Decision urgency invigorates movement in humans

Rapid, systematic updating of movement by accumulated decision evidence

Acting in the natural world requires not only deciding among multiple options but also converting decisions into motor commands. How the dynamics of decision formation influence the fine kinematics of response movement remains, however, poorly understood. Here we investigate how the accumulation of decision evidence shapes the response orienting trajectories in a task where freely-moving rats combine prior expectations and auditory information to select between two possible options. Response trajectories and their motor vigor are initially determined by the prior. Rats movements then incorporate sensory information as early as 60 ms after stimulus onset by accelerating or slowing depending on how much the stimulus supports their initial choice. When the stimulus evidence is in strong contradiction, rats change their mind and reverse their initial trajectory. Human subjects performing an equivalent task display a remarkably similar behavior. We encapsulate these results in a computational model that, by mapping the decision variable onto the movement kinematics at discrete time points, captures subjects' choices, trajectories and changes of mind. Our results show that motor responses are not ballistic. Instead, they are systematically and rapidly updated, as they smoothly unfold over time, by the parallel dynamics of the underlying decision process.

Atomoxetine and reward size equally improve task engagement and perceptual decisions but differently affect movement execution

Our ability to engage and perform daily activities relies on balancing the associated benefits and costs. Rewards, as benefits, act as powerful motivators that help us stay focused for longer durations. The noradrenergic (NA) system is thought to play a significant role in optimizing our performance. Yet, the interplay between reward and the NA system in shaping performance remains unclear, particularly when actions are driven by external incentives (reward). To explore this interaction, we tested four female rhesus monkeys performing a sustained Go/NoGo task under two reward sizes (low/high) and three pharmacological conditions (saline and two doses of atomoxetine, a NA reuptake inhibitor: ATX-0.5 mg/kg and ATX-1 mg/kg). We found that increasing either reward or NA levels equally enhanced the animal's engagement in the task compared to low reward saline; the animals also responded faster and more consistently under these circumstances. Notably, we identified differences between reward size and ATX. When combined with ATX, high reward further reduced the occurrence of false alarms (i.e., incorrect go trials on distractors), implying that it helped further suppress impulsive responses. In addition, ATX (but not reward size) consistently increased movement duration dose-dependently, while high reward did not affect movement duration but decreased its variability. We conclude that noradrenaline and reward modulate performance, but their effects are not identical, suggesting differential underlying mechanisms. Reward might energize/invigorate decisions and action, while ATX might help regulate energy expenditure, depending on the context, through the NA system.

Evidence for a common mechanism supporting invigoration of action selection and action execution

The speed, or vigor, of our movements can vary depending on circumstances. For instance, the promise of a reward leads to faster movements. Reward also leads us to move with a lower reaction time, suggesting that the process of action selection can also be invigorated by reward. It has been proposed that invigoration of action selection and of action execution might occur through a common mechanism, and thus these aspects of behavior might be coupled. To test this hypothesis, we asked participants to make reaching movements to "shoot" through a target at varying speeds to assess whether moving more quickly was also associated with more rapid action selection. We found that, when participants were required to move with a lower velocity, the speed of their action selection was also significantly slowed. This finding was recapitulated in a further dataset in which participants determined their own movement speed, but had to move slowly to stop their movement inside the target. By reanalyzing a previous dataset, we also found evidence for the converse relationship between action execution and action selection; when pressured to select actions more rapidly, people also executed movements with higher velocity. Our results establish that invigoration of action selection and action execution vary in tandem with one another, supporting the hypothesis of a common underlying mechanism.NEW & NOTEWORTHY We show that voluntary increases in the vigor of action execution lead action selection to also occur more rapidly. Conversely, hastening action selection by imposing a deadline to act also leads to increases in movement speed. These findings provide evidence that these two distinct aspects of behavior are modulated by a common underlying mechanism.

Integrated control of non-motor and motor efforts during perceptual decision-making and action execution: a pilot study

Humans daily life is characterized by a succession of voluntary actions. Since energy resources are limited, the ability to invest the appropriate amount of effort for selecting and executing these actions is a hallmark of adapted behavior. Recent studies indicate that decisions and actions share important principles, including the optimization of their duration when the context requires it. In the present pilot study, we test the hypothesis that the management of effort-related energy resources is shared between decision and action too. Healthy human subjects performed a perceptual decision task where they had to choose between two levels of effort to invest in making the decision (i.e. two levels of perceptual difficulty), and report it with a reaching movement. Crucially, the movement accuracy requirement gradually increased from trial to trial depending on participants' decision performance. Results indicate an overall moderate and non-significant impact of the increasing motor difficulty on the choice of the non-motor (decision) effort to invest in each trial and on decision performance. By contrast, motor performance strongly decreased depending on both the motor and decisional difficulties. Together, the results support the hypothesis of an integrated management of the effort-related energy resources between decision and action. They also suggest that in the present task, the mutualized resources are primarily allocated to the decision-making process to the detriment of movements.

Capacity Limits Lead to Information Bottlenecks in Ongoing Rapid Motor Behaviors

Studies of ongoing, rapid motor behaviors have often focused on the decision-making implicit in the task. Here, we instead study how decision-making integrates with the perceptual and motor systems and propose a framework of limited-capacity, pipelined processing with flexible resources to understand rapid motor behaviors. Results from three experiments show that human performance is consistent with our framework: participants perform objectively worse as task difficulty increases, and, surprisingly, this drop in performance is largest for the most skilled performers. As well, our analysis shows that the worst-performing participants can perform equally well under increased task demands, which is consistent with flexible neural resources being allocated to reduce bottleneck effects and improve overall performance. We conclude that capacity limits lead to information bottlenecks and that processes like attention help reduce the effects that these bottlenecks have on maximal performance.

Movement characteristics impact decision-making and vice versa

Previous studies suggest that humans are capable of coregulating the speed of decisions and movements if promoted by task incentives. It is unclear however whether such behavior is inherent to the process of translating decisional information into movements, beyond posing a valid strategy in some task contexts. Therefore, in a behavioral online study we imposed time constraints to either decision- or movement phases of a sensorimotor task, ensuring that coregulating decisions and movements was not promoted by task incentives. We found that participants indeed moved faster when fast decisions were promoted and decided faster when subsequent finger tapping movements had to be executed swiftly. These results were further supported by drift diffusion modelling and inspection of psychophysical kernels: Sensorimotor delays related to initiating the finger tapping sequence were shorter in fast-decision as compared to slow-decision blocks. Likewise, the decisional speed-accuracy tradeoff shifted in favor of faster decisions in fast-tapping as compared to slow-tapping blocks. These findings suggest that decisions not only impact movement characteristics, but that properties of movement impact the time taken to decide. We interpret these behavioral results in the context of embodied decision-making, whereby shared neural mechanisms may modulate decisions and movements in a joint fashion.

Post-error Slowing Reflects the Joint Impact of Adaptive and Maladaptive Processes During Decision Making

Errors and their consequences are typically studied by investigating changes in decision speed and accuracy in trials that follow an error, commonly referred to as “post-error adjustments”. Many studies have reported that subjects slow down following an error, a phenomenon called “post-error slowing” (PES). However, the functional significance of PES is still a matter of debate as it is not always adaptive. That is, it is not always associated with a gain in performance and can even occur with a decline in accuracy. Here, we hypothesized that the nature of PES is influenced by one’s speed-accuracy tradeoff policy, which determines the overall level of choice accuracy in the task at hand. To test this hypothesis, we had subjects performing a task in two distinct contexts (separate days), which either promoted speed (hasty context) or cautiousness (cautious context), allowing us to consider post-error adjustments according to whether subjects performed choices with a low or high accuracy level, respectively. Accordingly, our data indicate that post-error adjustments varied according to the context in which subjects performed the task, with PES being solely significant in the hasty context (low accuracy). In addition, we only observed a gain in performance after errors in a specific trial type, suggesting that post-error adjustments depend on a complex combination of processes that affect the speed of ensuing actions as well as the degree to which such PES comes with a gain in performance.

Compensative movement ameliorates reduced efficacy of rapidly-embodied decisions in humans

Dynamic environments, such as sports, often demand rapid decision-making and motor execution. The concept of embodied decision refers to the mutual link between both processes, but little is known about how these processes are balanced under severe time constraints. We address this problem by using a baseball-like hitting paradigm with and without Go/No-go judgment; participants were required to hit (Go) a moving target in the strike area or not to hit (No-go) other targets. We found that Go/No-go judgments were effective with regard to task performance, but efficacy was lost below the time constraint of 0.5 seconds mainly due to a reduction in judgment accuracy rather than movement accuracy. However, either slowing movement initiation in Go trials or canceling the movement in progress in No-go trials improved judgment accuracy. Our findings suggest that embodied decision efficacy is limited in split-second periods, but compensation is possible by changing ongoing movement strategies.

Hasty sensorimotor decisions rely on an overlap of broad and selective changes in motor activity

Humans and other animals are able to adjust their speed–accuracy trade-off (SAT) at will depending on the urge to act, favoring either cautious or hasty decision policies in different contexts. An emerging view is that SAT regulation relies on influences exerting broad changes on the motor system, tuning its activity up globally when hastiness is at premium. The present study aimed to test this hypothesis. A total of 50 participants performed a task involving choices between left and right index fingers, in which incorrect choices led either to a high or to a low penalty in 2 contexts, inciting them to emphasize either cautious or hasty policies. We applied transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) on multiple motor representations, eliciting motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in 9 finger and leg muscles. MEP amplitudes allowed us to probe activity changes in the corresponding finger and leg representations, while participants were deliberating about which index to choose. Our data indicate that hastiness entails a broad amplification of motor activity, although this amplification was limited to the chosen side. On top of this effect, we identified a local suppression of motor activity, surrounding the chosen index representation. Hence, a decision policy favoring speed over accuracy appears to rely on overlapping processes producing a broad (but not global) amplification and a surround suppression of motor activity. The latter effect may help to increase the signal-to-noise ratio of the chosen representation, as supported by single-trial correlation analyses indicating a stronger differentiation of activity changes in finger representations in the hasty context.

Many have argued that the regulation of the speed-accuracy tradeoff relies on an urgency signal, which implements "collapsing decision thresholds" by tuning neural activity in a global manner in decision-related structures. This study indicates that the reality is more subtle, with several aspects of "urgency" being specifically targeted to particular corticospinal populations within the motor system.

Evidence for a cost of time in the invigoration of isometric reaching movements

How the brain determines the vigor of goal-directed movements is a fundamental question in neuroscience. Recent evidence has suggested that vigor results from a trade-off between a cost related to movement production (cost of movement) and a cost related to our brain's tendency to temporally discount the value of future reward (cost of time). However, whether it is critical to hypothesize a cost of time to explain the vigor of basic reaching movements with intangible reward is unclear because the cost of movement may be theoretically sufficient for this purpose. Here we directly address this issue by designing an isometric reaching task whose completion can be accurate and effortless in prefixed durations. The cost of time hypothesis predicts that participants should be prone to spend energy to save time even if the task can be accomplished at virtually no motor cost. Accordingly, we found that all participants generated substantial amounts of force to invigorate task accomplishment, especially when the prefixed duration was long enough. Remarkably, the time saved by each participant was linked to their original vigor in the task and predicted by an optimal control model balancing out movement and time costs. Taken together, these results supports the existence of an idiosyncratic, cognitive cost of time that underlies the invigoration of basic isometric reaching movements.

Dissociating the Impact of Movement Time and Energy Costs on Decision-Making and Action Initiation in Humans

Recent theories and data suggest that adapted behavior involves economic computations during which multiple trade-offs between reward value, accuracy requirement, energy expenditure, and elapsing time are solved so as to obtain rewards as soon as possible while spending the least possible amount of energy. However, the relative impact of movement energy and duration costs on perceptual decision-making and movement initiation is poorly understood. Here, we tested 31 healthy subjects on a perceptual decision-making task in which they executed reaching movements to report probabilistic choices. In distinct blocks of trials, the reaching duration (“Time” condition) and energy (“Effort” condition) costs were independently varied compared to a “Reference” block, while decision difficulty was maintained similar at the block level. Participants also performed a simple delayed-reaching (DR) task aimed at estimating movement initiation duration in each motor condition. Results in that DR task show that long duration movements extended reaction times (RTs) in most subjects, whereas energy-consuming movements led to mixed effects on RTs. In the decision task, about half of the subjects decreased their decision durations (DDs) in the Time condition, while the impact of energy on DDs were again mixed across subjects. Decision accuracy was overall similar across motor conditions. These results indicate that movement duration and, to a lesser extent, energy expenditure, idiosyncratically affect perceptual decision-making and action initiation. We propose that subjects who shortened their choices in the time-consuming condition of the decision task did so to limit a drop of reward rate.

Reducing behavioral dimensions to study brain-environment interactions

Movement vigor provides a window on action valuation. But what is vigor, and how to measure it in the first place? Strikingly, many different co-varying vigor-related metrics can be found in the literature. I believe this is because vigor, just like the neural circuits that determine it, is an integrated, low-dimensional parameter. As such, it can only be roughly estimated.

Trading accuracy for speed over the course of a decision

Humans and other animals often need to balance the desire to gather sensory information (to make the best choice) with the urgency to act, facing a speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT). Given the ubiquity of SAT across species, extensive research has been devoted to understanding the computational mechanisms allowing its regulation at different timescales, including from one context to another, and from one decision to another. However, animals must frequently change their SAT on even shorter timescales-that is, over the course of an ongoing decision-and little is known about the mechanisms that allow such rapid adaptations. The present study aimed at addressing this issue. Human subjects performed a decision task with changing evidence. In this task, subjects received rewards for correct answers but incurred penalties for mistakes. An increase or a decrease in penalty occurring halfway through the trial promoted rapid SAT shifts, favoring speeded decisions either in the early or in the late stage of the trial. Importantly, these shifts were associated with stage-specific adjustments in the accuracy criterion exploited for committing to a choice. Those subjects who decreased the most their accuracy criterion at a given decision stage exhibited the highest gain in speed, but also the highest cost in terms of performance accuracy at that time. Altogether, the current findings offer a unique extension of previous work, by suggesting that dynamic cha*nges in accuracy criterion allow the regulation of the SAT within the timescale of a single decision.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Extensive research has been devoted to understanding the mechanisms allowing the regulation of the speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) from one context to another and from one decision to another. Here, we show that humans can voluntarily change their SAT on even shorter timescales-that is, over the course of a decision. These rapid SAT shifts are associated with dynamic adjustments in the accuracy criterion exploited for committing to a choice.

Evidence accumulation under uncertainty - a neural marker of emerging choice and urgency

To interact meaningfully with its environment, an agent must integrate external information with its own internal states. However, information about the environment is often noisy. In this study, we identify a neural correlate that tracks how asymmetries between competing alternatives evolve over the course of a decision. In our task participants had to monitor a stream of discrete visual stimuli over time and decide whether or not to act, on the basis of either strong or ambiguous evidence. We found that the classic P3 event-related potential evoked by sequential evidence items tracked decision-making processes and predicted participants' categorical choices on a single trial level, both when evidence was strong and when it was ambiguous. The P3 amplitudes in response to evidence supporting the eventually selected option increased over trial time as decisions evolved, being maximally different from the P3 amplitudes evoked by competing evidence at the time of decision. Computational modelling showed that both the neural dynamics and behavioural primacy and recency effects can be explained by a combination of (a) competition between mutually inhibiting accumulators for the two categorical choice outcomes, and (b) a context-dependant urgency signal. In conditions where evidence was presented at a low rate, urgency increased faster than in conditions when evidence was very frequent. We also found that the readiness potential, a classic marker of endogenously initiated actions, was observed preceding movements in all conditions - even when those were strongly driven by external evidence.

Humans sacrifice decision-making for action execution when a demanding control of movement is required

A growing body of evidence suggests that decision-making and action execution are governed by partly overlapping operating principles. Especially, previous work proposed that a shared decision urgency/movement vigor signal, possibly computed in the basal ganglia, coordinates both deliberation and movement durations in a way that maximizes the reward rate. Recent data support one aspect of this hypothesis, indicating that the urgency level at which a decision is made influences the vigor of the movement produced to express this choice. Here we investigated whether, conversely, the motor context in which a movement is executed determines decision speed and accuracy. Twenty human subjects performed a probabilistic decision task in which perceptual choices were expressed by reaching movements toward targets whose size and distance from a starting position varied in distinct blocks of trials. We found strong evidence for an influence of the motor context on most of the subjects' decision policy, but contrary to the predictions of the "shared regulation" hypothesis, we observed that slow movements executed in the most demanding motor blocks in terms of accuracy were often preceded by faster and less accurate decisions compared with blocks of trials in which big targets allowed expression of choices with fast and inaccurate movements. These results suggest that decision-making and motor control are not regulated by one unique "invigoration" signal determining both decision urgency and action vigor, but more likely by independent, yet interacting, decision urgency and movement vigor signals.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Recent hypotheses propose that choices and movements share optimization principles derived from economy, possibly implemented by one unique context-dependent regulation signal determining both processes' speed. In the present behavioral study conducted on human subjects, we demonstrate that action properties indeed influence perceptual decision-making, but that decision duration and action vigor are actually independently set depending on the difficulty of the movement executed to report a choice.

Perceptual decisions about object shape bias visuomotor coordination during rapid interception movements

Visual processing for perception and for action is thought to be mediated by two specialized neural pathways. Using a visuomotor decision-making task, we show that participants differentially utilized online perceptual decision-making in reaching and interception and that eye movements necessary for perception influenced motor decision strategies. These results provide evidence that task complexity modulates how pathways processing perception versus action information interact during the visual control of movement.