1
|
Turan-Küçük EN, Kibbe MM. Three-year-olds' ability to plan for mutually exclusive future possibilities is limited primarily by their representations of possible plans, not possible events. Cognition 2024; 244:105712. [PMID: 38160650 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105712] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/23/2023] [Revised: 12/19/2023] [Accepted: 12/21/2023] [Indexed: 01/03/2024]
Abstract
The ability to prepare for mutually exclusive possible events in the future is essential for everyday decision making. Previous studies have suggested that this ability develops between the ages of 3 and 5 years, and in young children is primarily limited by the ability to represent the set of possible outcomes of an event as "possible". We tested an alternative hypothesis that this ability may be limited by the ability to represent the set of possible actions that could be taken to prepare for those possible outcomes. We adapted the inverted y-shaped tube task of Redshaw and Suddendorf (2016), in which children are asked to catch a marble that is dropped into the top of the tube and can emerge from either the left or right branch of the tube. While 4-year-olds typically place their hands under both openings to catch the marble, preparing for both possible outcomes (optimal action), 3-year-olds often cover only one opening, preparing for only one possible outcome (suboptimal action). In three Experiments, we asked whether first showing children the set of possible actions that could be taken on the tube would enable them to recognize the optimal action that should be used to catch the marble (Experiments 1 and 3, total n = 99 US 3- and 4-year-olds) and enable them to use the optimal action themselves (Experiment 2, n = 96 US 3- and 4-year-olds). We found that 3- and 4-year-olds performed similarly when they were given the opportunity to observe the set of possible actions beforehand. These findings suggest that 3-year-olds' competence at representing mutually exclusive possibilities may be masked by their developing ability to represent and deploy plans to act on these possibilities.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Esra Nur Turan-Küçük
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA.
| | - Melissa M Kibbe
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Center for Systems Neuroscience, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA.
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Atance CM, Ayson G, Martin-Ordas G. Moving beyond "Spoon" tasks: When do children autocue their episodic future thought? WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2023; 14:e1646. [PMID: 37440219 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1646] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/30/2022] [Revised: 02/10/2023] [Accepted: 03/07/2023] [Indexed: 07/14/2023]
Abstract
Much developmental (and comparative) research has used Tulving's Spoon test (i.e., whether an individual will select an item needed to solve a future problem) as the basis for designing tasks to measure episodic future thinking, defined as the capacity to mentally pre-experience the future. There is, however, intense debate about whether these tasks successfully do so. Most notably, it has been argued that children may pass (i.e., select an item with future utility) by drawing on non-episodic, associative processes, rather than on the capacity to represent the future, per se. Although subsequent developmental tasks have sought to address this limitation, we highlight what we argue is a more fundamental shortcoming of Spoon tasks: they prompt future-directed action making it impossible to determine whether children have used their episodic future thinking to guide their behavior. Accordingly, we know little about children's thought about the future that is independently generated (i.e., without prompting), or autocued, and is subsequently reflected (and measurable) by children's actions. We argue that this capacity is a critical, and heretofore overlooked, transition in future-oriented cognition that may not occur until middle childhood. We further hypothesize that it is reliant on children developing richer and more detailed future event representations, along with the necessary cognitive control to transform these representations into actions that serve to benefit their future selves. The time is ripe for researchers to explore this aspect of cognitive development and we suggest several novel approaches to do so. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Gladys Ayson
- School of Psychology, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada
| | - Gema Martin-Ordas
- Division of Psychology, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK
- Department of Psychology, University of Oviedo, Asturias, Spain
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Vale GL, Coughlin C, Brosnan SF. The importance of thinking about the future in culture and cumulative cultural evolution. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2022; 377:20210349. [PMID: 36314144 PMCID: PMC9620744 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0349] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/15/2021] [Accepted: 02/28/2022] [Indexed: 12/21/2023] Open
Abstract
Thinking about possibilities plays a critical role in the choices humans make throughout their lives. Despite this, the influence of individuals' ability to consider what is possible on culture has been largely overlooked. We propose that the ability to reason about future possibilities or prospective cognition, has consequences for cultural change, possibly facilitating the process of cumulative cultural evolution. In particular, by considering potential future costs and benefits of specific behaviours, prospective cognition may lead to a more flexible use of cultural behaviours. In species with limited planning abilities, this may lead to the development of cultures that promote behaviours with future benefits, circumventing this limitation. Here, we examine these ideas from a comparative perspective, considering the relationship between human and nonhuman assessments of future possibilities and their cultural capacity to invent new solutions and improve them over time. Given the methodological difficulties of assessing prospective cognition across species, we focus on planning, for which we have the most data in other species. Elucidating the role of prospective cognition in culture will help us understand the variability in when and how we see culture expressed, informing ongoing debates, such as that surrounding which social learning mechanisms underlie culture. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- G. L. Vale
- Lester E. Fisher Center for the Study and Conservation of Apes, Lincoln Park Zoo, Chicago, IL 60614, USA
- Department of Psychology, Language Research Center, Neuroscience Institute and Center for Behavioral Neuroscience, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30302-5010, USA
| | - C. Coughlin
- Center for Learning and Memory, University of Texas at Austin, 100 East 24th Street, Austin, TX 78712, USA
| | - S. F. Brosnan
- Department of Psychology, Language Research Center, Neuroscience Institute and Center for Behavioral Neuroscience, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30302-5010, USA
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Lenz S, Paulus M. Friendship is more than strategic reciprocity: Preschoolers' selective sharing with friends cannot be reduced to strategic concerns. J Exp Child Psychol 2021; 206:105101. [PMID: 33639575 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105101] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/18/2020] [Revised: 11/27/2020] [Accepted: 01/11/2021] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Abstract
The current study investigated whether children share especially much with their friends when sharing can be reciprocated (strategic sharing) or whether friendship and strategic reciprocity are independent factors in predicting children's sharing. If the former is the case, children should prefer their friend relatively more in a situation where the friend can reciprocate than in a situation without the possibility for reciprocity. In two experiments, 3- and 5-year-old participants (N = 270) could distribute stickers between themselves and three recipients: a friend, a child who would join the kindergarten group the next day, and a stranger. Half of the children were led to believe that their generosity could be reciprocated, and the other half were not. In Experiment 1, this was implemented by anonymous and nonanonymous sharing. In Experiment 2, the possibility of reciprocity or lack thereof was explicitly mentioned. The results show that participants across both age groups shared more resources with their friend than with less familiar recipients. Potential reciprocity affected 5-year-olds' sharing but not 3-year-olds' sharing-but only if reciprocity was explicitly mentioned (Experiment 2). Importantly, the preference for the friend was independent of the possibility to be reciprocated for all children. The current study shows that friendship and strategic reciprocity are relevant but probably largely independent factors for children's sharing. That is, the preference to share with friends cannot be reduced to strategic considerations.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Samantha Lenz
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig Maximilians Universität München, 80802 Munich, Germany.
| | - Markus Paulus
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig Maximilians Universität München, 80802 Munich, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Paulus M, Essler S. Why do preschoolers perpetuate inequalities? Theoretical perspectives on inequity preferences in the face of emerging concerns for equality. DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW 2020; 58:100933. [PMID: 33311831 PMCID: PMC7722505 DOI: 10.1016/j.dr.2020.100933] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/28/2019] [Revised: 10/05/2020] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Recent research has shown that preschool children tend to preferentially allocate resources to rich than to poor others. The findings that young children tend to perpetuate inequalities are puzzling given classical developmental theories that largely focused on the emergence of equality and equity in childhood. In this review, we first sketch the early ontogeny of fairness concerns before providing an overview on studies reporting perpetuation of inequality in young children. We review four classical theories (Piaget, Kohlberg, Damon, Social Domain Theory) and discuss how they would account for this phenomenon. We then introduce four recent theoretical models that directly speak to the underlying psychological processes; the affective preference model, the reciprocity-based strategic model, the numerical matching model, and the normative model. We highlight the key tenets of each model, their relation to other developmental processes, and the strength of the empirical evidence. From each model, we derive specific hypotheses. Finally, in an integrative section we discuss how the models might relate to each other, highlight connections to other research areas, and present avenues for future research.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Markus Paulus
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
| | - Samuel Essler
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Mahy CEV, Masson C, Krause AM, Mazachowsky TR. The effect of episodic future simulation and motivation on young children's induced-state episodic foresight. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2020; 56:100934. [PMID: 32834469 PMCID: PMC7421301 DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100934] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/13/2019] [Revised: 07/06/2020] [Accepted: 07/30/2020] [Indexed: 12/20/2022]
Abstract
Future simulation and motivation are two strategies that might help children improve their induced-state episodic foresight. In Study 1, 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 96) consumed pretzels (to induce thirst) and were asked what they would prefer the next day, pretzels or water. Children were randomly assigned to an experimental condition: (1) a standard thirsty condition, (2) an episodic simulation condition where they imagined being hungry the next day, (3) a motivation condition where children chose between a cupcake and water, or (4) a control condition (thirst was not induced). Future preferences did not differ by age and children were less likely to choose water (vs. a cupcake) in the motivation condition compared to the standard thirsty condition. Study 2 found that 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 22) were also less likely to choose water for right now versus a cupcake when thirst was induced.
Collapse
|
7
|
Melzel S, Paulus M. The development of the prediction of complex actions in early childhood. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2020. [DOI: 10.1080/17405629.2020.1773786] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Saskia Melzel
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
| | - Markus Paulus
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Martin-Ordas G. It is about time: Conceptual and experimental evaluation of the temporal cognitive mechanisms in mental time travel. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2020; 11:e1530. [PMID: 32338829 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1530] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/03/2020] [Revised: 03/20/2020] [Accepted: 04/04/2020] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability that allows humans to mentally project themselves backwards in time to remember past events (i.e., episodic memory) or forwards in time to imagine future events (i.e., future thinking). Despite empirical evidence showing that animals might possess MTT abilities, some still claim that this ability is uniquely human. Recent debates have suggested that it is the temporal cognitive mechanism (i.e., ability to represent the sense of past and future) that makes MTT uniquely human. Advances in the field have been constrained by a lack of comparative data, methodological shortcomings that prevent meaningful comparisons, and a lack of clear conceptualizations of the temporal cognitive mechanism. Here I will present a comprehensive review into MTT in humans and animals-with a particular focus on great apes. I will examine three of the most prominent and influential theoretical models of human MTT. Drawing on these accounts, I suggest that a basic way of understanding time might be shared across species, however culture and language will play a critical role at shaping the way we elaborate mental representations about past and future events. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Psychology > Comparative Psychology.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Gema Martin-Ordas
- Division of Psychology, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Wilkins C, Clayton N. Reflections on the spoon test. Neuropsychologia 2019; 134:107221. [PMID: 31586552 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2019.107221] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/11/2019] [Revised: 09/26/2019] [Accepted: 09/29/2019] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
In this paper, we shall use Tulving's seminal empirical and theoretical research including the 'Spoon Test' to explore memory and mental time travel and its origins and role in planning for the future. We will review the comparative research on future planning and episodic foresight in pre-verbal children and non-verbal animals to explore how this may be manifest as wordless thoughts.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Clive Wilkins
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Nicola Clayton
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.
| |
Collapse
|
10
|
Atance CM, Celebi SN, Mitchinson S, Mahy CEV. Thinking about the future: Comparing children's forced-choice versus "generative" responses in the "spoon test". J Exp Child Psychol 2019; 181:1-16. [PMID: 30690296 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2018.12.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/08/2018] [Revised: 12/13/2018] [Accepted: 12/15/2018] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
One of the most popular methods to assess children's foresight is to present children with a problem (e.g., locked box with no key) in one room and then later, in another room, give them the opportunity to select the item (e.g., key) that will solve it. Whether or not children choose the correct item to bring back to the first room is the dependent measure of interest in this "spoon test." Although children as young as 3 or 4 years typically succeed on this test, whether they would pass a more stringent version in which they must verbally generate (vs. select) the correct item in the absence of any cues is unknown. This is an important point given that humans must often make decisions about the future without being explicitly "prompted" by the future-oriented option. In Experiment 1, using an adapted version of the spoon test, we show that as the "generative" requirements of the task increase, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds' (N = 99) performance significantly decreases. We replicate this effect in Experiment 2 (N = 48 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds) and also provide preliminary evidence that the capacity to verbally generate the correct item in a spoon test may draw more heavily on children's category fluency skills than does their capacity to select this item among a set of distracters. Our findings underscore the importance of examining more generative forms of future thought in young children.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Cristina M Atance
- School of Psychology, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5, Canada.
| | - Seyda Nur Celebi
- School of Psychology, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5, Canada
| | - Sarah Mitchinson
- Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5, Canada
| | - Caitlin E V Mahy
- Department of Psychology, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario L2S 3A1, Canada
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
Abstract
Abstract
We focus on three main sets of topics emerging from the commentaries on our target article. First, we discuss several types of animal behavior that commentators cite as evidence against our claim that animals are restricted to temporal updating and cannot engage in temporal reasoning. In doing so, we illustrate further how explanations of behavior in terms of temporal updating work. Second, we respond to commentators’ queries about the developmental process through which children acquire a capacity for temporal reasoning and about the relation between our account and accounts drawing similar distinctions in other domains of cognition. Finally, we address some broader theoretical issues arising from the commentaries, concerning in particular the question as to how our account relates to the phenomenology of experience in time, and the question as to whether our dichotomy between temporal reasoning and temporal updating is exhaustive, or whether there might be other forms of cognition or representation related to time not captured by it.
Collapse
|
12
|
Cheke LG, Clayton NS. What is the role of episodic foresight in planning for future needs? Theory and two experiments. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2018; 72:1961-1976. [PMID: 30518305 DOI: 10.1177/1747021818820808] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Considerable evidence suggests that episodic memory and foresight rely on the same underlying cognitive processes. Some theorists have suggested that the key role of episodic foresight is to allow an individual to disengage from current states to plan for future needs. However, the contribution of episodic cognition to this type of planning has not been investigated. We present two experiments exploring future-state planning in 3-6-year-old children and healthy young adults, finding that both groups were consistently biased towards current states. We further found that there were few relationships between episodic memory ability and future-state planning. Where there was a relationship, the degree of bias was positively related to episodic memory ability, such that those with better episodic were more biased by their current motivational state. These findings are consistent with previous research suggesting that episodic cognition is particularly vulnerable to bias from current feelings. We propose an account in which episodic cognition allows for cross-talk between current and future motivational states, and that while this can aid prospective decision-making in some scenarios, it may hinder it in others.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Lucy G Cheke
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Nicola S Clayton
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| |
Collapse
|
13
|
Abstract
Abstract
We outline a dual systems approach to temporal cognition, which distinguishes between two cognitive systems for dealing with how things unfold over time – a temporal updating system and a temporal reasoning system – of which the former is both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more primitive than the latter, and which are at work alongside each other in adult human cognition. We describe the main features of each of the two systems, the types of behavior the more primitive temporal updating system can support, and the respects in which it is more limited than the temporal reasoning system. We then use the distinction between the two systems to interpret findings in comparative and developmental psychology, arguing that animals operate only with a temporal updating system and that children start out doing so too, before gradually becoming capable of thinking and reasoning about time. After this, we turn to adult human cognition and suggest that our account can also shed light on a specific feature of humans’ everyday thinking about time that has been the subject of debate in the philosophy of time, which consists in a tendency to think about the nature of time itself in a way that appears ultimately self-contradictory. We conclude by considering the topic of intertemporal choice, and argue that drawing the distinction between temporal updating and temporal reasoning is also useful in the context of characterizing two distinct mechanisms for delaying gratification.
Collapse
|
14
|
Dickerson KL, Ainge JA, Seed AM. The Role of Association in Pre-schoolers’ Solutions to “Spoon Tests” of Future Planning. Curr Biol 2018; 28:2309-2313.e2. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2018.05.052] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/09/2018] [Revised: 04/03/2018] [Accepted: 05/17/2018] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
|