Contextual factors modulate risk preferences in adult humans

Attention biases the process of risky decision-making: Evidence from eye-tracking

Attention determines what kind of option information is processed during risky choices owing to the limitation of visual attention. This paper reviews research on the relationship between higher-complexity risky decision-making and attention as illustrated by eye-tracking to explain the process of risky decision-making by the effect of attention. We demonstrate this process from three stages: the pre-phase guidance of options on attention, the process of attention being biased, and the impact of attention on final risk preference. We conclude that exogenous information can capture attention directly to salient options, thereby altering evidence accumulation. In particular, for multi-attribute risky decision-making, attentional advantages increase the weight of specific attributes, thus biasing risk preference in different directions. We highlight the significance of understanding how people use available information to weigh risks from an information-processing perspective via process data.

Differences in Discounting Behavior and Brain Responses for Food and Money Reward

Most neuroeconomic research seeks to understand how value influences decision-making. The influence of reward type is less well understood. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate delay discounting of primary (i.e., food) and secondary rewards (i.e., money) in 28 healthy, normal-weighted participants (mean age = 26.77; 18 females). To decipher differences in discounting behavior between reward types, we compared how well-different option-based statistical models (exponential, hyperbolic discounting) and attribute-wise heuristic choice models (intertemporal choice heuristic, dual reasoning and implicit framework theory, trade-off model) captured the reward-specific discounting behavior. Contrary to our hypothesis of different strategies for different rewards, we observed comparable discounting behavior for money and food (i.e., exponential discounting). Higher k values for food discounting suggest that individuals decide more impulsive if confronted with food. The fMRI revealed that money discounting was associated with enhanced activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, involved in executive control; the right dorsal striatum, associated with reward processing; and the left hippocampus, involved in memory encoding/retrieval. Food discounting, instead, was associated with higher activity in the left temporoparietal junction suggesting social reinforcement of food decisions. Although our findings do not confirm our hypothesis of different discounting strategies for different reward types, they are in line with the notion that reward types have a significant influence on impulsivity with primary rewards leading to more impulsive choices.

A critical review of risk-sensitive foraging

Foraging is risk sensitive if choices depend on the variability of returns from the options as well as their mean return. Risk-sensitive foraging is important in behavioural ecology, psychology and neurophysiology. It has been explained both in terms of mechanisms and in terms of evolutionary advantage. We provide a critical review, evaluating both mechanistic and evolutionary accounts. Some derivations of risk sensitivity from mechanistic models based on psychophysics are not convincing because they depend on an inappropriate use of Jensen's inequality. Attempts have been made to link risk sensitivity to the ecology of a species, but again these are not convincing. The field of risk-sensitive foraging has provided a focus for theoretical and empirical work and has yielded important insights, but we lack a simple and empirically defendable general account of it in either mechanistic or evolutionary terms. However, empirical analysis of choice sequences under theoretically motivated experimental designs and environmental settings appears a promising avenue for mapping the scope and relative merits of existing theories. Simply put, the devil is in the sequence.

Decision-making under risk and ambiguity in adults with Tourette syndrome

BACKGROUND

Tourette syndrome (TS) as well as its most common comorbidities are associated with a higher propensity for risky behaviour in everyday life. However, it is unclear whether this increased risk propensity in real-life contexts translates into a generally increased attitude towards risk. We aimed to assess decision-making under risk and ambiguity based on prospect theory by considering the effects of comorbidities and medication.

METHODS

Fifty-four individuals with TS and 32 healthy controls performed risk and ambiguity decision-making tasks under both gains and losses conditions. Behavioural and computational parameters were evaluated using (i) univariate analysis to determine parameters difference taking independently; (ii) supervised multivariate analysis to evaluate whether our parameters could jointly account for between-group differences (iii) unsupervised multivariate analysis to explore the potential presence of sub-groups.

RESULTS

Except for general 'noisier' (less consistent) decisions in TS, we showed no specific risk-taking behaviour in TS or any relation with tics severity or antipsychotic medication. However, the presence of comorbidities was associated with distortion of decision-making. Specifically, TS with obsessive-compulsive disorder comorbidity was associated with a higher risk-taking profile to increase gain and a higher risk-averse profile to decrease loss. TS with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder comorbidity was associated with risk-seeking in the ambiguity context to reduce a potential loss.

CONCLUSIONS

Impaired valuation of risk and ambiguity was not related to TS per se. Our findings are important for clinical practice: the involvement of individuals with TS in real-life risky situations may actually rather result from other factors such as psychiatric comorbidities.

Rationality and cognitive bias in captive gorillas' and orang-utans' economic decision-making

Human economic decision-making sometimes appears to be irrational. Partly, this is due to cognitive biases that can lead to suboptimal economic choices and context-dependent risk-preferences. A pertinent question is whether such biases are part of our evolutionary heritage or whether they are culturally acquired. To address this, we tested gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and orang-utans (Pongo abelii) with two risk-assessment experiments that differed in how risk was presented. For both experiments, we found that subjects increased their preferences for the risky options as their expected gains increased, showing basic understanding of reward contingencies and rational decision-making. However, we also found consistent differences in risk proneness between the two experiments, as subjects were risk-neutral in one experiment and risk-prone in the other. We concluded that gorillas and orang-utans are economically rational but that their decisions can interact with pre-existing cognitive biases which modulates their risk-preference in context-dependent ways, explaining the variability of their risk-preference in previous literature.

Keep your budget together! Investigating determinants on risky decision-making about losses

The present study investigates the influence of framing, different amounts to lose, and probabilities of a risky and sure choice option, time limits, and need on risky decision-making. For a given block of trials, participants were equipped with a personal budget (number of points). On each trial within a block, a specific initial amount is possibly taken from the budget by the outcome of a gamble or the choice of a sure loss option. The goal was to avoid losing points from the budget for not falling below a predefined need threshold. Three different levels of induced need were included. Employing a psychophysical experimental approach, we furthermore tested a sequential component of human risk behavior towards a need threshold inspired by research on animal foraging behavior. Risk-sensitivity models and the Stone-Geary framework serve as generating hypotheses on need thresholds. We found that framing, need, and probabilities influenced risky choices. Time limits and initial amounts moderated the framing effect. No sequential component was observed.

The adaptive value of probability distortion and risk-seeking in macaques' decision-making

In humans, the attitude toward risk is not neutral and is dissimilar between bets involving gains and bets involving losses. The existence and prevalence of these decision features in non-human primates are unclear. In addition, only a few studies have tried to simulate the evolution of agents based on their attitude toward risk. Therefore, we still ignore to what extent Prospect theory's claims are evolutionarily rooted. To shed light on this issue, we collected data from nine macaques that performed bets involving gains or losses. We confirmed that their overall behaviour is coherent with Prospect theory's claims. In parallel, we used a genetic algorithm to simulate the evolution of a population of agents across several generations. We showed that the algorithm selects progressively agents that exhibit risk-seeking, and has an inverted S-shape distorted perception of probability. We compared these two results and found that monkeys' attitude toward risk is only congruent with the simulation when they are facing losses. This result is consistent with the idea that gambling in the loss domain is analogous to deciding in a context of life-threatening challenges where a certain level of risk-seeking behaviour and probability distortion may be adaptive. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Variation in primate decision-making under uncertainty and the roots of human economic behaviour

Uncertainty is a ubiquitous component of human economic behaviour, yet people can vary in their preferences for risk across populations, individuals and different points in time. As uncertainty also characterizes many aspects of animal decision-making, comparative research can help evaluate different potential mechanisms that generate this variation, including the role of biological differences or maturational change versus cultural learning, as well as identify human-unique components of economic decision-making. Here, we examine decision-making under risk across non-human primates, our closest relatives. We first review theoretical approaches and current methods for understanding decision-making in animals. We then assess the current evidence for variation in animal preferences between species and populations, between individuals based on personality, sex and age, and finally, between different contexts and individual states. We then use these primate data to evaluate the processes that can shape human decision-making strategies and identify the primate foundations of human economic behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.