Context-specific control and context selection in conflict tasks

Understanding dual process cognition via the minimum description length principle

Dual-process theories play a central role in both psychology and neuroscience, figuring prominently in domains ranging from executive control to reward-based learning to judgment and decision making. In each of these domains, two mechanisms appear to operate concurrently, one relatively high in computational complexity, the other relatively simple. Why is neural information processing organized in this way? We propose an answer to this question based on the notion of compression. The key insight is that dual-process structure can enhance adaptive behavior by allowing an agent to minimize the description length of its own behavior. We apply a single model based on this observation to findings from research on executive control, reward-based learning, and judgment and decision making, showing that seemingly diverse dual-process phenomena can be understood as domain-specific consequences of a single underlying set of computational principles.

Context-specific adaptation for head fakes in basketball: a study on player-specific fake-frequency schedules

In basketball, an attacking player often plays a pass to one side while looking to the other side. This head fake provokes a conflict in the observing opponent, as the processing of the head orientation interferes with the processing of the pass direction. Accordingly, responses to passes with head fakes are slower and result in more errors than responses to passes without head fakes (head-fake effect). The head-fake effect and structurally similar interference effects (e.g., Stroop effect) are modulated by the frequency of conflicting trials. Previous studies mostly applied a block-wise manipulation of proportion congruency. However, in basketball (and also in other team sports), where different individual opponents can be encountered, it might be important to take the individual frequency (e.g., 20% vs. 80%) of these opponents into account. Therefore, the present study investigates the possibility to quickly (i.e., on a trial-by-trial basis) reconfigure the response behavior to different proportions of incongruent trials, which are contingent on different basketball players. Results point out that participants indeed adapted to the fake-frequency of different basketball players, which could be the result of strategic adaptation processes. Multi-level analyses, however, indicate that a substantial portion of the player-specific adaptation to fake frequencies is accounted by episodic retrieval processes, suggesting that item-specific proportion congruency effects can be explained in terms of stimulus-response binding and retrieval: The head orientation (e.g., to the right) of a current stimulus retrieves the last episode with the same head orientation including the response that was part of this last episode. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, an attacking player would provoke the strongest detrimental effect on an opponent if s/he repeats the same head movement but changes the direction of the pass. Whether it is at all possible to strategically apply this recommendation in practice needs still to be answered.

Need for cognition moderates the relief of avoiding cognitive effort

When making decisions, humans aim to maximize rewards while minimizing costs. The exertion of mental or physical effort has been proposed to be one those costs, translating into avoidance of behaviors carrying effort demands. This motivational framework also predicts that people should experience positive affect when anticipating demand that is subsequently avoided (i.e., a "relief effect"), but evidence for this prediction is scarce. Here, we follow up on a previous study [1] that provided some initial evidence that people more positively evaluated outcomes if it meant they could avoid performing an additional demanding task. However, the results from this study did not provide conclusive evidence that this effect was driven by effort avoidance. Here, we report two experiments that are able to do this. Participants performed a gambling task, and if they did not receive reward they would have to perform an orthogonal effort task. Prior to the gamble, a cue indicated whether this effort task would be easy or hard. We probed hedonic responses to the reward-related feedback, as well as after the subsequent effort task feedback. Participants reported lower hedonic responses for no-reward outcomes when high vs. low effort was anticipated (and later exerted). They also reported higher hedonic responses for reward outcomes when high vs. low effort was anticipated (and avoided). Importantly, this relief effect was smaller in participants with high need for cognition. These results suggest that avoidance of high effort tasks is rewarding, but that the size off this effect depends on the individual disposition to engage with and expend cognitive effort. They also raise the important question of whether this disposition alters the cost of effort per se, or rather offset this cost during cost-benefit analyses.

A mosaic of cost-benefit control over cortico-striatal circuitry

Dopamine contributes to cognitive control through well-established effects in both the striatum and cortex. Although earlier work suggests that dopamine affects cognitive control capacity, more recent work suggests that striatal dopamine may also impact on cognitive motivation. We consider the emerging perspective that striatal dopamine boosts control by making people more sensitive to the benefits versus the costs of cognitive effort, and we discuss how this sensitivity shapes competition between controlled and prepotent actions. We propose that dopamine signaling in distinct cortico-striatal subregions mediates different types of cost-benefit tradeoffs, and also discuss mechanisms for the local control of dopamine release, enabling selectivity among cortico-striatal circuits. In so doing, we show how this cost-benefit mosaic can reconcile seemingly conflicting findings about the impact of dopamine signaling on cognitive control.

Conflict monitoring and the affective-signaling hypothesis-An integrative review

Conflict-monitoring theory proposes that conflict between incompatible responses is registered by a dedicated monitoring system, and that this conflict signal triggers changes of attentional filters and adapts control processes according to the current task demands. Extending the conflict-monitoring theory, it has been suggested that conflict elicits a negative affective reaction, and that it is this affective signal that is monitored and then triggers control adaptation. This review article summarizes research on a potential signaling function of affect for cognitive control. First, we provide an overview of the conflict-monitoring theory, discuss neurophysiological and behavioral markers of monitoring and control adaptation, and introduce the affective-signaling hypothesis. In a second part, we review relevant studies that address the questions of (i) whether conflict elicits negative affect, (ii) whether negative affect is monitored, and (iii) whether affect modulates control. In sum, the reviewed literature supports the claim that conflict and errors trigger negative affect and provides some support for the claim that affect modulates control. However, studies on the monitoring of negative affect and the influence of phasic affect on control are ambiguous. On the basis of these findings, in a third part, we critically reassess the affective-signaling hypothesis, discuss relevant challenges to this account, and suggest future research strategies.

Developing adaptive control: Age-related differences in task choices and awareness of proactive and reactive control demands

Developmental changes in executive function are often explained in terms of core cognitive processes and associated neural substrates. For example, younger children tend to engage control reactively in the moment as needed, whereas older children increasingly engage control proactively, in anticipation of needing it. Such developments may reflect increasing capacities for active maintenance dependent upon dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, younger children will engage proactive control when reactive control is made more difficult, suggesting that developmental changes may also reflect decisions about whether to engage control, and how. We tested awareness of temporal control demands and associated task choices in 5-year-olds and 10-year-olds and adults using a demand selection task. Participants chose between one task that enabled proactive control and another task that enabled reactive control. Adults reported awareness of these different control demands and preferentially played the proactive task option. Ten-year-olds reported awareness of control demands but selected task options at chance. Five-year-olds showed neither awareness nor task preference, but a subsample who exhibited awareness of control demands preferentially played the reactive task option, mirroring their typical control mode. Thus, developmental improvements in executive function may in part reflect better awareness of cognitive demands and adaptive behavior, which may in turn reflect changes in dorsal anterior cingulate in signaling task demands to lateral prefrontal cortex.

Situation selection and cognitive conflict: explicit knowledge is necessary for conflict avoidance

Humans transform their environment in order to regulate their own affect. One way to do so is to avoid situations that come with negative rather than positive affect. This selection might not solely bear on expectations of full-blown emotions, but may also be invoked by anticipating the aversiveness of cognitive conflict, when a situation suggests competing behavioural responses. If cognitive conflict is indeed aversive, it may trigger affect regulation goals, which in turn influence choices of situations depending on the magnitude of conflict they contain. People should prefer actions that produce conflict-free situations to actions that produce conflicting situations. In three experiments, participants had to solve a Stroop task by freely choosing between response keys that were either associated with low-conflict or high-conflict in the subsequent trial. We find that people do not automatically prefer actions associated with conflict-free situations to actions that are associated with conflicting situations. They only do so, when they are explicitly informed about the contingency between action and congruency of an upcoming situation. This suggests that cognitive conflict, at least at the level of a standard conflict task as used here, is insufficient to invoke affect regulation processes.

Delta phase reset predicts conflict-related changes in P3 amplitude and behavior

When multiple competing responses are activated, we respond more slowly than if only one response is activated (response conflict). Conflict-induced slowing is reduced for consecutive high-conflict stimuli, an effect known as conflict adaptation. Verguts and Notebaert's (2009) adaptation by binding theory suggests this is due to Hebbian learning of cognitive control, potentiated by the response of the locus coeruleus norepinephrine (NE) system. Phasic activity of the NE system can potentially be measured non-invasively in humans by recording the P3 component of the event-related potential (ERP), and the P3 is sensitive to conflict adaptation. Bouret and Sara's (2005) network reset theory suggests that phasic NE might functionally reset ongoing large-scale network activity, generating synchronous neural population activity like the P3. To examine the possibility that network reset contributes to conflict effects in the P3, we recorded high-density EEG data while subjects performed a flanker task. As expected, conflict and conflict adaptation modulated P3 amplitudes. Brain-behavior correlation analyses indicated that activity during the rise of the P3 was related to RT and predicted RT differences due to conflict. More importantly, phase of delta oscillations not only predicted reaction time differences between low-conflict and high-conflict conditions, but delta phase reset also predicted the amplitude of the P3. Delta oscillations exhibited dominant peaks both pre and post-stimulus, and delta at stimulus onset predicted the post-stimulus ERP, in particular the N2 and P3. This result bridges human EEG with basic mechanisms suggested by computational neural models and invasive patient recordings, namely that salient cognitive events might reset ongoing oscillations leading to the generation of the phase-locked evoked potential. We conclude that partial phase reset is a cortical mechanism involved in monitoring the environment for unexpected events, and this response contributes to conflict effects in the ERP. These results are in line with theories that phasic NE release might reset ongoing cortical activity, leading to the generation of ERP components like the P3.

Cost-benefit trade-offs in decision-making and learning

Value-based decision-making involves trading off the cost associated with an action against its expected reward. Research has shown that both physical and mental effort constitute such subjective costs, biasing choices away from effortful actions, and discounting the value of obtained rewards. Facing conflicts between competing action alternatives is considered aversive, as recruiting cognitive control to overcome conflict is effortful. Moreover, engaging control to proactively suppress irrelevant information that could conflict with task-relevant information would presumably also be cognitively costly. Yet, it remains unclear whether the cognitive control demands involved in preventing and resolving conflict also constitute costs in value-based decisions. The present study investigated this question by embedding irrelevant distractors (flanker arrows) within a reversal-learning task, with intermixed free and instructed trials. Results showed that participants learned to adapt their free choices to maximize rewards, but were nevertheless biased to follow the suggestions of irrelevant distractors. Thus, the perceived cost of investing cognitive control to suppress an external suggestion could sometimes trump internal value representations. By adapting computational models of reinforcement learning, we assessed the influence of conflict at both the decision and learning stages. Modelling the decision showed that free choices were more biased when participants were less sure about which action was more rewarding. This supports the hypothesis that the costs linked to conflict management were traded off against expected rewards. During the learning phase, we found that learning rates were reduced in instructed, relative to free, choices. Learning rates were further reduced by conflict between an instruction and subjective action values, whereas learning was not robustly influenced by conflict between one’s actions and external distractors. Our results show that the subjective cognitive control costs linked to conflict factor into value-based decision-making, and highlight that different types of conflict may have different effects on learning about action outcomes.

Value-based decision-making involves trading off the cost associated with an action–such as physical or mental effort–against its expected reward. Although facing conflicts between competing action alternatives is considered aversive and effortful, it remains unclear whether conflict also constitutes a cost in value-based decisions. We tested this hypothesis by combining a classic conflict (flanker) task with a reinforcement-learning task. Results showed that participants learned to maximise their earnings, but were nevertheless biased to follow irrelevant suggestions. Computational model-based analyses showed a greater choice bias with more uncertainty about the best action to make, supporting the hypothesis that the costs linked to conflict management were traded off against expected rewards. We additionally found that learning rates were reduced when following instructions, relative to when choosing freely what to do. Learning was further reduced by conflict between instructions and subjective action values. In short, we found that the subjective cognitive control costs linked to conflict factor into value-based decision-making, and that different types of conflict may have different effects on learning about action outcomes.

Measuring Adaptive Control in Conflict Tasks

The past two decades have witnessed an explosion of interest in the cognitive and neural mechanisms of adaptive control processes that operate in selective attention tasks. This has spawned not only a large empirical literature and several theories but also the recurring identification of potential confounds and corresponding adjustments in task design to create confound-minimized metrics of adaptive control. The resulting complexity of this literature can be difficult to navigate for new researchers entering the field, leading to suboptimal study designs. To remediate this problem, we present here a consensus view among opposing theorists that specifies how researchers can measure four hallmark indices of adaptive control (the congruency sequence effect, and list-wide, context-specific, and item-specific proportion congruency effects) while minimizing easy-to-overlook confounds.

The Subjective Value of Cognitive Effort is Encoded by a Domain-General Valuation Network

Cognitive control is necessary for goal-directed behavior, yet people treat cognitive control demand as a cost, which discounts the value of rewards in a similar manner as other costs, such as delay or risk. It is unclear, however, whether the subjective value (SV) of cognitive effort is encoded in the same putatively domain-general brain valuation network implicated in other cost domains, or instead engages a distinct frontoparietal network, as implied by recent studies. Here, we provide rigorous evidence that the valuation network, with core foci in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum, also encodes SV during cognitive effort-based decision-making in healthy, male and female adult humans. We doubly dissociate this network from frontoparietal regions that are instead recruited as a function of decision difficulty. We show that the domain-general valuation network jointly and independently encodes both reward benefits and cognitive effort costs. We also demonstrate that cognitive effort SV signals predict choice and are influenced by state and trait motivation, including sensitivity to reward and anticipated task performance. These findings unify cognitive effort with other cost domains, and suggest candidate neural mechanisms underlying state and trait variation in willingness to expend cognitive effort.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Subjective effort costs are increasingly understood to diminish cognitive control over task performance and can thus undermine functioning across health and disease. Yet, we are only beginning to understand how decisions about cognitive effort are made. A key question is how subjective values are computed. Recent work suggests that the value of cognitive effort might be computed by networks that are distinct from those involved in other domains like intertemporal and risky decision-making, implying distinct mechanisms. Here we demonstrate that the domain-general network also encodes effort-discounted value, linking cognitive effort closely with other domains. Our results thus elucidate key mechanisms supporting decisions about cognitive effort, and point to candidate neural targets for intervention in disorders involving impaired cognitive motivation.

Boundary conditions for the influence of spatial proximity on context-specific attentional settings

Flexibility of cognitive control is illustrated by the context-specific proportion compatibility (CSPC) effect, the now well-documented pattern showing that compatibility effects are reduced in mostly incompatible relative to mostly compatible locations. The episodic-retrieval account attributes the CSPC effect to location-specific representations that include the attentional settings formed via experience within a given location (e.g., a "focused" attentional setting becomes bound to a location with frequent conflict, whereas a "relaxed" setting becomes bound to one with infrequent conflict). However, Diede and Bugg (Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 78, 1255-1266, 2016) demonstrated that the attentional setting associated with a given location can be based on experiences that accumulate across multiple "grouped" locations-namely, those that are proximal to each other, relative to other (distal) locations. This spatial grouping effect supported the relative-proximity hypothesis, which we further tested in the present study. Experiment 1 replicated the spatial grouping effect and showed that it could be disrupted by a horizontal line dividing the otherwise grouped locations. Experiments 2 through 4 suggested that grouping might be a form of "chunking"-that is, the spatial grouping effect did not occur when the proximal locations were few enough in number (two) to represent independently, but it did occur when there were six locations. When there were eight proximal locations (and ten locations overall), the CSPC effect disappeared entirely. These findings suggest important boundary conditions for the relative-proximity hypothesis and inform our understanding of how past experiences with conflict are organized in the form of episodic representations that enable on-the-fly adjustments in cognitive control.

Mental labour

Mental effort is an elementary notion in our folk psychology and a familiar fixture in everyday introspective experience. However, as an object of scientific study, mental effort has remained rather elusive. Cognitive psychology has provided some tools for understanding how effort impacts performance, by linking effort with cognitive control function. What has remained less clear are the principles that govern the allocation of mental effort. Under what circumstances do people choose to invest mental effort, and when do they decline to do so? And what regulates the intensity of mental effort when it is applied? In new and promising work, these questions are being approached with the tools of behavioural economics. Though still in its infancy, this economic approach to mental effort research has already uncovered important aspects of effort-based decision-making, and points clearly to future lines of inquiry, including some intriguing opportunities presented by recent artificial intelligence research.

The emotive nature of conflict monitoring in the medial prefrontal cortex

The detection of conflict between incompatible impulses, thoughts, and actions is a ubiquitous source of motivation across theories of goal-directed action. In this overview, we explore the hypothesis that conflict is emotive, integrating perspectives from affective science and cognitive neuroscience. Initially, we review evidence suggesting that the mental and biological processes that monitor for information processing conflict-particularly those generated by the anterior midcingulate cortex-track the affective significance of conflict and use this signal to motivate increased control. In this sense, variation in control resembles a form of affect regulation in which control implementation counteracts the aversive experience of conflict. We also highlight emerging evidence proposing that states and dispositions associated with acceptance facilitate control by tuning individuals to the emotive nature of conflict, before proposing avenues for future research, including investigating the role of affect in reinforcement learning and decision making.

Cognitive effort is modulated outside of the explicit awareness of conflict frequency: Evidence from pupillometry

Classic theories of cognitive control conceptualized controlled processes as slow, strategic, and willful, with automatic processes being fast and effortless. The context-specific proportion compatibility (CSPC) effect, the reduction in the compatibility effect in a context (e.g., location) associated with a high relative to low likelihood of conflict, challenged classic theories by demonstrating fast and flexible control that appears to operate outside of conscious awareness. Two theoretical questions yet to be addressed are whether the CSPC effect is accompanied by context-dependent variation in effort, and whether the exertion of effort depends on explicit awareness of context-specific task demands. To address these questions, pupil diameter was measured during a CSPC paradigm. Stimuli were randomly presented in either a mostly compatible location or a mostly incompatible location. Replicating prior research, the CSPC effect was found. The novel finding was that pupil diameter was greater in the mostly incompatible location compared to the mostly compatible location, despite participants' lack of awareness of context-specific task demands. Additionally, this difference occurred regardless of trial type or a preceding switch in location. These patterns support the view that context (location) dictates selection of optimal attentional settings in the CSPC paradigm, and varying levels of effort and performance accompany these settings. Theoretically, these patterns imply that cognitive control may operate fast, flexibly, and outside of awareness, but not effortlessly. (PsycINFO Database Record

Different Stages, Different Signals: The Modulating Effect of Cognitive Conflict on Subsequent Processing

The present study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate the function of signals induced by cognitive conflict during the detection stage and the resolution stage of perceptual processing. The study used a combination of the Stroop task and an affective priming task to examine the conflict priming effect when the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was 200 ms or 800 ms. Behavioral results showed that the RTs were shorter for positive targets following congruent primes relative to incongruent primes, and for negative targets following incongruent primes relative to congruent primes when the SOA was 200 ms. ERP results showed that the N2 amplitudes (200–300 ms) for incongruent stimuli were significantly larger than for congruent stimuli in the Stroop task, which indicated a significant conflict effect. Moreover, the N400 amplitudes (500–700 ms) for positive targets after congruent primes were significantly lower than those after incongruent primes when the SOA was 200 ms, which showed a significant negative priming effect. While the SOA was 800 ms, behavioral results showed that the RTs were shorter for positive targets following incongruent primes relative to congruent primes. ERP results showed that the N2 amplitudes (200–300 ms) for incongruent stimuli were significantly larger than for congruent stimuli in the Stroop task, which indicated a significant conflict effect. The N400 amplitudes (1100–1300 ms) for the negative targets after congruent primes were significantly lower than those after incongruent primes when the SOA was 800 ms, which showed a significant positive priming effect. The results demonstrated that the functions of signals induced by cognitive conflict were reversed in two different cognitive processing stages.

The Role of Anterior Cingulate Cortex in the Affective Evaluation of Conflict

An influential theory of ACC function argues that this brain region plays a crucial role in the affective evaluation of performance monitoring and control demands. Specifically, control-demanding processes such as response conflict are thought to be registered as aversive signals by ACC, which in turn triggers processing adjustments to support avoidance learning. In support of conflict being treated as an aversive event, recent behavioral studies demonstrated that incongruent (i.e., conflict inducing), relative to congruent, stimuli can speed up subsequent negative, relative to positive, affective picture processing. Here, we used fMRI to investigate directly whether ACC activity in response to negative versus positive pictures is modulated by preceding control demands, consisting of conflict and task-switching conditions. The results show that negative, relative to positive, pictures elicited higher ACC activation after congruent, relative to incongruent, trials, suggesting that ACC's response to negative (positive) pictures was indeed affectively primed by incongruent (congruent) trials. Interestingly, this pattern of results was observed on task repetitions but disappeared on task alternations. This study supports the proposal that conflict induces negative affect and is the first to show that this affective signal is reflected in ACC activation.

No pain, no gain: the affective valence of congruency conditions changes following a successful response

The cognitive control theory of Botvinick, Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 356-366 (2007) integrates cognitive and affective control processes by emphasizing the aversive nature of cognitive conflict. Using an affective priming paradigm, we replicate earlier results showing that incongruent trials, relative to congruent trials, are indeed perceived as more aversive (Dreisbach & Fischer, Brain and Cognition, 78(2), 94-98 (2012)). Importantly, however, in two experiments we demonstrate that this effect is reversed following successful responses; correctly responding to incongruent trials engendered relatively more positive affect than correctly responding to congruent trials. The results are discussed in light of a recent computational model by Silvetti, Seurinck, and Verguts, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5:75 (2011) where it is assumed that outcome expectancies are more negative for incongruent trials than congruent trials. Consequently, the intrinsic reward (prediction error) following successful completion is larger for incongruent than congruent trials. These findings divulge a novel perspective on 'cognitive' adaptations to conflict.

Conscious and unconscious context-specific cognitive control

A key feature of the human cognitive system is its ability to deal with an ever-changing environment. One prototypical example is the observation that we adjust our information processing depending on the conflict-likelihood of a context (context-specific proportion congruency effect, CSPC, Crump etal., 2006). Recently, empirical studies started to question the role of consciousness in these strategic adaptation processes (for reviews, see Desender and Van den Bussche, 2012; Kunde etal., 2012). However, these studies have not yielded unequivocal results (e.g., Kunde, 2003; Heinemann etal., 2009; Van Gaal etal., 2010a; Desender etal., 2013; Reuss etal., 2014). In the present study, we aim at replicating the experiment of Heinemann etal. (2009) in which the proportion of congruent and incongruent trials between different contexts was varied in a masked priming task. Their results showed a reduction of the congruency effect for the context with more incongruent trials. However, this CSPC effect was only observed when the prime–target conflict was conscious, rather than unconscious, suggesting that context-specific control operates within the boundaries of awareness. Our replication attempt however contrasts these findings. In the first experiment we found no evidence for a CSPC effect in reaction times (RTs), neither in the conscious nor in the unconscious condition. The error rate analysis did show a CSPC effect, albeit not one modulated by consciousness. In the second experiment we found an overall CSPC effect in RTs, independent of consciousness. The error rates did not display a CSPC pattern. These mixed results seem to nuance the findings of Heinemann etal. (2009) and highlight the need for replication studies in psychology research.