An empirical test of the decision to lie component of the Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT)

The effects of deception on memory: a comparative study of actors and eyewitnesses accounts

Deception is a common occurrence in daily life and has been shown to impair memory. This study investigated the memory-undermining effects of deception in a simulated daily life scenario, focusing on the potential moderating effect of the liars' role (i.e., actor vs. eyewitness). In a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, 128 participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: actors who told the truth, actors who lied, eyewitnesses who told the truth, and eyewitnesses who lied. Participants engaged in a simulated shopping task, followed by an interview where they either provided truthful or deceptive responses about the items they bought (actors) or observed (eyewitnesses). Two days later, participants completed a series of memory tests assessing item memory, source memory, destination memory, and non-believed memories. Results showed that deception impaired source memory, with a greater impairment observed for actors than eyewitnesses. Deception also led to more non-believed memories and impaired item and destination memory, regardless of the liars' role. These findings suggest that the role of liars moderates the effects of deception on memory, with self-related deception (actors) leading to greater memory impairments than other-related deception (eyewitnesses).

Anterior N2 enhancement is not a general electrophysiological index of concealed information

Event-related potentials (ERPs) have been used with the concealed information test (CIT) to detect concealed recognition of specific stimuli (i.e., "probes"). While most research has focused on the P300 component, which is larger for infrequent probes than for frequent control stimuli (i.e., "irrelevants"), some studies have investigated an earlier ERP component, the anterior N2, with mixed results. Although some studies have reported a larger anterior N2 for probes than irrelevants (N2 enhancement), other studies, including our own, have not found such an effect. The present study aimed to replicate and extend our previous findings using the same CIT paradigm and measurement parameters. Results of Bayesian analyses show strong evidence against the hypothesis of anterior N2 enhancement by probes, replicating our previous work. Bayesian analyses also show strong evidence against the hypothesis of N2 enhancement for the three components revealed by a temporal principal component analysis (PCA) conducted to disentangle potentially overlapping ERP effects. In conclusion, whereas the CIT has shown promise in detecting recognition of specific information, anterior N2 enhancement cannot be used as an electrophysiological measure of concealed information across CIT paradigms.

Level of Effort and Economic Dishonesty: Are Expectations Relevant?

Some research has shown that expectations modulate people's economic dishonesty. These studies have allowed their participants to precisely establish the dishonest extra financial gain, without threatening their image of honesty. In this article, we show that in situations where our economic dishonesty is driven by hard-to-quantify motivators such as level of effort, it is difficult to change the categorization of (dishonest) judgments. Faced with this ambiguity, people make decisions guided by moral intuitions that are not conditioned by changing expectations. We carried out three studies (one single-group study and two experimental between-subjects studies) in which we tested whether the level of deception varies when manipulating expectations of transparency/privacy and dishonesty/honesty. Our results show that the levels of dishonesty remain low, regardless of the participants' expectations. When our decisions are motivated by more ambiguous factors, in terms of being able to justify ourselves, our economic dishonesty becomes more rigidly directed toward the dictates of our moral intuitions.

Does deception involve more cognitive control than truth-telling? Meta-analyses of N2 and MFN ERP studies

A number of psychological theories propose that deception involves more cognitive control than truth-telling. Over the last decades, event-related potentials (ERPs) have been used to unravel this question, but the findings are mixed. To address this controversy, two meta-analyses were conducted to quantify the results of existing studies reporting N2 or medial frontal negativity (MFN) associated with deception. In total, 32 papers consisting of 1091 participants were included, which yielded 32 effect sizes for N2 and 7 effect sizes for MFN. We found that deception was associated with a more negative N2 and MFN than truth-telling with medium and large effect sizes (r = .25 and .51, respectively). We also found that the deception paradigm modulated the results (p = .043), but found no evidence for publication bias. Our findings indicate that deception involves more cognitive control than truth-telling. Our review also identifies gaps in this literature, including a need for more ERP studies using spontaneous deception.

Default settings affect children's decisions about whether to be honest

Behavioral economics research has revealed that our decision-making can be biased by default settings. That is, all other things being equal, adults tend to choose default options even when the effort involved in choosing other options is minimal. Extensive evidence shows that default settings can systematically influence adult decisions in a wide variety of domains (e.g., pension choices, organ donation), but little is known about their developmental origin. Of interest in the present research is whether default settings can influence young children's decisions about whether to be honest. We investigated this question in two studies of 5- and 6-year-old Chinese children (total N = 120; 60 girls; M_age = 5.81, SD_age = 0.14). Each study used a specially designed device that allowed children to play a guessing game in either a Cheating Default condition in which they would cheat by doing nothing or in an Honesty Default condition in which they would be honest by doing nothing. In each condition, they had the option of taking a trivially easy action to override the default (pushing a button in Study 1 or moving a screen in Study 2). In both studies, children decided to cheat significantly more often in the Cheating Default condition than in the Honesty Default condition. Additionally, overall cheating rates were significantly higher in Study 2 than in Study 1 (55% vs. 25%), which suggests that even though the default setting effect generalized across different actions, the specific action in question can also affect the cheating rate. Taken together, these results indicate that default setting effects that have been observed in adults have origins in childhood, and they point toward new ways to use nudges to promote positive social development and moral decision-making.

Utilizing the Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory to predict children's hypothetical decisions to deceive

The Decision component of the Activation-Decision-Construction-Action-Theory (ADCAT) utilizes a cost-benefit formula to explain the cognitive, motivational and social processes involved in deception. Three prior studies suggest that ADCAT can be used to predict adults' future deceptive behavior; however, no study has assessed the potential relevance of ADCAT with children. The present study is the first to date to examine whether this cost-benefit formula can predict children's hypothetical decisions to tell three types of lies, and whether there are specific developmental factors that need to be considered. The results indicate that the cost-benefit formula was only effective for predicting children's hypothetical lies for self-gain at no cost to another (Self-No Cost lies) and lies for others when there was a personal cost (Other-Cost to Self). More specifically, expected value of telling the truth was related to lower willingness to tell hypothetical Self-No Cost and Other-Cost to Self lies. On the other hand, the expected value of lying was not related to children's hypothetical decisions to tell Self-No Cost, Self-Cost to Other or Other-Cost to Self lies. Children's inhibitory control and theory of mind were significant covariates for some of the ADCAT predictor variables and children's hypothetical truth and lying behaviors. Altogether, these findings indicate that the effectiveness of the ADCAT cost-benefit formula for predicting children's lying behavior is affected by developmental factors and the type of lie being analyzed.

To err is human but not deceptive

This study addresses a poorly understood but important question concerning the cognition of deception: How much more is there to lying than to responding incorrectly, the latter capturing how researchers have occasionally operationalized deception? A recent social-cognitive account of lying - Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT) - asserts a qualitative difference between the two - for instance, that deception involves Theory of Mind inferences and more proactive interference. To test these notions within-subjects, participants answered closed-ended and open-ended questions probing general truths honestly, deceptively, or with intentional errors. Response time and noncompliance with instructions were the dependent measures. Deceptive responding generally elicited the longest response times and the lowest instruction compliance, followed by intentional erring, supporting the theory. Although not the primary focus, response inhibition due to implausible deception was demonstrated for the first time.

Measuring Deception: A Look at Antecedents to Deceptive Intent

A Deceptive Belief Inventory scale is developed and validated using 10 first-order factors to represent 3 second-order constructs (deception confidence, duping delight, and guiltless deception). A new theoretical model describing how deception confidence, duping delight, and guiltless deception may influence a person’s intent to deceive others is also tested. Traditional deceptive communication research has focused on situation-specific factors surrounding deception. This study focuses on understanding and assessing a person’s propensity to deceive others. The findings of this study can be used to better understand the factors that may influence a person’s reported propensity to deceive and ultimately be used to improve security procedures designed to protect critical information systems.