Examining the cognitive costs of counterfactual language comprehension: Evidence from ERPs

Temporal Shift Length and Antecedent Occurrence Likelihood Modulate Counterfactual Conditional Comprehension: Evidence from Event-Related Potentials

Counterfactual conditionals posit hypothetical scenarios in which antecedent events contradict reality. This study examined whether and how the processing difficulty of Chinese counterfactual conditionals (yaobushi, equivalent to if it had not been for in English) can be affected by the length of temporal shifts of the events across clauses and the likelihood of the antecedent occurrence. Participants read Chinese counterfactuals that contained either long (e.g., qunian-xianzai [last year-right now]) or short temporal shifts (e.g., zuotian-xianzai [yesterday-right now]) within highly likely (e.g., sign up for school activity) or less likely contexts (e.g., sign up for Arctic scientific research). ERP results revealed a significant N400 interaction between the temporal shift length and antecedent likelihood on the temporal indicators in the consequent and the sentence-ending verbs. Specifically, the less likely events elicited larger negativity than highly likely events with short temporal shifts on the temporal indicator. On the sentence-ending word, the long temporal shift elicited enlarged negativity than the short temporal shift when the antecedent was highly likely. These findings have two key implications regarding the interplay of implied causality and falsity constraints during counterfactual comprehension. First, salient falsity constraints can override effects of causal coherence on processing. Second, greater negativity for unlikely antecedents suggests that counterfactual markers concurrently activate factual and hypothetical representations.

Better I than He: Personal perspective modulates counterfactual processing

First-person narratives are more attentively and emotionally engaging than third-person narratives. This study examined whether and how personal perspective modulates counterfactual processing. Participants read counterfactual and causal conditionals written from the first-person or third-person perspective (e.g., If/Because I/he had read enough literature before, I/he would have finished my/his thesis easily.), followed by factual consequences that contained a critical word either consistent or inconsistent with preceding contexts (e.g., Therefore, when I/he was about to defend the thesis I/he felt panicked/confident). In both perspectives, inconsistent words showed a prolonged N400 vs. consistent words in the counterfactual condition, but a larger P600 in the causal condition. The critical word showed a larger P600 in the first- than the third-person condition in counterfactual scenarios, but not in causal scenarios. These findings suggest that personal perspective exerts different influences on counterfactual processing, presumably by modulating the amount of attentional resources involved.

Similarities and differences in understanding negative and affirmative counterfactuals and causal assertions: Evidence from eye-tracking

Two eye-tracking experiments compared affirmative and negative counterfactuals, "if she had (not) arrived early, she would (not) have bought roses" and affirmative and negative causal assertions, "Because she arrived (did not arrive) early, she bought (did not buy) roses." When participants heard a counterfactual, they looked on screen at words corresponding to its conjecture ("roses"), and its presupposed facts ("no roses"), whereas for a causal assertion, they looked only at words corresponding to the facts. For counterfactuals, they looked at the conjecture first, and later the presupposed facts, and at the latter more than the former. The effect was more pronounced for negative counterfactuals than affirmative ones because the negative counterfactual's presupposed facts identify a specific item ("she bought roses"), whereas the affirmative counterfactual's presupposed facts do not ("she did not buy roses"). Hence, when participants were given a binary context, "she did not know whether to buy roses or carnations," they looked primarily at the presupposed facts for both sorts of counterfactuals. We discuss the implications for theories of negation, the dual meaning of counterfactuals, and their relation to causal assertions.

Autistic Adults are Not Impaired at Maintaining or Switching Between Counterfactual and Factual Worlds: An ERP Study

We report an event-related brain potential (ERP) experiment that tests whether autistic adults are able to maintain and switch between counterfactual and factual worlds. Participants (N = 48) read scenarios that set up a factual or counterfactual scenario, then either maintained the counterfactual world or switched back to the factual world. When the context maintained the world, participants showed appropriate detection of the inconsistent critical word. In contrast, when participants had to switch from a counterfactual to factual world, they initially experienced interference from the counterfactual context, then favoured the factual interpretation of events. None of these effects were modulated by group, despite group-level impairments in Theory of Mind and cognitive flexibility among the autistic adults. These results demonstrate that autistic adults can appropriately use complex contextual cues to maintain and/or update mental representations of counterfactual and factual events.

How children and adults keep track of real information when thinking counterfactually

Thinking about counterfactual conditionals such as “if she had not painted the sheet of paper, it would have been blank” requires us to consider what is conjectured (She did not paint and the sheet was blank) and what actually happened (She painted and the sheet was not blank). In two experiments with adults (Study 1) and schoolchildren from 7 to 13 years (Study 2), we tested three potential sources of difficulty with counterfactuals: inferring, distinguishing what is real vs conjectured (epistemic status) and comprehending linguistic conditional expressions (“if” vs “even if”). The results showed that neither adults nor schoolchildren had difficulty in the comprehension of counterfactual expressions such as “even if” with respect to “if then”. The ability to infer with both of these develops during school years, with adults showing great ability. However, the third source factor is critical: we found that the key to young children’s difficulty with counterfactual thinking was their inability to differentiate real and conjectured information, while adults showed little difficulty with this.

The Comprehension of Counterfactual Conditionals: Evidence From Eye-Tracking in the Visual World Paradigm

Three experiments tracked participants' eye-movements to examine the time course of comprehension of the dual meaning of counterfactuals, such as "if there had been oranges then there would have been pears." Participants listened to conditionals while looking at images in the visual world paradigm, including an image of oranges and pears that corresponds to the counterfactual's conjecture, and one of no oranges and no pears that corresponds to its presumed facts, to establish at what point in time they consider each one. The results revealed striking individual differences: some participants looked at the negative image and the affirmative one, and some only at the affirmative image. The first experiment showed that participants who looked at the negative image increased their fixation on it within half a second. The second experiment showed they do so even without explicit instructions, and the third showed they do so even for printed words.

Tracking Colisteners' Knowledge States During Language Comprehension

When we receive information in the presence of other people, are we sensitive to what they do or do not understand? In two event-related-potential experiments, participants read implausible sentences (e.g., "The girl had a little beak") in contexts that rendered them plausible (e.g., "The girl dressed up as a canary for Halloween"). No semantic-processing difficulty (no N400 effect) ensued when they read the sentences while alone in the room. However, when a confederate was present who did not receive the contexts so that the critical sentences were implausible for him or her, participants exhibited processing difficulty: the social-N400 effect. This effect was obtained when participants were instructed to adopt the confederate's perspective-and critically, even without such instructions-but not when performing a demanding comprehension task. Thus, unless mental resources are limited, comprehenders engage in modeling the minds not only of those individuals with whom they directly interact but also of those individuals who are merely present during the linguistic exchange.

Pragmatic skills predict online counterfactual comprehension: Evidence from the N400

Counterfactual thought allows people to consider alternative worlds they know to be false. Communicating these thoughts through language poses a social-communicative challenge because listeners typically expect a speaker to produce true utterances, but counterfactuals per definition convey information that is false. Listeners must therefore incorporate overt linguistic cues (subjunctive mood, such as in If I loved you then) in a rapid way to infer the intended counterfactual meaning. The present EEG study focused on the comprehension of such counterfactual antecedents and investigated if pragmatic ability—the ability to apply knowledge of the social-communicative use of language in daily life—predicts the online generation of counterfactual worlds. This yielded two novel findings: (1) Words that are consistent with factual knowledge incur a semantic processing cost, as reflected in larger N400 amplitude, in counterfactual antecedents compared to hypothetical antecedents (If sweets were/are made of sugar). We take this to suggest that counterfactuality is quickly incorporated during language comprehension and reduces online expectations based on factual knowledge. (2) Individual scores on the Autism Quotient Communication subscale modulated this effect, suggesting that individuals who are better at understanding the communicative intentions of other people are more likely to reduce knowledge-based expectations in counterfactuals. These results are the first demonstration of the real-time pragmatic processes involved in creating possible worlds.

Assessing Early Receptive Language Skills in Children With ASD

Language assessments play a large role in the diagnosis and treatment of autism spectrum disorders (ASD) because language impairments are often part of an ASD diagnosis and language status is a fundamental prognostic indicator for individuals with ASD. Receptive language forms the foundation for competent expressive language including literacy skills. Information from language assessments is also used to create therapy goals and monitor progress on these goals. Therefore, valid and accurate assessment of receptive language for individuals with ASD is paramount. Current assessments include tasks that are particularly difficult for individuals with ASD and often assess higher-level language skills and not emerging language skills, resulting in floor effects for individuals with ASD. Developing better receptive language measures is an important area for future research. Assessing and treating receptive language impairments will lead to improved expressive communication, including social communication, and literacy skills for individuals with ASD.

Understanding Counterfactuality: A Review of Experimental Evidence for the Dual Meaning of Counterfactuals

Cognitive and linguistic theories of counterfactual language comprehension assume that counterfactuals convey a dual meaning. Subjunctive-counterfactual conditionals (e.g., 'If Tom had studied hard, he would have passed the test') express a supposition while implying the factual state of affairs (Tom has not studied hard and failed). The question of how counterfactual dual meaning plays out during language processing is currently gaining interest in psycholinguistics. Whereas numerous studies using offline measures of language processing consistently support counterfactual dual meaning, evidence coming from online studies is less conclusive. Here, we review the available studies that examine online counterfactual language comprehension through behavioural measurement (self-paced reading times, eye-tracking) and neuroimaging (electroencephalography, functional magnetic resonance imaging). While we argue that these studies do not offer direct evidence for the online computation of counterfactual dual meaning, they provide valuable information about the way counterfactual meaning unfolds in time and influences successive information processing. Further advances in research on counterfactual comprehension require more specific predictions about how counterfactual dual meaning impacts incremental sentence processing.