rather than the abnormality of their action, that is driving people's causal judgments. Given the predictability of the normally acting agent's behaviour, the abnormal agent is in a better position to foresee the consequences of their action. We put this hypothesis to test in four experiments. In Experiment 1, we show that people judge the atypical agent as more causal than the normally acting agent, but also judge the atypical agent to have an epistemic advantage. In Experiment 2, we find that people do not judge a causal difference if no epistemic advantage for the abnormal agent arises. In Experiment 3, we replicate these findings in a scenario in which the abnormal agent's epistemic advantage generalises to a novel context. In Experiment 4, we extend these findings to mental states more broadly construed and develop a Bayesian network model that predicts the degree of outcome-oriented mental states based on action normality and epistemic states. We find that people infer mental states like desire and intention to a greater extent from abnormal behaviour when this behaviour is accompanied by an epistemic advantage. We discuss these results in light of current theories and research on people's preference for abnormal causes.

Perceived similarity of imagined possible worlds affects judgments of counterfactual plausibility

People frequently entertain counterfactual thoughts, or mental simulations about alternative ways the world could have been. But the perceived plausibility of those counterfactual thoughts varies widely. The current article interfaces research in the philosophy and semantics of counterfactual statements with the psychology of mental simulations, and it explores the role of perceived similarity in judgments of counterfactual plausibility. We report results from seven studies (N = 6405) jointly supporting three interconnected claims. First, the perceived plausibility of a counterfactual event is predicted by the perceived similarity between the possible world in which the imagined situation is thought to occur and the actual world. Second, when people attend to differences between imagined possible worlds and the actual world, they think of the imagined possible worlds as less similar to the actual world and tend to judge counterfactuals in such worlds as less plausible. Lastly, when people attend to what is identical between imagined possible worlds and the actual world, they think of the imagined possible worlds as more similar to the actual world and tend to judge counterfactuals in such worlds as more plausible. We discuss these results in light of philosophical, semantic, and psychological theories of counterfactual thinking.

When Ignoring Negative Feedback Is Functional: Presenting a Model of Motivated Feedback Disengagement

Contrary to popular belief, negative feedback occasionally hinders performance improvements. Investigations targeting this feedback-performance gap usually rest on two assumptions: (a) Feedback recipients want to improve their performance (have an improvement goal), and (b) feedback recipients engage with the negative feedback. We argue that people sometimes disengage from negative feedback for hedonic-goal attainment (to feel good). To explain such functional feedback disengagement, we conceptualize feedback processing from an emotion-regulation perspective, the model of motivated feedback disengagement. We posit that feedback-induced negative affect may render hedonic goals more salient than improvement goals, motivating emotion regulation. After forming the intention to regulate their emotions, feedback recipients select and implement an emotion-regulation strategy. We consider two common engagement strategies (reappraisal and feedback focus) and two common disengagement strategies (distraction and feedback removal). These strategies differentially impact recipients’ affect and feedback processing. Strategy-, person-, and situation-related factors influence strategy choice. Feedback processing is cyclical and dynamically unfolds over time. The model provides novel directions for future investigations and practical implications for stakeholders in negative-feedback contexts.

I'd do much better, if only … counterfactual comparisons related to traumatic life events

The association between posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and counterfactual comparisons (CFC) is poorly understood and CFC-measures are missing. We developed and applied the Posttraumatic Counterfactual Comparisons Scale (P-CFC-S), which measures frequency, intensity and affective impact of trauma-related CFC. We further measured trauma history, PTSD symptoms, probable PTSD diagnosis, posttraumatic cognitions, satisfaction with life and basic sociodemographic information. The sample consisted of 556 adults (62.95% female) who had all experienced at least one potentially traumatic event and of whom 15.29% fulfilled a probable PTSD diagnosis. The P-CFC-S yielded adequate internal consistency and a one-factor structure in the explorative factor analysis. CFC were common, and about two-fold more common in individuals with probable PTSD compared to those without. In hierarchical regression analyses, the frequency and intensity in CFC explained a significant amount of variance in PTSD symptoms when potentially confounding variables (i.e. age, gender, posttraumatic cognitions and counterfactual thinking) were accounted for. Our findings suggest that CFC may be an active ingredient in PTSD maintenance. Longitudinal research is needed to examine the dynamics between CFC and PTSD and the hypothesis that CFC is related to cognitive avoidance and/or maladaptive appraisals of trauma meaning.

Improving workplace safety by thinking about what might have been: A first look at the role of counterfactual thinking

INTRODUCTION

Information processing theories of workplace safety suggest that cognition is an antecedent of safety behavior. However, little research has directly tested cognitive factors as predictors of workplace safety within organizational psychology and behavior research. Counterfactuals (cognitions about "what might have been") can be functional when they consist of characteristics (e.g., "upward' - focusing on better outcomes) that alter behavior in a manner consistent with those outcomes. This field study aimed to examine the influence of counterfactual thinking on safety behavior and explanatory mechanisms and boundary conditions of that relationship.

METHOD

A sample of 240 medical providers from a hospital in China responded to three surveys over a four-month time frame.

RESULTS

Results showed that upward counterfactuals were positively related to supervisor ratings of safety compliance and participation. These relationships were mediated by safety knowledge but not by safety motivation. Upward counterfactuals were more strongly related to safety behavior and knowledge than downward counterfactuals. As expected, safety locus of control strengthened the mediating effects of safety knowledge on the relationship between upward counterfactuals and safety behavior. Conclusions and Practical Applications: The findings demonstrated that counterfactual thinking is positively associated with safety behavior and knowledge, thus expanding the variables related to workplace safety and laying some initial groundwork for new safety interventions incorporating counterfactual thinking.