How I became myself after merging with a computer: Does human-machine symbiosis raise human rights issues?

10. Three Embodied Dimensions of Communication

In the last chapter, Janna van Grunsven, Caroline Bollen and Bouke van Balen show how the phenomenology of communication can inform the field of augmented or alternative communication technology (AAC-tech). AAC-tech is a set of technologies developed for people who are unable to use some of their bodily expressive resources due to congenital or acquired disability. This inability often makes it very difficult for those people to communicate. Developers of AAC-tech often take a cognitivist starting-point, thereby missing out on the subtle ways in which embodiment shapes communication. The phenomenological description of the lived experiences of these people offers a fruitful starting-point for recognizing the often forgotten embodied dimension of communication, and enables to formulate desiderata for how AAC-tech should be developed: AAC-tech should take into account (1) embodied address, (2) embodied enrichment, and (3) embodied diversity. Focusing on the lived experience of potential users of AAC-tech has, according to van Grunsven, Bollen, and van Balen, not only direct practical applications for technology development but also can inform phenomenology methodologically: focusing on a limit case as the one discussed in this chapter makes visible that communication takes place in a wide variety of ways and that it is not the task of the phenomenologist to lay bare a general or essential structure of communication that can be taken as a standard.

Right to mental integrity and neurotechnologies: implications of the extended mind thesis

The possibility of neurotechnological interference with our brain and mind raises questions about the moral rights that would protect against the (mis)use of these technologies. One such moral right that has received recent attention is the right to mental integrity. Though the metaphysical boundaries of the mind are a matter of live debate, most defences of this moral right seem to assume an internalist (brain-based) view of the mind. In this article, we will examine what an extended account of the mind might imply for the right to mental integrity and the protection it provides against neurotechnologies. We argue that, on an extended account of the mind, the scope of the right to mental integrity would expand significantly, implying that neurotechnologies would no longer pose a uniquely serious threat to the right. In addition, some neurotechnologies may even be protected by the right to mental integrity, as the technologies would become part of the mind. We conclude that adopting an extended account of the mind has significant implications for the right to mental integrity in terms of its protective scope and capacity to protect against neurotechnologies, demonstrating that metaphysical assumptions about the mind play an important role in determining the moral protection provided by the right.

Mental integrity, autonomy, and fundamental interests

Many technology ethicists hold that the time has come to articulate neurorights: our normative claims vis-à-vis our brains and minds. One such claim is the right to mental integrity ('MI'). I begin by considering some paradigmatic threats to MI (§1) and how the dominant autonomy-based conception ('ABC') of MI attempts to make sense of them (§2). I next consider the objection that the ABC is overbroad in its understanding of what threatens MI and suggest a friendly revision to the ABC that addresses the objection (§3). I then consider a second objection: that the ABC cannot make sense of the MI of the non-autonomous This objection appears fatal even to the revised ABC (§4). On that basis, I develop an alternative conception on which MI is grounded in a plurality of simpler capacities, namely, those for affect, cognition, and volition Each of these more basic capacities grounds a set of fundamental interests, and they are for that reason worthy of protection even when they do not rise to the level of complexity necessary for autonomy (§5). This yields a fully general theory of MI that accounts for its manifestations in both the autonomous and the non-autonomous.

Where is the exit? The ethical importance of exit plans in clinical trials with neural implants

BACKGROUND

As clinical trials involving implantable neural devices (INDs) increase in frequency and attract greater public attention, it is paramount to ensure they are conducted in alignment with fundamental ethical guidelines. Particular focus must be placed on the often underexplored aspect of trial termination for INDs.

OBJECTIVE

To systematically review the ethical challenges encountered in clinical trials for INDs at the juncture of trial termination.

METHODS

We conducted a rapid review using PubMed with two specific search queries, including all publications addressing ethical issues in the context of IND clinical trials. Priority was given to publications focusing on the end of treatment or the discontinuation of clinical studies or trials.

RESULTS

We identified three primary groups of ethical challenges: patient-centric challenges, challenges faced by the research and physician team, and manufacturer-related issues. Further analysis highlights the importance of initiating early, transparent discussions regarding trial cessation protocols, ensuring that all stakeholders-patients, healthcare providers, researchers, and manufacturers-are equitably considered. Additionally, we found a discrepancy between current discontinuation strategies and international ethical guidelines. To address this, we emphasize the ethical obligation to establish comprehensive exit strategies that align with the principles in the Declaration of Helsinki and the CIOMS/WHO guidelines.

CONCLUSION

Our findings highlight the need for increased attention to the ethical and practical aspects of exit strategies and encourage further empirical research to address gaps in current practices. This would ensure that the discontinuation of IND trials is handled with ethical rigor, prioritizing the interests and well-being of all stakeholders involved.

Non-voluntary BCI explantation: assessing possible neurorights violations in light of contrasting mental ontologies

In research involving patients with implantable brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), there is a regulatory gap concerning post-trial responsibilities and duties of sponsors and investigators towards implanted patients. In this article, we analyse the case of patient R, who underwent non-voluntary explantation of an implanted BCI, causing a discontinuation in her sense of agency and self. To clarify the post-trial duties and responsibilities involved in this case, we first define the ontological status of the BCI using both externalist (EXT) and internalist (INT) theories of cognition. We then give particular focus to the theories of extended and embedded cognition, hence considering the BCI either as a constitutive component of the patient's mind or as a causal supporter of her brain-based cognitive capacities. We argue that patient R can legitimately be considered both as an embedded and extended cognitive agent. Then, we analyse whether the non-voluntary explantation violated patient R's (neuro)rights to cognitive liberty, mental integrity, psychological continuity and mental privacy. We analyse whether and how different mental ontologies may imply morally relevant differences in interpreting these prima facie neurorights violations and the correlational duties of sponsors and investigators. We conclude that both mental ontologies support the identification of emerging neurorights of the patient and give rise to post-trial obligations of sponsors and investigators to provide for continuous technical maintenance of implanted BCIs that play a significant role in patients' agency and sense of self. However, we suggest that externalist mental ontologies better capture patient R's self-conception and support the identification of a more granular form of mental harm and associated neurorights violation, thus eliciting stricter post-trial obligations.

Need for greater post-trial support for clinical trial participants assessing high-risk, irreversible treatments

There are increasing numbers of clinical trials assessing high-risk, irreversible treatments. Trial participants should only expect knowledge gain to society, no personal therapeutic benefit. However, participation may lead to long-term harms and prevent future therapeutic options. While some discussion has occurred around post-trial access to treatments for participants who received therapeutic benefit, there are no post-trial support requirements for those suffering long-term consequences from trial participation. Participants may be left with significant medical, psychological, social, technical or financial needs. All trials will end at some point, regardless of their success. Subsequently, they should be designed to take into account the post-trial period including the impact on the ongoing health of a participant and their post-trial needs.

Post-trial access to implantable neural devices: an exploratory international survey

Objectives

Clinical trials of innovative neural implants are rapidly increasing and diversifying, but little is known about participants' post-trial access to the device and ongoing clinical care. This exploratory study examines common practices in the planning and coordination of post-trial access to neurosurgical devices. We also explore the perspectives of trial investigators on the barriers to post-trial access and ongoing care, as well as ethical questions related to the responsibilities of key stakeholder groups.

Design setting and participants

Trial investigators (n=66) completed a survey on post-trial access in the most recent investigational trial of a surgically implanted neural device they had conducted. Survey respondents predominantly specialized in neurosurgery, neurology and psychiatry, with a mean of 14.8 years of experience working with implantable neural devices.

Main outcome measures

Outcomes of interest included rates of device explantation during or at the conclusion of the trial (pre-follow-up) and whether plans for post-trial access were described in the study protocol. Outcomes also included investigators' greatest 'barrier' and 'facilitator' to providing research participants with post-trial access to functional implants and perspectives on current arrangements for the sharing of post-trial responsibilities among key stakeholders.

Results

Trial investigators reported either 'all' (64%) or 'most' (33%) trial participants had remained implanted after the end of the trial, with 'infection' and 'non-response' the most common reasons for explantation. When asked to describe the main barriers to facilitating post-trial access, investigators described limited funding, scarcity of expertise and specialist clinical infrastructure and difficulties maintaining stakeholder relationships. Notwithstanding these barriers, investigators overwhelmingly (95%) agreed there is an ethical obligation to provide post-trial access when participants individually benefit during the trial.

Conclusions

On occasions when devices were explanted during or at the end of the trial, this was done out of concern for the safety and well-being of participants. Further research into common practices in the post-trial phase is needed and essential to ethical and pragmatic discussions regarding stakeholder responsibilities.

Definition of Implanted Neurological Device Abandonment: A Systematic Review and Consensus Statement

Importance

Establishing a formal definition for neurological device abandonment has the potential to reduce or to prevent the occurrence of this abandonment.

Objective

To perform a systematic review of the literature and develop an expert consensus definition for neurological device abandonment.

Evidence Review

After a Royal Society Summit on Neural Interfaces (September 13-14, 2023), a systematic English language review using PubMed was undertaken to investigate extant definitions of neurological device abandonment. Articles were reviewed for relevance to neurological device abandonment in the setting of deep brain, vagal nerve, and spinal cord stimulation. This review was followed by the convening of an expert consensus group of physicians, scientists, ethicists, and stakeholders. The group summarized findings, added subject matter experience, and applied relevant ethics concepts to propose a current operational definition of neurological device abandonment. Data collection, study, and consensus development were done between September 13, 2023, and February 1, 2024.

Findings

The PubMed search revealed 734 total articles, and after review, 7 articles were found to address neurological device abandonment. The expert consensus group addressed findings as germane to neurological device abandonment and added personal experience and additional relevant peer-reviewed articles, addressed stakeholders' respective responsibilities, and operationally defined abandonment in the context of implantable neurotechnological devices. The group further addressed whether clinical trial failure or shelving of devices would constitute or be associated with abandonment as defined. Referential to these domains and dimensions, the group proposed a standardized definition for abandonment of active implantable neurotechnological devices.

Conclusions and Relevance

This study's consensus statement suggests that the definition for neurological device abandonment should entail failure to provide fundamental aspects of patient consent; fulfill reasonable responsibility for medical, technical, or financial support prior to the end of the device's labeled lifetime; and address any or all immediate needs that may result in safety concerns or device ineffectiveness and that the definition of abandonment associated with the failure of a research trial should be contingent on specific circumstances.

What an International Declaration on Neurotechnologies and Human Rights Could Look like: Ideas, Suggestions, Desiderata

International institutions such as UNESCO are deliberating on a new standard setting instrument for neurotechnologies. This will likely lead to the adoption of a soft law document which will be the first global document specifically tailored to neurotechnologies, setting the tone for further international or domestic regulations. While some stakeholders have been consulted, these developments have so far evaded the broader attention of the neuroscience, neurotech, and neuroethics communities. To initiate a broader debate, this target article puts to discussion twenty-five considerations and desiderata for recognition by a future instrument. They are formulated at different levels of abstraction, from the big picture to technical details, seek to widen the perspective of preparatory reports and transcend the narrow debate about "neurorights" which overshadows many richer and more relevant aspects. These desiderata are not an exhaustive enumeration but a starting point for discussions about what deserves and what requires protection by an international instrument.

Untangling a taxonomy of living from the science of the continuum of life

Medical innovation and technologic advances enrich daily living and occur within our normative worlds, that are socially constructed. These advances confront society with critical questions about the nature of human life, laying bare the inadequacies of extant norms and boundaries. Yet, society has been unable to develop consensus about when life ends. Scientific studies highlight that life is best characterized by continua without natural boundaries. Thus, scientific information alone cannot be employed to justify the socially constructed health categories required for setting norms and boundaries. An iterative process that integrates a broad range of non-scientific data with advancing scientific information is needed to facilitate consensus for updating social norms and boundaries. This can lead to a new taxonomy of living across the measurable continuum of life and align our normative worlds with the dizzying pace of medical innovation and advances in technologies transforming the world in which we live.

Biohybrid neural interfaces: improving the biological integration of neural implants

Implantable neural interfaces (NIs) have emerged in the clinic as outstanding tools for the management of a variety of neurological conditions caused by trauma or disease. However, the foreign body reaction triggered upon implantation remains one of the major challenges hindering the safety and longevity of NIs. The integration of tools and principles from biomaterial design and tissue engineering has been investigated as a promising strategy to develop NIs with enhanced functionality and performance. In this Feature Article, we highlight the main bioengineering approaches for the development of biohybrid NIs with an emphasis on relevant device design criteria. Technical and scientific challenges associated with the fabrication and functional assessment of technologies composed of both artificial and biological components are discussed. Lastly, we provide future perspectives related to engineering, regulatory, and neuroethical challenges to be addressed towards the realisation of the promise of biohybrid neurotechnology.