Dynamic decision making and value computations in medial frontal cortex

Undermatching Is a Consequence of Policy Compression

The matching law describes the tendency of agents to match the ratio of choices allocated to the ratio of rewards received when choosing among multiple options (Herrnstein, 1961). Perfect matching, however, is infrequently observed. Instead, agents tend to undermatch or bias choices toward the poorer option. Overmatching, or the tendency to bias choices toward the richer option, is rarely observed. Despite the ubiquity of undermatching, it has received an inadequate normative justification. Here, we assume agents not only seek to maximize reward, but also seek to minimize cognitive cost, which we formalize as policy complexity (the mutual information between actions and states of the environment). Policy complexity measures the extent to which the policy of an agent is state dependent. Our theory states that capacity-constrained agents (i.e., agents that must compress their policies to reduce complexity) can only undermatch or perfectly match, but not overmatch, consistent with the empirical evidence. Moreover, using mouse behavioral data (male), we validate a novel prediction about which task conditions exaggerate undermatching. Finally, in patients with Parkinson's disease (male and female), we argue that a reduction in undermatching with higher dopamine levels is consistent with an increased policy complexity.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The matching law describes the tendency of agents to match the ratio of choices allocated to different options to the ratio of reward received. For example, if option a yields twice as much reward as option b, matching states that agents will choose option a twice as much. However, agents typically undermatch: they choose the poorer option more frequently than expected. Here, we assume that agents seek to simultaneously maximize reward and minimize the complexity of their action policies. We show that this theory explains when and why undermatching occurs. Neurally, we show that policy complexity, and by extension undermatching, is controlled by tonic dopamine, consistent with other evidence that dopamine plays an important role in cognitive resource allocation.

Prospective and retrospective values integrated in frontal cortex drive predictive choice

To make a deliberate action in a volatile environment, the brain must frequently reassess the value of each action (action-value). Choice can be initially made from the experience of trial-and-errors, but once the dynamics of the environment is learned, the choice can be made from the knowledge of the environment. The action-values constructed from the experience (retrospective value) and the ones from the knowledge (prospective value) were identified in various regions of the brain. However, how and which neural circuit integrates these values and executes the chosen action remains unknown. Combining reinforcement learning and two-photon calcium imaging, we found that the preparatory activity of neurons in a part of the frontal cortex, the anterior-lateral motor (ALM) area, initially encodes retrospective value, but after extensive training, they jointly encode the retrospective and prospective value. Optogenetic inhibition of ALM preparatory activity specifically abolished the expert mice's predictive choice behavior and returned them to the novice-like state. Thus, the integrated action-value encoded in the preparatory activity of ALM plays an important role to bias the action toward the knowledge-dependent, predictive choice behavior.

Behavioral Analysis of EEG Signals in Loss-Gain Decision-Making Experiments

Extraction and analysis of the EEG (electroencephalograph) information features generated during behavioral decision-making can provide a better understanding of the state of mind. Previous studies have focused more on the brainwave features after behavioral decision-making. In fact, the EEG before decision-making is more worthy of our attention. In this study, we introduce a new index based on the reaction time of subjects before decision-making, called the Prestimulus Time (PT), which have important reference value for the study of cognitive function, neurological diseases, and other fields. In our experiments, we use a wearable EEG feature signal acquisition device and a systematic reward and punishment experiment to obtain the EEG features before and after behavioral decision-making. The experimental results show that the EEG generated after behavioral decision due to loss is more intense than that generated by gain in the medial frontal cortex (MFC). In addition, different characteristics of EEG signals are generated prior to behavioral decisions because people have different expectations of the outcome. It will produce more significant negative-polarity event-related potential (ERP) in the forebrain area when the humans are optimistic about the outcomes.

The Cost of Imagined Actions in a Reward-Valuation Task

Growing evidence suggests that humans and other animals assign value to a stimulus based not only on its inherent rewarding properties, but also on the costs of the action required to obtain it, such as the cost of time. Here, we examined whether such cost also occurs for mentally simulated actions. Healthy volunteers indicated their subjective value for snack foods while the time to imagine performing the action to obtain the different stimuli was manipulated. In each trial, the picture of one food item and a home position connected through a path were displayed on a computer screen. The path could be either large or thin. Participants first rated the stimulus, and then imagined moving the mouse cursor along the path from the starting position to the food location. They reported the onset and offset of the imagined movements with a button press. Two main results emerged. First, imagery times were significantly longer for the thin than the large path. Second, participants liked significantly less the snack foods associated with the thin path (i.e., with longer imagery time), possibly because the passage of time strictly associated with action imagery discounts the value of the reward. Importantly, such effects were absent in a control group of participants who performed an identical valuation task, except that no action imagery was required. Our findings hint at the idea that imagined actions, like real actions, carry a cost that affects deeply how people assign value to the stimuli in their environment.