How to explain receptivity to conjunction-fallacy inhibition training: evidence from the Iowa gambling task

Risk Decision Making and Executive Function among Adolescents and Young Adults

The dual theory establishes that the decision-making process relies on two different systems, the affective system and the executive function (EF), developed during adolescence. This study analyzes the relationship between the decision-making and EF processes in a group of early adolescents (mean age = 12.51 years, SD = 0.61), where more affective impulse processes are developed, and in young adults (mean age = 19.38 years, SD = 1.97), where cognitive control processes have already matured. For this purpose, 140 participants in Spain completed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to measure their risky decisions and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) to measure their EF. Performance on the IGT improves over blocks; however, adolescents received lower mean scores than young adults. However, controlling for age, perseverative errors were negatively associated with the mean net score on the risky blocks of IGT; thus, those who committed more perseverative errors in the WCST were more likely to take cards from the disadvantageous decks on the last blocks of the IGT. The current study shows that adolescents and adults solve ambiguous decisions by trial and error; however, adolescents are more likely to make risky decisions without attending to the long-term consequences. Following the dual theory hypothesis, the maturation of EF with age partly accounts for this difference in risky decision-making between adolescents and adults.

The role of inhibition capacities in the Iowa gambling test performance in young tattooed women

Background

Using the Iowa Gambling Test (IGT), we demonstrated previously impaired decision- making process in young tattooed women. The purpose of the present study was to explore the associations among the three facets of impaired inhibition (response inhibition, reflection inhibition and interference inhibition) and decision-making processes in this population.

Methods

To this end, the participants of the previous study (60 tattooed women and 60 non-tattooed women) were assessed in the Go/NoGo task, a measure of response inhibition, the Matched Familiar Figure Test (MFFT), a measure of reflection inhibition and the Stroop task a measure of interference inhibition.

Results

Tattooed women were significantly slower than non-tattooed women in the Go/NoGo performance; however, no differences were detected in the MFFT and the Stroop task. A hierarchical regression analysis did not reveal any significant main effects of these inhibition measures on the IGT performance.

Conclusions

These findings do not support the hypothesis that risky decision in young tattooed women is due to impaired inhibitory control. Further studies are needed to identify the cognitive mechanisms involved in the tendency to risky decisions in young tattooed women.

Inhibiting intuitive rules in a geometry comparison task: Do age level and math achievement matter?

Many people apply the "larger area-larger perimeter" rule to solve the perimeter comparison problems, even in situations where this intuitive rule is misleading. To investigate whether inhibitory control is needed in the perimeter comparison reasoning and whether the efficiency of inhibitory control varies with students' ages and achievements, we designed a negative priming paradigm and conducted two experiments. In Experiment 1, a negative priming effect was observed in both Chinese primary school students (n = 123) and college students (n = 42) when they were solving a perimeter comparison task. In Experiment 2 (N = 86), we found that the negative priming effect existed in both high-achieving and low-achieving primary school students, but the magnitude of this effect appeared to be smaller in high-achieving students. These results imply that success in solving geometry quantitative problems requires the ability to inhibit the larger area-larger perimeter intuition in some situations and also that high-achieving students are more capable of doing so.

The role of gender in association between inhibition capacities and risky decision making

BACKGROUND

Research on the association between decision making and inhibition abilities has exhibited fundamental controversies. Some authors claim that inhibition abilities are an integral part of the decision-making process, whereas others suggest that the decision-making process does not operate in close association with inhibition abilities. Can gender explain variations in risky decisions via inhibition influences?

PURPOSE

The purpose of the present study was to explore the associations between response inhibition, reflection inhibition, interference inhibition, and decision-making processes in men and women.

METHODS

To this end, 46 women and 46 men were assessed by the Go/NoGo task, a measure of response inhibition, by the Matching Familiar Figure Test, a measure of reflection inhibition; and by the Stroop task, a measure of interference inhibition.

RESULTS

No differences were detected in these measures between groups. The net score of the performance on the last section of the Iowa Gambling Task choices did not correlate with the inhibition measures in the two groups. We did not discover any significant main effects of gender on the association between these measures.

CONCLUSION

These findings do not support the hypothesis that risky decisions are due to impaired inhibitory control. Further studies are needed to identify the cognitive mechanisms involved in the tendency to make risky decisions.

How minimal executive feedback influences creative idea generation

The fixation effect is known as one of the most dominant of the cognitive biases against creativity and limits individuals' creative capacities in contexts of idea generation. Numerous techniques and tools have been established to help overcome these cognitive biases in various disciplines ranging from neuroscience to design sciences. Several works in the developmental cognitive sciences have discussed the importance of inhibitory control and have argued that individuals must first inhibit the spontaneous ideas that come to their mind so that they can generate creative solutions to problems. In line with the above discussions, in the present study, we performed an experiment on one hundred undergraduates from the Faculty of Psychology at Paris Descartes University, in which we investigated a minimal executive feedback-based learning process that helps individuals inhibit intuitive paths to solutions and then gradually drive their ideation paths toward creativity. Our results provide new insights into novel forms of creative leadership for idea generation.

High But Not Low Probability of Gain Elicits a Positive Feeling Leading to the Framing Effect

Human risky decision-making is known to be highly susceptible to profit-motivated responses elicited by the way in which options are framed. In fact, studies investigating the framing effect have shown that the choice between sure and risky options depends on how these options are presented. Interestingly, the probability of gain of the risky option has been highlighted as one of the main factors causing variations in susceptibility to the framing effect. However, while it has been shown that high probabilities of gain of the risky option systematically lead to framing bias, questions remain about the influence of low probabilities of gain. Therefore, the first aim of this paper was to clarify the respective roles of high and low probabilities of gain in the framing effect. Due to the difference between studies using a within- or between-subjects design, we conducted a first study investigating the respective roles of these designs. For both designs, we showed that trials with a high probability of gain led to the framing effect whereas those with a low probability did not. Second, as emotions are known to play a key role in the framing effect, we sought to determine whether they are responsible for such a debiasing effect of the low probability of gain. Our second study thus investigated the relationship between emotion and the framing effect depending on high and low probabilities. Our results revealed that positive emotion was related to risk-seeking in the loss frame, but only for trials with a high probability of gain. Taken together, these results support the interpretation that low probabilities of gain suppress the framing effect because they prevent the positive emotion of gain anticipation.

Helping reasoners succeed in the Wason selection task: when executive learning discourages heuristic response but does not necessarily encourage logic

Reasoners make systematic logical errors by giving heuristic responses that reflect deviations from the logical norm. Influential studies have suggested first that our reasoning is often biased because we minimize cognitive effort to surpass a cognitive conflict between heuristic response from system 1 and analytic response from system 2 thinking. Additionally, cognitive control processes might be necessary to inhibit system 1 responses to activate a system 2 response. Previous studies have shown a significant effect of executive learning (EL) on adults who have transferred knowledge acquired on the Wason selection task (WST) to another isomorphic task, the rule falsification task (RFT). The original paradigm consisted of teaching participants to inhibit a classical matching heuristic that sufficed the first problem and led to significant EL transfer on the second problem. Interestingly, the reasoning tasks differed in inhibiting-heuristic metacognitive cost. Success on the WST requires half-suppression of the matching elements. In contrast, the RFT necessitates a global rejection of the matching elements for a correct answer. Therefore, metacognitive learning difficulty most likely differs depending on whether one uses the first or second task during the learning phase. We aimed to investigate this difficulty and various matching-bias inhibition effects in a new (reversed) paradigm. In this case, the transfer effect from the RFT to the WST could be more difficult because the reasoner learns to reject all matching elements in the first task. We observed that the EL leads to a significant reduction in matching selections on the WST without increasing logical performances. Interestingly, the acquired metacognitive knowledge was too "strictly" transferred and discouraged matching rather than encouraging logic. This finding underlines the complexity of learning transfer and adds new evidence to the pedagogy of reasoning.

What have we learned about the processes involved in the Iowa Gambling Task from developmental studies?

Developmental studies using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) or child-friendly adaptations of the IGT converged in showing that children and adolescents exhibit a strong bias in favor of disadvantageous choices whereas adults learn to decide advantageously during the course of the task. In the present article, we reviewed developmental studies that used the IGT or child-friendly adaptations of the IGT to show how these findings provide a better understanding of the processes involved in decision-making under uncertainty. For instance, developmental studies have underlined that until late adolescence, the dominant strategy is to focus only on the frequency of punishment and to choose among options with infrequent losses. Indeed, school-aged children and adolescents' choices in the IGT seem to be guided by the loss frequency leading them to fail in distinguishing between advantageous and disadvantageous options. In addition, recent developmental studies revealed that adults switch less often after losses than school-aged children and adolescents. These findings suggest that psychological tolerance to loss may facilitate learning the characteristics of each option, which in turn improves the ability to choose advantageously. In conclusion, developmental studies help us refine our understanding of decision-making.

Measuring inhibitory control in children and adults: brain imaging and mental chronometry

Jean Piaget underestimated the cognitive capabilities of infants, preschoolers, and elementary schoolchildren, and overestimated the capabilities of adolescents and even adults which are often biased by illogical intuitions and overlearned strategies (i.e., “fast thinking” in Daniel Kahneman’s words). The crucial question is now to understand why, despite rich precocious knowledge about physical and mathematical principles observed over the last three decades in infants and young children, older children, adolescents and even adults are nevertheless so often bad reasoners. We propose that inhibition of less sophisticated solutions (or heuristics) by the prefrontal cortex is a domain-general executive ability that supports children’s conceptual insights associated with more advanced Piagetian stages, such as number-conservation and class inclusion. Moreover, this executive ability remains critical throughout the whole life and even adults may sometimes need “prefrontal pedagogy” in order to learn inhibiting intuitive heuristics (or biases) in deductive reasoning tasks. Here we highlight some of the discoveries from our lab in the field of cognitive development relying on two methodologies used for measuring inhibitory control: brain imaging and mental chronometry (i.e., the negative priming paradigm). We also show that this new approach opens an avenue for re-examining persistent errors in standard classroom-learning tasks.

Impaired self-awareness in pathological gamblers

Lack of self-awareness of one's decisions remains an understudied and elusive topic in the addiction literature. The present study aimed at taking a first step towards addressing this difficult subject through the use of a combination of behavioral procedures. Here, we explored the association between a metacognitive process (the ability to reflect and evaluate the awareness of one's own decision) and poor performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) in a group of pathological gamblers (PG; n = 30), and in a comparison group (n = 35). This metacognitive process was assessed during the IGT with the post-decision wagering procedure, while a number of potential confounds (i.e., reward/loss sensitivity, dual-tasking) were controlled for. Results showed that: (1) Initial performance enhancement of the control group on IGT occurred without explicit knowledge of the task, thus confirming its implicit character; (2) compared to controls, performance of PG on the IGT failed to increase during the task; (3) taking into account increased reward sensitivity and decreased loss sensitivity as well as poorer dual-tasking in pathological gamblers, PG tended to exhibit a bias in evaluating their own performance on the IGT by maximizing their wagers independently of selecting advantageous decks. Our findings suggest that biased metacognition may affect pathological gamblers, leading to disadvantageous post-decision wagering, which is in turn linked to impaired decision making under ambiguity. Perhaps this deficit reflects the impaired insight and self-awareness that many addicts suffer from, thus providing a novel approach for capturing and measuring this impairment, and for investigating its possible causes.

Is it just a brick wall or a sign from the universe? An fMRI study of supernatural believers and skeptics

We examined with functional magnetic resonance imaging the brain activity of 12 supernatural believers and 11 skeptics who first imagined themselves in critical life situations (e.g. problems in intimate relationships) and then watched emotionally charged pictures of lifeless objects and scenery (e.g. two red cherries bound together). Supernatural believers reported seeing signs of how the situations were going to turn out in the pictures more often than skeptics did. Viewing the pictures activated the same brain regions among all participants (e.g. the left inferior frontal gyrus, IFG). However, the right IFG, previously associated with cognitive inhibition, was activated more strongly in skeptics than in supernatural believers, and its activation was negatively correlated to sign seeing in both participant groups. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on the universal processes that may underlie supernatural beliefs and the role of cognitive inhibition in explaining individual differences in such beliefs.

Is human decision making under ambiguity guided by loss frequency regardless of the costs? A developmental study using the Soochow Gambling Task

Converging developmental decision-making studies have demonstrated that until late adolescence, individuals prefer options for which the risk of a loss is low regardless of the final outcome. Recent works have shown a similar inability to consider both loss frequency and final outcome among adults. The current study aimed to identify developmental changes in feedback-monitoring ability to consider both loss frequency and final outcome in decision making under ambiguity. Children, adolescents, and adults performed an adapted version of the Soochow Gambling Task. Our results showed that children and adolescents presented an exclusive preference for options associated with infrequent punishment. In contrast, only adults seemed to consider both loss frequency and the final outcome by favoring the advantageous options when the frequency of losses was low. These findings suggest that the ability to integrate both loss frequency and final outcome develops with age. Moreover, the analysis of strategic adjustments following gains and losses reveals that adults switch less often after losses compared with children and adolescents. This finding suggests that psychological tolerance to loss may facilitate learning the characteristics of each option and improve the ability to choose advantageously.

Developmental changes of win-stay and loss-shift strategies in decision making

This study aims to clarify the developmental changes in real-life decision making when strategy is adjusted using both positive and negative feedback, that is, whether strategic adjustment evolves with age. A total of 84 participants divided into three age groups (children, adolescents, and adults) performed the standard version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Children and adolescents showed a strong bias in favor of disadvantageous choices whereas adults learned to decide advantageously during the course of the task. Interestingly, the results clearly demonstrate that children did not switch differently following gains and losses whereas adolescents and adults switched more often after a loss than after a gain, corresponding to the "loss-shift" and the "win-stay" strategies, respectively. The results also revealed that adults switched less often after losses compared to children and adolescents and, thus, used the loss-stay strategy more often than the 2 youngest groups. These new findings suggest that successful completion of the IGT by adults requires fine feedback monitoring and more frequent use of the win-stay and loss-stay strategic adjustments.

Power of the desired self: Influence of induced perceptions of the self on reasoning

This research shows that the motivation to posses a desired characteristic (or to avoid an undesired one) results in self-perceptions that guide people's use of base rate in the Lawyer-Engineer problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). In four studies, participants induced to believe (or recall, Exp. 2) that a rational cognitive style is success-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style failure-conducive) subsequently viewed themselves as more rational and relied more on base rate in their probability estimates than those induced to believe that a rational cognitive style is failure-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style success-conducive). These findings show that the desired self had an influence on reasoning in the self-unrelated lawyer-engineer task, since the use of base rates was mediated by changes in participants' perceptions of their own rationality. These findings therefore show that the desired self, through the working self-concept that it entails, constitutes another factor influencing people's use of distinct modes of reasoning.

Risk-taking decisions in pathological gamblers is not a result of their impaired inhibition ability

This work investigates whether inhibition impairments influence the decision making process in pathological gamblers (PGs). The PG (N=51) subjects performed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT as the measure of the decision making process) and two tests of inhibition: the Stroop (interference inhibition), and the Go/NoGo (response inhibition), and were compared with demographically matched healthy subjects (N=57). Performance in the IGT block 1 and block 2 did not differ between the groups, but the differences between the PGs and healthy controls began to be significant in block 3, block 4 and block 5. PGs learned the IGT task more slowly than the healthy controls and had non-optimal outcomes (more disadvantageous choices). Impaired IGT performance in PGs was not related to an inhibition ability measured by the Stroop (interference response time) and the Go/NoGo (number of commission errors) parameters. Further controlled studies with neuroimaging techniques may help to clarify the particular brain mechanisms underlying the impaired decision making process in PGs.